ML020780234
| ML020780234 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/2002 |
| From: | Ann Marie Stone Division Reactor Projects III |
| To: | Skolds J Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2006-0115 IR-02-003 | |
| Download: ML020780234 (45) | |
See also: IR 05000456/2002003
Text
March 18, 2002
Mr. John L. Skolds, President
Exelon Nuclear
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT:
BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-456/02-03(DRP); 50-457/02-03(DRP)
Dear Mr. Skolds:
On February 22, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Braidwood Station Units 1
and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on
February 22, 2002, with Mr. J. von Suskil and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification
and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and
with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved selected
examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews
with personnel.
On the basis of the sample selected for review, the inspectors concluded that your corrective
action program adequately identified, evaluated, and resolved conditions adverse to quality.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified (self-revealed). This finding
was associated with the failure to follow procedure which caused the Unit 1 Train B of the
containment spray system to be inoperable. The finding was determined to involve a violation
of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance and because the
finding was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issue as Non-
Cited Violations, consistent with Section VI.A.1, of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you deny
this Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within
30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional
Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspectors at the Braidwood
Station.
In addition, the inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the failure to identify the cause and take action to prevent
recurrence for recurring failures of the check valves between the instrument air system and the
accumulators for the Unit 1 pressurizer power operated relief valves. However, the staffs
significance determination of this issue was not complete at the time this report was issued;
therefore, this issue is considered an unresolved item.
J. Skolds
-2-
During this inspection, several examples of poor quality apparent cause evaluations were
identified. A variety of deficiencies were noted; however, the most significant involved
evaluations where potential common mode failure mechanisms were mentioned but not
addressed in the documented corrective actions. In some cases, it was unclear whether the
common mode failure aspect was evaluated as evident in the apparent violation described
above. In addition, these deficiencies were not identified by your staff in the review and
approval process.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/Ann Marie Stone
Ann Marie Stone, Chief
Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-456/02-03(DRP);
50-457/02-03(DRP)
See Attached Distribution
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\BRAI\\bra 2002-03.wpd
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:"C" = Copy without enclosure "E"= Copy with enclosure"N"= No copy
OFFICE
RIII
NAME
AMStone:dtp
DATE
03/18/02
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
J. Skolds
-3-
cc w/encl:
Site Vice President - Braidwood
Braidwood Station Plant Manager
Regulatory Assurance Manager - Braidwood
Chief Operating Officer
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services
Senior Vice President - Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Vice President - Mid-West Operations Support
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Director Licensing - Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Manager Licensing - Braidwood and Byron
Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Document Control Desk - Licensing
M. Aguilar, Assistant Attorney General
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
State Liaison Officer
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
J. Skolds
-3-
cc w/encl:
Site Vice President - Braidwood
Braidwood Station Plant Manager
Regulatory Assurance Manager - Braidwood
Chief Operating Officer
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services
Senior Vice President - Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Vice President - Mid-West Operations Support
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Director Licensing - Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Manager Licensing - Braidwood and Byron
Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Document Control Desk - Licensing
M. Aguilar, Assistant Attorney General
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
State Liaison Officer
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
ADAMS Distribution:
AJM
MLC
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GEG
CJP3
C. Ariano (hard copy)
DRPIII
DRSIII
PLB1
JRK1
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos:
50-456; 50-457
License Nos:
Report Nos:
50-456/02-03(DRP); 50-457/02-03(DRP)
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
35100 S. Route 53
Suite 84
Braceville, IL 60407-9617
Dates:
February 4 through February 22, 2002
Inspectors:
R. Skokowski, Senior Resident Inspector, Team Leader
D. Schrum, Reactor Engineer
N. Shah, Resident Inspector
Observer:
N. Valos, Reactor Inspector (Trainee)
Approved by:
Ann Marie Stone, Chief
Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
2
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000456-02-03(DRP), 05000457-02-03(DRP); on 02/04-02/22/2002, Exelon Generation
Company, LLC; Braidwood Station; Units 1 & 2. Identification and Resolution of Problems.
The inspection was conducted by one senior resident inspector, one region-based reactor
engineer and one resident inspector. This inspection identified one Green finding which
involved Non-Cited Violations. In addition, the inspectors identified an apparent violation of
NRC requirements. The staffs significance determination of this issue was not complete at the
time this report was issued; therefore, this issue was considered an unresolved item. The
significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using NRC
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at
its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.
Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of
the applicable violation.
Identification and Resolution of Problems
The inspectors concluded that the licensee adequately identified, evaluated, and resolved
problems within the requirements of the corrective action program (CAP). In general, the
significance threshold for entering issues into the corrective action program appeared
appropriate. However, the inspectors noted several examples where apparent cause
evaluations (ACEs) were of poor quality. These deficiencies were not identified by line
management during the licensee's review and approval process. The types of deficiencies
varied but included the following:
New information that could impact the original operability and reportability evaluations
was not re-evaluated by shift management.
Other apparent problems were mentioned but were not fully addressed in the evaluation.
For example, potential common cause failure mechanisms were included as possible
apparent causes; however, the impact on like-equipment was not resolved or evaluated.
The extent of the evaluations and corrective actions were not always well documented.
In addition, the inspectors noted that equipment problems identified during outages were not
always evaluated for operability or reportability. In addition, causes for significant equipment
problems were not always addressed prior to plant startup.
The licensee was effective in correcting broke/fix type issues such as equipment problems,
procedure deficiencies, and calculational errors. However, the licensee was less effective in
correcting recurring human performance problems. This was evidenced by recurring problems
associated with configuration control, contractor control, foreign material exclusion control, fire
protection control, and rework issues.
Through interviews and observations, the inspectors concluded that Braidwood established a
safety-conscious work environment where people were not reluctant to raise issues. However,
the inspectors noted that recent changes to the CAP made it somewhat burdensome to enter
3
items into the corrective action program computerized process. Additionally, the inspectors
ascertained that the recent changes to the CAP also made the trending condition report-related
data burdensome by making the manipulation of the data difficult.
A.
Inspector Identified Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
(TBD). The inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the licensees failure to identify the cause and take
action to prevent recurrence for failures of the check valves between the instrument air
system and the accumulators for the Unit 1 pressurizer power operated relief valves
(PORVs). Specifically, following the October 1998 failures of all the Unit 1 pressurizer
PORV accumulator check valves, a significant condition adverse to quality, the licensee
did not determine the cause of the back leakage and take actions to preclude repetition
as evidenced by the similar failures of the same valves in September 2001.
The staffs significance determination of this finding was not complete at the time of
issuance of this report; therefore, this issue is considered an unresolved item. The safety
significance of this issue has been characterized as "To Be Determined (TBD)" pending
the completion of additional risk analysis. (Section 4OA2 a).
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
Green. Following a trip of the circuit breaker during surveillance testing, the licensee
determined that 14 months earlier, technicians failed to reset the instantaneous
overcurrent trip setpoint for the 1CS009B circuit break as prescribed in the station
procedure resulting in the instantaneous overcurrent being left at a nonconservatively
low value. This event was considered self-revealing.
The inspectors determined that this issue had a credible impact on safety because
under certain voltage conditions the 1B train of the containment spray would not have
been capable of fulfilling the design safety function. The inspectors concluded that this
issue could have affected the capability of controlling containment pressure; however,
because no actual reduction of the containment pressure control function occurred, this
issue was of very low safety significance. The failure to follow the maintenance
procedure for the inspection and testing of the 1B containment spray suction valve from
the containment sump circuit breaker was a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 a.
However, since this finding is of very low safety significance and it was captured in the
licensees corrective action program, this finding is being treated as a Non-Cited
Violation consistent with Section V1.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy
(Section 40A2 b).
4
Report Details
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
40A2
Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
a.
Effectiveness of Problem Identification
(1)
Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review of the Braidwood process for identifying and
correcting problems in the plant. The inspectors reviewed previous licensee and
inspector-identified issues related to the seven safety cornerstones in the Reactor
Safety, Radiation Safety, and Safeguards strategic performance areas to determine if
problems were appropriately identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective
action program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed selected plant procedures and
program description handbooks, interviewed selected plant personnel, and attended
various station meetings to understand the stations process for implementing the
corrective action program (CAP) and related activities.
The inspectors selected several condition reports generated since the last Problem
Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection. Also, the inspectors selected areas that
looked like potential trends and assessed whether the licensees had appropriately
identified and captured these trends within the corrective action program. In addition,
from a list of work request generated since the last PI&R inspection, the inspectors
selected 25 work requests to verify that CRs were generated when appropriate in
accordance with the thresholds established by the CAP.
To assess trending, maintenance rule implementation and to identify items that were
missed by the licensee, the inspectors reviewed the past performance of three systems.
The systems selected were the centrifugal charge system (CV), essential service water
system (SX) and instrument air system. These systems were selected because they
appeared together in several accident scenarios in the Significance Determination
Process (SDP). In addition, the inspectors selected the 4160/480 volt circuit breakers
for a similar review to assess how the licensee evaluated component issues related to
several systems. As part of this assessment, the inspectors interviewed the respective
system engineers, and reviewed system health reports, and system monitoring
programs and completed partial system walkdowns.
From a list of station and departmental self-assessments and audits, the inspectors
conducted a review to determine whether the audit and self-assessment programs were
effectively managed, and adequately covered the subject areas. In addition, the
inspectors interviewed licensee staff regarding the audit and self-assessment programs.
The inspectors also evaluated the licensees operator work around (OWA) process. The
evaluation included a review of the governing procedure and the licensees list of
identified OWAs. In order to assess the licensees performance with respect to
identifying OWAs, the inspectors evaluated issues described in various licensee CAP
5
documents to determine whether issues that met the threshold to be considered an
OWA were appropriately dispositioned. In addition, the inspectors compared a list of
OWAs from another station to assess whether similar OWA existed at Braidwood.
The specific documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1 of this report.
(2)
Issues
The inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,
"Corrective Action," for the licensees failure to identify the cause and take action to
prevent recurrence for failures of the check valves between the instrument air system
and the accumulators for the Unit 1 pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs).
The safety significance of this issue has been characterized as "To Be Determined
(TBD)" pending the completion of additional risk analysis.
In general, station personnel effectively identified at a low threshold and entered
problems as CRs into the corrective action program. Although thousands of CRs were
initiated this past year, the inspectors identified two examples where the licensee failed
to recognize and address issues at the identification phase of the corrective actions
process. The first example was the apparent violation described above, and the second
example dealt with the failure to provide operators additional guidance regarding
alternative means of determining valve position after the normal local position indicator
for an SX valve was found degraded.
In addition, based on interviews with plant personnel, the inspectors ascertained that
some employees found the CAP computer program complex and difficult to navigate and
some individuals routinely relied on their supervisors for entering items into the CAP.
Additionally, the inspectors identified that a new assigned chemistry supervisor was not
provided the management training on the CAP process. The inspectors concluded that
no significant issues were missed based on the lack of training. The corrective action
program coordinator stated that the other supervisors received the applicable CAP
training and that the chemistry supervisor would be trained in the very near future.
Pressurizer PORV Accumulator Check Valve Failures
During the Fall 2001 Unit 1 refueling outage, all four check valves that separate the non
safety-related instrument air system from the safety-related pressurizer PORV control air
accumulators were found to have excessive back leakage. In the event of a loss of
instrument air pressure, these check valves ensure sufficient air pressure is available to
operate the PORVs, and therefore, allowing a means to depressurize the reactor coolant
system in response to certain transients.
On September 29, 2001, the licensee initiated CR 00076349, During Performance of
1BwOSR 3.4.11.3.3 Check Valves Failed, to document this issue. The licensee
generated work orders to repair and retest the valves. On October 15, 2001, the
licensee generated CR 00078892, Maintenance Rule Criteria RY2 Exceeds Reliability
Criteria, and an apparent cause evaluation (ACE) was written to determine the cause of
the failures. Within this ACE, the licensee stated that all four valves failed due to a
dislodged O-ring on the valve disc, which prevented the disc from fully engaging with the
6
seat. The licensee also stated in the ACE that all four of these valves failed for the same
reason back in 1998, and, at that time, the valves were rebuilt and successfully tested;
however no CR was generated to evaluate the cause. After additional review and
discussions with system engineering staff, the inspectors ascertained that in 1998, these
valves had passed their as-found surveillance test; however, during the scheduled
rebuild of the valves, the O-rings were found dislodged. Furthermore, the inspectors
determined that since 1991, these valves on Unit 1 have had similar failures.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not identify and correct the cause
for Unit 1 pressurizer PORV accumulator check valve failures following the
October 1998, and September 2001 failures. This was based on ineffectiveness of
the 1998 corrective actions to address the O-rings becoming dislodged as evidenced
by the similar failure in September 2001. Furthermore, the corrective actions taken to
address the September 2001 failures were the same as the ineffective actions taken in
October 1998, specifically rebuilding the valves. Based on the apparent common mode
failure mechanism that could impact both pressurizer PORVs on both units, the
inspectors considered this to be a significant condition adverse to quality.
The inspectors discussed with the Braidwood Station Management, the impact of the
issue with respect to the current operability of the pressurizer PORVs for both units and
with respect to the past operability of the pressurizer PORVs in Unit 1. The licensee
stated historical data showed that the valves operated satisfactorily for greater than one
operating cycle after rebuild, and since the valves were just rebuilt in September 2001,
the licensee concluded the Unit 1 valves were currently operable. In addition, the
licensees review of the Unit 2 operating history of the same valves revealed very few
failures; therefore, the licensee concluded that the Unit 2 valves were also operable.
The inspectors could not dispute the licensees conclusion regarding current operability.
With respect to past operability, the inspectors concluded that both Unit 1 pressurizer
PORVs were inoperable for some period prior to the as-found test failure. This
conclusion was reached because the cause of the failures was unknown and the
accumulator check valves failed the as-found surveillance test.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part,
that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality,
such as failures, are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant
conditions adverse to quality, the measure shall assure that the cause of the
condition is determined and corrective actions taken to preclude repetition. Following
the October 1998 failures of all the Unit 1 pressurizer PORV accumulator check valves
to maintain pressure, a significant condition adverse to quality, the licensee failed to
determine the cause of the condition and take actions to preclude repetition as
evidenced by the similar failures of the same valves in September 2001. This issue is
considered an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This issue
was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition
Report 00095245.
The inspectors determined that this issue had a credible impact on safety because the
Unit 1 pressurizer PORVs could not be relied upon to mitigate a steam generator tube
rupture event. The staffs significance determination of this finding was not complete at
the time of issuance of this report; therefore, this issue is considered an Unresolved Item
7
(50-456/02-03-01(DRP)). The safety significance has been characterized as TBD
pending the completion of additional risk analysis.
Alternate valve position indication
The inspectors the reviewed CR A2000-03490, Failed Surveillance -
0BwOSR 3.7.8.3-1 for 0SX147, which was written after an operator was unable
to determine the position of the Unit 0 component cooling water heat exchanger outlet
valve (0SX147) during a surveillance test. The inspectors noted that since 1997, there
has been an open work order to repair the 0SX147 local valve position indication.
When the work order was initiated, the licensee did not provide formal guidance to the
operators regarding how to alternatively determine the valve position. Subsequently,
operators continued to complete this surveillance on a quarterly basis using alternative
methods, based on institutional knowledge, to determine the valve position. After
discussions with members of the Braidwood operations and engineering departments,
the inspectors concluded that the operators were adequately determining the valve
position. However, the licensees informal approach that relied on institutional
knowledge was less than effective as evident by the operator's need to generate
CR A2000-03490. Additionally, the licensee closed this CR without taking action to
repair the valve or to sanction the other methods being used by the operators. The
licensee acknowledged these shortcomings and issued CR 00094403 to address the
concerns.
Trending of Issues
The inspectors determined that the licensees trending of issues was adequate. Station
personnel identified individual specific deficiencies and entered those deficiencies into
the CAP database. Although the Station's Coding and Trending Manual provided
detailed guidance on trending CR-related information, the inspectors found that the
trending of CR-related data was inconsistent with some departments informally trending
CR-related information. Additionally, the inspectors ascertained that trending CR-related
data became burdensome due to recent changes to the Exelon-wide CAP database that
made manipulating the data difficult. The inspectors noted that the licensee was aware
of this issue as evidenced by CR 00093520. However, the inspectors also noted that
the quality of CR-related trending had been on ongoing issue at Braidwood even before
the change to the CAP-database.
b.
Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues
(1)
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed previous inspection reports and corrective action documents
generated since September 2000. In particular the inspectors reviewed selected ACEs,
root cause reviews, prompt investigations, operability determinations and common
cause analysis to verify that identified issues were appropriately prioritized and
evaluated when entered into the licensees corrective action program. During this
review, the inspectors focused on the technical adequacy of the cause determinations,
extent of condition reviews including evaluations of potential common cause or generic
8
concerns, and the appropriateness of the corrective actions. In addition, the inspectors
also focused on the operability and reportability determinations.
The inspectors selected several items to ensure proper implementation of the
Maintenance Rule. This included verifying that the functional failures and unavailability
time were properly counted and tracked.
The inspectors attended management meetings to observe the assignment of
CR categories for current issues including the initial operability and reportability
evaluations. In addition, during some of these meetings, the inspectors observed station
managements review of root cause analyses and corrective actions for existing CRs.
The inspectors also evaluated the licensees process for reviewing industry operating
experience (OPEX). Documents reviewed included the licensees procedure, and their
assessment of selected industry operating event reports, NRC, and vendor generic
notices recorded since September 2000. Additionally, the inspectors discussed the
process with the Braidwood OPEX coordinator.
A listing of the specific documents reviewed is attached to the report.
(2)
Issues
The inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance that was determined
to be a Non-Cited Violation (NCV). This finding involved the failure to follow procedure
resulting in the inoperability of one division of the Unit 1 the containment spray system.
Specifically, during a maintenance activity on the circuit breaker for the suction valve
from the containment sump (1CS009B) to the 1B containment spray pump, a technician
left the instantaneous overcurrent setting nonconservatively low.
Furthermore, during the review, the inspectors noted several examples where ACEs
were of poor quality. The inspectors noted that these poor quality ACEs were reviewed
and approved by a first line manager or above. The types of deficiencies varied but
included the following:
New information that could impact the original operability and reportability
evaluations was not re-evaluated by shift management.
Other apparent problems were mentioned but were not fully addressed in the
evaluation. For example, potential common cause failure mechanisms were
included as possible apparent causes; however, the impact on like-equipment
was not resolved or evaluated.
Examples where the apparent cause, extent of the evaluations and corrective
actions were not well documented.
These problems were more apparent for ACEs generated early in the assessment
period, but a few examples of similar problems were noted with more recent ACEs. In
most cases, after discussions with the responsible individuals, the inspectors concluded
9
that the causes were truly determined, that the corrective actions were appropriate, and
other issues, including operability and potential common cause issues were addressed.
In addition, the inspectors noted that equipment problems identified during outages were
not always evaluated for operability or reportability. In addition, causes for significant
equipment problems were not always addressed prior to plant startup.
Specific examples include:
CR A2001-01170 Potential Rework - 1CS009B trips breaker during votes
testing after maintenance. This CR described a condition where the
containment spray recirculation suction valved tripped on instantaneous over
current during motor-operated valve testing. During the ACE for this CR, the
licensee discovered that 14 months earlier, a technician dialed down the
instantaneous over current setting to the minimum value during circuit breaker
testing and did not return the setting to the normal value as required by
Procedure MA-BR-EM-1-3.8.a.3-1, Surveillance for Inspection and Testing of
480 Volt Motor Control Center (MCC) Draw-Out Units. Furthermore, in the ACE,
the licensee documented that if the valve was called upon to operate during the
14 months while the instantaneous overcurrent trip setpoint was set
nonconservatively low, the breaker would have probably tripped and the valve
would not have opened and could have possibly resulted in eventual pump
damage. The inspectors determined that this information was not provided back
to the shift manager for operability and reportability reviews. When the
inspectors questioned the operability of the valve, the licensee re-evaluated the
operability of the breaker and determined that under the normal voltage
conditions experienced during the 14 months in question, the breaker would not
have tripped prematurely. However, under worst case design conditions, the
breaker would have tripped prematurely if it had been called upon to operate.
The inspectors determined that the failure to reset the instantaneous overcurrent
trip setpoint for the 1CS009B circuit break as prescribed in the station procedure
had a credible impact on safety because under certain voltage conditions the
1B train of containment spray would not have been capable of fulfilling the design
safety function. The inspectors concluded that this issue could have affected the
capability of controlling containment pressure. The inspectors evaluated this
issue through the SDP and determined that since the other train of containment
spray was not affected, there was no actual reduction of the atmospheric
pressure control function of the reactor containment, and therefore this issue was
of very low safety significance (Green).
Technical Specification 5.4.1, states, in part, that written procedures shall be
established, implemented, and maintained covering the following activities: The
applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,
Appendix A, February 1978. Paragraph 9.a. of this Regulatory Guide states, in
part, that procedures for performing maintenance that can affect the performance
of safety-related equipment shall be prepared and activities shall be performed in
accordance with these procedures. The licensee established Procedure MA-BR-
EM-1-3.8.a.3-1, Surveillance for Inspection and Testing of 480 Volt Motor
10
Control Center (MCC) Draw-Out Units, as the implementing procedure for
inspecting and testing 480 Volt circuit breakers. Contrary to the above, on
February 29, 2000, the technicians failed to return the adjustable magnetic
element (instantaneous overcurrent setpoint) to the setting position recorded
earlier in Procedure MA-BR-EM-1-3.8.a.3-1. This is considered a violation of
Technical Specification 5.4.1. However, because this violation was of very low
risk significance, was non-repetitive, and was captured in the licensees
corrective action program (CR 00094420), this violation is being treated as a
Non-Cited Violation in accordance with Section V1.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement
Policy (NCV 50-456-02-03-02 (DRP)).
CR A2000-04475, Unplanned Limiting Condition for Operations entry for
the 2B AF pump during surveillance run. This CR described an instance
when Unit 2 diesel driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump room cooler failed to
automatically start as designed. Specifically, on December 1, 2000, during a test
start of the diesel driven AFW pump, the SX outlet valve for the room cooler
failed to open and resulted in the inoperability of the 2B AFW pump. The room
cooler was designed such that on a AFW pump start the SX inlet valve opens
and upon reaching a full open position, a limit switch on the valve stem makes-up
a permissive contact in the control circuit to allow the room cooler outlet valve to
open.
The ACE associated with this CR described the cause as three physical
deficiencies with the limit switch on the inlet valve. However, no discussion was
provided on how these deficiencies were caused. The corrective actions merely
corrected the deficiencies, not the cause, and provided additional clarification to
a maintenance procedure associated with the inlet valve limit switch. Based on
the review of the ACE, the inspectors were unable to determine the cause of the
event, and therefore, were unable to determine whether or not the corrective
actions were appropriate to prevent recurrence. Furthermore, the inspectors
noted that the licensee reviewer for this ACE did not identify the same problems.
In fact, the completed apparent cause evaluation quality checklist was marked
"yes" for the following questions:
Does the Apparent Cause Section clearly describe why the problem
occurred and is the Apparent Cause(s) clearly stated?
Are the corrective actions linked to the apparent cause(s) stated?
After a discussion with the engineers responsible for reviewing this event, the
inspectors ascertained that the cause of the limit switch deficiencies was a failure
to adequately tighten the limit switch jam nut. Therefore, the inspectors
concluded that the cause was appropriately determined and the corrective
actions were acceptable; however, the documentation of the evaluation was
poor. Furthermore, the inspectors concluded that tightening the jam nut, was a
skill of the craft activity and the failure to adequately tighten the jam nut was not a
violation of NRC requirements. The licensee acknowledged the shortcomings
with the ACE documentation and issued CR 00094186 to address this concern.
11
ACE for A2001-02003, Inadequate ACE performed per CR A2001-01168."
This ACE was written to re-evaluate the cause of the April 20, 2001 1B AFW
pump room cooler outlet valve (1SX178) failure. The original ACE was re-
evaluated because the NRC resident inspectors determined that the cause was
not well supported. (The technical issues related to this event were described in
NRC Inspection Report 50-456-01-07.) In the ACE for CR A2001-02003, the
licensee concluded that dust, oil, and moisture in the air controlling this valve
caused the failure. Although this cause would appear to be a potential common
mode failure mechanism to other components that require instrument air to
operate, no discussion was provided within the ACE indicating that this common
mode failure mechanism was addressed. After discussing this concern with
station engineering personnel, the inspectors ascertained that, based on reviews
of the instrument air quality and other component performance histories, an
actual common mode failure problem with the instrument air system did not exist.
Again, the licensee reviewer of this ACE did not identify the potential common
cause failure mechanism. Additional information regarding this failure is provided
in NRC Inspection Report 50-456-02-04, the supplemental inspection for the
WHITE performance indicator for Unit 1 AFW functional failures.
Evaluating Equipment Problems During Outages. As discussed in
Section 4OA2 a(2), during the Fall 2001 Unit 1 refueling outage, all four check
valves that separate the non safety-related instrument air system from the safety-
related pressurizer PORV control air accumulators were found to have excessive
back leakage. On September 29, 2001, the licensee initiated CR 00076349 to
document this issue and generated work orders to repair and retest the valves.
The inspectors noted that shift management did not review the initial failure of
these valves for potential operability or reportability issues. Likewise, shift
management did not review CR 00078892 and associated ACE which described
a potential common mode failure mechanism that could have impacted both
units.
Based on discussions with the Shift Operations Supervisor, the inspectors
ascertained that during outages, operability and reportability issues routinely do
not go to the shift management review. This practice was based on the
philosophy that the items are normally not required to be operable during
outages, and that the equipment is repaired and tested prior to be returned to
service. As a result of this practice, it was unclear to the inspectors how
Braidwood ensured that past operability was reviewed and evaluated with
respect the reportability requirements.
The inspectors selected three additional CRs generated during the
September 2001 Unit 1 refueling outage to confirm that the causes of the
equipment problems were appropriately evaluated prior to returning the
equipment to service. The inspectors noted the following comment in
CR 0076146, 1PS9357B Failed Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) per
1BwOSR 3.6.1.1-8 Section 4, When the valve was made available to work,
there was pressure from Work Control to work the valve and solenoid and not to
return the valve to service to perform troubleshooting. During the ACE
associated with the CR, the licensee identified the potential problem with not
12
troubleshooting similar equipment problems and had established corrective
actions to re-enforce station managements expectations to identify the cause of
equipment failures.
The licensee acknowledged these two shortcomings and issued CR 0009537 to
address the concerns.
c.
Effectiveness of Corrective Action
(1)
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected CRs and associated corrective actions to evaluate
the effectiveness of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed CRs, operability
determinations, ACEs, and root cause reports to verify that corrective actions,
commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, were identified and
implemented in a timely manner, including corrective actions to address common cause
or generic concerns. The inspectors also verified the implementation of a sample of
corrective actions. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action
effectiveness reviews completed by the licensee. The samples were selected based on
their importance in reducing operational risks and recurring problems. The inspectors
reviewed information recorded since September 2000.
Since the licensees CAP allowed for the closing of corrective action tracking items
once the work control process was initiated, the inspectors reviewed the status of all
work request created as corrective actions for the period October 1, 2000, though
December 31, 2000, to ensure items that these were not subsequently canceled or
excessively postponed.
A listing of the specific documents reviewed is attached to the report.
(2)
Issues
During the review, the inspectors noted that the licensee was effective in correcting
broke/fix type issues such as equipment problems, procedure deficiencies, calculational
errors. However, the licensee was less effective in correcting recurring human
performance problems. This was evidenced by recurring problems associated with
configuration control, contractor control, foreign material exclusion (FME) control, fire
protection control, and rework issues.
Regarding configuration controls, the licensee's July 2001 human performance root
cause review recognized that past corrective actions were less than effective and new
corrective actions were established to address the problem from a different perspective.
In the areas of FME, fire protection, contractor controls and rework issues, the licensee
repeatedly identified trends in these areas; however, the corrective actions have not
effectively reduced the trends. Often the corrective actions had been used repeatedly
even though these actions had not substantially reduced the trends in the past. For
example, departmental meetings to discuss the problems were routinely used as a
corrective action even though it was evident that these meetings were not effective in the
13
past. The licensee was aware that these trends have been continuing and they planned
additional corrective actions to be taken during the next refueling outage. The
inspectors reviewed the proposed actions, but it was too early to assess the
effectiveness of the corrective actions.
During review of the corrective actions associated with the Root Cause Review,
2B residual heat removal (RH) pump Tripped on Phase C Overcurrent (AR 00081944),
the inspectors noted that a procedure change made to address this problem did not
provide clear guidance to the operators. Specifically, in order to address concerns with
potential binding of the RH pump, a change was made to Braidwood Operating
Procedure BwOP RH-06 Placing the RH System in Shutdown Cooling, to monitoring
and limit the heatup rate of the pump prior to placing shutdown cooling in service.
Although the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for this change adequately supported the
change, it specified that there was only a limited time to establish shutdown cooling due
the available condensate storage volume, and assumed that heatup rate monitoring of
the RH system would not start until 260oF. However, this was not clearly stated in the
procedure and there was the potential that operators could have inappropriately
monitored the heatup rate of the system from ambient temperatures, which could have
delayed placing shutdown cooling in service. Based on discussions with the Operations
Manager, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were trained on the new
procedure and during the training, RH system heatup monitoring was started at the
appropriate temperatures. Furthermore, the inspectors ascertained that the licensee
had not yet had the need to perform this procedure in the plant. However, the Operation
Manager acknowledged that the procedure could be enhanced to provide clearer
direction and CR 00094181 was generated to address the issue.
The inspectors review of licensee event reports identified no significant concerns.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective actions created to address NCVs and
concluded that the licensees proposed actions were completed in a timely manner and
that the actions appeared appropriate as evidenced by the lack of repeat problems.
d.
Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment
(1)
Inspection Scope
The inspectors interviewed plant staff to assess the establishment of a safety conscious
work environment.
During the conduct of interviews, document reviews and observations of activities, the
inspectors looked for evidence that suggested plant employees may be reluctant to raise
safety concerns. Most of the individuals interviewed were asked questions similar to
those listed in Appendix 1 to NRC Inspection Procedure 71152, Suggested Questions
for Use in Discussions with Licensee Individuals Concerning PI&R Issues. The
inspectors also reviewed the stations procedures related to the Employee Concerns
Program, and discussed the implementation of this program with the stations program
coordinator.
14
(2). Issues
No significant findings were identified. The inspectors noted no indications of
unwillingness to raise safety issues. However, during some of the interviews, the
inspectors were informed that the August 2001 change to the CAP made it somewhat
burdensome to enter items into the corrective action program computerized process.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. von Suskil and other members
of licensee management on February 22, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the
findings presented. The inspectors confirmed with the licensee that proprietary
information was examined during the inspection; however, this was not specifically
discussed in this report.
15
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
J. von Suskil, Site Vice President
K. Schwartz, Plant Manager
J. Bailey, Regulatory Assurance - NRC Coordinator
G. Baker, Security Manager
G. Dudek, Operations Manager
C. Dunn, Engineering Director
A. Ferko, Regulatory Assurance Manager
R. Graham, Work Management Director
L. Guthrie, Maintenance Director
F. Lentine, Design Engineering Manager
K. Schwartz, Plant Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
G. Grant, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
A. Stone, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-456/02-03-01
Apparent violation of 10 CFR Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for
the licensees failure to identify the cause and take action to
prevent recurrence for failures Unit 1 pressurizer PORV
50-456/02-03-02
Failure to follow procedure resulted in the inoperability of the
1B containment spray suction valve from the containment
Closed
50-456/02-03-02
Failure to follow procedure resulted in the inoperability of the
1B containment spray suction valve from the containment
16
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS USED
Apparent Cause Evaluation
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Action Request
Corrective Action Program
Common Cause Analysis
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
CR
Condition Report
CV
Centrifugal Charge System
Division of Reactor Projects
Engineered Safety Feature
Instrument Air System
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operations
LCOAR
Limiting Condition for Operations Action Requirement
LER
Licensee Event Report
Local Leak Rate Test
Motor Control Center
Non-Cited Violation
NO
Nuclear Oversight
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Out-Of-Service
Operating Experience
Operator Work Around
Problem Identification and Resolution
Power Operated Relief Valve
Root Cause Report
RH
Significance Determination Process
SSPS
Solid State Protection System
Essential Service Water System
To Be Determined
Technical Requirements Manual
TS
Technical Specification
U1
Unit 1
U2
Unit 2
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
LIST OF INFORMATION REQUESTED
1.
Copy of the Administrative procedure(s) governing the identification and resolution of
problems.
2.
Copies of any Quality Assurance audit (self-assessment) of the corrective action
program completed since September 1, 2000.
3.
List of Maintenance Rule (a)(1) systems and components, and the associated system
health reports since September 1, 2000.
4.
List of all significant conditions adverse to quality Condition Reports since September 1,
2000.
5.
List of all Condition Reports involving human performance or corrective action problems
since September 1, 2000.
6.
List of Operator Work Arounds and Temporary Modifications since September 1, 2000.
7.
Copies of Root Cause evaluations since September 1, 2000.
8.
List of Condition Reports since September 1, 2000.
9.
Copies of Prompt Investigations since September 1, 2000.
10.
List of Work Orders and Action Requests since September 1, 2000.
11.
List of Apparent Root Causes completed since September 1, 2000.
12.
Copies of Operability Evaluations performed since September 1, 2000.
13.
List of Quality Assurance audits and self assessments performed since September 1,
2000.
14.
List of top 10 risk significant systems and components.
15.
(NRC identified issues) Copies of NCVs since September 1, 2000, and copies of the
licensees actions for issues related to NCVs by cornerstones.
16.
List of issues identified through employee concerns program.
17.
Copies of latest outage critiques for each unit.
18.
Copies of Common Cause Evaluations completed since September 1, 2000.
19.
Copies of Effectiveness Reviews completed since September 1, 2000.
20.
Copy of administrative procedure for the employee concerns program.
18
21.
Copy of administrative procedure for incorporating industry operating experience
(OPEX).
22.
Copies of trend analysis reports for condition reports (Station and Department level).
23.
List of the corrective action backlog; work order backlog risk significance assessment.
24.
Copies of the corrective action system program reports submitted to management since
September 1, 2000.
25.
Copies of procedures governing Operator Work Arounds, Temporary Modifications,
Operability Evaluations, Root Cause Evaluations, and Prompt Investigations.
26.
List of times and locations of site meetings, particularly those associated with the
corrective action process.
27.
Copy of Site Organization Charts.
28.
List or rework items and repeat failures since September 1, 2000.
Documents requested to be available during the inspection:
a.
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report,
b.
Technical Specifications,
c.
Procedures,
d.
Copies of any self-assessments and associated condition reports generated in
preparation for the inspection.
19
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Action Requests (AR) and Condition Reports (CR)
A2000-03509: Nuclear Oversight (NO)
Identifies Operator Work Around Program
Deficiencies/Weakness
September 8, 2000
Assignment Detail for A2000-03928;
Report of the Site Self Assessment
Indicates
January 12, 2001
AR Assignment/Sub Assignment Summary
Report (CAP010) for A2000-04348;
Potential trend - Foreign Material Exclusion
- FH
November 17, 2000
Minute Oil Leak and Water Leaks on 1A
and 2A Centrifugal Charge System (CV)
Pumps
2CV8519 Found Open
September 15, 2001
Siemens - Westinghouse Individual Was
Injured
September 27, 2001
No Timer Signal for OB WO Signal During
1BwVSR 3.8.1.11-2
September 29, 2001
Radiological Series of Events Requires
Common Cause Analysis
January 11, 2002
Operator Workaround Procedure Has
Confusing Examples
October 11, 2001
Potential Trend - Increasing Amount of
Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) Issues &
Events
October 17, 2001;
October 19, 2001;
October 24, 2001
Potential Trend - Contractor Control Issues
in A1R09
October 23, 2001;
October 24, 2001
NRC Identified Need to Revise Procedure
October 18, 2001
Potential Trend - Increasing Amount of
Rework Issues
December 14, 2001
Reactor Coolant System Cooldown
Surveillance Acceptance Criteria Conflict
November 7, 2001
20
Inappropriate Shutdown Safety
Classification on 2B Residual Heat
Removal (RH) Pump Failure
November 7, 2001
Disposition of 1B RH Pump Running
Clearances
November 12, 2001
Ambiguous Terms Used in Procedures
November 8, 2001
Braidwood SME Review - Non BY-01-097
January 8, 2002
Recommendation for RH Demonstration
During AR09
November 15, 2001
Secondary Plant Transient During
Instrument Maintenance Department
Calibration of 2F-CB001
January 23, 2002
Evaluate Unit 2 (U2) Cond Overflow for
Potential Operator Work Around
January 24, 2002
Trend - Preventive Maintenance Exceed
Late Date Prior to Deferral Approval
February 4, 2002
No Service Air or Caustic Isolation on OA
Radwaste Demin Clearance Order
February 4, 2002
CR A2000-00268
Potential Trend - Increased Frequency of
Human Performance Errors in Fuel
Handling
January 18, 2000
CR A2000-00968
2A CV Pump Seal Leakage
March 5, 2000
CR A2000-01988
2CV206 Leakage Has Increased
April 23, 2000
CR A2000-03478
Rework - Air Deflector on Unit 0 Station Air
Compressor Was Not Installed Correctly
September 1, 2000
CR A2000-03484
Potential Functional Failures for
Maintenance Rule Criteria PS3
September 1, 2000
CR A2000-03490
Failed Surveillance -0BwOSR 3.7.8.3-1 for
0SX147
September 3, 2000
CR A2000-03491
Unplanned GW004 Technical
Requirements Manual (TRM) Entry
September 3, 2000
CR A2000-03495
Poor Sequencing of 2B RH Train Work
Due to Procedure Inadequacies
September 5, 2000
CR A2000-03498
NO Identified Action Item Not Created for
Root Cause Corrective Action
September 5, 2000
21
CR A2000-03504
NO Identified: Design Deficiency Rework
Items Not Driven to Closure
September 5, 2000
CR A2000-03505
NO Identified Poor Quality of Apparent
Cause Evaluations (ACEs)
September 5, 2000
CR A2000-03512
NO Identifies Enhancement
Recommendation for System Engineering
September 5, 2000
CR A2000-03539
6.9 KiloVolt Breaker Sent to Wrong
Location
September 6, 2000
CR A2000-03545
Form Looks Like an Approved Procedure
September 5, 2000
CR A2000-03567
Unplanned Entry Into TRM 3.3.1 Due to
1FI-AF014A Main Control Room Flow
Indicator Pegged Low
September 8, 2000
CR A2000-03584
Conflicting Acceptance Criteria in Local
Leak Rate Test Procedures
September 13, 2000
CR A2000-03596
Unplanned Entry Into Fire Protection
GOCAR For Zone 2D-49
September 13, 2000
CR A2000-03606
A2R08 Procedure(s) Identified After Freeze
Date
September 13, 2000
CR A2000-03623
Special Plant Procedure 98-014 is Not
Available in Procedure Files or Entered
Into Controlled Documents
September 14, 2000
CR A2000-03632
2A CV Pump Inboard Leakage
September 18, 2000
CR A2000-03659
1A CV Pump Outboard Seal Leak Has
Increased
September 18, 2000
CR A2000-03668
4KV Breaker Motor Cutout Switch Failed
Surveillance
September 16, 2000
CR A2000-03672
Superceded Procedure Form Found in
D20-1-99-370-003
September 19, 2000
CR A2000-03686
50.59 Missing Tracking No. and Site
Procedure Not Detected for Safety Nuclear
Station Procedure
September 19, 2000
CR A2000-03712
Focus Area Self-Assessment Identified
Mechanical Maintenance Field
Observations Are Not Sufficiently
Objective/Critical
September 26, 2000
CR A2000-03719
2CV206 Leakage Discrepancies
September 25, 2000
22
CR A2000-03746
Adverse Trend Identified: Foreign Material
Exclusion Work Practices in Maintenance
September 27, 2000
CR A2000-03749
Procedure Revisions Needed as a Result
of Diesel Generator Modifications
September 27, 2000
CR A2000-03767
Unnecessary Diesel Unavailability Due to
Fire Protection CO2 Testing
September 28, 2000
CR A2000-03783
Radwaste Rounds Could Not Be
Performed on the Husky
October 1, 2000
CR A2000-03792
1MS018A Trouble Alarm/Unplanned
Limiting Condition for Operation Action
Requirement (LCOAR) Entry
October 3, 2000
CR A2000-03799
Incorrect Application of Procedural
Guidance, RS-AA-122-117
October 3, 2000
CR A2000-03819
Latch Check Switch on 6.9KiloVolt Breaker
Out of Adjustment
September 29, 2000
CR A2000-03825
Review Byron CR (B2000-02760)
Regarding Debris in the Safety Injection
system for Applicability to Braidwood
October 10, 2000
CR A2000-03843
Minimum Wall Thickness on Line
2SXB1AB-3"
October 9, 2000
CR A2000-03845
Maintenance Rule Functional Failure
Monthly Review for July and August 2000
October 9, 2000
CR A2000-03885
Work Performed Without Shift
Authorization
October 12, 2000
CR A2000-03893
2SX046B Was Not Leakage By
October 13, 2000
CR A2000-03909
Contingency Actions for Spent Fuel Pool
Level Loss Not Communicated to All Shift
Personnel
October 16, 2000
CR A2000-03909
Contingency Actions for Spent Fuel Pool
Level Loss Not Communicated to All Shift
Personnel
October 16, 2000
CR A2000-03921
1WX036B Found Open
October 17, 2000
CR A2000-03925
Supply Management Focus Area Self-
Assessment Deficiencies (MS-AA-402
Procedure)
October 18, 2000
23
CR A2000-03926
Report of the site Self Assessment
Indicates an Area for Improvement in
Industrial Safety
October 18, 2000
CR A2000-03927
Report of the Site Self Assessment
Indicates the Area for Improvement MA.2-1
Requires Further Action
October 20, 2000
CR A2000-03928
Report of the site Self Assessment
Indicates Area for Improvement MA.2-2
Requires Further Action
October 18, 2000
CR A2000-03929
Report of the Site Self Assessment
Indicates an Area for Improvement in
Operations
October 18, 2000
CR A2000-03948
Safety System Unavailability & YELLOW
Online Risk Extended by Unscheduled
Activity
October 19, 2000
CR A2000-04397
1B Essential Service Water System (SX)
Strainer Corrosion - NRC Concern
November 17, 2000
CR A2000-04475
Unplanned Limiting Condition for
Operations (LCO) Entry for the 2B Auxiliary
Feedwater System Pump During
Surveillance Run
December 1, 2000
CR A2000-04675
Potential Rework - Damage to Pump
Casing Caused by Incorrect Maintenance
Practices
December 21, 2000
CR A2001-00131
Adverse Trend Identified in Fire Protection
January 16, 2001
CR A2001-00371
Emergency Diesel Fuel Calculation
Discrepancies
February 5, 2001
CR A2001-00495
Instrument Inverter 213 Temperature
Qualification
February 15, 2001
CR A2001-00569
Inadequate Contingency Preparations
When Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Not
Available
February 22, 2001
CR A2001-00795
Supply Management Identified - Ineffective
Corrective Actions
March 16, 2001
CR A2001-00844
1BwGP 100-1 Errors Identified by NRC
March 21, 2001
CR A2001-01192
Ultrasonic Inspection Results on 1B SX
Pump Strainer Drain Line
April 23, 2001
24
CR A2001-01291
Pipe Penetrations Not Protected - Safety
Issue
May 1, 2001
CR A2001-01331
NRC Question Regarding Floor Openings -
Safety Issue
May 4, 2001
CR A2001-01451
Essential Service Water Pump Weight
Increase
May 15, 2001
CR A2001-01802
2A CV Pump Has Excessive Inboard Seal
Leakage
June 17, 2001
CR A2001-02013
Ineffective Corrective Action - Pre-define is
Still Not Properly Scheduled
July 9, 2001
CR A2001-02030
Validation of Trend in Human Performance
Warrants Root Cause Analysis
July 11, 2001
CR A2001-02102
NO Identified Corrective Actions Not
Initiated in Action Tracking per Corrective
Action Program
July 18, 2001
CR A2001-02152
1VA06SB - Isolation Valves
July 20, 2001
CR 00076349
During Performance of 1BwOSR 3.4.11.3.3
Check Valves Failed
September 24, 2001
CR 00077005
No Timer Signal for 0B WO signal during
BwVSR 3.8.1.11-2
September 29, 2001
CR 00078892
Maintenance Rule Criteria RY2 Exceeds
Reliability Criteria
October 15, 2001
CR 00091925
Unit 2 Train of Instrument Air Exceeded
Maintenance Rule Unavailability Goal
CR 00093520
Weaknesses in Trending Noted in CAP
Self-Assessment
February 1, 2002
CR 00094181 1
Potential Misinterpretation in BwOP RH-6
Heatup Limits
February 6, 2002
CR 00094403 1
0SX147 Valve Stroke Issue/Potential
Operator Workaround
February 8, 2002
CR 00094420 1
Operability Concern with Valve 1CS009B
for 14 Month Period
February 8, 2002
CR 00094527 1
New Corrective Action Not Created From
February 9, 2002
CR 00095373 1
Process Issue with Investigation and
Potential Inoperability
February 14, 2002
25
CR 82711 - Supporting Operability
Documentation
July 9, 2001
Effectiveness Reviews
Effectiveness Review of A1998-02989;
Four 480V Motor Control Center (MCC)
Feed Breakers Would Not Close on
Effectiveness Review
March 12, 2001
Effectiveness Review of A1998-04252;
Train A Reactor Vessel Level Indication
System Unplanned LCOAR Entry
January 1, 2001
Effectiveness Review of SOER 91-01,
conduct of Infrequently Tests or Evolutions
September 28, 2001
Effectiveness Review of SOER 95-01:
Reducing Events
November 15, 2001
INPO SOER 97-1 - Potential Loss of High
Pressure Injection
December 13, 2000
Effectiveness Review of A1997-04982;
2SI8851 Relief Valve Lift - Corrective
Actions
March 20, 2001
Effectiveness Review of A1999-01229
Accident in Containment
March 8, 2001
Effectiveness Review of A1999-01692;
Unit 2 Reactor Trip on 1R High Flux
December 8, 2000
Effectiveness Review of A1999-02929;
Solid State Protection System (SSPS)
Slave Relays Response Time Untested
November 17, 2000
Effectiveness Review of A1999-03710;
Trend Problem Identification Form-Out-of-
Service (OOS) Issue Within Maintenance
June 29, 2001
A2000-00691: Potential Trend-Wrong
Lubricants Being Used
December 15, 2000
A2000-00729: Excessive Unit 2 Reactor
Coolant System Leakage
March 27, 2001
Effectiveness Review of A2000-00883;
Trend-Incorrect/Uncontrolled Procedures
in Radiation Protection
March 30, 2001
26
A2000-00661: Lack of Rigor in Handling
Increased Radiation Indication on Control
Room Heating, Ventilation and Air
Conditioning System
August 31, 2001
Effectiveness Review of A2000-01910;
2FW079A/B Graphoil Seal Found
Extruded
November 16, 2001
Effectiveness Review of A2000-00855;
Potential Trend - Missed Fire Watches
February 28, 2001
A2000-01121: Loss of Unit 1 (U1) and U2
SG Blowdown
May 4, 2001
Effectiveness Review of A2000-02626;
Bad Wire Replacement in Security
Multiplexer 2
February 28, 2001
Effectiveness Review of A2000-03032;
Rework - 1CB01PD Outboard Bearing
Failure Due to Lubrication
June 27, 2002
Effectiveness Review of A2000-03203;
Adverse Trend-Plant Personnel Dont
Understand
October 18, 2001
Effectiveness Review of A2001-00131;
Adverse Trend Identified in Fire Protection
February 25, 2002
CR A2001-00582
Corrective Actions for CR A1999-03530,
OOS Error Not Effective
November 15, 1999
CR A2001-00712
Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence
for Effectiveness Review Determined to Be
Collectively Ineffective
March 7, 2001
Root Cause Reports
A2000-04281 Failed Circulation Water
Blowdown Vacuum Breaker Flooding
May 30, 2002
A2000-04707 Number of Out-of-Service
Errors is Increasing
February 1, 2001
A2001-00131 Adverse Trend Identified in
Fire Protection
February 25, 2002
AR 00042593-02-00
AR Assignment/Sub Assignment Summary
Report (CAP010) -Completed and Open
Actions from A2001-00131
February 6, 2001
27
A2001-02014 Steam Dump Valves
1MS004 C and G Made Inoperable
June 3, 2002
Root Cause Analysis for 1MS016B,
1MS017B, and 1MS014D Exceeds 3%
Technical Specification Criteria
November 7, 2001
Root Cause Analysis for Main Steam Line
Isolation Valves Not Stroke Timed in Mode
3 as Required
November 9, 2001
Root Cause Analysis for 2B RH Pump
Tripped on Phase C Overcurrent
December 13, 2001
Adverse Trend Observed During Rework
Common Cause Analysis (CCA) (AR
79728)
February 8, 2002
CR A2000-03746
Adverse Trend of Foreign Material
Exclusion Events and Issues Caused by a
Lack of Procedural Understanding and
Inadequate Training
October 20, 2000
CR A2000-04494
Adverse Trend - Contractors Fail to
Adequately Follow the Hot Work
Procedure (OP-AA-201-004) Due to Lack
of Reinforcement of Procedural
Requirements During Pre-Job Briefings
December 3, 2000
CR A2000-04587
Root Cause Evaluation for Erroneous
Feedwater Temperature Input into the
Calorimetric Program due to a Modification
Installation Error
January 23, 2000
CR A2000-04707
Number of Out-of-Service Errors is
Increasing
December 19, 2000
CR A2001-00131
Root Cause Evaluation Report for Lack of
Sensitivity and Awareness by Supervision
and Work Force to Engage Fire Protection
Standards Pertaining to Combustible
Storage (Transient Fire Loading) and
Blockage of Fire Protection Equipment
January 16, 2001
CR A2001-00815
Unintentional Rotation of Unit 1 C/D
Traveling Screens During Maintenance
March 19, 2001
ATI 00056776-02
Root Cause Investigation Report for
Procedural Noncompliance at Braidwood
Station Due to a Lack of Management
Oversight and Failure to Enforce
Management Standards and Expectations
July 23, 2001
28
Abstract from Root Cause Report Titled
Adverse Trend - contractors Fail to
Adequately Follow the Hot work Procedure
(OP-AA-201-004) Due to Lack of
Reinforcement of Procedural
Requirements During Pre-Job Briefs (ATI
42593-02)
Non-Cited Violations (NCVs)
50-456/2000011-01
Equipment Alignment of 1A Safety
Injection Pump
September 13, 2000
50-456/457/2001002-01
Violation of Criterion III Due to Failure to
Correctly Translate Tank Weight Into a
Seismic Calculation
March 12, 2001
50-456/2001005-01
Inadequate Post Maintenance Testing
Associated with Preventive Maintenance
on the OA Hydrogen Recombiner
April 27, 2001
50-456/457/2002007-01
Inadequate Procedure for Performing
Maintenance on the 1AOV-SX178 Valve
July 26, 2001
50-457/2002009-02
Failure to Follow Procedures Lead to Unit
September 17, 2001
50-456/2001010-01
Failure to Follow Procedure Resulting in a
Water Spill
October 26, 2001
50-456/457/2001010-02
Failure to Have Procedure Appropriate to
Circumstances
October 26, 2001
50-456/457/2001011-01
Failure to Follow Procedure during Startup
December 12, 2001
50-456/457/2001011-03
Failure to Follow Technical Specification 5.7.2(d)
December 12, 2001
50-456/457/2001013-02
Failure to Perform RH Pump Maintenance
in Accordance with Procedure
November 7, 2001
Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE)
PIF A1998-02003
Inappropriate Temp Lift
June 2, 1998
PIF A2000-02112
Potential Trend - Contractor Control
Issues During Refuel Outage
May 3, 2000
ACE for CR A2000-3576; Potential
Weakness Exists for Identifying
Maintenance Rule Functional Failure
November 30, 2001
29
Procedure Adherence Determined to be
Common Cause During CCA
August 8, 2001
Missed Firewatch on U1 Cable Tunnel
August 22, 2001
Reliability Criteria for Function SX1 Has
Been Exceeded
August 23, 2001
1SI8804B Trips Breaker When Trying to
Stroke - Unplanned LCO
September 10, 2001
Testing of 1CV03P, Letdown Booster PP,
Configuration Control
September 14, 2001
Unit 1 6.9KV Bus 156 and 157 Problems
With Breaker Rosettes
September 22, 2001
1PS9357B Failed Local Leak Rate Test
(LLRT) per 1BwOSR 3.6.1.1-8 Section 4
September 24, 2001
During Performance of 1BwOSR
3.4.11.3.3 Check Valves Failed
September 24, 2001
1CV8396A Found Open During LLRT
Subsequent Leak in Containment CWA
September 25, 2001
LLRT Failure of 1RY8047
September 25, 2001
Hydrolazing SX Cooling in 1B AF Water
Room, Water Spray
September 26, 2001
Potential Trend - Fire Protection/Hot Work
Issues in A1R09
October 18, 2001
Cardon Dioxide Restored to Unit 2 Cable
Tunnel Improperly
November 13, 2001
2CV460 Did Not Close While Establishing
Excess Letdown
December 7, 2001
ACE on 2SX178 Failure to Open (39827-
02) Requires Updating
February 6, 2002
CR A2000-03499
NO Identified Examples of Inadequate
Dispositioning of Operating Experience
(OPEX)
September 5, 2000
CR A2000-03532
Loss of Refueling Water Storage Tank
Level
September 6, 2000
CR A2000-03576
The Potential Exists That Maintenance
Rule Functional Failures Are Not Being
Identified
September 12, 2000
30
CR A2000-03615
Corrective Actions from CAP ACE Not
Performed or Tracked
September 14, 2000
CR A2000-03621
Preventive Maintenance Scheduled Past
Due Dates
September 14, 2000
CR A2000-03681
Incorrect Parts Issued for 2CV01PB Work
September 14, 2000
CR A2000-03706
0GW073 (Analyzer Outlet Isolation Valve)
Found Closed During Set Up for Monthly
Calibration
September 21, 2000
CR A2000-03727
Potential Rework - 1PR06J configuration
Incorrect
September 25, 2000
CR A2000-03739
LSH Sump Pump Breaker Trips
September 26, 2000
CR A2000-03897
FME Issue - Lock Tube Lost in Fuel Pool
During Top Nozzle Reconstitution
October 15, 2000
CR A2000-03958
Entry Into LCOAR 3.4.5
October 21, 2000
CR A2000-03960
2PS5552A Fount Out of Position
October 21, 2000
CR A2000-03976
2B CW Pump Found Running
October 22, 2000
CR A2000-04111
Potential Rework - Reactor Trip Bypass
Breaker Replacement Contact Blocks
Installed in Incorrect Position
October 26, 2000
CR A2000-04153
A Train Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)
Sequence Timer Wired Wrong
October 30, 2000
CR A2000-04156
Loss of Seal Injection Flow to 2D Reactor
Coolant Pump
October 21, 2000
CR A2000-04170
OOS Not Properly Hung for 2CV8153A
October 30, 2000
CR A2000-04197
Rework - 2CV121 Valve Sticking
October 29, 2000
CR A2000-04246
Rework - Pressurizer Spray Valve
Temporary Modification Not Removed
November 8, 2000
CR A2000-04284
Incorrect Delta-I Target Leads to Unit 2
Ramp Down
November 8, 2000
CR A2000-04317
Potential Trend - Contractor Control
Issues During Refuel Outage
November 9, 2000
CR A2000-04554
480V ESF Switchgear 231X Breakers
Found in REMOVED Position
December 10, 2000
CR A2000-04679
Failure to Follow Written
Procedure/Program
December 22, 2000
31
CR A2001-00006
Engineering Self Assessment Identifies
NRC Commitment Not Met
January 2, 2001
CR A2001-00028
Poor Quality ACEs Being Completed by
Maintenance
January 4, 2001
CR A2001-00059
Performance Indicator OM.1, Unplanned
Entries Into LCOs, is in Variance
January 8, 2001
CR A2001-00208
Potential FME - 2SX052B Seat Ring and
Plate Missing
January 22, 2001
CR A2001-00379
Admin Procedure Not Adhered to
Resulting in NEP Inadvertent Deletion
February 6, 2001
CR A2001-00515
1CF5000B Found Out of Position
February 18, 2001
CR A2001-00608
Required Work for Temporary Modification
Removal Not Completed as Scheduled
February 28, 2001
CR A2001-00633
Unit 1 Station Air Compressor Found with
Low Oil Level
March 2, 2001
CR A2001-00714
Entry Into LCO 3.6.5 for U2 High
Containment Temperature
March 6, 2001
CR A2001-00916
Ambiguous Work Task Instructions Can
Result in OOS Error and Personal Injury
March 26, 2001
CR A2001-00930
NO Identified an Inadequate Corrective
Action
March 28, 2001
CR A2001-01168
Potential Rework - 1SX178 Failed to Open
on 1B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Diesel
Start
April 20, 2001
CR A2001-01170
Potential Rework - 1CS009B Trips
Breaker During Votes Testing after
Maintenance
April 20, 2001
CR A2001-01187
Unplanned Entry Into LCO 3.7.8 Due to 1B
SX Train Declared Inoperable
April 23, 2001
CR A2001-01337
Isolation of Secondary Pot Fuses for 4.16
and 6.9 KiloVolt Busses
May 6, 2001
CR A2001-01421
Unplanned Entry into TRM Technical LCO
Due to OOS
May 13, 2001
CR A2001-01535
Received Over Temperature Delta
Temperature High Reactor Trip Alert
Annunciator & Bistable Due to
Misperformed Procedure
May 21, 2001
32
CR A2001-01588
2SI080A Valve Found Out of Position
During Operator Rounds
May 28, 2001
CR A2001-01645
2RE1003 Failure to Open - Unplanned
LCOAR Entry
June 2, 2001
CR A2001-01735
2PR030J Failing Checksource, Unplanned
TRM Technical LCO Entry
June 10, 2001
CR A2001-01768
Work Delayed by Confined Space
Procedure Revision
June 11, 2001
CR A2001-01808
OPR10J Purge Inlet Valve Found Out of
Position
June 18, 2001
CR A2001-01893
Procedure Deficiency Associated with
Breath Alcohol Testing
June 25, 2001
CR A2001-02123
NRC Comments Associated with
Performance of 1BwOSR 3.5.2.2-2
July 20, 2001
CR A2001-02174
Unit 0 Service Air Compressor Unloader
Valve Malfunction
July 26, 2001
CR A2001-02271
Bus 159 Blew Secondary Pot Fuse
August 5, 2001
CR A2001-02304
Repair in Switchyard Without Proper
Procedure
August 8, 2001
CR A2000-03499
No Identified Examples of Inadequate
Dispositioning of OPEX
September 5, 2000
Work Requests (WRs)
Wall Thinning Replace Pipe
July 11, 2001
Cut Fire Retardant Door Wedges for
6.9/4 KiloVolt Breaker Doors
August 5, 2001
Aftercooler Cu Discharge Line is Cracked.
Please Replace
September 20, 2001
Pipe Break Upstream of Valve
September 28, 2001
Open End Limit Switch is Broken and
Requires Replacement
September 29, 2001
Instrument Air System (IA) Isolation Valve
to 1PS9354B is Broken Off
September 29, 2001
Air Line Upstream of IA Isolation Valve to
1WS106 Broke
September 30, 2001
33
Change Hand Switch Design to Dual
Action
October 4, 2001
Change Hand Switch Design to Dual
Action
October 4, 2001
Valve Wont Open, May be Bound, Need
Assist to Open
October 2, 2001
Internal of OWX248 Installed Backward.
Install it Correctly.
October 18, 2001
Valve May be Mechanically Binding,
Adjust Limits
October 4, 2001
Found IA Line Disconnected
October 4, 2001
Several Concerns With Steam Dumps
Discovered
October 12, 2001
Stem Separated From Diaphragm
October 18, 2001
Grease Fitting on Pipe Support Painted:
Prevents Lubrication
October 25, 2001
Grease Fitting on Pipe Support Painted:
Prevents Lubrication
October 25, 2001
Grease Fitting on Pipe Support Painted:
Prevents Lubrication
October 25, 2001
Grease Fitting on Pipe Support Painted:
Prevents Lubrication
October 25, 2001
Replace Cylinder #9R Kiene Valve
(Binding, Wont Open Fully)
October 31, 2001
Valve Will Not cycle During Performance
of 2BwOS SX-Q1
November 24, 2001
WR 00357926-01
1 SI8840B Breaker Trips When Trying To
Open the Valve
September 10, 2001
Reverse Threaded Valve Installed
October 30, 1997
Disassemble, Inspect, and Preventive
Maintenance Recondition per NSP-ER-
3017
October 12, 1999
1CS009B MCC Thermal Overload
Protection Surveillance (132X1-G1)
February 29, 2000
34
Outboard Seal is Leaking Approximately 2
Drops/Minute. Repair/Replace Pump, 2A
Centrifugal Charging Assembly
March 5, 2000
Remove Pipe Cap, Clean and chase
Threads, Install New Pipe
April 24, 2000
Valve Stem Twisted-Replace. Discovered
While Trying to Achieve
June 9, 2000
Replace Relay K0913, Contact
Discrepancy Noted During SSPS
September 8, 2000
Pipe Wall has Significant Thinning.
Correct Per Engineering Request 9801093
September 22, 2000
IA Line Separated from I/A Isolation Valve
October 19, 2000
Valve Does Not Completely Isolate on
Close Signal
October 24, 2000
2CV121, Stuck 10% Open Will Not Move
Either Direction
October 30, 2000
2RY8028 Valve Will Not Stay Open When
Stroked. Troubleshoot
October 31, 2000
Water Seeping Into Room Thru East Wall
and to Floor
December 31, 2000
Erosion/Replace 8" 90el AND 16" OF Pipe
Downstream W/P22
February 28, 2001
High Speed Breaker Fails to Close When
Attempted
March 8, 2001
WR 99137981-01
MM Leaks By
December 27, 2001
High Pressure Turbine #1 Governor Valve
Failed Closed
April 3, 2001
Pinhole Leak in Elbow Located at 418oF
10 + 11 FT.
April 9, 2001
1CS009B; Molded Case Circuit Breaker
Trip Test Surveillance
April 18, 2001
WR 990130116 01
SX Crosstie Valve Stroke & Indication
Quarterly Surveillance Test
March 16, 2000
WR 990155110 01
SX Crosstie Valve Stroke & Indication
Quarterly Surveillance Test
June 10, 2000
35
WR 990184343 01
SX Crosstie Valve Stroke & Indication
Quarterly Surveillance Test
September 2, 2000
Valve Will Not Fully Close, Troubleshoot
Repair as Necessary
September 3, 2000
WR 99277806 01
Essential Service Water Indication 18
Month Surveillance Test
November 21, 2001
WR A56570
Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV)
October 6, 1992
WR A56571
October 6, 1992
WR A56572
October 6, 1992
WR A56573
October 6, 1992
1RY085A Inspection
October 9, 1998
1RY085B Inspection
October 9, 1998
1RY086A Inspection
October 9, 1998
1RY086B Inspection
October 9, 1998
WR 970051161 01
Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV Instrument Air
Accumulator Check Valve Test
October 17, 1998
WR 970114258 01
Unit 2 Pressurizer PORV Instrument Air
Accumulator Check Valve Test
May 3, 1999
Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV Instrument Air
Accumulator Check Valve Test
March 22, 2000
WR 990050256 01
Unit 2 Pressurizer PORV Instrument Air
Accumulator Check Valve Test
October 24, 2000
WR 990224847 01
Unit 2 Pressurizer PORV Instrument Air
Accumulator Check Valve Test
October 28, 2000
WR 99159828 01
Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV Instrument Air
Accumulator Check Valve Test
September 24, 2001
Common Cause Analysis
A2000-02557: A Review of CAPSYS
Indicates 23 PIFs Initiated This Year
Identifying Incorrect or Non-Conforming
Parts Received at Braidwood A2000-
02557)
August 4, 2000
A2000-03442: Potential Trend-Foreign
Material Events and Issues
September 29, 2000
36
A2000-03505: Nuclear Oversight Identified
Poor Quality of ACEs
October 4, 2000
A2000-03675: 7 of 7 Trend Reports
Reviewed Found Unsatisfactory by
Downers Grove Office
November 17, 2000
A2000-04317: Potential Trend-Contractor
Control Issue-Outage
June 29, 2001
A2000-04329: A2R08 Outage Reactivity
Management
December 15, 2000
A2000-04348: Potential Trend: Foreign
Material Exclusion
April 2, 2001
A2000-04494: Procedural Non-
Compliance of OP-AA-201-004
January 19, 2001
A2000-04560: Administrative Directors Not
Contacted During August Drill
February 21, 2001
A2000-04610: Common Cause Related to
December 3, 2001
A2001-00271: Potential Adverse Trend
Related Electrical Maintenance
Department
December 31, 2001
A2001-00381: Potential Increase Trend of
Errors - Design Change Document
March 20, 2001
A2001-00440: Safety System Design
Inspection Items-Drawings
April 6, 2001
A2001-01917: Potential Adverse Trend-
Rework Issues Relating
August 21, 2001
NO Identified Problems with Administrative
Procedure Adherence
October 16, 2001
Potential Trend - Fire Protection/Hot Work
Issues in A2R09
December 14, 2001
Potential Trend - Contractor Control
Issues in A1R09
January 18, 2001
Potential Trend - Increasing Amount of
Rework Issues
December 14, 2001
AR 0032989-02
Ineffective Corrective Actions to Prevent
Recurrence Associated with Work
Package Quality
October 31, 2000
37
CR A2000-03675
7 of 7 Trend Reports Reviewed Found
Unsatisfactory by Downers Grove
September 19, 2000
CR A2000-04610
Common Cause Related to A2R08 -
Overconfidence
December 15, 2000
AIT 57124-02
An Investigation Into the High Number of
Chiller Related CRs Generated in 2001
August 16, 2001
AIT 79302-03
Perform a Review of the 23 Condition
Reports Identified Under CR# 79302 to
Determine if an Adverse Trend Exists in
the Area of Fire Protection/Hot Work
Issues in A1R09
December 16, 2001
AIT 79519-03
Perform a Review of Approximately 88
Condition Reports Identified Under CR#
79519 to Determine if an Adverse Trend
Exists in the Area of Contractor Control
January 10, 2001
Reactivity Management Controls During
Plant Operations
Revision 0
Pressure Water Reactor Reactivity
Management Controls During Operations
Revision 0
Self-Assessments
Braidwood Plant Support 4Q 2000
Observations
October 22, 2000
Maintenance FOs for NOA-BW-00-4Q
Assessment AR 36187
October 30, 2000
Plant Support FOs for NOA BW-00-4Q
Assessment AR 36187
January 3, 2001
Plant Support FOs for NOA BW-01-1Q
Assessment AR 41552
February 6, 2001
Operations FOs for NOA BW-01-2Q
Assessment AR 48227
July 28, 2001
Operations FOs for NOA BW-01-2Q
Assessment AR 48227
August 28, 2001
Maintenance FOs for NOA BW-01-2Q
Assessment AR 48227
June 22, 2001
Plant Support FOs for NOA BW-01-2Q
Assessment AR 48227
May 10, 2001
38
Plant Support FOs for NOA BW-01-2Q
Assessment AR 48227
June 30, 2001
Operations FOs for NOA BW-01-3Q
Assessment AR 48228
August 28, 2001
Operations FOs for NOA BW-01-3Q
Assessment AR 48228
August 29, 2001
Operations FOs for NOA BW-01-3Q
Assessment AR 48228
September 20, 2001
Maintenance FOs for NOA BW-01-3Q
Assessment AR 48228
August 21, 2001
Maintenance FOs for NOA BW-01-3Q
Assessment AR 48228
August 28, 2001
Maintenance FOs for NOA BW-01-3Q
Assessment AR 48228
September 7, 2001
Maintenance FOs for NOA BW-01-3Q
Assessment AR 48228
September 12, 2001
Maintenance FOs for NOA BW-01-3Q
Assessment AR 48228
September 20, 2001
Maintenance FOs for NOA BW-01-3Q
Assessment AR 48228
September 21, 2001
Maintenance FOs for NOA BW-01-3Q
Assessment AR 48228
September 30, 2001
Braidwood A1R09 Outage Field
Observations
September 18, 2001
Braidwood A1R09 Outage Field
Observations
September 24, 2001
Braidwood A1R09 Outage Field
Observations
September 29, 2001
Operations FOs for NOA-BW-01-4Q
Assessment AR 76870
December 1, 2001
Operations FOs for NOA-BW-01-4Q
Assessment AR 76870
December 17, 2001
Operations FOs for NOA-BW-01-4Q
Assessment AR 76870
December 30, 2001
Maintenance FOs for NOA-BW-01-4Q
Assessment AR 76870
November 21, 2001
39
Maintenance FOs for NOA-BW-01-4Q
Assessment AR 76870
November 30, 2001
Plant Support FOs for NOA-BW-01-4Q
Assessment AR 76870
December 20, 2001
Braidwood A1R09 Outage Field
Observations
October 9, 2001
Braidwood A1R09 Outage Field
Observations
October 21, 2001
Braidwood A2F35 Outage Field
Observations
November 10, 2001
Braidwood Station Chemistry, Radwaste &
Environmental Areas - 4th Quarter 2000
Braidwood Station Chemistry, Radwaste &
Environmental Areas - 1st Quarter 2001
Braidwood Station Chemistry, Radwaste &
Environmental Areas - 2nd Quarter 2001
Braidwood Station Chemistry, Radwaste &
Environmental Areas - 3rd Quarter 2001
NOL 20-01-034
Braidwood Station Nuclear Oversight
Post-Outage Performance Assessment for
A1R09
November 16, 2001
NOL 20-01-035
Braidwood Station Nuclear Oversight
Post-Outage Performance Assessment for
A2F35
November 30, 2001
NOA-BW-00-4Q
Nuclear Oversight Continuous
Assessment Report Braidwood Generating
Station October - December 2000
January 31, 2001
NOA-BW-01-1Q
Nuclear Oversight Continuous
Assessment Report Braidwood Generating
Station January - March 2001
April 30, 2001
NOA-BW-01-2Q
Nuclear Oversight Continuous
Assessment Report Braidwood Generating
Station April - June 2001
July 30, 2001
NOA-BW-01-3Q
Nuclear Oversight Continuous
Assessment Report Braidwood Generating
Station July - September 2001
October 31, 2001
40
NOA-BW-01-4Q
Nuclear Oversight Continuous
Assessment Report Braidwood Generating
Station October - December 2001
January 29, 2002
Nuclear Oversight Self-Assessment
Report 4th Quarter 2000
Nuclear Oversight Self-Assessment
Report 1st Quarter 2001
Nuclear Oversight Self-Assessment
Report 2nd Quarter 2001
Nuclear Oversight Self-Assessment
Report 3rd Quarter 2001
Radiation Protection Self-Assessment
Report - 3rd Quarter 2001
Self Assessment Report - 3rd Quarter 2001
Site-wide CAP Focused Area Self-
Assessment Report ( Follow-up Report)
February 1, 2001
Regulatory Assurance Self-Assessment 1st
Quarter 2001
Regulatory Assurance Self-Assessment 1st
Quarter 2001
Regulatory Assurance Self-Assessment
2nd Quarter 2001
Regulatory Assurance Self-Assessment
3rd Quarter 2001
Maintenance Quarterly Assessment
Report 3rd Quarter 2001
System Health Indicator Program
Braidwood Station SHIP Report for
September 2000
Procedures
BwOP RH-6
Placing the RH System in Shutdown
Cooling
Revision 2
0Bw0A PRI - 8
Auxiliary Building Flooding
Revision 1
1Bw0A PRI - 8
Essential Service Water Malfunction
Revision 100
41
1BwOSR 0.1-1,2,3
U1 Modes 1,2, and 2 3 Shiftly and Daily
Operating Surveillance
Revision 14
1BwOSR 3.3.1.2-1
U1 Power Range High Flux Setpoint Daily
Channel Calibration (Computer
Calorimetric)
Revision 7
1BwOSR 3.4.11.3
Pressurizer PORV Instrument Air
Accumulator Check Valve Test
Revision 1
1BwOSR 3.4.11.3
Pressurizer PORV Instrument Air
Accumulator Check Valve Test
Revision 2
1BwOSR 3.4.11.3
Pressurizer PORV Instrument Air
Accumulator Check Valve Test
Revision 3
1BwOSR 3.7.8.1
U2 Essential Service Water Monthly
Surveillance Data Sheet
Revision 4
2BwOSR 5.5.8.SX-1B
Essential Service Water Train B Valve
Stroke Quarterly Surveillance
Revision 3
1BwOS SX-Q1
U2 Essential Service Water System
Manual Ball Valve Cycle Quarterly
Surveillance
Revision 2
BwVS 800-2
Instrument Air Sampling Requirements
Revision 4E2
MA-BR-EM-1-3.8.a.3-1
Surveillance for Inspection and Testing of
480 Volt Motor Control Center (MCC)
Draw-Out Units
Revision 1
MA-BR-EM-1-3.8.a.3-1
Surveillance for Inspection and Testing of
480 Volt Motor Control Center (MCC)
Draw-Out Units
Revision 2
Work Screening and Classification
Revision 5
Operator Work-Around Program
Revision 0
Corrective Action Program (CAP)
Procedure
Revision 1
Common Cause Analysis Manual
Revision 1
Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual
Revision 0
Effectiveness Review Manual
Revision 0
Coding and Trending Manual
Revision 1
CAP Process Expectations Manual
Revision 0
Equipment Reliability Process Description
Revision 0
42
Implementation of the Maintenance Rule
Revision 1
Exelon Nuclear Employee Concerns
Program Process Description
Revision 0
Nuclear Policy Employee Issues
June 25, 2001
Shutdown Safety Management Program
Revision 1
Operating Experience (OPEX)
Revision 2
Q1 2001 Procedure Use and Compliance
Prompt Investigations
A2001-02014: Steam Dump Valves
1MS004 C and G Made Inoperable
June 3, 2002
Prompt Investigation Into the Motor
Rotation Issues With the 1D
Condensate/Condensate Booster Pump
Motor
June 8, 2001
Prompt Investigation of 1WG01FB Circuit
Found Energized with Clearance Order
Placed (CR 82702)
November 13, 2001
Miscellaneous
Operator Work Around Status Update
February 11, 2001
Operator Workaround Minutes
October 5, 2000
ER 99-029
1B Charging Pump (1CV01PB) Seal
Leakage
December 22, 1999
UFSAR 9-058
Increase the Maximum Allowed ESF
Recirculation Loop Leakage External to
Containment
Braidwood Chronic Problem List
PIF A1997-04845
Incorrect Valve Installed as 2SX124B
October 30, 1997
Braidwood Maintenance Rule (a)(1)
Systems Since 09/01/2000
System Health Overview Instrument Air 4th
Quarter 2001
43
Drawing. M55
Diagram of Instrument Air Lake/River
Screen House and Make-up Demin. Bldg.
Units 1 & 2
Revision AA
System Monitoring Plan
Instrument Air System
April 30, 2001
AIT 79728
Potential Adverse Trend - Increasing
Rework Issues
December 12, 2001
00042593-05-00
Completed and Open Actions from A2001-
00131: AR Assignment/Sub Assignment
Summary Report (CAP010)
February 26, 2001
Instrument Air Sample Data 1/2000-
12/2001
NUREG-1275 Vol. 2
Operating Experience Feedback Report -
Air Systems Problems
December 1987
ANSI/ISA-S7.3-1975
Quality Standard for Instrument Air
November 16, 1981
Instrument Air System Maintenance Rule -
Evaluation History
Perform OPEX Review of NRC
June 12, 2001
Main Feedwater system Degradation in
Safety-Related ASME Code class 2 Piping
Inside the Containment of a Pressurized
Water Reactor
June 2, 2001
Foreign Material in Standby Liquid Control
Storage Tanks
January 17, 2002
NON BY-01-097
Planning and Human Performance Errors
Delay 2B Diesel Generator Return to
Service
December 3, 2001
NSAL-01-004
May 2, 2001
ESBU-TB-96-03-RO
RH Pump Operating Recommendations
June 20, 1996
Condensate Storage Tank
Licensee Event Report
Three Main Steam Safety Valves
Exceeded the Technical specification Limit
by Greater Than 3%
November 19, 2001
44
Braidwood U2 Reactor Trip and
Subsequent Loss of Non-Safety Related
Offsite Power Due to Failure to Perform
Concurrent Verification and Improper
Command and Control
July 17, 2001
Main Steam Isolation Valves Not Stroke
Timed in Mode 3 as Required
November 26, 2001
CQD-003676
Review of the Sulzer Qualification Report
(E12.5.785, Rev. 0) for the Essential
Service Water Pumps (1,2SX01PA & PB)
for the Braidwood and Byron Stations
Revision 1
AP System Notebook, Section 4,
Performance Monitoring Failures (DHP
Breaker Significant events)
September 12, 2001
AP System Notebook, Section 6,
Performance Monitoring Failures (MCC
Significant Events)
February 6, 2002
AP System Notebook, Section 6,
Performance Monitoring Failures (DS
Breaker significant Events)
Braidwood Inservice Inspection Program
Plan
September 1, 2001
01823-TR-001
Evaluation of Dresser 3700 Series Safety
Valve Inconel X-750 Disc
Revision 0
EC 0000332797 000
Change Breaker Setting for 1SI8804B
September 11, 2001
ComEd Corrective Action Program - NRC
Presentation
June 15, 2000
Nuclear Safety Review Board - Braidwood
Station
February 1, 2002
Braidwood Pressurizer PORV
Accumulator Instrument Air Isolation
Check Valve Performance
February 20, 2002