L-2017-076, Radiological Emergency Plan - Revision 65

Radiological Emergency Plan - Revision 65

ML17123A080
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	05/03/2017
From:	Snyder M Florida Power & Light Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-2017-076
Download: ML17123A080 (222)

Text

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MAY 0 3 2017 L-2017-076 10 CPR 50 Appendix E 10 CPR 72.4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Radiological Emergency Plan - Revision 65 In accordance with 10 CPR 50 Appendix E, enclosed is one copy of the St. Lucie Plant Radiological Emergency Plan Revision 65. The plan, as revised, continues to meet the standards of 10 CPR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CPR 50 Appendix E.

Enclosure 1 provides a summaty of changes to the St. Lucie Plant - Radiological Emergency Plan -

Revision 65.

Enclosure 2 is a copy of the St. Lude Plant - Radiological Emergency Plan - Revision 65, Effective Date: AprilS, 2017.

Please contact Gail Bowen at 772-467-5190 if there are questions regarding this revision.

Sincerely, Michael J. Snyder Licensing Manager St. Lucie Plant MJS/KWF Enclosures (2) cc: USNRC, Director, Spent Fuel Project Office (without Enclosure 2)

USNRC, Regional Administrator, Region II (without Enclosure 2)

Florida Power & Light Company 6501 S. Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL 34957

L-2017-076 Enclosure 1 Page 1 of 2 Enclosure 1 St. Lucie Plant Radiological Emergency Plan - Revision 65 Summary of Changes

L-2017-076 Enclosure 1 Page 2 of 2 St. Lucie Plant Radiological Emergency Plan - Revision 65 Summary of Changes Administrative Changes

1. Page 1-14 and Page 2 Nomenclature updated. The Emergency News Center (ENC) name was changed to the Joint Information Center (JIC).

2. Page 3-5: Table 3-2A, St. Lucie Unit 1 Process and Effluent Radiation Monitors Used for Accident Assessment Table - Typical high alarm set point was changed to the Unit 1 replacement Main Steam Line Monitor values.

3. Page 4-5: Figure 4 The Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form was updated with the current state revision.

4. Page 4 Remove reference to the ITN phone system from the communication interface table. Phones were upgraded to the Internet Protocol Telephony (IPT) system.

5. Figure 5-1, Protective Action Recommendations page 5-14 "PARs Based on Dose Table

- Aligned the PARs Based on Dose Table with current revision of EPIP-08, Off-Site Notifications and Protective Action Recommendations to address NRC inspection comment.

6. App-E-2: Appendix E, Technical Support Agreements section - Separates Martin County Fire Rescue into two specific technical support agreement departments. Martin County Department of Emergency Services was added to address NRC inspection comment.

Significant Changes

7. APP-A-9: Radiological Effluent page 6 - Unit 1 Main Steam Line Monitor RU1, RA1, and RS1 channel numbers and EALs were updated with replacement Main Steam Line Monitor instrument values. EAL threshold value units of measure were changed from mR/hr to µCi/cc. Unit 2 Main Steam Line Monitor RU1, RA1, and RS1 EALs were updated. EAL value determination remained consistent with NEI 99-01R5, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.

8. APP-C-9: Change Radiological Effluent page 6 - Unit 1 Main Steam Line Monitor RU1, RA1, and RS1 channel numbers and EALs were updated with replacement Main Steam Line Monitor instrument values. EAL threshold value units of measure were changed from mR/hr to µCi/cc. Unit 2 Main Steam Line Monitor RU1, RA1, and RS1 EALs were updated. EAL value determination remained consistent with NEI 99-01R5, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.

9. APP-A-22: RWT 2162031, Hot Basis Table page 19. Procedure 1[2] ONP-100.03 has been superseded by 1[2] AOP-100.03. Procedure numbers were changed.

10. APP-A-1, APP-A-2, APP-A-9, APP-A-10, APP-A-21, APP-A-22, APP-C-1, APP-C-2, APP-C-9, APP-C-10, APP-C-15, APP-C-16 Hot and Cold Basis page revision numbers and footers were updated to stay aligned with changed pages and EAL table updates.

L-2017-076 Enclosure 2 Enclosure 2 St. Lucie Plant Radiological Emergency Plan - Revision 65 Effective Date: April 5, 2017 (1 copy - 218 pages)

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4 I-Effective Date: - 5 I2017 EP3:4 (1) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE OF CONTENTS Planning Standards Page (NUREG-0654) 1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION 1.1 Purpose 1-1 A.1.b 1.2 Definitions 1-1 A.1.b 1.3 Scope and Applicability 1-6 A.1.b 1.4 Concept of Operations 1-7 A.1.b 1.5 Supporting Plans and Agreements 1-11 P.9 2.0 ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES 2.1 Elements of the Emergency Response 2-1 A.1.a, b, c, B.8, B.9, Organization C.4, L.4 2.2 Florida Power & Light Company 2-9 A.1.b, d, e, A.2.a Emergency Response Organization A.4, B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6, B.7, C.2.b, G.3.a, G.4.a, M.2, M.3, P.2, P.3 2.3 Emergency Response Support and 2-27 B.8, C.1, C.3, C.4, Resources H.6.c 2.4 Emergency Facilities and Equipment 2-30 H.1, H.2, H.4, H.9, H.11 2.5 Medical and Health Support 2-37 F.2, L.1, L.2, L.4 3.0 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 3.1 Unusual Event 3-1 D.1 3.2 Alert 3-1 D.1 3.3 Site Area Emergency 3-2 D.1 3.4 General Emergency 3-3 D.1 3.5 Emergency Action Levels 3-4 D.1, D.2, I.1 4.0 NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 4.1 FPL Emergency Response Organization 4-1 E.1, E.2, F.1.e, M.3 4.2 State and County Agencies 4-3 E.3, E.4, F.1a, b, d, e, J.7, M.3 4.3 St. Lucie County and Martin County Department of Public Safety Emergency 4-6 E.3, F.1.a, b, d, e Management Directors 4.4 Federal Agencies 4-7 E.3,F.1.a, b, d, e 4.5 Notification of the Public by the 4-8 E.5 State/County 4.6 Communications Equipment 4-8 F.1 4.7 Testing 4-10 F.3 EP3:4 (2) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Planning Standards Page (NUREG-0654) 5.0 RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS 5.1 Accident Assessment 5-1 H.5, H.6, H.7, H.8, H.12, I.2, I.3, I.4, I.5, I.6, I.7, I.8, I.9, M.4 5.2 Protective Response 5-9 E.5, E.6, J.1, J.2, J.3, J.4, J.5, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.10, K.7, M.4 5.3 Radiological Exposure Control 5-20 J.6, K.1, K.2, K.3, K.5 5.4 Recovery and Re-entry 5-27 M.1, M.2, M.3 6.0 PUBLIC INFORMATION 6.1 Preparatory Public Information Program 6-1 G.1, G.2 6.2 Florida Power & Light Company 6-1 E.7, G.3a, b, G.4.a, Emergency Public Information Program b, G.5 6.3 Rumor Control 6-4 7.0 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 7.1 Exercises and Drills 7-1 F.3, N.1, N.2, N.4, N.5, P.2 7.2 Emergency Response Training 7-8 O.1, O.2, O.3, O.4, O.5, P.2 7.3 Planning Effort Development 7-14 P.1, P.2, P.3, P.4, P.5, P.9 7.4 Emergency Equipment Maintenance 7-17 H.10 7.5 Letters of Agreement 7-17 H.10 EP3:4 (3) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Planning Standards Page (NUREG-0654)

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT APP-A-1-38 CONDITIONS TABLE APPENDIX B EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FISSION APP-B-1-2 PRODUCT BARRIER CHART APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD APP-C-1-32 CONDITIONS TABLE APPENDIX D STATE OF FLORIDA RADIOLOGICAL APP-D-1 A.2, C.2.a, D.3, H.3, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR I.11, J.9, J.10.b, d NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS thru i, J.11, J.12, K.4, L.3, O.4 APPENDIX E TECHNICAL SUPPORT AGREEMENTS APP-E-1 A.3, B.9

1. Westinghouse Electric (ABB/CE)

2. URS Corporation

3. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

4. U.S. Coast Guard

5. Florida Highway Patrol

6. St. Lucie County Sheriffs Department

7. St. Lucie County - Ft. Pierce Fire District

8. City of Ft. Pierce - Police Department

9. City of Ft. Pierce - City Manager

10. Martin County Sheriffs Department

11. AREVA NP Inc. (Framatome Technologies)

12. U.S. Department of Energy (Savannah River Operations)

13. U.S. Department of Energy (REAC/TS)

14. Lawnwood Regional Medical Center

15. Martin Memorial Medical Center

16. Bechtel Power Corporation

17. Martin County Fire Rescue

18. Martin County Department of Emergency Services APPENDIX F LISTING OF EMERGENCY PLAN APP-F-1 P.7 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EP3:4 (4) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Page Figure 1-1 Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone 1-8 Figure 1-2 Initial Notification 1-14 Figure 2-1 FPL Emergency Response Capability 2-4 Figure 2-2 Figure number not used Figure 2-3 St. Lucie Plant Normal Operating Organization 2-14 Figure 2-4 On-Shift Emergency Response Capability 2-15 Figure 2-5 Expanded Response Organization 2-28 Figure 2-6 St. Lucie Plant On-site Emergency Facilities Location Map 2-33 Figure 4-1 Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form 4-5 Figure 4-2 Communications Interfaces 4-12 Figure 5-1 Protective Action Recommendations 5-12 Figure 5-2 Site Evacuation Routes 5-25 Figure 5-3 General Public Evacuation Routes 5-26 Figure 6-1 Public Information Interfaces 6-2 EP3:4 (5) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

LIST OF TABLES Page Table 1-1 Typical Sequence of Actions 1-13 Table 2-1 Minimum Shift Crew Composition for a Two Unit Site with 2-22 Separate Control Rooms and Shift Staffing Augmentation and Emergency Capabilities Table 2-2 Florida Power & Light Emergency Response Organization 2-24 Functions and Responsibilities Table 2-3 Radiological Emergency Equipment for Control Rooms and TSC 2-34 Table 2-4 Radiological Emergency Equipment for the Operational Support 2-35 Center Table 3-1 Table number not used Table 3-2A St. Lucie Unit 1 Process and Effluent Radiation Monitors Used for 3-5 Accident Assessment Table 3-2B St. Lucie Unit 2 Process and Effluent Radiation Monitors Used for 3-6 Accident Assessment Table 3-3 St. Lucie 1 and 2 Area Radiation Monitors 3-7 Table 3-4 Non-Radiological Instrumentation Used for Accident Assessment 3-8 Table 4-1 Communications Responsibilities 4-11 Table 5-1 Sources of Meteorological Data 5-5 Table 6-1 6-5 to 6-7 (Sample Initial) FPL Press Statements (for public release)

Table 7-1 Example Scenario Format 7-3 EP3:4 (6) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

1. GENERAL INFORMATION 1.1 Purpose This Emergency Plan contains Florida Power & Light Company's plans for coping with radiological emergencies at the St. Lucie Plant, a facility with two commercial power reactors, Units 1 and 2 located in St. Lucie County, Florida.

The plan has been designed to preclude or mitigate the adverse health and safety effects of an emergency. Four general objectives have been considered in the development of this plan:

1. Timely and accurate assessment of off-normal or emergency conditions, and proper notification of responsible authorities.

2. Effective coordination of emergency actions among all organizations having a response role.

3. Continued assessment of actual or potential consequences both on-site and off-site.

4. Continuing maintenance of an adequate state of emergency preparedness.

1.2 Definitions Annual - Occurring once per calendar year (January 1 through December 31).

Assessment Actions - Those actions taken during or after an emergency event to obtain and process information necessary to make decisions to implement specific emergency measures.

Company - Florida Power & Light Company (FPL)

Corporate Functional Area Manager (CFAM) - Emergency Preparedness -

Emergency Preparedness is a key discipline that supports the FPL Fleet Excellence Plan. The CFAM is the highest authority in a specific functional area. The purpose of the CFAM is to provide fleet wide leadership and direction to position the applicable functional area as a top industry performer. The CFAM provides oversight of functional area programs, policies and processes utilizing assessment reports, performance indicators and peer groups to assess the health of programs, policies and processes. The CFAM works with the Site Functional Area Manager (SFAM), who is the site Emergency Preparedness Manager.

EP3:4 1-1 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

1. GENERAL INFORMATION (continued) 1.2 Definitions (continued)

Corrective Actions - Those measures taken to mitigate or terminate an emergency situation at or near the source of the problem in order to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive material or to reduce the magnitude of a release, e.g., shutting down equipment, firefighting, repair and damage control.

Emergency - Any off-normal event or condition which is classified into one of the four event categories of Table 3-1, Emergency Classification Table. A radiological emergency at the Plant is classified in accordance with Section 3, Emergency Classification System and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPIP-01, Classification of Emergencies, as an (Notification of) Unusual Event, an Alert, a Site Area Emergency, or a General Emergency.

Emergency Action Levels (EALs) - Plant specific values (such as radiological dose rates, contamination levels, or specific instrument indications); states (such as containment integrity breached or confirmed hurricane warning); or combinations of values and states that may be used as thresholds for initiating specific emergency measures (i.e.,

designating a particular class of emergency, or initiating a particular protective action).

Emergency Control Officer (ECO) - A designated company officer or senior manager who will act as the chief nuclear officer. He/she will serve as the official spokesperson for the Nuclear Division.

Emergency Coordinator (EC) - The title assumed by the Shift Manager, until relieved by plant management through proper turnover, in the event of emergency conditions at the plant that trigger the Emergency Plan. The EC is responsible for notifying off-site authorities, emergency responders both inside and outside the company, and has full authority and responsibility for on-site emergency response actions. The EC is also responsible for Protective Action Recommendations during the initial stages of an emergency.

Emergency Information Manager (EIM) - A senior manager or designated member of the Corporate Communications Department who directs the operation of the Joint Information Center, develops news releases, and serves as a spokesperson for the company.

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) - Separate designated off-site facilities from which the St. Lucie County, Martin County and State of Florida Emergency Response Organizations will direct necessary assessment and protective actions for off-site areas.

EP3:4 1-2 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

1. GENERAL INFORMATION (continued) 1.2 Definitions (continued)

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - A designated off-site facility from which FPL emergency activities including assessment, protective action recommendations, and coordination with state and county officials is conducted.

Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) - Specific procedures that provide instructions to guide plant operations to terminate or mitigate the consequences of an accident during potential or actual emergency situations.

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) - A set of emergency response procedures initiated and followed by the FPL Emergency Response Organization to implement the appropriate sections of the Emergency Plan, assess and classify the emergency, notify the appropriate authorities, and provide continuing response capability.

Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) - That area, in which emergency planning for plume and/or ingestion exposure has been given consideration, in order to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken, to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the plant.

Emergency Response Organization (ERO) - That portion of the FPL organization assigned responsibilities upon initiation of the St. Lucie Plant Radiological Emergency Plan.

Emergency Security Manager (ESM) - A designated company manager, supervisor, or specialist who will have the responsibility for security aspects of the emergency response.

Emergency Technical Manager (ETM) - A designated company manager who will be responsible for providing technical support for emergency response actions.

Expanded Emergency Response Organization - A group of designated individuals from within the normal company organization who may cease normal activities and assume responsibility for augmenting FPL corrective, assessment and protective actions in the event of a radiological emergency at the plant.

Governmental Affairs Manager (GAM) - A designated senior manager who has the responsibility for liaison between the Recovery Manager/

Emergency Control Officer and political officials of the State and Federal Governments during an emergency.

EP3:4 1-3 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

1. GENERAL INFORMATION (continued) 1.2 Definitions (continued)

Hostile Action - An act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force.

Ingestion Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone - That area, approximately 50 miles in radius from the center of the plant, for which plans are made to protect people from ingestion of food-stuffs and water contaminated by radioactive materials released from the plant.

Joint Information Center (JIC) - A designated facility for use by the EIM and his/her staff in communicating with the news media. Public information officers from State, local, and federal response agencies would also function from the JIC.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) -

Governmental agency responsible for the forecasting of weather conditions. The National Weather Service (NWS) is a branch under NOAA that provides weather information and warning of severe weather situations, such as hurricanes and tornadoes.

Operational Support Center (OSC) - An on-site emergency response facility area where FPL Operations, Maintenance, Radiation Protection, Security, and Chemistry support personnel can report in an emergency and await assignment.

Plant - The St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2.

Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone - That area, approximately 10 miles in radius from the center of the plant, for which detailed plans are made to protect people from exposure to a plume containing radioactive materials.

Protective Actions - Those measures taken for the purpose of preventing or minimizing radiological exposure to persons.

Quarterly - Occurring once per calendar quarter with quarters ending on March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31 in a year.

Radiation Controlled Area (RCA) - The area (within the Protected Area) wherein personnel access is restricted for the purpose of monitoring and controlling exposure to radiation.

EP3:4 1-4 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

1. GENERAL INFORMATION (continued) 1.2 Definitions (continued)

REAC/TS - The Radiological Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site is operated by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities for the Department of Energy. REAC/TS serves as backup medical support for the St. Lucie Plant.

Recovery Actions - Those actions taken after an emergency to restore the plant as nearly as possible to its condition before the emergency.

Recovery Manager (RM) - A designated company officer or senior manager, who will have responsibility for the direction and control of the EOF. He/she has the authority to establish policy and to expend funds necessary to cope with emergency situations that trigger the implementation of the Emergency Plan.

Shift Communicator (SC) - a specific shiftly designated individual trained and qualified to assist the Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator in the Control Room in making emergency off-site notifications, notifying the Emergency Response Organizations and performing other activities as directed.

Site - A general term referring to the location of the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Other terms related to the site are given below:

On-Site - A relative term meaning those persons, things, locations, etc., which are associated with the "site."

Off-Site - A relative term meaning those persons, things, locations, etc., which are not directly associated with the "site." For example, this term is used to describe the State and local government groups as "off-site" agencies.

Owner Controlled Area - That portion of FPL property surrounding and including the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant which is subject to limited access and control as deemed appropriate by FPL.

Protected Area - The area (within the Owner Controlled Area) occupied by the nuclear units and associated equipment and facilities enclosed within the security perimeter fence. The area within which accountability of personnel is maintained in an emergency.

State - The State of Florida.

State Plan - The State of Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan.

EP3:4 1-5 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

1. GENERAL INFORMATION (continued) 1.2 Definitions (continued)

System Operations Power Coordinator - An FPL System Operations position which is staffed 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s/day for uninterrupted coordination of electrical power distribution. Communication is maintained with all FPL plants, service centers, and the General Office.

Technical Support Center (TSC) - A designated on-site facility that serves as a work area for use by technical and management personnel.

The TSC provides technical support to Control Room personnel in the event of an emergency.

Technical Support Center Supervisor - The person assigned to supervise the personnel and direct the technical support activities in the TSC.

Thyroid Dose (CDE) - The thyroid exposure from inhaled radioiodines -

Committed Dose Equivalent. Thyroid Dose (CDE) is used in Protective Action determination.

Total Dose (TEDE) - The total exposure from both external and internal (weighted) sources - Total Effective Dose Equivalent.

1.3 Scope and Applicability The Emergency Plan describes Florida Power & Light Company's plans for responding to emergencies that may develop at the St. Lucie Plant.

The plan has been prepared to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, 10 CFR 50.72, and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E. The purpose of this plan is to define and assign authority and responsibility in order to protect the health and safety of the public and plant personnel. This plan applies to all plant emergencies which have resulted in, or which increase the risk of the accidental release of radioactive materials to the environment.

Plans have been developed based upon knowledge of the potential consequences, timing, and release characteristics of a spectrum of events. Emergency Planning Zones have been defined. Figure 1-1 illustrates the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone for the St. Lucie Plant. The map (Figure 1-1) does not specifically include the area of ocean east of the plant. Since there are no islands in that direction, any evacuation of boating traffic would be addressed on a best effort basis. A key component of this plan is coordination with federal, state, and county authorities who contribute to the overall response effort.

This plan outlines company responsibilities within the framework of the overall emergency response organization, and provides a conceptual basis for the development of the detailed procedures necessary to implement the plan.

EP3:4 1-6 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

1. GENERAL INFORMATION (continued) 1.4 Concept of Operations The Emergency Plan defines emergency conditions and delineates the responsibilities and duties of the FPL Emergency Response Organization.

The Emergency Plan is concerned with the following basic activities, which are discussed in the Plan in detail:

1. Organization and resources adequate to detect the presence of an emergency condition, assess the condition, and respond in an appropriate manner (Chapter 2).

2. Assignment of an off-normal event to its proper emergency classification (Chapter 3).

3. Notification of off-site authorities, as required, and continuing communications (Chapter 4).

4. Gathering and interpreting data to determine appropriate actions (Chapter 5).

5. Assisting governmental agencies in the development of information for the public both in terms of preparatory education and emergency response information (Chapter 6).

6. Maintaining the FPL Emergency Preparedness Program in a state of readiness (Chapter 7).

Associated with this Emergency Plan are implementing procedures which provide a source of pertinent information and data required by the response organization during an emergency. These procedures are listed in Appendix F.

EP3:4 1-7 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

FIGURE 1-1 PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE N

ST LUCIE BLVD l.tARnN HWY (DIPSI EPLAN-F 1. 1-R3)

EP3:4 1-8 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

1. GENERAL INFORMATION (continued) 1.4 Concept of Operations (continued)

Off-normal events have been separated into the following four classifications of emergencies:

A. Notification of Unusual Event B. Alert C. Site Area Emergency D. General Emergency These four classes represent emergency conditions which trigger activation of emergency plans and procedures. When an emergency is declared in connection with one of these four classes, individuals assume new titles with special responsibilities.

Each emergency class is characterized by abnormal plant events detected by Control Room instrumentation and/or routine or directed surveillance activities.

The company's response to an emergency condition consists of an on-shift (immediate) response and an expanded (augmented) response Emergency Response Organization (ERO) which can readily adapt to an emergency condition as it develops. The immediate response phase encompasses the period of time and sequence of actions associated with the initial detection of an off-normal event, classification as an emergency, and activation of the Emergency Response Organization, if required.

During this phase, the Shift Manager assumes responsibility as the Emergency Coordinator and initiates the following general activities:

1. Diagnosis of the emergency

2. Initiation of corrective actions

3. Classification of the emergency

4. Notification of appropriate FPL authorities

5. Notification of appropriate off-site authorities EP3:4 1-9 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

1. GENERAL INFORMATION (continued) 1.4 Concept of Operations (continued)

During the expanded response phase, the Emergency Coordinator will assess the situation and expand, as necessary, the Emergency Response Organization. All available company resources (on-site and off-site) can be mobilized as needed during this period. State, county and federal response organizations can become fully operational, as required.

Continuing corrective, assessment, and protective actions are underway as required.

Table 1-1 summarizes the sequence of actions taken during the phased response. Figure 1-2 delineates the initial notification flow.

As discussed throughout this plan, FPL maintains adequate facilities and equipment for detecting, assessing, and responding to emergencies.

Redundant means of communications among key response participants are maintained. FPL also maintains agreements that will provide emergency medical, rescue, or fire support on-site, if needed. The training program is designed to maintain the proficiency of the Emergency Response Organization.

The FPL individual in charge of on-site emergency response during the immediate and expanded response phases is the Emergency Coordinator.

The senior company official involved in emergencies, with responsibility for policy and authority to expend funds, is the Recovery Manager. The Recovery Manager is also responsible for Emergency Operations Facility operation during the expanded response phase.

In St. Lucie and Martin Counties, the individual responsible during emergencies is the Chairperson, County Board of Commissioners or his/her designate (Director of County Department of Public Safety/Emergency Management). In both counties, the Chairperson, County Board of Commissioners, is responsible for direction and control during emergencies.

As indicated in Chapter 2 of the State Plan, the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) will operate from the State Emergency Operations Center in Tallahassee led by a Governor-appointed State Coordinating Officer (SCO), usually the Director of the Division of Emergency Management.

EP3:4 1-10 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

1. GENERAL INFORMATION (continued) 1.5 Supporting Plans and Agreements (continued)

Supporting plans and agreements are included in the Appendices of this plan. Additional material utilized in the preparation of the St. Lucie Plan are:

1. NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in support of Nuclear Power Plants; November, 1980.

2. NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Supplement 3, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants -

Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations, November, 2011.

3. NUREG-0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force: Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations; July, 1979.

4. NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements; November, 1980.

5. 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation.

6. 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.

7. 10 CFR 50.54 (hh)(1), Potential Aircraft Threat

8. EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents; October 1991.

9. Reg. Guide 1.97, Revision 2, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident, December, 1980.

10. NUREG-0728, Rev. 4, NRC Incident Response Plant (IRP),

April 14, 2005.

11. NUREG/BR-0150, Vol. 1, Response Technical Manual (USNRC).

12. NUREG/CR-7002, Criteria For Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies

13. UFSAR - Unit 1, Section 13.3, Emergency Planning

14. UFSAR - Unit 2, Section 13.3, Emergency Planning

15. Fire Protection Plan (AP 1800022)

16. St. Lucie Security Plan EP3:4 1-11 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

1. GENERAL INFORMATION (continued) 1.5 Supporting Plans and Agreements (continued)

17. Nuclear Energy Policy on Exposure Limits for Emergency Response Personnel, Revision to Policy Statement, Ltr. No. JNO-HP-94-056, 26 October, 1994.

18. On-Shift Staffing Analysis in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A, Revision 0, December 2012.

19. KLD TR-533, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Development of Evacuation Time Estimates EP3:4 1-12 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 1-1 TYPICAL SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS FPL RESPONSE Detection of Off-Normal Conditions Individual identifies off-normal condition.

Individual immediately notifies Shift Manager (SM).

Response Actions Shift Manager (SM) diagnoses condition and directs initial corrective action to control or mitigate the condition.

Shift Manager (SM) classifies condition in accordance with plant procedures. If the condition is classified as an emergency, the SM implements the Emergency Plan and becomes the Emergency Coordinator (EC).

The Emergency Coordinator (EC) mobilizes on-site response teams as necessary to assess and control the emergency.

Emergency Coordinator (EC) initiates necessary protective actions for on-site personnel, and evaluates need for protective action recommendations for the general public.

Shift Communicator (SC) notifies state and county in accordance with plant procedures.

The Emergency Coordinator (EC) orders mobilization of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) required for Alert classification or higher classification, in accordance with plant procedures.

Shift Communicator (SC) notifies NRC via Emergency Notification System (ENS) communications link, in accordance with plant procedures.

EP3:4 1-13 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 1-1 TYPICAL SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS (continued)

FPL RESPONSE (continued)

Expanded Response (as appropriate)

The Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC) are staffed and declared operational assuming command and control of the emergency. This includes Protective Action Recommendations (PARs),

notifications, and classification.

The Recovery Manager (RM) proceeds to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Recovery Manager (RM) notifies Emergency Coordinator (EC) when Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is operational and assumes responsibility for recommending off-site protective actions and for communications with off-site organizations. The Emergency Coordinator (EC) can now devote his/her attention to control of the power plant.

Recovery Manager (RM) (or designated response staff) receives and assesses periodic plant status, radiological data, and meteorological data, and continues communications and coordination with the state and county authorities.

Recovery Manager (RM) continues assessment of conditions and control of FPL response until plant conditions stabilize then closes out with summary to off-site authorities (Alert or higher classification) or prepares for further long-term activities.

Emergency Information Manager (EIM) proceeds to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) as appropriate and establishes communications with the Emergency Control Officer (ECO) and the Joint Information Center (JIC).

EP3:4 1-14 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

FIGURE 1-2 INITIAL NOTIFICATION EMERGENCY COORDINATOR I

SHIFT COMMUNICATOR

- ......... __., PLANT GENERAL

"""""""" MANAGER STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF .......

""""IIII( FPLEMERGENCY EMERGENCY .....

...... RESPONSE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION -

STATE OF FLORIDA BUREAU OF ....... (1)

RADIATION CONTROL EPZ COUNTIES EMERGENCY .....

RESPONSE

DIRECTORS US NRC (2)

OPERATIONS CENTER ON-SHIFT LOCAL SUPPORT

1. FIRE/AMBULANCE

2. MEDICAL

......... (3) (4}

-.... EMERGENCY

RESPONSE

ORGANIZATION (1) Via State Hot Ring Down Telephone (HRD)

Legend:

(2) Via Emergency Notification System (ENS)

- Primary Notification Pathway (3) Medical & Fire Emergencies Only, As Needed

- - - Alternate Notification Pathway (4) Via Plant Public Address System (PA}

(DIPS/ EPLAN/Fig.1 ~2/Rev.36)

EP3:4 1-15 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES 2.1 Elements of the Emergency Response Organization This section defines the primary components of the overall Emergency Response Organization and the relationship of each component to the total effort.

1. Florida Power & Light Company Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) is the licensed operator of the St. Lucie Plant. As the licensed operator, FPL has developed this Emergency Plan (and associated procedures) to specify actions and provide a framework for emergency response. FPL's primary responsibilities include the following:

1. Diagnosis and corrective action.

2. Emergency classification.

3. Notification of appropriate outside response organizations and continuing communication.

4. Initiation of protective actions for employees and others on-site.

5. Recommendation of protective actions, for the public.

6. Mobilization of Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Response Organization.

7. Continuing data collection, dose projection, and assessment actions.

8. Owner Controlled Area recovery and re-entry.

The Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Response Capability is described in detail in Section 2.2 and illustrated in Figure 2-1, with minimum crew staffing illustrated in Table 2-1.

2. State of Florida Emergency Response Organization As stated in State Plan, Appendix III,Section III, St. Lucie and Martin Counties are responsible for initial radiological emergency response operations. Should the scope of the emergency exceed the response capability of the risk counties, increased State action will be warranted. The Governor may transfer responsibility for overall emergency management to the State by issuing an Executive Order under the provisions of Section 252.35, Florida Statutes. Upon issuance of such an Executive Order, the risk, host and ingestion counties will continue to coordinate county response operations.

EP3:4 2-1 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.1 2. State of Florida Emergency Response Organization (continued)

In accordance with Chapter 252, Part III, Florida Statues, Florida has also adopted the Emergency Management Assistance Compact and Memoranda of Understanding between the Counties, other States and private organizations. These agreements provide mechanisms to obtain additional resources.

State of Florida Division of Emergency Management The Division of Emergency Management (DEM) is the state agency authorized to receive initial notification from Florida Power & Light Company (FPL). The State Watch Office (SWO) is responsible for alerting the state and county emergency response agencies to all notifications from FPL. Specific discussion on transportation of state emergency response personnel to the vicinity of the plant is discussed in Chapter 8 of the State Plan. This emergency response is conducted in accordance with the State Plan prepared by the DEM, in coordination with other State and County emergency response agencies. The locations where State Plan copies are kept at the St. Lucie Plant appear in Appendix D.

The DEM's defined responsibilities include:

1. Overall responsibility for coordinating the development and implementation of state and county emergency response plans.

2. Command and control of State emergency response resources.

3. Notification of state and county response agencies.

4. Coordination among state, federal (i.e., FEMA, EPA, DOE), and local agencies.

State of Florida Department of Health The Department of Health is the state agency authorized to provide the DEM with technical support and expertise in public health matters.

Department of Health defined responsibilities include:

1. Emergency medical services, public health, and sanitation.

2. Economic and social services.

Through the Bureau of Radiation Control

3. Radiological monitoring, off-site.

4. Off-site radiological exposure control and protective response recommendations for plume and ingestion pathway counties.

EP3:4 2-2 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.1 2. State of Florida Emergency Response Organization (continued)

Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Florida Highway Patrol The Florida Highway Patrol, through the coordination of the Department of Law Enforcement, provides the following services.

1. Traffic control

2. Communications (support)

3. Law enforcement coordination

4. Upon request, assist in the transportation of samples for analysis when immediate analysis is necessary

5. Within their authority, evaluate and exclude individuals from designated public areas.

These services will be provided in accordance with the State Plan (Chapter 2).

Other State Agencies As defined in the State Plan (Chapter 2), the DEM can request support as necessary from the following state agencies.

1. Department of Transportation

2. Department of Military Affairs

3. American Red Cross EP3:4 2-3 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

FIGURE 2-1 FPL EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY EMERGENCY

- INFORMATION MANAGER EMERGENCY CONTROL ~

OFFICER GOVERNMENTAL w I I

- AFFAIRS MANAGER l- I UiI LL I LL I EMERGENCY 0 .

I r--- SECURITY MANAGER RECOVERY MANAGER -

EMERGENCY TECHNICAL MANAGER EMERGENCY SENIOR MANAGER .

SHIFT MANAGER ORALTERNATE COORDINATOR (ON-SHIFl) * (EC) (PRIMARY)

ON-SHIFT EMERGENCY FUNCTION PRIMARY w Recovery As Directed By

!:: As Directed by & Emergency Coordinator/

enI Emergency Coordinator Restoration Recovery Manager z

0 TSC Health Physics Radiation Health Physics Supervisor Representative Protection or Alternate Fire Brigade Fire Fire Brigade Leader Protection Leader Operations/Chemistry Operations/Chemistry Personnel First Aid Personnel Security Shift Specialist TSC Security Supervisor Alternate Security or Protected Area Guard Alternate As Directed By Site Assembly Site Assembly Security Shift Specialist Area Supervisor Other Trained Emergency Response osc ERO Personnel (Re-entry/Repair) Re-entry Teams On-Shift Chemistry Off-Site TSC Dose Assessor/

Representative Dose Calculations EOF Dose Assessor (D!PSIEPLAN-F2.1-R3711if)

EP3:4 2-4 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES 2.1 3. County Emergency Response Agencies Counties that fall within the plume exposure pathway EPZ include St. Lucie County and Martin County. Counties that fall within the ingestion pathway EPZ include St. Lucie County, Martin County, Indian River County, Brevard County, Palm Beach County, Osceola County, Okeechobee County, Highlands County and Glades County.

The responsibility for hosting evacuees rests on Palm Beach, Indian River, and Brevard Counties.

The county emergency response agencies are described in Appendix III of the State Plan.

Chapter 10 of the State Plan addresses short term actions required in the plume exposure pathway EPZ and ingestion pathway EPZ.

State agencies take the lead in controlling ingestion pathway response. Appendix III establishes procedures to protect citizens of St. Lucie County and visitors to the County from the effects of an accident at the St. Lucie plant.Section II A of Appendix III includes the St. Lucie County Radiological Emergency Organization.

Section II B of Appendix III establishes procedures to protect citizens of Martin County and visitors to Martin County from the effects of an accident at the St. Lucie plant.Section II B of Appendix III describes the Martin County Radiological Emergency Organization.Section II C, II D, and II E to Appendix III include host plans for Indian River County, Palm Beach County, and Brevard County, respectively.

Boards of County Commissioners will take proper and responsible action to protect life, health, safety, property, and the environment from the consequences of nuclear power accidents. During radiological emergencies, resources and personnel of St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, Palm Beach, and Brevard Counties will be reserved and available for use by County Commissioners. Decision to implement protective action recommendations will be made jointly by the Chairpersons, Boards of County Commissioners (of the affected counties), and the Governor or State Director, Division of Emergency Management. If time does not permit State involvement in initial decision making, the decision to take protective actions may be made by the Chairperson, Board of County Commissioners (for the respective affected county), or designated alternate.

All County personnel and resources will be under the control of the County Commissioners. Federal and State resources will also be available to the Counties.

EP3:4 2-5 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.1 3. County Emergency Response Agencies (continued)

Alerting, warning, and evacuation of populations will be in accordance with procedures prescribed in Sections VI and VII of Appendix III and in Chapters 5 and 11 of the State Plan. Sections IX and XII of Appendix III describe hosting responsibilities, including shelter location and operation, and evacuee registration, monitoring, and decontamination.

Responsibility for direction and control of emergency response of each county rests with the Chairperson, Board of County Commissioners, unless a disaster declaration under provisions of Florida Statutes, Chapter 252 is in effect. If a disaster has been declared, responsibility for direction and control rests with the Governor or authorized representative.

In accordance with Chapter 252, Part III, Florida Statues, Florida has also adopted the Emergency Management Assistance Compact and Memoranda of Understanding between the Counties, other States and private organizations. These agreements provide mechanisms to obtain additional resources.

County Departments of Public Safety report to the Boards of County Commissioners. This is also true for other County resources, including the Sheriffs' Offices, Engineers' Offices, Fire Departments, Public Health Offices, School Boards, and other county organizations.

The Chairperson, Board of County Commissioners, has responsibility for overall emergency response planning. County Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors are responsible for actual plan development and updating. St. Lucie County, Palm Beach County, Martin County, Indian River County, and Brevard County each have an Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

EP3:4 2-6 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.1 3. County Emergency Response Agencies (continued)

St. Lucie and Martin County Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors The Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors for St. Lucie and Martin Counties have the major responsibility for coordinating emergency operations including communicating with the County Board and State DEM. The County Public Safety Directors receive initial notification from Florida Power & Light Company simultaneously with DEM via the State's Hot Ring Down telephone for all radiological emergencies. The St. Lucie and Martin County Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors then have responsibility for initiating any necessary protective actions for off-site areas (including off-site evacuations) based upon available information from the FPL Emergency Coordinator, Recovery Manager, and Bureau of Radiation Control. The St. Lucie County and Martin County plans are a part of the State Plan. In addition to overall responsibility, the Public Safety Directors have responsibility for the following:

St. Lucie and Martin County Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors (continued)

1. Coordination of county resources

2. Protective response for off-site areas including warning and evacuation

3. Communications

4. Public information

5. Off-site radiological exposure control

6. Coordination of arrangements for shelter and feeding of evacuees EP3:4 2-7 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.1 3. County Emergency Response Agencies (continued)

County Sheriffs (St. Lucie and Martin Counties)

At the request of the respective Public Safety/Emergency Management Director, the County Sheriffs can provide the following support services:

1. Law enforcement

2. Warning and evacuation (implementation)

3. Traffic control

4. Communications (support)

5. Rescue (support)

Other Local Agencies As defined in the County plans, the Public Safety/Emergency Management Director can request support as necessary from the following:

1. County Engineer's Department

2. County Road Department

3. County Public Health Departments

4. Public School Boards

5. County Fire/Rescue Department Other Local Agencies (continued)

St. Lucie County-Fort Pierce Fire District by agreement with Florida Power & Light Company (Appendix E) will respond to emergencies on-site upon request.

4. Federal Response Agencies U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will be notified via a dedicated telephone line (ENS) from the Control Room to the Operations Center in Maryland immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes. NRC is the Coordinating Agency for incidents that occur at fixed nuclear facilities.

EP3:4 2-8 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.1 4. Federal Response Agencies (continued)

U.S. Coast Guard At the request of Florida Power & Light Company (on-site activities) and the DEM (off-site activities), the Coast Guard can provide rescue assistance in accordance with their general authority as described in Appendix E.

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

Upon request by the Department of Health, DEM can request that the DOE provide a Radiological Assistance Team to aid in evaluating radiological hazards. This support would be provided out of DOE's Savannah River Operations Office, Aiken, South Carolina. This provision is described in Chapter 9,Section IV, of the State Plan.

DOE is responsible for coordinating the off-site radiological monitoring and evaluation activities of the Federal Government.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

FEMA has the responsibility for coordinating all non-technical response activities of the Federal Government off-site. They serve as the primary point of contact for requests for federal assistance from state and local officials and other federal agencies.

5. Private Sector Organizations Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

INPO maintains industry source lists for personnel and equipment which can be made available for support services during an emergency.

Westinghouse Electric ABB/Combustion Engineering (CE), now Westinghouse Electric, is the Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor for the St. Lucie Plant.

Upon request, Westinghouse Electric can supply emergency technical services and resources as provided by the Purchase Order listed in Appendix E.

URS Corporation (previously Washington Group)

URS Corporation is the Architect/Engineer for the St. Lucie Plant.

Upon request, URS Corporation can supply emergency technical services as provided by the Purchase Order listed in Appendix E.

EP3:4 2-9 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Response Organization (ERO)

The purpose of this section is to describe FPL's Emergency Response Organization. The Emergency Response Organization is defined relative to the two phases of response and actions which are anticipated.

This approach recognizes that the organization will be a dynamic one, dependent upon response time and the severity of the emergency.

The "on-shift" response consists of shift operators, the plant duty shift and other trained plant personnel as available who are responsible for diagnosing the emergency and taking corrective actions. Along with the required shift operations personnel, the "expanded" response includes personnel necessary to man the TSC, OSC, and EOF. The ERO includes plant and corporate personnel who are available, as the emergency warrants, to assist in assessment actions, control, and stabilization.

1. Normal On-site Operating Organization A generalized operating organization chart for St. Lucie Plant is shown in Figure 2-3. The specific plant organization chart is in plant procedures. The plant is staffed with qualified personnel prepared to take necessary actions to implement the Emergency Plan and to initiate the necessary immediate response actions.

EP3:4 2-10 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 1. Normal On-site Operating Organization (continued)

During normal hours, the operating staff at the St. Lucie Plant consists of approximately 1100 people. During off-hours approximately 76 employees are on-site. Key operating positions are described below:

Vice President - St. Lucie Plant The Vice President - St. Lucie Plant, reports to the Chief Nuclear Officer and has the direct responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the St. Lucie Plant in a safe, reliable, and efficient manner.

Plant General Manager The Plant General Manager reports to the Vice President - St. Lucie Plant and is responsible for overall operation and control over those on-site activities necessary for safe operation and maintenance of the plant.

Operations Director The Operations Director reports directly to the Plant General Manager and has the overall responsibility for directing the day-to-day operation of the plant. The Operations Director coordinates operations-related maintenance activities with the Maintenance Manager. The Operations Director is responsible for directing supervisory activities in the areas of Operations and Chemistry.

Assistant Operations Manager The Assistant Operations Manager reports directly to the Operations Director. He/she has responsibility for directing the activities of the nuclear plant operating shifts, including the Shift Manager and Unit Supervisors. He/she holds an NRC Senior Reactor Operator License.

He/she is also responsible for supervision of fuel handling operations.

Shift Manager (SM)

The Shift Manager reports directly to the Assistant Operations Manager. He/she is responsible for the actual operation of the nuclear plant and fuel handling operations on his/her assigned shift.

He/she holds an active NRC Senior Reactor Operator License.

He/she directs the activities of the personnel on his/her shift and is cognizant of maintenance activities being performed while on duty.

EP3:4 2-11 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 1. Normal On-site Operating Organization (continued)

Unit Supervisor (US)

The Unit Supervisor reports directly to the Shift Manager. He/she holds an active NRC Senior Reactor Operator License. He/she directs the activities of the Operators on his/her assigned Unit and remains cognizant of all maintenance activities performed on that Unit while on duty.

Nuclear Watch Engineer (NWE)

The Nuclear Watch Engineer (NWE) reports directly to both Unit Supervisors. He/she is the operating shift foreman and is responsible for plant operations on his/her shift. The NWE directs the activities of non-licensed operators on his/her shift.

Chemistry Manager The Chemistry Manager is responsible for administrative oversight of the Chemistry Control Program. He/she serves as a member of the St. Lucie Plant Emergency Response Organization.

Radiation Protection Manager The Radiation Protection Manager is responsible for administrative oversight of the Radiation Protection Program. He/she serves as a member of the St. Lucie Plant Emergency Response Organization.

Reactor Engineering Supervisor The Reactor Engineering Supervisor reports to the Engineering Manager. He/she supervises the Reactor Engineering Department.

He/she is responsible for monitoring day-to-day reactor operation, nuclear physics testing, fuel burnup calculations, fuel shuffles during refuelings, and various administrative duties.

EP3:4 2-12 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 1. Normal On-site Operating Organization (continued)

Maintenance Director The Maintenance Director reports directly to the Plant General Manager. He/she supervises the Electrical Maintenance, Mechanical Maintenance, and Instrument and Control (I&C) Departments.

He/she is responsible for the maintenance of mechanical, electrical, and I&C equipment in the nuclear units.

System Engineering Manager The System Engineering Manager reports directly to the Engineering Director. He/she supervises general plant engineers and technicians.

Nuclear Oversight Supervisor The Nuclear Oversight Supervisor reports directly to the Site Nuclear Oversight Manager. He/she supervises the Quality Control (QC)

Department. He/she is responsible for directing the activities of the QC Inspectors who perform surveillance and inspection of nuclear safety related activities to monitor for technical specification and regulatory compliance.

Fire Brigade Leader The Fire Brigade Leader reports to the SM, US or EC. The Fire Brigade Leader is a designated on-shift Operations Department individual who has the knowledge or has received sufficient training in plant safety-related systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability and advises the Control Room as required in the FSAR and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

On-site Review Group (ORG)

The On-site Review Group functions to advise the Plant General Manager on all matters related to nuclear safety. Specific responsibilities of the ORG are identified in the Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR).

EP3:4 2-13 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 (continued)

2. On-shift Response Phase Initiating Event (Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency)

The emergency response is initiated by any individual who discovers an emergency condition. This person notifies the Shift Manager by the fastest means possible. This first phase is characterized by diagnosis and immediate action by the plant operators on shift.

Organization If the diagnosis indicates that the condition should be classified as an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency, the Shift Manager declares an emergency.

The Shift Manager becomes the Emergency Coordinator and, as such, directs the On-shift Emergency Response Organization.

Initially, shift operators and the plant duty staff constitute the response organization. Emergency requirements take immediate precedence over normal operating responsibilities (as determined by procedure or at the direction of the Emergency Coordinator). The Plant Staff Emergency Assignments section describes the emergency services that can be provided initially by shift operators and the plant duty staff.

Figure 2-4 shows the On-shift Emergency Response Capability.

EP3:4 2-14 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

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FIGURE 2-4 ON-SHIFT EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY SHIFT MANAGER/

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SECURITY SHIFT SPECIALIST CHEMISTRY f--

REPRESENTATIVE OTHER TRAINED (DIPSIEPLAN/Fig.2-4/Rev.36/png)

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ON-SHIFT EP3:4 2-16 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 2. On-shift Response Phase (continued)

Line of Succession In the event the Shift Manager is incapacitated, the Emergency Coordinator will be (in order of succession):

1. Unit Supervisor (from the affected Unit)

2. Any other member of the plant staff with an active Senior Reactor Operator license.

It is the responsibility of the new Emergency Coordinator to ascertain the status of all Emergency Coordinator responsibilities prior to assumption of duty. The Emergency Coordinator can grant permission for watch relief, including his/her own, when it is safe in his/her judgement to do so.

The Plant General Manager, Operations Director, or Assistant Operations Manager should assume the Emergency Coordinator function from the Shift Manager following proper turnover. Other senior managers who have extensive plant or industry operating experience or knowledge and Emergency Coordinator qualifications may assume the Emergency Coordinator function.

Actions The Emergency Coordinator initiates the following actions per plant procedures and using his/her judgement:

1. Orders corrective actions to bring the emergency under control.

2. Mobilizes the Emergency Response Organization.

3. Notifies the State Division of Emergency Management State Watch Office Duty Officer and County Public Safety Directors, in accordance with plant procedures.

4. Provides recommendations for off-site protective action as discussed in Chapter 5.

5. Notifies NRC via ENS immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes.

EP3:4 2-17 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 2. On-shift Response Phase (continued)

Delegation The Emergency Coordinator shall not delegate the following responsibilities prior to the TSC being declared operational:

1. Classification of Emergencies

2. Decision to notify off-site organizations and the content of those notifications.

3. Recommendation of protective actions for the public (off-site).

The EC may delegate the completion of certain tasks, but is responsible to ensure that all tasks are completed and logged.

Turnover Once the Technical Support Center (TSC) is operational and proper turnover has been conducted, the TSC Emergency Coordinator will assume the responsibility for classification of emergencies, notification of off-site organizations and for recommending protective actions.

Once the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is operational and proper turnover has been conducted, the Recovery Manager will assume responsibility for notification of off-site organizations and for recommending protective actions.

Plant Staff Emergency Assignments A. On-shift Emergency Response Organization

1. The On-shift Emergency Response Organization is composed of operators, the plant duty staff and other trained ERO personnel on-shift. All are qualified in procedures and practices required for the performances of their duties as ERO members. The On-shift Emergency Response Organization takes action until the emergency condition is mitigated or until relieved.

2. Members of the On-shift Emergency Response Organization may consider themselves relieved only upon the specific instructions of the EC or appropriate facility supervisor. Merely knowing that a replacement is present does not constitute a release from emergency duties and responsibilities.

EP3:4 2-18 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 2. On-shift Response Phase (continued)

B. Expanded Emergency Response Organization

1. The Expanded Emergency Response Organization is composed of operations personnel and ERO personnel to man the TSC, OSC, and EOF, as necessary.

2. With the knowledge of the appropriate facility supervisor, alternate ERO members may relieve their counterpart on the On-shift Emergency Response Organization.

C. Functional Areas of Emergency Activity

1. Plant Operations and Assessments of Operational Aspects The Shift Manager (SM) on duty becomes the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in the event of an emergency. His/her normal alternate is the Unit Supervisor (US) from the affected unit. The SM and US positions are constantly manned. The Plant General Manager, Operations Director, Assistant Operations Manager, or another EC-trained person should assume the Emergency Coordinator function following proper turnover.

If the Technical Support Center (TSC) is activated, the EC should direct the on-site Emergency Response Organization (ERO) from the TSC. The SM will remain in the control room to control and monitor plant conditions.

2. Emergency Direction and Control Emergency Coordinator as previously discussed.

3. Notification and Communication Emergency Coordinator as previously discussed.

EP3:4 2-19 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 2. C. Functional Areas of Emergency Activity (continued)

4. Radiological Accident Assessment and In-Plant Protective Actions The primary TSC Radiation Protection Supervisor is the Radiation Protection Manager. He/she directs the radiological surveillance performed by the Radiation Protection technicians under the orders of the Emergency Coordinator. Prior to the availability of the TSC Radiation Protection Supervisor, the Radiation Protection technicians on-site will provide assistance to the EC in recommending protective actions based on radiological assessments.

The Chemistry Department performs off-site radiological dose assessment until the EOF is manned and operational and the Recovery Manager, through his/her staff, relieves them of this responsibility. The TSC Chemistry Supervisor will continue to monitor dose assessment results with personnel performing dose calculations in the EOF.

5. Plant System Engineering, Repair, and Corrective Actions and Support of Operational Accident Assessment The Shift Technical Advisor will provide the initial technical support necessary for repair, corrective actions, and operational accident assessment.

6. Firefighting The Fire Brigade provides first line response to a fire on-site. The Fire Brigade is under the direction of the Fire Brigade Leader. The St. Lucie County - Ft. Pierce Fire District can respond to fires on-site, if requested.

7. Rescue Operations and First Aid A. Rescue Operations involve the First Aid Team and Radiation Protection personnel as necessary. Under the control of the Emergency Coordinator/TSC Radiation Protection Supervisor, entry to potentially hazardous areas will be made by the First Aid Team with assistance from Radiation Protection personnel.

Upon notification of the injury, the team will respond per the Emergency Coordinator's instructions.

EP3:4 2-20 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 2. C. Functional Areas of Emergency Activity (continued)

7. B. An Operations Department representative (either an operator or chemist), trained in first aid will act as the on-shift team leader for the First Aid Team.

Operations Department personnel, trained in first aid, serve as the First Aid Team members and will be the primary care provider.

8. Access Control and Personnel Accountability The TSC Security Supervisor will ensure personnel control and accountability. It is estimated that personnel accountability can be accomplished within 30 minutes following the declaration of an evacuation by the EC.

Notification of occupants in the Owner Controlled Area, outside the Protected Area, will be accomplished by security sweeps.

9. Repair and Damage Control Repair and damage control will be performed by assigned teams. These teams may be composed of members from any plant discipline and may be augmented by non-Florida Power & Light Company support personnel. Under the direction of the Emergency Coordinator or his/her designee, these teams are used to mitigate the consequences of the accident and to help restore the normal operation of the plant. Actions include, but are not limited to, the movement and set-up of portable shielding, tools, emergency equipment, the repair of equipment and the operation of plant systems.

EP3:4 2-21 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 3. Expanded Response Phase Initiating Action This phase is initiated by the Emergency Coordinator (EC).

Notification by the EC provides the basis for mobilization of the Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Response Organization (ERO) as well as state, local, and federal emergency response organizations. Activation of FPL personnel proceeds to the degree necessary, as determined by the EC, in response to the severity of the emergency.

In an Alert or higher emergency, the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC) shall become operational.

The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) shall become operational in a Site Area Emergency and/or General Emergency. Figure 2-5 shows the response organization that can develop during this period.

EP3:4 2-22 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 2-1 MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION FOR A TWO UNIT SITE WITH SEPARATE CONTROL ROOMS Position Number of Individuals Required to Fill Position Shift Manager (SRO) 1 Unit Supervisors (SRO) 2 (1 per Unit)

Reactor Operators 4 (2 per Unit) 1 Shift Technical Advisor 1 2

Auxiliary Operators/Fire Brigade 7 Shift Communicator 1 Radiation Protection Technicians 2 Rad/Chemistry Technician 1 Security Per Security Plan 1

A single, on-site STA position shall be manned unless the Shift Manager meets the qualifications for the STA as required by Technical Specification 6.3.1 or an individual on each unit with a Senior Reactor Operators license meets the qualifications for the STA as required by Technical Specification 6.3.1.

2 Fire Brigade staffing consists of a minimum of five (5) personnel; One (1) Fire Brigade Leader and four (4) Fire Brigade Members from Operations.

Note: The St. Lucie on-shift staffing analysis confirms the above positions are not assigned concurrent duties as specified in 10CFR50 Appendix E, Section IV.A.9.

EP3:4 2-23 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 2-1 MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION FOR A TWO UNIT SITE WITH SEPARATE CONTROL ROOMS (continued)

SHIFT STAFFING AUGMENTATION AND EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES NOTE Augmented staffing capabilities are routinely tested to ensure timely response is maintained with respect to the goals identified in NUREG 0654.

Augmented Staffing Capabilities/

NUREG-0654 Goal Major Functional Area 30 min. 60 min.

1. Notification/Communication 1 2

2. Radiological Accident Assessment and Support of Operational Accident Assessment/Protective Actions (In-Plant)

A. Activate EOF (Sr. Mgt. Rep.) --- 1 B. Off-site Dose Assessment and Rad/Chem technician1 12 1 C. Radiation Protection Technicians 63 6

3. Plant System Engineering, Repair and Corrective Actions A. Core/Thermal Hydraulics 1 ---

B. Electrical (TSC)/ --- 1 Mechanical (TSC) --- 1 C. Mechanical Maintenance/ --- 1 Radwaste Operator --- 1 D. Electrical Maintenance 1 1 E. I&C Technician 1 ---

1 Combines all qualified individuals for similar functions from Table B-1 of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1 2

On-shift 3

Two are on-shift EP3:4 2-24 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 2-2 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES RESPONSIBILITY Function On-shift Expanded Command and Control Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator/

(Shift Manager) Recovery Manager Warning Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator/

Recovery Manager Notification Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator/

Communications Recovery Manager Public Information Emergency Coordinator Emergency Information Manager Accident Assessment Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator (assisted by Shift Technical assisted by TSC Technical Advisor) Staff Fire Fire Brigade Leader Fire Brigade Leader Rescue Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator Traffic Control Security Shift Specialist TSC Security Supervisor (on-site)

Emergency Medical On-shift First Aid Team On-shift First Aid Team Services Transportation Security Shift Specialist Emergency Security Manager Protective Response Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator/

(on-site) TSC RP Supervisor Radiological Exposure Emergency Coordinator TSC RP Supervisor Control (on-site) (assisted by Radiation Protection Department representative)

Radiological Dose Emergency Coordinator Recovery Manager Assessment (assisted by Chemistry (assisted by Recovery Department representative) Manager's Staff)

EP3:4 2-25 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 4. Key Emergency Operations Facility Positions Emergency Control Officer (ECO)

The ECO is a designated company officer or senior manager who will act as the chief nuclear officer. He/she will serve as the official spokesperson for the Nuclear Division.

Recovery Manager (RM)

The RM is a senior manager who has knowledge of nuclear plant operations and design and who will be responsible for declaring the EOF operational and directing the Company's expanded emergency response organization in conjunction with the Emergency Coordinator. He/she has the authority to establish policy and to expend funds necessary to cope with any emergency situations that arise. The Recovery Manager reports initially to the EOF.

The following specific responsibilities are assumed by the RM in the EOF:

1. To inform the Emergency Control Officer periodically of the on-site status of the emergency and immediately of any significant changes.

2. To provide support and data as necessary to the Emergency Coordinator.

3. To obtain information on diagnosis and prognosis of the emergency, estimates of radioactive releases, prevailing meteorological conditions, projected radiological exposures, and recommended off-site protective actions.

4. To assume from the EC, the responsibility for communicating such information to and coordinating with off-site organizations, and the issuance of Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for the public.

5. To assure continuity of technical and administrative support, and material resources.

6. To request additional support from FPL and others as necessary.

7. To provide logistical support for emergency personnel (e.g., transportation, communications, temporary quarters, food, water and sanitary facilities in the field, and procurement of special equipment and supplies).

EP3:4 2-26 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 4. Key Emergency Operations Facility Positions Emergency Information Manager (EIM)

The EIM is a senior manager or designated member of the Corporate Communications Department experienced in disseminating information to the public via the news media. The EIM operates from the Emergency Operations Facility. The EIM will have the following responsibilities:

1. To serve as a public spokesperson for FPL.

2. To disseminate available information from the ECO to the news media and to provide periodic updates.

3. To work with federal, state and county public information representatives to effect joint releases and public appearances.

4. To provide for dispatching a company representative to the St. Lucie County and Martin County EOCs, if appropriate.

Emergency Security Manager (ESM)

The ESM is a company supervisor, manager, or specialist with security experience and will be responsible to the RM for providing liaison with county law enforcement and rescue agencies. The ESM also provides for and manages security personnel at the EOF/JIC.

Emergency Technical Manager (ETM)

The ETM is a manager or senior engineer with detailed knowledge of nuclear plant design and who will be responsible for providing technical support and information regarding engineering design for the plant.

Governmental Affairs Manager (GAM)

The GAM is a member of the Governmental Affairs staff experienced in interfacing with political officials of local, state, and federal governments. He/she acts as liaison between the ECO and these political officials.

EP3:4 2-27 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.2 4. Key Emergency Operations Facility Positions (continued)

Lines of Succession Lines of succession for the Recovery Manager and Managers of the Expanded Emergency Organization are controlled by procedures which are maintained by the site Emergency Preparedness Manager.

Delegation Delegation authority is controlled by procedure.

2.3 Emergency Response Support and Resources This section describes the arrangements that Florida Power & Light Company has made for assistance to augment the Emergency Response Organization.

1. Response Organization Representatives Florida Power & Light Company has provided facilities in the Emergency Operations Facility for representatives from FPL, state, local, and federal response organizations.

2. Radiological Laboratories Florida Power & Light Company has primary and backup radiological laboratory facilities on-site. A hot lab backup will be provided by portable equipment described in procedures. Environmental sampling will be augmented by the State's Radiological monitoring team and the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) within approximately three hours of activation. If required, the laboratory facilities at FPL's Turkey Point Plant can be used; appropriate arrangements will be made on an as-needed basis.

3. Additional Assistance The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) maintains industry source lists for personnel and equipment which can be made available for support services during an emergency.

Additional technical assistance can also be obtained directly from the Nuclear Steam System Supply (NSSS) vendor (ABB/Combustion Engineering Co., now Westinghouse Electric).

EP3:4 2-28 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

FIGURE 2-5 EXPANDED RESPONSE ORGANIZATION ON-SITE I OFF-SITE (REQUIRED@ ALERT) I (REQUIRED@ SITE AREA EMERGENCY I

I & GENERAL EMERGENCY)

I

~------ EMERGENCY 1 INFORMATION I OFFICER I EMERGENCY EMERGENCY COORDINATOR + I I

RECOVERY MANAGER

--- CONTROL OFFICER r-GOVERNMENTAL I - AFFAIRS I

I MANAGER 1...----------,

I I

I I EMERGENCY L----------1 - TECHNICAL I MANAGER I EMERGENCY TSC osc - SECURITY SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR MANAGER

~ OPERATIONS ~ OPERATIONS - EOFSTAFF

~ RADIATION PROTECTION ~RADIATION PROTECTION

~ CHEMISTRY ~ CH E M I STRY r-- REACTOR ENGINEERING ~SECURITY

~SECURITY - MAl NT. SUPERVISORS f- ENGINEERING - RE-ENTRYTM. MEMBERS (D!P5/EPLAN/Fig.2-5/Rev.1/png)

TECHNICAL STAFF - SUPPORT STAFF EP3:4 2-29 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.3. 4. Support to Federal Assistance Teams The Recovery Manager has the authority to request Federal assistance. It is expected that such assistance will be provided primarily by the NRC. Also, FEMA may send a representative to the EOF for near-site coordination of federal resources. It is expected that NRC personnel will begin to arrive at the site within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after declaration of a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency.

Requests for assistance from the Department of Energy's Savannah River Operations office in Aiken, South Carolina can be made by the State under the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan (FRMAP). Such requests are the responsibility of the Director of the Division of Emergency Management in consultation with the Department of Health.

Federal assistance teams can achieve access to the plant area through the Stuart, Florida airfield, approximately one half hour from the plant. The company may assign an individual to meet such assistance teams and to escort them to the appropriate facilities, if necessary.

Florida Power & Light has reserved adequate space and facilities for the staff of the NRC and FEMA at the EOF. Designated phone lines, workspace and support services (reproduction, office supplies, etc.)

will be arranged through Florida Power & Light. Similar arrangements have been made in the TSC for the NRC. These provisions are routinely exercised and evaluated for adequacy by the NRC.

EP3:4 2-30 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.4 Emergency Facilities and Equipment This section describes the facilities and equipment that Florida Power &

Light Company maintains in readiness for an emergency situation.

Figure 2-6 shows the locations of the on-site facilities.

1. Control Room For any emergency response, the Control Room of the affected unit serves as the initial point of control. The Shift Manager (SM) stations himself in the affected unit's Control Room when he/she assumes the role of Emergency Coordinator (EC). The EC can leave the Control Room if necessary, after a proper turnover to a qualified alternate EC, to make a personal assessment regarding plant safety.

The Control Rooms are designed to remain tenable under accident conditions described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). All plant related operations are directed from the Control Room. Nuclear plant instrumentation, including area and process radiation monitoring system instrumentation, is provided in the Control Room to give early warning of a potential emergency and to provide for continuing indication of an emergency situation. The Control Rooms contain the controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the reactor under normal and emergency conditions.

A supply of radiological emergency equipment is maintained in each of the Control Rooms. Table 2-3 provides an example list of emergency equipment maintained for the two Control Rooms and the Technical Support Center (TSC) use.

Each Control Room contains the necessary communications equipment for notifying on-site personnel and off-site authorities in the event of an accident. This includes the Hot Ring Down (HRD) telephone to the State Watch Office (SWO), EMnet (Satellite Communications System), Emergency Notification System (ENS) to the NRC Operations Center (in Maryland), commercial telephones, Florida Power & Light Company radio system, public address system, portable radio sets (walkie-talkies), and a radio paging system. These systems are used as defined by procedure to accomplish the necessary notifications and communications.

EP3:4 2-31 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.4 2. Technical Support Center (TSC)

The company maintains an on-site Technical Support Center to provide the Control Room with in-depth diagnostic and engineering assistance without adding to congestion within the Control Room.

The TSC interfaces with the EOF regarding those diagnostic and engineering decisions. This assistance can help determine the operational decisions that would be appropriate to best control and mitigate the consequences of the emergency. The TSC is located adjacent to the Unit 1 Control Room.

Activation of the Technical Support Center will be initiated by the Emergency Coordinator in the event of an Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. Arrangements have been made to staff the TSC in a timely manner.

The Technical Support Center contains pertinent records and drawings.

The Technical Support Center has an emergency communications network similar to the Control Rooms. The TSC also has the NRC Emergency Telecommunications System (ETS).

3. Operational Support Center (OSC)

The company maintains an on-site Operational Support Center (OSC) to serve as an assembly point for auxiliary operators, radiation protection technicians, maintenance personnel, and other plant personnel available to support the emergency response. Required staff will be assigned to appropriate activities by the Emergency Coordinator or his/her designee.

Equipment that can be used by personnel dispatched from the OSC is stored in the South Service Building. Table 2-4 indicates the types of material and equipment stored there.

Activation of the OSC will be initiated by the Emergency Coordinator.

The OSC will be activated and in operation for an Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. Arrangements have been made to staff the OSC in a timely manner.

The OSC is maintained in the large conference room on the second floor of the South Service Building. Telephone communications are maintained between the OSC and the Technical Support Center.

EP3:4 2-32 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.4 4. Alternate Operational Support Center In the event that the OSC becomes uninhabitable, the Emergency Coordinator will designate an alternate location in accordance with procedures.

5. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The company maintains an Emergency Operations Facility from which evaluation and coordination of FPL activities related to an emergency can be carried out and from which FPL can provide information to federal, state, and local authorities.

The Emergency Operations Facility is located at the intersection of State Route 712 (Midway Road) and I-95 approximately 10 1/2 miles west of the St. Lucie Plant. The EOF has sufficient space to accommodate the Florida Power & Light Company response organization and designated representatives of the federal, state, and local authorities. Alternate temporary locations for the Emergency Operations Facility may be designated by the Recovery Manager if a natural disaster or other (non-radiological) external event significantly affects the operational capability of the facility.

The Emergency Operations Facility has an emergency communications network including but not limited to, commercial (Bell) telephone lines, Hot Ring Down (HRD) phone, NRC ENS, NRC HPN, NRC counterpart links, EMnet (Satellite Communications System),

and various Florida Power & Light Co. maintained radio systems.

Essential, precalculated emergency data and pertinent reports and drawings are readily available.

The RM is responsible for declaring the EOF operational. The EOF is required to be in operation for a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, but may go operational for an Alert. Arrangements have been made to activate the EOF in a timely manner.

The EOF serves as an alternate facility for the Technical Support Center and the Operations Support Center in a hostile action event at the station.

These facilities collectively have the following characteristics: the capability for communication with the emergency operations facility, control room and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including dmage control team planning and prepration, for use when onsite emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile action.

EP3:4 2-33 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.4 6. Joint Information Center (JIC)

An Joint Information Center (JIC) is provided to allow the news media access to information from the Emergency Operations Facility.

The Emergency Information Manager will designate an individual to supervise the JIC. The JIC is co-located with the EOF (Midway Road/I-95 intersection).

EP3:4 2-34 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

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TABLE 2-3 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT FOR CONTROL ROOMS AND TSC Unit 1 Control Room/TSC Storage Locker

1. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

2. Pocket Dosimeters / Electronic Personnel Dosimeters (EPDs)

3. Dosimeter Charger

4. TLDs

5. Coveralls

6. Hoods

7. Gloves

8. Shoe Covers

9. Full Face Respirators and Filters

10. Portable Count Rate Instrumentation

11. Portable Dose Rate Instrumentation

12. Contamination Smears and Envelopes

13. Radiation Tape/Rope

14. Radiological Signs

15. Step-Off Pads

16. Plastic Bags Unit 2 Control Room Storage Locker

1. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

2. Pocket Dosimeters / Electronic Personnel Dosimeters (EPDs)

3. Dosimeter Charger

4. TLDs

5. Coveralls

6. Hoods

7. Gloves

8. Shoe Covers

9. Full Face Respirators and Filters

10. Portable Count Rate Instrumentation

11. Portable Dose Rate Instrumentation

12. Contamination Smears and Envelopes

13. Radiation Tape/Rope

14. Radiological Signs

15. Step-Off Pads

16. Plastic Bags EP3:4 2-36 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 2-4 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT FOR THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER

1. Coveralls

2. Shoe Covers

3. Hoods

4. Gloves

5. Full Face Respirators and Filters

6. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

7. Pocket Dosimeters / Electronic Personnel Dosimeters (EPDs)

8. Dosimeter chargers

9. TLDs

10. Portable count rate instrumentation

11. Portable dose rate instrumentation

12. Radiological signs

13. Contamination smears and envelopes

14. Flashlights

15. Survey maps

16. Writing materials

17. Log Book

18. Decontamination kits

19. Radiological tape/rope

20. Selected procedures

21. Waste storage bags

22. Assorted batteries EP3:4 2-37 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.4 7. St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center The St. Lucie County EOC will be the point from which county response activities will be controlled. The facility is located at 15305 W. Midway Rd., Ft. Pierce, Florida. Communications include Hot Ring Down (HRD) phone, EMnet (Satellite Communications System), teletype, police department and fire department networks, and commercial telephone.

8. Martin County Emergency Operations Center The Martin County EOC will be the point from which county response activities will be controlled. This facility is located at 800 S.E. Monterey Road, Stuart, Florida. Communications include Hot Ring Down (HRD) phone, EMnet (Satellite Communications System), teletype, police department and fire department networks, and commercial telephone.

9. Florida State Emergency Operations Center (State Watch Office)

The State's initial response comes from the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Tallahassee. Initial notification goes to the State Watch Office (SWO) located in the State EOC. The location is 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida.

Communications include Hot Ring Down (HRD), EMnet (Satellite Communications System), teletype and telephone. This facility is manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day by a duty officer.

EP3:4 2-38 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.5 Medical and Health Support This section describes the agreements and provisions that Florida Power

& Light Company has made for emergency medical support.

1. Plant First-Aid Facilities The First-Aid Rooms on the ground floor of the Auxiliary Buildings are provided with first-aid supplies. The medical supplies in the First-Aid Rooms are checked on a two month basis and replenished as necessary. In addition, standard 24-unit First-Aid Kits are maintained at numerous locations throughout the St. Lucie Plant. The First-Aid Kits are checked once every two months and replenished as necessary. A commercial First-Aid Kit is maintained in the Site Assembly Station.

Personnel decontamination washrooms and shower rooms are provided on the ground floor of the Auxiliary Buildings. Accepted decontamination practices will be employed on-site and are described in a Radiation Protection procedure.

Life endangering injuries such as extensive burns, serious wounds or fractures shall receive prompt medical attention at off-site support medical facilities. Personnel with injures involving radiation or radioactive contamination can also be handled by these off-site support medical facilities. The off-site support medical facilities are Lawnwood Regional Medical Center in Ft. Pierce, Fl., and Martin Memorial Medical Center in Stuart, Fl.

Both of these medical facilities are equipped and staffed with physicians and nurses capable of treating a contaminated injured individual(s). The physicians will provide for medical examinations, treatment, and laboratory services for those employees and other persons, designated by Florida Power & Light Company, who have been involved in a radiation accident.

The patient receiving areas are equipped for patient decontamination and the performance of emergency medical procedures for life-saving purposes. Additionally, these facilities have intensive care units available for the treatment of decontaminated radiation accident casualties or persons who have received only internal radiation exposure. Both facilities are available on a 24-hour basis.

EP3:4 2-39 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

2. ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND SUPPORT SERVICES (continued) 2.5 Medical and Health Support (continued)

1. Plant First-Aid Facilities (continued)

Backup Facility A letter of agreement between the Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) and Florida Power & Light Company provides backup support for the definitive care and treatment of seriously irradiated persons. The ORAU Medical and Health Sciences Division operates the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the U.S. Department of Energy. It studies radiation and radioactive materials in diagnosis, therapy, and research. Its specialized facilities are available for the care and treatment of possible radiation accident victims.

2. Transportation of Injured Personnel St. Lucie County-Ft. Pierce Fire District Rescue service, company, or private vehicle will provide transportation of personnel with injuries whether or not the injury is associated with radiation or contamination. The fire district rescue service is preferred, but in the case of injuries which require urgent transportation or external exposure without contamination, other transportation may be used.

3. Communications When injured personnel are transported to an off-site medical facility by county ambulance, radio contact, as well as telemetry, is normally maintained between the facility and the ambulance. In accordance with procedures, telephone notification is made by the Plant to the medical facility concerning the pending arrival of an injured person(s).

EP3:4 2-40 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

3. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM The system which has been adopted for categorizing off-normal events or conditions at the Plant has four classes. In order of increasing severity, these are: Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.

3.1 Notification of Unusual Event Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

1. Assess and respond as directed by the Emergency Coordinator.

2. Report the Unusual Event to off-site authorities (FPL and non-FPL) in accordance with plant procedures.

3. Provide plant status updates in accordance with plant procedures.

4. Close out by verbal summary to off-site authorities, or escalate to a higher class.

3.2 Alert Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

FPL actions in response to this category will be:

1. Assess and respond as directed by the Emergency Coordinator.

2. The Emergency Coordinator will augment resources by activating the on-site Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center.

3. Report the Alert status to off-site authorities (FPL and non-FPL) in accordance with plant procedures.

4. Dispatch monitoring teams as directed by the TSC Radiation Protection Supervisor.

5. Provide periodic plant status updates in accordance with plant procedures, typically every sixty minutes or upon significant change in plant conditions.

EP3:4 3-1 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

3. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (continued) 3.2 6. Provide periodic meteorological assessments in accordance with plant procedures if releases are anticipated or occurring. If releases are occurring, provide dose estimates for actual releases.

7. Close out by verbal summary to off-site authorities, followed by a written summary within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or escalate to a higher class.

3.3 Site Area Emergency Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

FPL actions in response to this category will be:

1. Assess and respond as directed by the Emergency Coordinator.

2. Augment resources as necessary by activating the on-site Technical Support Center, the on-site Operational Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility.

3. Report the Site Area Emergency status to off-site authorities (FPL and non-FPL) in accordance with plant procedures.

4. Dispatch monitoring teams as directed by the TSC Radiation Protection Supervisor.

5. Provide periodic plant status updates in accordance with plant procedures, typically every sixty minutes or upon significant change in plant conditions.

6. Provide periodic meteorological assessments in accordance with plant procedures.

7. Provide release and dose projections based on available plant and meteorological information and foreseeable contingencies.

8. Close out or recommend a change in emergency class when appropriate by briefing off-site authorities.

9. Submit a brief written summary to off-site authorities within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after closing out the emergency.

EP3:4 3-2 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

3. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (continued) 3.4 General Emergency Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

FPL actions in response to this category will be:

1. Assess and respond as directed by the Emergency Coordinator.

2. Augment resources by activating the on-site Technical Support Center, the on-site Operational Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility.

3. Report the General Emergency status to off-site authorities (FPL and non-FPL) in accordance with plant procedures.

4. Dispatch monitoring teams as directed by the TSC Radiation Protection Supervisor.

5. Provide periodic plant status updates in accordance with plant procedures, typically every sixty minutes or upon significant change in plant conditions.

6. Provide periodic meteorological assessments in accordance with plant procedures.

7. Provide release and dose projections based on available plant and meteorological information and foreseeable contingencies.

8. Provide off-site protective action recommendations to the State DEM.

9. Close out or recommend a reduction in emergency class when appropriate by briefing off-site authorities.

10. Submit a brief written summary to off-site authorities within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after closing out the emergency.

EP3:4 3-3 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

3. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (continued) 3.5 Emergency Action Levels The Shift Manager (SM) uses the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) to evaluate plant conditions requiring declaration of an Emergency Class and initiation of the Emergency Plan. The EALs, listed in Appendices A, B and C, are grouped into Recognition Categories depending on the nature of the initiating condition and the impact on plant operation and safety.

As the condition(s) of the plant degrade(s), increasing Emergency Action Levels are reached resulting in a higher (greater severity) class of emergency being declared. Fifteen (15) minutes should not be exceeded for assessing and classifying an emergency once indications (Emergency Action Levels (EALs) / thresholds) are available to Plant Operators that an Initiating Condition (IC) has been met and/or exceeded.

For EALs that are time-based, a prescribed assessment period is provided. It is to be acknowledged that the condition described in the EAL has been met if the stated time period elapsed. There is not an additional 15 minute assessment period.

Tables 3-2 and 3-3 contain listings of Process and Effluent Monitors and Area Radiation Monitors that may be used to initiate emergency actions.

These tables contain information regarding the type of monitor, range of the instruments, and typical setpoints (actual setpoints are defined by procedure).

Table 3-4 contains a listing of non-radiological monitors, meters, or gauges that may be used to initiate emergency actions. This table contains information regarding the parameter measured and the range of the monitor, meter, or gauge.

3.6 Hostile Action An act toward a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, takes hostages, and/or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

3.7 Hostile Force One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

EP3:4 3-4 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 3-2A ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITORS USED FOR ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT NUMBER CONTROL RANGE OF TYPICAL HIGH ALARM MONITORS (PER UNIT) TYPE (1) LOCATION FUNCTION MEASUREMENT SETPOINT

a. Steam Generator 2 SSL RAB Close S/G blowdown 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM 1 x 104 CPM Blowdown and sample valves FCV-23-3, 5, 7, 9

b. Condenser Air 1 SSG Turbine Bldg. NONE 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM (2) 7.5 x 101 CPM Ejector

c. Fuel Handling 1 NGM with low & high FHB Roof NONE 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc G (low) 1.51 x 10-3 µCI/cc Building Stack range gas channels 1 x 10-4 to 1 x 105 µCi/cc G (high) 3.2 x 101 µCi/cc

d. Plant Stack 1 NGM with low & high RAB Roof NONE 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc G (low) 1.42 x 10-3 µCI/cc range gas channels 1 x 10-4 to 1 x 105 µCi/cc G (high) 3.24 x 101 µCi/cc

e. ECCS Area 1/train PIG with medium & RAB Elev. 43' NONE 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM P (3) 1 x 104 CPM Ventilation high range gas 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM I (3) 1 x 104 CPM Exhaust channels 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc G (low) 5 x 10-4 µCI/cc 2.5 x 10-2 to 4 x 102 µCi/cc G (medium) 2.5 x 10-1 µCi/cc 1 x 10-1 to 1 x 105 µCi/cc G (high) 2.5 x 101 µCi/cc

f. Steam Dumps 1/train Shielded G-M tubes Main Steam Lines NONE 1 x 10-1 to 1 x 104 µCi/cc 2.7 x 10-1 µCi/cc A&B Upstream of MSIVs (1) SSG - single stage gaseous with beta scintillator detector. PIG-particulate/iodine/noble gas with beta scintillator detectors and sodium iodide for iodine channel.

Medium and high range noble gas channels utilize energy compensated G-M tubes.

SSL - single stage liquid with sodium iodide detector.

NGM - Noble Gas Monitor (2) The condenser air ejector exhaust is normally diverted to the main Plant Stack. This point is monitored by the Plant Stack monitoring system.

(3) These are effluent level monitors, not used for accident assessment.

EP3:4 3-5 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 3-2B ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITORS USED FOR ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT NUMBER CONTROL RANGE OF TYPICAL HIGH ALARM MONITORS (PER UNIT) TYPE (1) LOCATION FUNCTION MEASUREMENT SETPOINT

a. Steam Generator 2 SSL RAB Close S/G blowdown 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-2 µCi/cc 2 x 10-4 µCi/cc Blowdown valves and sample FCV-23-3, 5, 7, 9

b. Condenser Air 1 SSG Turbine Bldg. NONE 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc (3) 2 x 10-6 µCi/cc Ejector

c. Fuel Handling 1 PIG FHB Roof (3) 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM P 1 x 104 CPM Building Stack 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM I (3) 1 x 104 CPM 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc G (2) 1 x 10-3 µCI/cc

d. Plant Stack 2 PIG RAB Roof (3) 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM P (3) 1 x 104 CPM 1 x 101 to 1 x 106 CPM I (3) 1 x 104 CPM 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 CPM G 1 x 10-3 µCI/cc Plant Stack 1 3-stage gas with RAB Roof Auto switchback to 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc Low 1 x 10-3 µCI/cc Accident Range multiple part/iodine normal range monitor 1.2 x 10-3 to 1.2 x 103 µCi/cc Medium collectors 1 x 10-1 to 1 x 105 µCi/cc High

e. ECCS Area 1/train 3-stage gas with RAB Elev. 43' Auto switchover to 1 x 10-7 to 1 x 10-1 µCi/cc Low 5 x 10-4 µCI/cc Ventilation / multiple part/iodine accident range 1.2 x 10-3 to 1.2 x 103 µCi/cc Medium Accident Range collectors monitor 1 x 10-1 to 1 x 105 µCi/cc High

f. Steam Dumps 1/train Shielded G-M tubes Main Steam Lines NONE 1 x 10-2 to 1 x 104 mR/hr 1.5 mR/hr A&B with bkgd subtraction Upstream of MSIVs feature (1) SSG - single stage gaseous with beta scintillator detector. PIG-particulate/iodine/noble gas with beta scintillator detectors and sodium iodide for iodine channel.

3-stage accident monitors use beta scintillator for low range, cadmium - teluride for medium/high ranges.

SSL - single stage liquid with sodium iodide detector.

(2) The condenser air ejector exhaust monitor is normally diverted to the Plant Stack. The FHB stack exhaust is diverted to the main Plant Stack under high fuel pool area radiation conditions and then becomes monitored by the Plant Stack monitoring system.

(3) These are effluent level monitors, not used for accident assessment.

EP3:4 3-6 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 3-3 ST. LUCIE 1 AND 2 AREA RADIATION MONITORS

1. Containment Isolation Monitors Unit 1:

Range: 1.0 to 105 mR/hr Typical Alarm Setpoint 8000 mR/hr Unit 2:

Range: 1.0 to 107 mR/hr Typical Alarm Setpoint 8000 mR/hr

2. In-Containment High Range Monitors Unit 1:

Range: 1.0 to 108 R/hr Typical High Alarm Setpoints: 6.4 R/hr (calibrated setpoint)

Typical High/High Alarm Setpoints: 8.0 R/hr (calibrated setpoint)

Unit 2:

Range: 1.0 to 108 R/hr Typical High Alarm Setpoints: 6.4 R/hr (calibrated setpoint)

Typical High/High Alarm Setpoints: 8.0 R/hr (calibrated setpoint)

3. Spent Fuel Pool Monitor Unit 1:

Range: 0.1 to 104 mR/hr Typical Alarm Setpoints: 5 mR/hr (High) 12 mR/hr (High/High)

Unit 2:

Range: 0.1 to 104 mR/hr Typical Alarm Setpoints 5 mR/hr (High) 15 mR/hr (High/High)

4. Post LOCA Monitors Unit 1:

Range: 1.0 to 105 mR/hr Typical Alarm Setpoints: 75 mR/hr (High) 100 mR/hr (High/High)

Unit 2:

Range:

10 to 107 mR/hr Typical Alarm Setpoints:

75 mR/hr (High) 100 mR/hr (High/High)

EP3:4 3-7 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 3-4 NON-RADIOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION USED FOR ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS RANGE UNIT 1 RANGE UNIT 2 RCS pressure 0-1600/ 0-750/

1500-2500 psia 1500-2500 psia 0-3000 psia 0-3000 psia RCS temperature hot leg (control channel) 515-615 F 515-615 F hot leg (safety channel) 515-665 F 515-665 F cold leg (control channel) 515-615 F 515-615 F cold leg (safety channel) 465-615 F 465-615 F cold leg (wide range) 0-600 F 0-600 F Incore thermocouples 32-2300 F 32-2300 F Subcooled Margin Monitors (QSPDS) Calculated Calculated Nuclear Instrumentation Power Range (Linear Scale) 0-125% 0-125%

Wide Range Power (Log Scale) 2 x 10-8-200% 2 x 10-8-200%

Start-Up Channel 1-105 CPS 1-105 CPS Pressurizer pressure 0-1600/ 0-750/

(same as RCS) 1500-2500 psia 1500-2500 psia 0-3000 psia 0-3000 psia Pressurizer level 0-100% 0-100%

Steam Generator pressure (Main steam side) 0-1200 psig 0-1200 psig Steam Generator level 0-100% 0-100%

Main steam pressure (safety channel) 0-1200 psia 0-1200 psia ECCS header isolation red - open red - open valve lights green - closed green - closed ECCS pumps 0-75 amps 0-75 amps Containment pressure 0-50 psig (ESFAS) 0-15 psig (ESFAS) 0-60 psig 0-60 psig 175 psig 175 psig Earthquake monitor 0-20%g N/A N/A = not applicable to unit EP3:4 3-8 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

4. NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION This section describes the procedures and methods established for initial notification and follow-up communications with Florida Power & Light Company, and from Florida Power & Light Company to the appropriate state, county, and federal response organizations. Section 4.6, Communications Equipment, describes the referenced systems in more detail. Figure 1-2 shows the initial notification flow.

Table 4-1 presents the organizational positions and alternates for the primary response organizations responsible for ensuring the manning of communications links.

4.1 FPL Emergency Response Organization The FPL Emergency Coordinator, acting in accordance with plant procedures, has the responsibility to make the necessary notifications and communications, and for determining the content of the notification.

However, actual contacts may be made by designated communications assistants. The use of the phrase "Emergency Coordinator" below is also defined as "Emergency Coordinator or designated communicator," except for those items described in Section 2.2.2.2 which cannot be delegated.

1. Initial Notification Florida Power & Light Company emergency procedures call for the following actions for initial notification within the FPL organization.

1. Personnel detecting a potential significant off-normal event or condition should report it to the Shift Manager by the fastest means available. This may mean face-to-face communication, the plant public address system, or the commercial telephone system.

These systems provide adequate means of redundancy for this initial notification.

The following information should be related to the extent possible:

Type of emergency (fire, pipe rupture, etc.).

Location of emergency.

Presence of injured personnel.

Extent of damage to plant components.

The Shift Manager directs the investigative actions to address the off-normal event. The Shift Manager classifies the event and if it is determined to be an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency, implements this Emergency Plan and becomes the Emergency Coordinator.

EP3:4 4-1 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

4. NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION (continued) 4.1 1. 1. (continued)

As necessary, the Emergency Coordinator notifies plant personnel of the emergency situation and any required protective actions by the Plant Public Address system. Activation of FPL personnel proceeds to the degree necessary, as determined by the EC, in response to the severity of the emergency.

If necessary, the Emergency Coordinator directs the evacuation of all visitors and non-essential Florida Power & Light Company employees.

2. The Emergency Coordinator notifies the Shift Communicator (SC) by the most readily available communications system and provides basic information as described below and the status of his/her notification of off-site authorities. The SC notifies the Recovery Manager (RM) and appropriate response personnel by telephone, cellular phone, or beeper.

The Emergency Coordinator provides the following information to the SC to the extent possible:

Type of accident or incident Affected Unit Assessment of the emergency condition (including the class of emergency).

Information on personnel injuries, and an estimate of personnel radiation exposures.

Off-site support already called in and/or required.

An estimate of the magnitude of a radioactive material release and the area possibly affected, if applicable.

Actions already taken or recommended with respect to the evacuation of various on-site areas, if applicable.

Meteorological information.

Assessment of potential radiation exposure to persons off-site and any protective actions for off-site areas recommended, if applicable.

3. Once the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is declared operational the Recovery Manager (RM) assumes responsibility for notification of off-site governmental agencies.

EP3:4 4-2 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

4. NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION (continued) 4.1 2. Communications Initially, communications between the Emergency Coordinator (in the Control Room) and FPL's Expanded Emergency Organization are by redundant telephone systems, with radio as the backup. When the Emergency Operations Facility is mobilized, communications within the FPL Emergency Response Organization are accomplished primarily using commercial phones.

Follow-up messages regarding the prognosis for worsening or terminating of the event as well as requests for on-site support by off-site organizations will be made periodically or as needed by the EC to the RM. Recommendations for off-site protective measures to Division of Emergency Management (DEM) may be included as part of follow-up messages. These measures are indicated on Figure 5-1.

4.2 State and County Agencies The State and County agencies are notified of an emergency situation (within 15 minutes) via redundant communication lines. State of Florida notification and communications procedures are presented in Chapter 6 of the State Plan.

1. Division of Emergency Management Initial Notification FPL's Shift Communicator will make initial notification within 15 minutes of declaring an emergency to the Duty Officer at the State Watch Office (SWO) in Tallahassee. The State's Hot Ring Down (commercial telephone and EMnet (Satellite Communications System) serve as backups) will be used for notification of any emergency: Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. Backup telephone numbers for 24-hour per day notification are provided by procedure.

Figure 4-1 shows the information to be communicated to SWO during initial and follow-up notifications. The listed information is provided to the extent possible at the time of initial notification. Periodically, additional update information is included in follow-up messages.

Follow-up messages may come from the Technical Support Center (TSC), if operational, or the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), if operational.

EP3:4 4-3 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

4. NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION (continued) 4.2 1. Division of Emergency Management (continued)

The initial notification may be brief with certain information not available.

Follow-up messages from the Emergency Coordinator or Recovery Manager to the Division of Emergency Management (DEM) will include the required information as it becomes available.

The Division of Emergency Management has established a procedure to authenticate emergency notification from the St. Lucie Plant. The Hot Ring Down and EMnet systems are restricted circuits under control of the DEM and local government.

Communications The Emergency Coordinator will maintain periodic contact with the State Watch Office, located at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Tallahassee, via the Hot Ring Down network.

FPL responsibility for communication with off-site agencies is transferred from the Emergency Coordinator to the Recovery Manager when the Recovery Manager declares the EOF operational.

EP3:4 4-4 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

FIGURE 4-1 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM1 (Page 1 of 1)

On-line Verification : D SWP/DEM 0 DOHIBRC 0 St . Lucie County/Fl. Pierce D Martin County 1.* A. 0 THIS IS A DRILL B. 0 THIS IS AN EMERGENCY

2. A. Date: _..:......___:__ B.* Contact Time : C. Reported by: ( N a m e ) - - - - - - - - - - - -

D. Message Number: _ __ E. Reported from: 0 Control Room D TSC D EOF F. 0 Initial/ New Classification OR D Update Notification 3.* Site : A. D Crystal River Unit 3 B. D St. Lucie Unit 1 C. D St. Lucie Unit 2 D. D Turkey Point Unil3 E. D Turkey Point Unit 4 4.* Emergency Classification : A. D Notification of Unusual Event B. 0Aiert C. D Site Area Emergency D. D General Emergency 5.* A. 0 Emergency Declaration: B. D Emergency Termination : Date : _..:......___:__ Time: _ _ __

6.* Reason for Emergency Declaration : A. 0 EAL Number OR B. 0

Description:

Alpha I Alpha I Numeric

7. Additional Information or Update: A. D None OR B. 0

Description:

8.* Weather Data : A. Wind direction from _ _ degrees B. Downwind Sectors Affected: - - - - - -

9.

• Release Status: A. D None (Go to Item 11) 8. 0 In progress C. 0 Has occurred, but stopped (Go to Item 11)

10. Release Significance Cateqorv at the Site Boundary:

A. D Under evaluation B. 0 Release within normal operating limits

c. D Non-Significant (fraction of protective action guide range) D. D Protective action guide range E. D Liquid release (no actions required) 11.* UTILITY PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC:

A. 0 No utility recommended actions at this time.

B. D The utility recommends the following protective actions:

Evacuate Sectors Shelter Sectors Monitor & Prepare Sectors Evacuate Zones : OR 0-2 Shelter Zones : 2-5 5-10 AND consider issuance of otassium iodide (KI "

If form is completed in the -Control Room, go to Item 15. If completed in the TSC or EOF, continue with item 12.

12. Plant Conditions: A. Reactor Shutdown? 0 Yes D No B. Core Adequately Cooled? 0 Yes D No C. Containment Intact? 0 Yes D No D. Core Condition : 0 Stable D Degrading

13. Weather Data: A. *Wind Speed _ _ _ mph B, Stability Class _ __

14. Additional Release Information: A. 0 Not Applicable (Go to Item 15)

Distance Projected Thyroid Dose (CDE) for __ hour(s) Projected Total Dose (TEDE) for _ _ hour(s) 1 Mile (Site Boundary) B. mrem C. mrem 2 Miles D. mrem E. mrem 5 Miles F. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ mrem G. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ mrem 10 Miles H. mrem _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ mrem

15. (Do Not Read) EC or RM Approval Signature : - - - - - - - - - Date :_..:.....___,__ Time:

Message Received By: Name:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date:_-'---'-- Time :

• Items are evaluated for NRC Performance Indicators (PI's)

EPIP- 08-F01 Form Revision : 4 1 Format may vary in plant procedures.

EP3:4 4-5 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

4. NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION (continued) 4.2 2. Department of Health Initial Notification The Division of Emergency Management (DEM) State Watch Office Duty Officer is responsible for notifying the Department of Health.

Notification is made to the Bureau of Radiation Control. A Health Physicist contacts the St. Lucie County EOC to ascertain what, if any, protective actions have been initiated. If required, the Bureau of Radiation Control activates the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) and/or the Radiological Monitoring Teams.

Communications The Public Health Physicist maintains contact with the Division of Emergency Management (DEM) via mobile radio as he/she travels to the FPL Emergency Operations Facility. Contact is maintained with the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) by the Division of Emergency Management (DEM) via cellular phone while the MERL is in transit. On arrival, commercial phones are also available.

The State Plan describes provisions for communication between EOCs and off-site radiological monitoring teams in Chapter 6 and Appendix III.

4.3 St. Lucie County and Martin County Department of Public Safety Directors Initial Notification The risk county EOCs are initially notified simultaneously via the same communications link used (Hot Ring Down or its alternates) to notify the Division of Emergency Management State Watch Office for all four classes of emergencies. Hot Ring Down and its alternates are monitored on a 24-hour basis by the St. Lucie and Martin County Departments of Public Safety.

The Department of Public Safety Directors can then be reached by telephone or by dispatching a patrol car. Also, the Duty Officer at the Division of Emergency Management's State Watch Office is responsible for confirming the receipt of emergency notification by the County Emergency Management Directors. When the emergency notification is by commercial telephone, he/she is responsible for verifying the message from the Plant by a callback procedure and informing the County Directors that the message has been verified. Alternate commercial telephone numbers for 24-hour per day notification are provided by procedure.

EP3:4 4-6 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

4. NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION (continued) 4.3 St. Lucie County and Martin County Department of Public Safety Directors (continued)

Initial Notification (continued)

Follow-up messages concerning the emergency (Alert Class and higher) may come from the TSC staff or the EOF. Information that should be contained in these messages is shown in Figure 4-1.

Communications The County Department of Public Safety Directors proceed to the St. Lucie and Martin County Emergency Operations Centers, respectively and use the communication channels available there. These include Hot Ring Down, EMnet (Satellite Communications System), teletype, facsimile, police and fire radio networks, telephone, and RACES (Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services).

4.4 Federal Agencies

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Initial Notification The NRC Operations Center in Maryland is notified of certain events by Emergency Notification System (ENS) from the Control Room.

The notifications include all radiological emergencies and are made in accordance with Federal Regulations and plant procedures.

The Emergency Coordinator or his/her designee initiates this contact immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes. Alternate commercial phone numbers are provided by procedure.

Communications Communications with the NRC may be handled by telephone from the Control Room, the Technical Support Center (if operational), or the Emergency Operations Facility (if operational).

2. U.S. Coast Guard Assistance from the Coast Guard for on-site rescue, aid or evacuation of persons in danger, and the protection of property threatened by any type of disaster can be requested by telephone from the Emergency Coordinator or his/her designee or the Recovery Manager or his/her designee to the Coast Guard Duty Officer.

EP3:4 4-7 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

4. NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION (continued) 4.5 Notification of the Public by the State/County The State Plan (See Appendix D for Distribution of State Plan) defines the state and county procedures for notifying the public in the event of an emergency. Appendix III,Section VI of the State Plan describes further provisions.

4.6 Communications Equipment The various communications systems previously discussed are described in more detail below and shown in Figure 4-2.

This communications network incorporates all telephones, the plant public address system, fixed and mobile radio systems, and radio "beepers" employed for routine plant operation and other normal company business.

Key personnel on-site are readily accessible, since at any time most or all of these systems are available to contact them. In addition, the communication systems of State and County agencies and other organizations with which the company has emergency assistance agreements will be used to implement emergency activities.

Public Address System (PA)

The PA system, with speakers strategically located throughout the Protected Area, provides for the transmission of warning and instructions in the event of an emergency. The system is in frequent use during normal plant operations, and consists of numerous separate amplifiers which operate from the plant 120 volt AC vital instrument power system. Handsets are provided in the Plant Control Rooms, the North and South Services Buildings, and numerous other locations within the Protected Area. The system includes one paging channel and five party line channels.

Commercial Telephones There are numerous Telephone System lines connected to the plant for normal dial telephone service. This system represents the primary system for routine communication with areas outside the plant.

Portable Radio Transceivers Various portable radio transceivers (walkie-talkies) are available to supplement the fixed communications equipment in the plant. These radios are lightweight battery operated units which may be easily carried by personnel to any location on the plant site. Some of these portable radios are capable of communicating with an FM radio transceiver over a range of several miles.

EP3:4 4-8 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

4. NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION (continued) 4.6 Communications Equipment (continued)

Radio Paging System Telephones may be interconnected to the Radio Paging System. This system is capable of reaching beepers located within FPL's service area from Sebastian Inlet to Miami-Dade County/Monroe County line. Beepers are regularly assigned to key personnel in the Emergency Response Organization as shown in the Emergency Response Directory (ERD).

Company Radio System The company radio system consists of a variety of fixed base radio equipment. The System Operations Power Coordinator's office, trouble dispatcher offices, service centers, power plants, and mobile service vehicles are equipped with one or more of these radio systems. In the event of interruption of electric service to the base radio stations, emergency power can be supplied to this equipment.

The Control Room, TSC, and EOF have access to one or more of these radio systems. These radio systems will provide back-up communications between the Plant, the EOF, and the System Operations Office. The System Operations Office has direct telephone lines and either direct, patch, or indirect radio contact with all the plants, radio-equipped vehicles and service centers in the Florida Power and Light Company system.

EP3:4 4-9 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

4. NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION (continued) 4.6 Communications Equipment (continued)

Hot Ring Down Telephone System (HRD)

The Hot Ring Down Telephone System is installed in the Control Rooms, TSC, EOF, State EOC, and risk county EOCs. This system uses dedicated commercial telephone lines and is activated through pre-designated three digit access "telephone numbers."

The initial notification of an emergency and other required notifications are made via this system to the State Division of Emergency Management (State Watch Office - Tallahassee) and the County Departments of Public Safety. The Hot Ring Down System is the primary system for communication among these facilities. Commercial telephone and EMnet (Emergency Satellite Communications System) serve as backups.

EMnet EMnet is an Emergency Satellite Communications System which is available in the Control Rooms, the Technical Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility. The EMnet is an alternate communications pathway for the Hot Ring Down telephone.

NRC Emergency Telecommunications System (ETS)

Portions of this system are used to contact the NRC, such as the ENS and HPN. These phone links are described below:

Emergency Notification System (ENS) - The ENS is used for initial notification by the licensee, as well as ongoing information on plant systems, status, and parameters. The ENS is installed in each Control Room, TSC and EOF.

Health Physics Network (HPN) - The HPN is used for communication with the licensee on radiological conditions (in-plant and off-site) and meteorological conditions, as well as their assessment of trends and needs for protective measures on-site and off-site. The HPN is located in the TSC and EOF.

Additionally, this system contains conferencing bridges and access to a Local Area Network (LAN) for use by the NRC Site Team.

4.7 Testing As discussed in Section 7.1, Exercises and Drills, communications equipment and procedures will be tested periodically as part of the FPL program of exercises, drills, and tests for maintaining emergency preparedness.

EP3:4 4-10 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 4-1 COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSIBILITIES The following positions are responsible to ensure the manning of communication links for the listed organizations/facilities:

1. FPL On-shift Emergency Response Organization/Control Room Primary: Emergency Coordinator

1. Shift Manager (SM)

2. Alternate as defined by plan and procedure Alternate: Shift Communicator (from available plant operating and technical staff).

2. FPL Expanded Emergency Response Organization/Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility Primary: Emergency Coordinator/Recovery Manager

1. Plant General Manager (TSC)/Senior Company Manager (EOF)

2. Alternate as defined by plan and procedure Alternate: Designated Communicator (from available management or technical staff).

3. Florida Division of Emergency Management/State Emergency Operations Center, Tallahassee Primary: Chief of Operations, DEM Alternate: As defined in the State Plan

4. St. Lucie County/Emergency Operations Center, Ft. Pierce Primary: St. Lucie County Department of Public Safety Director Alternate: As defined in the State Plan

5. Martin County/Emergency Operations Center, Stuart Primary: Martin County Department of Public Safety Director Alternate: As defined in the State Plan

6. Florida Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC)/Field Monitoring Teams Primary: Supervisor, BRC Alternate: As defined in the State Plan EP3:4 4-11 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

FIGURE 4-2 COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACES CONTROL ROOM HRD FPL RADIO I_. USNRC REGION II/

OPSCENTER ENS HPN TELE FAX EMnet ENS PLT PA TELE FAX

~~

DIVISION OF EMERGENCY

,r I~

MANAGEMENT OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER PLT PA TELE FAX FPLRADIO TSC FPL RADIO HPN HRD FAX ENS PLT PA EM net TELE

~~

HRD TELE FAX EM net ST. LUCIE COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

,, HRD TELE FAX EM net EOF/JIC HRD FPL RADIO HPN FAX ENS EMnetTELE

..... MEDICAL FIRE/

AMBULANCE SUPPORT AGENCY FM RADIO 911 TELE Legend:

-Direction MARTIN COUNTY

--- Coordination EMERGENCY

~

OPERATIONS CENTER HRD TELE FAX EM net HRD- STATE HOT RING DOWN ENS -EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM (NRC)

FAX- TELECOPIER HPN -HEALTH PHYSICS NETWORK (NRC)

PLT PA -PLANT PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM (PAGE)

EMnet- EMERGENCY SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM TELE - COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE (PIPS&f!EPIAN/Rg.4-2/Rev.41/png)

EP3:4 4-12 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS Table 3-1 identifies a spectrum of off-normal events and classifies those events into four categories. The classification is based on Emergency Action Levels which are related to instrument readings, or observations, or a combination of these identified in the table. This section discusses the assessment of and response to these events.

5.1 Accident Assessment Once an off-normal event has been detected and classified in accordance with the Emergency Action Levels, a process of continuing assessment will be initiated. System instrumentation and procedures which would be used as appropriate in the assessment process are described below.

Specifications of instrumentation utilized for accident assessment are contained in procedures. Post accident sampling capabilities are also described in procedures.

1. Plant Release Pathways Units 1 and 2 at the St. Lucie Plant are equipped with independent systems for measuring radioactivity at potential release points and within the containment buildings (See Table 3-2 and 3-3).

The plant vent monitoring system samples the exhaust stream which is the pathway for releases from the containment purge, reactor auxiliary building, condenser air ejector exhaust and the waste gas decay tanks.

The waste gas system has a separate monitor which controls releases to the plant vent.

Additional release pathways are also monitored. These include the fuel building vent (exhaust for fuel pool, new fuel room and fuel pool pump room). During accident conditions, the Unit 2 fuel building exhaust is diverted and monitored through the Unit 2 plant vent. The two Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pump bays at each of the units have monitored exhaust systems. The two main steam lines at each of the units are monitored for possible releases via the safety relief valves and/or atmospheric steam dump.

All monitored pathways, excluding the main steam lines, are equipped with high efficiency particulate filters or charcoal/iodine filters or both.

The monitoring point is after the filters and before the release opening to the atmosphere.

For particulates and iodine, release points other than the main steam lines will be monitored using grab sampling and analysis in accordance with plant procedures.

EP3:4 5-1 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.1 1. Plant Release Pathways (continued)

In addition to these monitors, each unit is provided with an area radiation monitoring system (see Table 3-3). This monitoring system employs detectors distributed throughout the unit and detector indicators are provided locally and in the respective Control Rooms.

The area monitoring system provides early indication of a release of radioactivity within the unit.

Under accident conditions, the containment atmosphere is monitored for radioisotopic content by grab sampling. In addition, the containment is provided with radiation monitors. These monitors would provide an early indication of radioactivity in the containment, particularly as a result of a loss of reactor coolant to the containment building.

Chemical and radioisotopic analyses of the reactor coolant are provided by grab sampling.

Also, each plant has a system of fire detectors with appropriate alarms in the Control Room to provide warning of a fire emergency.

2. On-site Sampling Resources The capability is available at the St. Lucie Plant to obtain grab samples of the reactor containment atmosphere and the reactor coolant.

To obtain grab samples of the containment atmosphere following an accident, a special removable gas sampling vessel is provided in the Containment Hydrogen Analyzer System on both units. The removable vessel would be transported to the plant laboratory. At the laboratory, a portion of the gas would be drawn from the vessel, and the radioisotopic content determined by a multichannel analyzer. Plant procedures provide detailed instructions for sample acquisition, transportation, and analysis.

Reactor coolant grab samples can also be taken following an accident.

Details on sample acquisition, transportation, and analysis are described in plant procedures.

EP3:4 5-2 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.1 2. On-site Sampling Resources (continued)

Air samples will be collected using portable air samplers in accordance with a plant procedure. Portable air samplers are located such that time required to obtain results is minimized for critically manned areas (e.g., Control Room, Technical Support Center). Silver zeolite sample cartridges are stored on-site. To preclude interferences by noble gas adsorption, only silver zeolite cartridges will initially be used to sample critically manned areas (e.g., Control Room, Technical Support Center, other areas which require personnel to be present). Collected samples will be transported promptly to the lab. If necessary, an alternate Counting Room will be established using portable equipment in a low background area. Analysis by gamma spectroscopy, in accordance with approved procedures, is preferred, but portable instrumentation yielding usable results is available.

3. Meteorological Systems Meteorological data are required to make estimates of off-site radiation exposure in the event of a release of gaseous radioactivity.

Measurement of three meteorological parameters, wind speed, wind direction, and a measure of atmospheric stability, are required to make estimates of atmospheric dispersion, an essential part of an off-site radiation exposure calculation.

Meteorological data are collected at the St. Lucie Plant site. The readouts from the site meteorological tower are digital with strip chart recorders to provide 15 minute averages and the data are directly available at the Unit 1 Control Room. The National Weather Service Station serves as the backup. Table 5-1 summarizes the available data.

As indicated in Table 5-1, values of the key meteorological parameters are provided for by the St. Lucie Plant meteorological tower. These readouts are provided continuously and the data are directly available at the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) via the Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System (ERDADS).

Meteorological data are provided to the State via initial and follow-up communications. Data is also provided in response to direct inquiries from DEM and the Bureau of Radiation Control. The EOF and NRC can receive timely meteorological information through the TSC, upon request, or through ERDADS.

EP3:4 5-3 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.1 4. Source Term and Release Determination As discussed in Section 5.1.3 certain meteorological parameters are required for the calculation of off-site radiation exposure from airborne releases. Additional essential pieces of information are the rate of release and isotopic composition of the released radioactivity.

If radioactivity was released from a monitored vent, then a direct measure of the release rate would be available. Monitored release points are discussed in Section 5.1.1.

Based upon certain assumptions, a specific source term can be determined using EPIP-14, Dose Assessment Using the Unified RASCAL Interface for all monitored release points and grab samples.

In the event of a loss of coolant accident, the containment radiation monitors would provide the first indication of the magnitude or existence of radioactivity in the containment atmosphere. Additional information about the isotopic composition of the airborne radioactivity would be derived from isotopic analysis of a containment atmosphere sample.

Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (CHRRM) provide an indication of levels of radioactive material in the containment atmosphere. These monitors can be used to determine a certain concentration of radionuclides based upon the isotopic mixes assumed for the accidents described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Procedures addressing these parameters and calculations are provided in EPIP-14, Dose Assessment Using the Unified RASCAL Interface.

Procedures have been developed to assist the plant staff in estimating release rates and isotopic content for releases from the various plant vents.

A containment release rate for use in the off-site dose estimation procedure mentioned above is conservatively estimated as the design basis leak rate at the design pressure.

EP3:4 5-4 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 5-1 SOURCES OF METEOROLOGICAL DATA Meteorological Primary Source Type of Alternate Source Parameter of Information Display of Information Wind Speed St. Lucie ERDADS display National Weather Meteorological Tower or Digital and Chart Service Station (10 meter sensors recorder (15 minute serve as primary, averages) - Unit 1 only Melbourne 60 meter sensors serve as first backup)

Wind Direction St. Lucie ERDADS display National Weather Meteorological Tower or Digital and Chart Service Station (10 meter sensors recorder (15 minute serve as primary, averages) - Unit 1 only Melbourne 60 meter sensors serve as first backup)

Stability Class St. Lucie ERDADS display National Weather

( T) Meteorological Tower or Digital and Chart Service Station (60 meter temperature recorder (15 minute sensor - 10 meter averages) - Unit 1 only Melbourne temperature sensor)

Other basic National Weather None meteorological Service Station (via telephone) parameters Melbourne EP3:4 5-5 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.1 5. Exposure and Dose Rate Determination One of the uses of radiation monitors and meteorological instrumentation is the calculation of off-site radiation exposures.

An estimate of doses is needed in the event of a radiological emergency so that responsible agencies can use this information to plan protective action.

EPIP-14, Dose Assessment Using the Unified RASCAL Interface, provides the details of how initial dose estimates are determined. In particular, current meteorological data, grab sample results, Field Monitoring Team data, process monitor data, and Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (CHRRM) readings are used in conjunction with tables to estimate doses under actual meteorological conditions.

Dose calculations will be updated periodically during the course of the accident and the results will be provided to State and County authorities for their use in evaluating the need for protective action. Figure 5-1 compares off-site dose estimates with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs). Initial dose estimates would be prepared by the Chemistry Department representative who reports to the Technical Support Center. Refined dose estimates would be performed by dose assessment personnel in the Emergency Operations Facility, when operational. Dose estimates are performed using EPIP-14. Default values, estimating a worst case situation can be utilized if assessment instrumentation is not available (off-scale or inoperable) and field sample analysis has not yet been completed. FPL off-site dose calculations and field monitoring analysis will be compared with Florida Department of Health and other off-site agencies (NRC, DOE) calculations and analysis when those agencies co-locate in the EOF.

EP3:4 5-6 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.1 6. Off-site Monitoring Dosimetry The Florida Department of Health maintains a system of about 35 TLD stations in the vicinity of St. Lucie Plant. Stations are provided in each land based 22.5 sector, at approximately 1-mile, 5-mile and 10-mile radii.

Laboratories and Sampling Laboratory facilities are provided as discussed in Section 2.3.2.

The plant's on-site radiological laboratories serve as primary facilities with backup provided by portable equipment. Analysis of off-site environmental samples collected by the State will be performed at the State's Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory. This mobile lab can be in position near the site within three hours of notification. Bureau of Radiation Control representatives dispatched to the EOF will serve as a central point for the receipt of all State off-site field monitoring data.

Field Monitoring - State Chapter 9 of the State Plan discusses the State role in accident assessment. It describes agencies and their missions, specialized personnel, special equipment, and other matters related to field monitoring within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). Chapter 8,Section V and Figures 8-2 to 8-4 discuss in further detail the capability and resources for field monitoring.

Transportation of field teams is discussed in Chapter 8,Section III of the State Plan. Field team communications are described in Chapter 6 of the State Plan. Monitoring equipment is described in Chapter 8,Section V and Figures 8-2 to 8-4. Composition of field teams is discussed in Chapter 9 of the State Plan.

Although county plans discuss accident assessment,Section X of Appendix III, of the State Plan, indicates that the off-site accident assessment responsibility rests with the Bureau of Radiation Control.

DOH Bureau of Radiation Control provides for the measurement of iodine in air and the use of such measurements in assessment activities.

EP3:4 5-7 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.1 6. Off-site Monitoring (continued)

Field Monitoring - Plant Plant procedure RP-SL-100-1005, Radiation Protection Emergency Organization, provides methods for activation of emergency field monitoring teams and dispatching these teams throughout the plume EPZ.

Procedure RP-SL-102-2005, Environmental Monitoring During Emergencies, includes techniques for measurements of airborne concentrations of radioiodine and direct radiation dose rates, transportation of teams, expected deployment times, and communications. Instrumentation, at the plant, is available with the capability to detect radioiodine in concentrations of at least 10-7 microcuries/cc, in the field. Assessment of data is discussed in EPIP-10, "Off-site Radiological Monitoring."

Coordination of Sampling Data To assure that information concerning FPL off-site radiological assessment is exchanged, arrangements have been made for representatives from the Bureau of Radiation Control to be stationed at the EOF. Direction and control of field operations for the Department of Health will be provided by the Bureau of Radiation Control Health Physics Supervisor. He/she will conduct/supervise accident assessment and/or response of the field teams from a post at the EOF, where office space and communications equipment are available. Prior to the arrival of Bureau of Radiation Control personnel, coordination of this information will be through follow-up communications with DEM and the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ counties.

Department of Energy (DOE) off-site monitoring assistance, if required, will be requested by the DEM in consultation with the Bureau of Radiation Control. Lead responsibility for coordination with the DOE is assigned to the Bureau of Radiation Control.

EP3:4 5-8 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.2 Protective Response This section describes the protective actions on-site and data provided to assist the State and County in determining appropriate off-site protective actions.

1. Protective Actions On-site On-site protective actions for a radiological emergency consist of evacuation of the affected area (localized evacuation or site evacuation), monitoring of all personnel who were in the affected area, decontamination as required, and re-entry to determine the magnitude and extent of the problem when it is determined to be safe to do so.

During a Hostile Action event, protective actions can range from taking cover to evacuation, depending on the event and timing of the event.

Individuals remaining or arriving on-site during an emergency will be provided protective equipment as prescribed by the TSC RP Supervisor and plant procedures. Florida Power & Light Company will make Potassium Iodide (KI) available for use as a thyroid blocking agent.

Use of KI will be in accordance with plant procedures.

Control Room personnel are in an isolated environment and need protective equipment if they leave the Control Room. An emergency kit with necessary equipment is present inside both Control Rooms and is to be used for this purpose (Table 2.3). In addition, if there is fire or smoke in the Control Room or if the Control Room air becomes contaminated, Control Room personnel might have to don respiratory protective equipment in order to remain in the Control Room to handle the emergency.

Decontamination Personnel decontamination facilities are available in four locations.

Their use will be governed by the nature of the incident.

1. Hot Locker Rooms - Showers and sinks available for the decontamination of personnel with no (or minor) injuries. One is located in the Auxiliary Building for each unit.

EP3:4 5-9 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.2 1. Protective Actions (continued)

Decontamination (continued)

2. Lawnwood Regional Medical Center in Ft. Pierce, FL and Martin Memorial Medical Center in Stuart, FL are available for medical treatment and decontamination of contaminated injured individuals. Lawnwood Regional Medical Center is located approximately 8 miles Northwest of St. Lucie Plant. Martin Memorial Medical Center is located approximately 10 1/4 miles South of St. Lucie Plant.

3. Decontamination Facility - The Site Assembly Station personnel decontamination capabilities consist of utilizing various types of decontamination agents, such as waterless cleaners and decontamination foams. A quantity of cloth material is available for use with these decontamination agents. Contamination monitoring is performed through the use of count rate instruments with beta sensitive probes. Extra clothing for personnel whose personal clothing has been contaminated is available in the form of disposable garments. Decontamination of vehicles will be handled following the accident. Methods for decontamination and monitoring are described in plant procedures.

Off-site Off-site areas are the responsibility of the respective County Public Safety Departments, the Department of Health, and the Division of Emergency Management of the State of Florida. Control of radioactive contamination and public safety in off-site areas are responsibilities of these governmental agencies, and their criteria for implementing protective actions may be found in the State Plan Chapter 10.

Decontamination of off-site areas will be performed under the direction of the Bureau of Radiation Control.

Section XII.E. of Appendix III of the State Plan discusses evacuation routes, times, and facilities in relation to St. Lucie and Martin Counties.

Recommendations for protective actions will be made by the Emergency Coordinator (Recovery Manager after EOF is operational) based upon consideration of severity of an accident (emergency class) and estimated off-site doses (if available). A range of protective actions has been developed in accordance with NUREG-0654, FEMA REP 1, NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Supplement 3 and EPA 400-R-92-001. Figure 5-1 shows the decision-making criteria for determination of Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).

EP3:4 5-10 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.2 2. On-site Warning and Response During an emergency, the relocation of plant personnel in the Protected Area may be required in order to prevent or minimize exposure to radioactive materials. Evacuation is the primary protective action anticipated for on-site personnel. An emergency evacuation is the orderly, rapid, and safe withdrawal of all personnel from an area affected by an emergency condition. The plant public address system will be used to announce evacuation orders. Announcement of an emergency situation to all plant personnel within the Protected Area can be accomplished in less than 15 minutes. Depending on the nature of the emergency and the extent of the area affected, evacuations have been classified as either a Local Evacuation or an Owner Controlled Area Evacuation.

1. Local Evacuation Definition A local evacuation is the evacuation of personnel from a room, area, or building located within the Protected Area.

Criteria The evacuation of an affected local area will be initiated per routine RP procedures when any of the following conditions occur:

1. Area Radiation Monitor Alarm

2. Containment Evacuation Alarm

3. Unevaluated direct radiation dose rate increase in excess of 100 mrem/hour above normal levels.

4. Unexpected airborne radioactivity concentration in excess of 1 x 10-9 micro Ci/cc.

5. Removable radioactive surface contamination in an unposted area in excess of 1000 dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma over an area 100 ft2.

6. Removable radioactive surface contamination in an unposted area in excess of 50 dpm/100 cm2 alpha over an area 100 ft2.

EP3:4 5-11 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

FIGURE 5-1 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS1 (Page 1 of 3)

PARs Based on Plant Conditions

,.../,..'"', . ,. ,...... . . ....-...........~. D . d I!1...EAB. .

,--' "-,, // ' ',, ownwm Evacuate Sector!: Shelter Sector!: Momtor & Prcpilrc

,/' '-, Yes , / 'Rapidly Progressm8'-, Yes Distance Sf!ctors

<__ Gcncrul Emcrccncy? ;~-- Severe Acd dcnt?  ;~ 0-2 mile-s All None- None

',, /'/ ~- {Nt>te l) /_, 2-S mil~~ (AH~ct~d Sectors) Non~ All R~m~ining ~-----i~

' ',,)".,-' / ' ' -_,_ ,// /

S-10 miles None (Affected Seotors} All Remaing y..,

~ 1 No ,--'//' **-.,,,,,

Continue No ,rA r <' PAGs exre,dN1 ~ ~

Auessnu:tt1t 4r*d ...: the Sileo Boundary o r )~

Conltnuc to Ancss Conditions Main~'~K~u rrent -,,, beyond? _,/'

(Not., SJ '-,,, / /

/ f..._

~ ~

~ /'

t~

,/' ' -, Downwind Evacuate Sectors Shelter Sectors Monitor & Prepare ,- "--,

_,,, -, Yc~ Distance sectors /' , ,

'Y

.,.,/ 1:."' .H':":.~il.: A\.liun .......... . 0 _2 miles None All None //I~ Hu:. Uic A~liun !a lill J........

<, TiOkm e Place? /~ ~ factor? '>

'-_,, (Note 2) _,- 2-5 rnile10 Nune (Affected Sectun;) All Rernaininy '-,, (Note 21 .,.,-/

>00 ~~ '"~ Nooo AO ) /

P1 PAR No Evacuate Ser:tors II Shelter

__ --*--- I Monitor Moni~:tors & Prepare I /"'-_

---* Sectors

---*-* ** I' --*tors

• I ,/ '-,

All None 1e I None N I Y<!!: / ' ' / GE Conditio,-. ' '-,,

lAtfected :>ectors) I ~ne N~ne I _

All Rema1n1ng I *-,,, n~ma tn"'

(Noto 6J ,/ *

~

None I None All ', ,r-'

',, / /

Continue ASses~ mcnt (Note 5)

.._-----------------+(, and Exp and PARs b.-.s\."\1 Ofrc h;,rr8Cd plant cond il ions o:

Consider Ev acuating S ru::l t.:-r<.-dArca~

w hen S~.t fe to fio so 1+-------J when:: PAG~ will!:>.:.

exceeded.

EPIP-08-F02 Form Revision: 6 1 Format may vary in plant procedures.

EP3:4 5-12 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

FIGURE 5-1 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS1 (Page 2 of 3)

PARs Based on Plant Conditions NOTE:

(1) A Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident involves a containment failure with >20% clad damage or PAG's exceeded at site boundary within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Loss of containment integrity::: EALs indicate containment barrier loss. This path is used for scenarios in which containment integrity can be determined as bypassed or immediately lost during aGE with core damage .

20% Clad Damage is identified by ANY the following :

• Pressure:::; 100 psia and 1250 CET Temp (F)

• Pressure between 100 and 1200 psia and 1550 CET Temp (F)

• Pressure between 1200 and 1650 psia and 1925 CET Tempt (F)

If this scenario cannot be immediately confirmed, assume it is not taking place and answer "no" to this decision block.

(2) Hostile Action : An act toward a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. Hostile Action should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP.

(3) Shelter in Place (SIP) means that instructions are given to members of the public to remain indoors, turn off heating or air conditioning (as appropriate for the region and season) , close windows, monitor communications channels, and prepare to evacuate.

(4) Monitor and Prepare: The instruction to monitor and prepare is intended to engage the population within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone , inform them of the emergency, and advise them that they should monitor the situation and prepare for the possibility of evacuation , SIP, or other protective actions. If an evacuation is underway, officials should ask members of the public who are not directed to evacuate to remain off the roadways to allow the evacuation to proceed .

(5) Continue Assessments : Radiological and meteorological assessments should be continued and evacuation considered for any areas where dose projections or field measurements indicate that PAGs may be exceeded. Communications with the public should be maintained while protective actions are in effect. Additionally, changes in wind direction may indicate that if a release begins, it would affect different downwind sectors. If a licensee believes that containment may fail, it should pursue the expansion of PARs.

(6) GE Conditions Remain: If the plant has mitigated the conditions that caused the GE declaration (i.e. , core cooling is restored), expanding the PAR to evacuate downwind sectors upon completion of the initial staged evacuation may not be necessary. However, if GE emergency action levels are still met, expansion of the PAR to the downwind sectors may be appropriate. If the plant restores core cooling , it must still perform a radiological assessment to identify the extent of contamination, if any. If surveys or dose projections reveal areas under no protective action direction where protective action guidelines (PAGs) could be exceeded, the members of the public in those areas should be evacuated or sheltered, as appropriate.

EPI P-08-F02 Form Revision : 6 1 Format may vary in plant procedures.

EP3:4 5-13 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

FIGURE 5-1 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS1 (Page 3 of 3)

PARs Based on Dose Assessment Table NOTE

• If TEDE Dose or CDE Thyroid Dose is~ PAGs (~ 1.00E+03 and~ 5.00E+03 respectively) at the Site Boundary (1 mile for Manual Dose Calculations), notify the Emergency Coordinator and/or Recovery Manager and verify current Emergency Classification is General Emergency.

• When using URI Dose Assessment report or Dose Assessment Summation report, ensure Affected Sectors includes all sectors indicated on the Evacuation Area map.

Proceed down the page until PARs based on Dose Assessment are selected. Once PARs based on Dose Assessment have been selected , go to step 2.

1. Is all calculated dose < 1.00E+3 TEDE and/or< 5.00 E + 3 CDE (Thyroid)? If so no PARs based on Dose Assessment are required. If not, proceed to step 2.

2. At greater than or equal to 10 miles is calculated dose~ 1.00E+03 TEDE and/or~ 5.00E+03 CDE (Thyroid)? If so, select the following PARs based on Dose Assessment and go to step 6. Additionally, perform a URI 50 mile assessment. If not, continue to step 3.

Miles Evacuate Shelter Monitor & Prepare 0-2 All None None 2-5 Affected Sectors None All Remaining 5-10 Affected Sectors None All Remainin~

> 10 Affected Sectors None All Remaining

3. At greater than 2 miles and less than 10 miles is any calculated dose~ 1.00E+03 TEDE and/or~ 5.00E+03 CDE (Thyroid)? If so, select the following PARs based on Dose Assessment and go to step 6. If not, continue to step 4.

Miles Evacuate Shelter Monitor & Prepare 0-2 All None None 2-5 (Affected Sectors) None All Remaining 5-10 (Affected Sectors) None All Remaining

>10 None (Affected Sectors) All Remaining

4. At less than or equal to 2 miles Is any calculated dose~ 1.00E+03 TEDE and/or;;::: 5.00E+03 CDE (Thyroid)? If so, select the following PARs based on Dose Assessment and go to step 6. If not, continue to step 5.

Miles Evacuate Shelter Monitor & Prepare 0-2 All None None 2-5 (Affected Sectors) None All Remaining 5-10 None (Affected Sectors) All Remaining

>10 None None None

5. Compare the selected PARs based on Dose Assessment with Plant Condition PARs using the PAR Worksheet.

Once selection of PARs based on dose assessment is complete, dose assessors must continue to assess conditions and update dose assessment if:

• Release Point Information increases by more than 25 percent or additional release pathways are discovered ;

• Wind speed decreases to less than one half of previous value ;

• Atmospheric stability becomes more stable by more than one class (e.g., change from Stability Class D to F);

• Wind direction changes by more than 22 .5 degrees (i.e., plume centerline is more than one sector away from prior location) .

EPIP-08-F02 Form Revision : 6 EP3:4 5-14 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.2 2. 1. Local Evacuation (continued)

Personnel Actions When the containment evacuation alarm is activated or when the Emergency Coordinator makes notification over the public address system that a local evacuation has been declared, non-essential FPL and contract personnel, and visitors in the area will go to the designated assembly area and remain there for personnel accountability and monitoring. Plant visitors are escorted at all times by a trained person who is accountable for them. They will also be informed by their escort during any emergency of what they are expected to do during the emergency.

When a local evacuation is declared, the Security Force will assist in personnel accounting and be prepared to brief the SM/Emergency Coordinator.

Precautions Every effort will be made to minimize personnel exposure to radiation.

Personnel who have been in the area of an evacuation should remain in a group and should not mix with other personnel in the assembly area until they have been monitored for possible contamination, unless they are injured. Injured personnel will be treated by the First Aid Team. Provisions exist for off-site treatment of personnel, if required (see Section 2.5).

Evacuation Implementation The SM/Emergency Coordinator will announce the local evacuation over the public address system, identifying the area affected, the assembly point and other instructions as required. All personnel in the evacuated area will stop work, turn off potentially hazardous equipment and leave the area. All personnel in the evacuated area should report to the designated assembly area for monitoring and accountability. The SM/Emergency Coordinator will activate the Emergency Response Organization as required. The SM/Emergency Coordinator, and department supervisors and foremen having personnel working in the evacuated area, will assist in verifying that all personnel are accounted for. The SM/Emergency Coordinator will initiate a search for personnel who have not been accounted for.

EP3:4 5-15 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.2 2. 2. Owner Controlled Area Evacuation Definition An Owner Controlled Area Evacuation is the orderly withdrawal of all non-essential personnel from the Owner Controlled Area (OCA), including the Protected Area (PA).

Criteria An Owner Controlled Area Evacuation can be initiated at the discretion of the EC and is signaled by the sounding of the evacuation alarm followed by instructions given over the public address system. Evacuation of the OCA will normally occur at a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency unless such action is deemed unwarranted by the EC (i.e., personnel would be placed at greater risk).

Responsibilities The EC advises the TSC Security Supervisor of evacuation of the OCA either directly or via the evacuation alarm and/or the public address system.

Information needed by the Security Force to properly fulfill their responsibilities during the evacuation is provided to the TSC Security Supervisor by the EC. Significant responsibilities during the evacuation include directing the evacuation movements and personnel accountability.

The EC will direct that a search be initiated for any personnel not accounted for.

Evacuation Preparedness The population within the OCA is approximately 1300, including workers who may be present on-site at shift change.

All visitors will have adequate transportation available to evacuate all members of their respective groups. The Security Force will assist in arranging for required transportation.

EP3:4 5-16 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.2 2. 2. Owner Controlled Area Evacuation (continued)

Evacuation Preparedness (continued)

Escorts accompanying visitors will assure that transportation is available at all times while the visitors are on-site. Escorts will maintain controls of groups of individuals to which they are assigned to enable all members of the groups to be located, notified, and evacuated in the event that evacuation of the OCA is called for.

Procedures used by the Security Force define which evacuation route(s) will be used by the various groups in the OCA.

Evacuation Implementation The EC will sound the evacuation alarm and announce instructions for evacuation of the OCA over the public address system. Upon hearing the alarm and/or evacuation order, all non-essential personnel will evacuate.

ERO personnel will report to the TSC, OSC, or EOF for assignment.

The EC will notify the TSC Security Supervisor that an Owner Controlled Area Evacuation is ordered and will advise him/her of all pertinent information affecting the evacuation, including priorities and/or special conditions which exist to enable the evacuation to be conducted in a safe manner. Security will assign specific areas of the OCA, outside the PA, for which they are responsible for personnel notification.

The TSC Security Supervisor will immediately initiate the evacuation procedures for the OCA, outside the PA including: (these actions may occur at the Alert level)

1. Notification of all security patrols and tour guides of the evacuation.

2. Notification of all non-company groups working in or using portions of the OCA.

3. Initiate sweeps of recreation areas and assist in personnel accountability.

EP3:4 5-17 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.2 2. 2. Owner Controlled Area Evacuation (continued)

Evacuation Implementation (continued)

Upon declaration of an Owner Controlled Area Evacuation, the Security Force will conduct personnel accountability in accordance with emergency procedures. An initial list of individuals in the PA is established in 30 minutes and continuously updated until all individuals are accounted for. The number of security officers on duty at any time is adequate to handle the evacuation of personnel in the OCA should such an action be called for by the EC.

Personnel Actions When an evacuation is ordered, all non-essential personnel shall exit the PA via their normal gate unless otherwise directed by the EC. Non-essential personnel shall travel from the plant site following the designated evacuation route. Figure 5.2 shows the evacuation route(s) for personnel. It is expected that the primary evacuation route will not be affected by adverse weather or traffic conditions. If a release is in progress and the potential exists for contamination of evacuees, they will be directed to an off-site assembly area. The primary assembly area for evacuated personnel is the Jaycee Public Park on Highway A1A, located approximately 7 1/2 miles north of the plant on the road to Ft. Pierce. The alternate assembly area, south of the plant, is Jensen Public Beach Parking Area. All personnel will be requested to remain at the assembly area until instructed otherwise.

3. Off-site Area Protective Measures An off-site area evacuation is the orderly withdrawal of all persons from the portion of the public areas surrounding the plant which have been affected by the emergency. The criteria for the initiation of the evacuation are determined by the Department of Health as specified in the State Plan. Appendix III of the State Plan describes evacuation measures and provides maps indicating designated evacuation routes.

Evacuation time estimates have been performed in accordance with NUREG/CR-7002. Annually, an analysis is performed for population changes. Figure 5-3 (Figure III-21 in the State Plan) is a map of the evacuation routes for the general public. Maps and text describing evacuation routes, monitoring points, and reception centers are provided in the State Plan.

EP3:4 5-18 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.2 3. Off-site Area Protective Measures (continued)

The EC (RM when the EOF is operational) will recommend offsite protective actions based on the criteria shown in Figure 5-1, Protective Action Recommendations.

The St. Lucie and Martin County Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors and the State Division of Emergency Management will be responsible for the direction and implementation of the necessary protective actions as specified in the State Plan, including notification and coordination with other State and local assistance agencies.

It will be the responsibility of the St. Lucie and Martin County Public Safety Departments to notify the general public if an evacuation is warranted. This will be accomplished as discussed in Sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.8.

The State Plan describes the basis for the choice of recommended actions for the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ during emergency conditions. Protective action decisions are made on the basis of information which becomes available as a result of accident assessment. The Bureau of Radiation Control Standard Operating Procedures also discuss the process by which state officials collect information and make recommendations. The Bureau of Radiation Control Standard Operating Procedures also discuss assessment actions which would form a basis for recommendations. The State and County Plans point out that EPA Protective Action Guides will be an important basis for Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).

4. Public Warning and Information Chapter 5,Section III to the State Plan, provides information on warning of the public, in general, and Appendix III Section VI discuss warning procedures in St.

Lucie and Martin Counties, in particular.

Prompt notification systems are discussed therein. FPL has purchased and installed an alert (siren) and notification system as described in Section 5.2.8.

Notification to the population and arrangements with public communications media are described in the State Plan. Chapter 7 to the State Plan provides the guidance for keeping the public informed about the potential hazards, emergency response, and protective measures that can be taken to minimize or avoid public health effects. Chapter 7 also provides procedures for the timely and accurate collection, coordination, and dissemination to the public of such information.

EP3:4 5-19 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.2 4. Public Warning and Information (continued)

Chapter 7, Figures 7-1 to 7-8 of the State Plan also provides for sample releases to be used for media. These are consistent with FPL's classification scheme.

These are examples of specific prior arrangements that have been made to use public communication media for issuing emergency instructions to the public.

Section VIII of Appendix III discusses annual orientation of the media.Section VI of Appendix III indicates TV and radio stations which would be used to alert the public.

5. Population Exposure Estimates Population exposure estimates are discussed in Chapter 13,Section IV of the State plan. Bureau of Radiation Control Standard Operating Procedures discuss the projected dose calculation process and assessment and monitoring in the Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZ. Standard Operating Procedures are used to determine dose rates.

6. Special Needs Population Section XII of Appendix III of the State Plan contains a discussion of evacuation of special need populations.

7. Population Distribution The State Plan contains maps showing population distribution, and it describes the means for notifying transient and resident population. Population maps and tables are included in Appendix III of the State Plan (St. Lucie Site Plan).

8. Alert and Notification System (ANS)

FPL has purchased an alert and notification system for use by the St. Lucie and Martin County Public Safety/Emergency Management Directors in alerting the population of the need to possibly take protective actions. The system consists of 90 electronic sirens located throughout the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ. These electronic sirens have public address capability for voice messages. Upon sounding the sirens, the affected public, keyed through the public information program, should turn on their radios to the local Emergency Alert System (EAS) radio station and await emergency information and instructions. Backup Alert Notification System for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant is achieved through physical Route Altering, which is contained in the Radiological Response Plans and procedures for the State of Florida and Offsite response Organizations in the EPZ that have been approved by FEMA in accordance with Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 44CFR350.12 and 14.

EP3:4 5-20 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.3 Radiological Exposure Control

1. On-site Radiation Protection Program An objective of emergency response is to minimize radiation exposure to individuals both on-site and off-site. Situations may arise, however, when observance of this goal is inconsistent with personnel or plant safety. In anticipation of such needs, guidelines have been established for emergency conditions. The guidelines on which the emergency radiation protection program is based are stated below.

Exposure to emergency response personnel should be maintained As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). Actions taken during an emergency should take into consideration the amount of exposure required to accomplish the task verses the potential benefit to the public health and safety.

Conditions may warrant re-entry into high radiation areas leading to exposure in excess of the regulatory limit. Except for rescue of personnel (life-saving only),

authorization must be given in advance by the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in consultation with the TSC RP Supervisor. If time permits the EC should obtain concurrence from the Recovery Manager (if the EOF is operational). In any case where regulatory limits have been exceeded the EC shall notify the RM of the event.

For those remote circumstances involving an event in progress, and obtaining EC approval will result in leaving the accident scene or decrease the victim(s) chance of survival, lifesaving actions may be performed without obtaining EC approval.

The EC shall be notified immediately following the rescue operation.

Re-entry personnel that have been selected/chosen to exceed regulatory exposure limits should be volunteers, broadly familiar with the risks involved (radiosensitivity of fetuses, effects of acute exposures, etc.), and whose normal duties have trained them for such missions.

EPA 400, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents," EPA 400-R-92-001 states that "To assure adequate protection of minors and the unborn during emergencies, the performance of emergency services should be limited to non-pregnant adults." FPL endorses this guidance; however, FPL recognizes that it is the right of the worker to make the decision to perform as an on-site emergency worker, understanding the potential risks involved.

EP3:4 5-21 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.3 1. On-site Radiation Protection Program (continued)

For the following missions, (1) TOTAL DOSE(2) THYROID(3) the exposure limit is: (TEDE) (CDE)

Performance of actions that would not 5 REM 50 REM directly mitigate the event, minimize escalation, or minimize effluent releases.

Performance of actions that mitigate the 10 REM 100 REM escalation of the event, rescue persons from a non-life threatening situation, minimize exposures or minimize effluent releases.

Performance of actions that decrease the 25 REM 250 REM severity of the event or terminate the processes causing the event in an attempt to control effluent releases to avoid extensive exposure of large populations. Also, rescue of persons from a life-threatening situation.

Rescue of persons from a life-threatening (5) (5) situation. (Volunteers should be above the age of 45.)(4)

NOTE 1 Both Total Dose (TEDE) and Thyroid Dose (CDE) should be used for purposes of controlling exposure.

NOTE 2 Protective clothing, including respirators should be used where appropriate.

(1) Exposure limits to the lens of the eye are 3 times the Total Dose (TEDE) values listed.

(2) Total Dose (TEDE) is the total dose from both external and internal (weighted) sources - Total Effective Dose Equivalent.

(3) Thyroid Dose (CDE) commitment from internal sources - Committed Dose Equivalent. The same dose limits also apply to other organs (CDE), skin (Shallow Dose Equivalent) and extremities (Extremity Dose Equivalent).

(4) Volunteers with full awareness of risks involved including numerical levels of dose at which acute effects of radiation will be incurred and numerical estimates of the risk of delayed effects.

(5) No upper limit for Total Dose (TEDE) and/or Thyroid Dose (CDE) has been established because it is not possible to pre-judge the risks that one person should be allowed to take to save the life of another.

Also, no specific limit is given for thyroid dose since in the extreme case, complete thyroid loss might be acceptable sacrifice for a life saved. This should not be necessary if respirators and/or thyroid protection for rescue personnel are available as the result of adequate planning.

EP3:4 5-22 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.3 2. Dose Records FPL Nuclear Division procedures provide for conducting the personnel dosimetry program. The company has the capability of determining personnel radiation exposures on a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day basis. Dose records for all individuals exposed to ionizing radiation at FPL's facilities are maintained.

All emergency response personnel under the authority of FPL who will potentially be exposed to radiation in the course of their duties will be monitored by the plant radiation exposure monitoring program. Personnel in this category will be issued the appropriate personal dosimetry devices.

Since, by their very nature, emergency exposures requiring immediate action are not planned, they are not controlled as a Planned Special Exposure. Dose received from exposure under emergency conditions will be added to the dose received during the current year, prior to the emergency, to determine compliance with the occupational dose limits in 10 CFR 20.

Doses above regulatory limits will require reporting pursuant to 10 CFR 20.2202 and 20.2203. Any dose in excess of the annual limits specified in Section 20.1201(a) will be accounted for in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1206(e). If an individual exceeds any of these limits, then that individual will not be available for additional dose under 20.1201(a).

3. Contamination Control and Decontamination Procedures A personnel decontamination washroom and shower room with chemical decontamination agents is provided on the ground floor of the Auxiliary Buildings.

Except in cases of serious injury, accepted decontamination practices will be employed on-site. Life endangering injuries or injuries such as extensive burns, serious wounds, or fractures shall receive prompt attention in preference to decontamination. Personnel with injuries involving radiation or radioactive contamination will be handled as discussed in Section 2.5.1. Decontamination of uninjured personnel must be attempted at contamination levels greater than minimum detectable activity as defined in Health Physics / Radiation Protection procedures.

EP3:4 5-23 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.3 3. Contamination Control and Decontamination Procedures (continued)

Any item of equipment, once having been taken inside a controlled area, requires a survey for possible contamination prior to its removal from the controlled area.

Equipment regularly required within a controlled area will be maintained within the controlled area. Areas within the Plant or items suspected of contamination will be checked before normal use is permitted. Laboratory analysis of swipes will be undertaken, and an area or item will be declared suitable for normal use if contamination levels are less than 1,000 dpm/100 cm2. Should contaminated equipment be discovered, it will be stored and either decontaminated or disposed of in accordance with Plant procedures.

Food for emergency workers will be brought in from off-site, if necessary. The plant drinking water is obtained from the Ft. Pierce water supply. It is unlikely that ingestion of contaminated food or water will occur.

Frequent surveys of habitable areas utilized for emergency response (i.e. Control Room, TSC and OSC) will be performed to assure these areas remain uncontaminated. Special attention to drinking water and food supplies will be given to assure that these supplies remain uncontaminated.

4. Radioactive Wastes Radioactive wastes (resins, trash, etc.) accumulated during an emergency will be handled by normal plant procedures. Any special circumstances will be handled on a case-by-case basis.

EP3:4 5-24 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

FIGURE 5-2 SITE EVACUATION ROUTES N

A1A 1

JAYCEE PARK OFF-SITE 95 ASSEMBLY AREA A1A PR AD IMA RO E E OB FT PIERCE UT ECH KE RO O

ATLANTIC OCEAN RY 707 E

SITE ASSEMBLY STATION MIDWAY RD (MET TOWER) 1 ST LUCIE PLANT TE PRIMA VISTA BLVD AL 95 A1A RN E

AT U

PORT ST LUCIE BLVD RO ST. LUCIE COUNTY N

TE MARTIN COUNTY SE JEN EWAY US CA ST LUCIE BLVD JENSEN PUBLIC RT 1

BEACH PARKING AREA PORT ST LUCIE OFF-SITE 707 ASSEMBLY AREA PO VD BL N

C EA STUART N EO A1A FL AT ID 76 OR NP UR IK MARTIN HWY E 714 1 A1A (D/PS/EPLAN-F5.2-R1)

EP3:4 5-25 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

FIGURE 5-3 GENERAL PUBLIC EVACUATION ROUTES N

KINGS HIGHWAY A1A 1

ST LUCIE BLVD 10 MILES CH BELCHER CANAL EA AY N B SEW FT. PIERCE U

CA .

DR INLET 25TH STREET ANGLE RD AY W

S EA 95 AREA 1 ORANGE AVE A1A ATLANTIC OCEAN AREA 3 HU AD TC RO E H IN BE VIRGINIA FT PIERCE HO AVE SO C N K EE VD O BL IS L AN 5 MILES EDWARDS R IS E D RD SUN SELVITZ RD IN 707 DI FL AN OR RI ID A VE AREA 4 R

TU RN 2 MILES P IK MIDWAY RD E

OLEANDER BLVD ST. JAMES DR G L T- A D O E FF S R D U

ST LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT CALIFORNIA BLVD IN D C

1 IA N AREA 2 R IV AIROSO BLVD ER DR IV E PRIMA VISTA FL DYER ROAD ST. LUCIE BLVD O AIROSO BLVD WEST BLVD RE ST A AREA 6 IN D 95 JULIET AVE DR WALTON ROAD IA N A1A BA R IV YS ER DEL RIO HO BLVD RE FE DE D IV BL RA ERS IO N D VD PORT ST LUCIE BLVD LH AREA 8 C AN A ON L A BLV WY H

S AV AC D GATLIN BLVD AREA 5 BE V EN Y B L AREA 7 NS A JE SEW A U C

ST LUCIE BLVD JENSEN BEACH BLVD TULIP BLVD 1 RD PORT ST LUCIE A S

N T N OR R VA RD 707 P AA SA F LO P

VD R ID BL AN AT CE ST. LUCIE COUNTY BECKER ROAD UR STUART NE O

MARTIN COUNTY NP MAPP A1A 'S IKE LL WA RD RD SE MONTEREY MURPHY RD PO MARTIN DOWNS 76 INT MARTIN DOWNS BLVD ST. LUCIE MARTIN HWY 714 1 INLET A1A 95 (D/PS/EPLAN-F5.3-R3)

EP3:4 5-26 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.4 Recovery and Re-entry

1. On-site Once the hazard potential has passed, steps must be taken to recover from the incident. All actions should be preplanned in order to limit exposures. Access to the area will be controlled and personnel exposures will be documented.

The Recovery Manager/EC has the responsibility for determining when the on-site conditions are stable and it is appropriate to enter the recovery phase. The Recovery Organization consists of an augmented Expanded Emergency Response Organization consisting of existing FPL emergency personnel and additional resources from both the company and contracted agencies. The Emergency Response Managers would continue their assigned duties with additional personnel to use as necessary. The Recovery Manager (or EC) will evaluate the status of the plant by reviewing all current and pertinent data available from emergency response and/or monitoring teams. The recovery phase will begin only when plant conditions are stable and the following guidelines are met:

1. Radiation levels in all in-plant areas are stable or decreasing with time.

2. Releases of radioactive materials to the environment from the plant are under control or have ceased.

3. Any fire, flooding, or similar emergency conditions are controlled or have ceased.

4. The reactor is in a stable condition.

At the time of initiating activities to enter the recovery phase, the Recovery Manager will be responsible for informing all applicable agencies (e.g., Federal, State, and local agencies) that on-site conditions have stabilized and activities for recovering from the incident can now begin. Once these agencies and the Emergency Control Officer (ECO) have been informed, the Recovery Manager has the authority to de-escalate the emergency classification.

Planned recovery actions which may result in a radioactive release will be evaluated by the Recovery Manager and his/her staff in advance. Such planning and data pertaining to the possible release will be reported to the appropriate off-site emergency response organizations and agencies.

EP3:4 5-27 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

5. RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (continued) 5.4 1. On-site (continued)

Re-entry into an affected area may be required before entering the recovery phase. Re-entry into an evacuated area will be made by the Emergency Response Organization personnel when required for one or more of the following reasons:

1. To ascertain that all personnel who were in affected area have been evacuated, or to search for unaccounted personnel.

2. To assist in evacuating injured or incapacitated personnel from the affected area.

3. To perform operations which may mitigate the effect of the emergency or hazardous condition.

4. To determine the nature and extent of the emergency and/or radiological conditions.

5. To establish definite personnel exclusion area boundaries.

Re-entry to the affected areas on-site will take place only under the authority of the Emergency Coordinator. The TSC RP Supervisor is responsible for evaluating the existing emergency conditions and informing the Emergency Coordinator of the advisability of re-entry. For emergencies inside the Radiation Controlled Area (RCA), the TSC RP Supervisor will supervise the initial entry of the Emergency Response Organization personnel and all subsequent entries until radiation areas have been properly marked. More detailed guidance for re-entry teams is contained in plant procedures.

2. Off-site State and County officials would be in control of recovery and re-entry off-site.

Population exposure estimates are discussed in the State plan. Chapter 11 discusses the Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZ. The State Plan (Chapter 13, Recovery and Re-entry) also discusses population dose measurement.

EP3:4 5-28 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

6. PUBLIC INFORMATION 6.1 Preparatory Public Information Program

1. Purpose The purpose of the preparatory public information program is to inform the public of how they would be notified and what their actions should be in a radiological emergency.

2. Program Execution Florida Power & Light Company has the responsibility for conducting the public information program with the support from the State Division of Emergency Management and the St. Lucie County and Martin County Departments of Public Safety.

Chapter 7 of the State Plan discusses the preparatory public information and education program. Education will be provided on an annual basis to local residents, transients, and news media in the manner described in Chapter 7,Section VII of the State Plan.

6.2 Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Public Information Program This section delineates the organization, public information network, and facilities that would be made available as required in an emergency.

1. Organization The members of the emergency public information organization (see Figure 6-1) and their respective responsibilities are as follows:

Emergency Information Manager (EIM)

The EIM is a senior manager or designated member of the Corporate Communications Department experienced in media relations, having knowledge of nuclear plant operations. He/she is the FPL official responsible for coordinating dissemination of information to the public via the news media. Insofar as practical, the EIM will work with the NRC, State, and local news media representatives to effect coordinated releases and public appearances. He/she will work with other company officials to develop formal statements and responses. All press releases, other than routine "updating" of data coming from the Emergency Operations Facility, should originate with or be cleared by the EIM. He/she will assure that exchange of information among designated spokespersons is accomplished in a timely manner, when possible.

EP3:4 6-1 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

FIGURE 6-1 PUBLIC INFORMATION INTERFACES EMERGENCY CONTROL OFFICER (OFFICIAL PUBLIC SPOKESPERSON)

EMERGENCY INFORMATION MANAGER STAFF STATE-COUNTY NRC PUBLIC NEWS PUBLIC RELATIONS RELATIONS MEDIA (D/PS/EPLAN-F6.1-R34)

EP3:4 6-2 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

6. PUBLIC INFORMATION (continued) 6.2 1. Organization (continued)

Nuclear Information Staff A staff of public information and technical personnel will be assigned as needed to the Joint Information Center. Their responsibilities will be to:

1. Provide technical briefings to the press.

2. Inform company employees through a newsletter, bulletin board statements, or other in-place networks.

3. Inform the industry, so other companies both in the United States and overseas can deal with questions as they arise from their local media.

4. Prepare background material for features, historical context, profiles, etc.

5. Handle the photographic needs of the company.

6. Record or transcribe all press conferences and other official proceedings for the benefit of company management, official agencies and the news media.

7. Accredit and escort members of the press.

8. Provide its own stenographic and typing services for news releases, photo captions, reports, transcripts, etc.

9. Provide reference services for maintaining files of releases and photos, obtaining newspapers, monitoring wire services and news broadcasts, logging all clippings.

The staff of the Florida Power & Light Company Corporate Communications Department may be augmented by personnel from other utilities, consultants, or universities.

2. Joint Information Center (JIC)

The St. Lucie Plant Joint Information Center (JIC) is adjacent to the EOF. The Emergency Information Manager will report to the EOF.

A designated JIC supervisor and his/her staff will man the JIC when the EIM deems it appropriate. The JIC/EOF is located at the intersection of State Route 712 (Midway Road) and I-95 approximately 10 1/2 miles west of St. Lucie Plant.

EP3:4 6-3 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

6. PUBLIC INFORMATION (continued) 6.2 3. News Media Provisions Florida Power & Light Company, in cooperation with the State of Florida and the risk counties, conducts an annual program to acquaint the news media with the emergency plans, information concerning nuclear power and points of contact for release of public information in an emergency.

In the event of an emergency, representatives of the news media will be provided space in the Joint Information Center for work and interview purposes.

4. Written Message for the Public Sample formats that may be used for release of information by FPL to the public via the news media appear in Tables 6-1 through 6-7.

These releases include initial statements for each class of emergency and follow-up statements for the Alert class and higher.

6.3 Rumor Control FPL will coordinate information exchange with State and County officials.

This coordination will include awareness of media releases.

The timely exchange of information among designated spokespersons will aid in dispelling most rumors. In written material which is disseminated annually to the public in the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ, means for obtaining timely and accurate information is provided. Chapter 7,Section VI of the State Plan also discusses Rumor Control.

EP3:4 6-4 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 6-1 FPL PRESS STATEMENT SAMPLE Number:___________ Florida Power & Light Company Joint Information Center Date:____/____/____ 9001 West Midway Road Ft. Pierce, FL 34945 Time:_____________ Phone: ( ) -

NEWS RELEASE UNUSUAL EVENT HUTCHINSON ISLAND - Florida Power & Light Company has alerted State and Local Officials and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that an "Unusual Event" has occurred at its St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant located south of Ft. Pierce.

According to initial reports, the event related to (give plant/unit specific data)

The situation was reported at (time) .

Due to the nature of the event, FPL officials have determined that:

(Options)

a. The unit can remain operational at this time without posing a health or safety hazard to plant employees or the general public;

b. The power levels at the plant will be systematically reduced in order to investigate the extent of the problem. Full shutdown is expected later today; or

c. The unit will be immediately brought off-line and orderly shutdown procedures will be initiated.

All safety systems are operating normally and officials have stated that no (or no significant) radioactivity has been released as a result of this event. No further information is available at this time. However, news media will be kept informed of the plant's status as it becomes available.

EP3:4 6-5 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 6-2 FPL PRESS STATEMENT SAMPLE Number:___________ Florida Power & Light Company Joint Information Center Date:____/____/____ 9001 West Midway Road Ft. Pierce, FL 34945 Time:_____________ Phone: ( ) -

NEWS RELEASE ALERT HUTCHINSON ISLAND - St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant has declared an Alert, based on problems at Unit #______.

The unit had been (still operational), (under gradual power reduction), (in a full-scale, orderly shutdown following (give data relating to alert)

FPL officials called for the Alert and have notified appropriate State, Local and Federal Officials.

Option 1 (radiation release)

Plant operators have detected small amounts of radiation being released to the atmosphere as a result of the problem. The minor releases are confined to the plant site and pose no health or safety hazard to FPL employees or the general public. Radiation monitoring teams have been deployed as a routine precaution.

Option 2 (no radiation release)

Plant operators report that no radiation has been released from the unit as a result of the problem. Monitoring teams have been deployed at the plant site as a routine precaution.

All Safety Systems are operating and the unit has been placed in an orderly shutdown mode as officials continue to investigate the problem. FPL officials caution that no public action is required and no health or safety problem exists at this time.

EP3:4 6-6 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 6-3 FPL PRESS STATEMENT SAMPLE Number:___________ Florida Power & Light Company Joint Information Center Date:____/____/____ 9001 West Midway Road Ft. Pierce, FL 34945 Time:_____________ Phone: ( ) -

NEWS RELEASE SITE-AREA EMERGENCY HUTCHINSON ISLAND - Florida Power & Light Company has announced that a Site Area Emergency exists at St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. At (a.m./p.m),

all plant employees, except those with emergency response duties, were ordered to evacuate the plant site.

Plant officials called for the evacuation of non-emergency employees as a precautionary measure due to (insert plant specific data, is known). There are still approximately 90 personnel remaining on the plant site located in the Control Rooms, Technical Support Center, and Operational Support Center. This includes plant management, operators for both Units, and personnel from Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Maintenance, and Engineering departments. The cause and nature of the problem are being investigated and further details are not available at this time.

Option 1 (radiation release)

Monitoring equipment at the plant has detected (small/additional) amounts of radiation being released to the atmosphere as a result of the present situation at Unit #______.

Option 2 (no radiation release)

No radiation releases have been detected as a result of the situation at Unit #______.

The plant is continuing shutdown procedures and emergency cooling of the reactor core is continuing. Persons in the immediate vicinity of the plant should continue to monitor radio and television broadcasts for the latest information.

EP3:4 6-7 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 6-4 FPL PRESS STATEMENT SAMPLE Number:___________ Florida Power & Light Company Joint Information Center Date:____/____/____ 9001 West Midway Road Ft. Pierce, FL 34945 Time:_____________ Phone: ( ) -

NEWS RELEASE GENERAL EMERGENCY HUTCHINSON ISLAND - Florida Power & Light Company, has notified State, County and Federal authorities, that a General Emergency exists at its St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant as a result of escalating problems at Unit #______.

Persons within a 10 mile radius of the plant are advised to monitor radio and television stations for more information. Please follow all instructions provided through emergency broadcast services.

At this time, the plant is experiencing (significant, but controlled), (significant, uncontrolled), (small, but controlled), (small, uncontrolled), (no) releases of radiation to the environment.

Non-essential plant personnel have left the site.

The public is advised to monitor and follow emergency broadcast messages on radio and television.

EP3:4 6-8 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 6-5 FPL PRESS STATEMENT SAMPLE Number:___________ Florida Power & Light Company Joint Information Center Date:____/____/____ 9001 West Midway Road Ft. Pierce, FL 34945 Time:_____________ Phone: ( ) -

NEWS RELEASE LOSS OF POWER/CORE DAMAGE/RADIATION PLUME (Possible Follow-Up to General Emergency)

HUTCHINSON ISLAND - Significant equipment problems and loss of power to operate reactor core cooling systems have resulted in loss of coolant and partial uncovering of reactor fuel at St. Lucie Nuclear Unit #______, FPL plant operators have reported.

Additional emergency systems are being employed. However, monitoring teams are registering radiation in the atmosphere around the plant site. Weather conditions are moving a radiological plume in a ______ direction.

The public is advised to monitor emergency broadcast messages on radio and television.

EP3:4 6-9 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 6-6 FPL PRESS STATEMENT SAMPLE Number:___________ Florida Power & Light Company Joint Information Center Date:____/____/____ 9001 West Midway Road Ft. Pierce, FL 34945 Time:_____________ Phone: ( ) -

NEWS RELEASE JOINT INFORMATION CENTER ACTIVATED HUTCHINSON ISLAND - The St. Lucie Joint Information Center is now operating.

Information about the nuclear emergency will be provided at this facility, located at Midway Road and I-95, just west of Ft. Pierce. All affected agencies - County, State and Federal - will have representatives at the Joint Information Center to provide information about the emergency.

The Joint Information Center can be contacted by calling .

IMPORTANT This telephone number is for news media only and should NOT be announced to the general public.

EP3:4 6-10 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 6-7 FPL PRESS STATEMENT SAMPLE Number:___________ Florida Power & Light Company Joint Information Center Date:____/____/____ 9001 West Midway Road Ft. Pierce, FL 34945 Time:_____________ Phone: ( ) -

NEWS RELEASE MEDICAL EMERGENCY HUTCHINSON ISLAND - Florida Power & Light Company has reported that one of its workers at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant has been injured and requires medical treatment.

Preliminary reports indicate the employee suffered (state injury) while working in the plant's (location) .

The worker has received some radioactive contamination, but further information of (his/her) condition is not available at this time.

Specialized equipment and protective procedures are in place to insure proper handling of any radioactive contamination.

EP3:4 6-11 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 7.1 Exercises and Drills

1. Definitions An exercise is an event that tests the integrated capability of a major portion of the basic elements existing within the Radiological Emergency Plan for St. Lucie Plant. An exercise normally includes mobilization of State and local governmental personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability to respond to an accident scenario.

A drill is a supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining skills in a particular operation. A drill is often a component of an exercise. A drill should be evaluated by the supervisory personnel conducting the drill.

2. Purpose Periodic exercises and drills will be conducted in order to test the state of emergency preparedness of participating personnel, organizations, and agencies. Each exercise or drill will be conducted to:

1. Ensure that participants are familiar with their respective duties and responsibilities.

2. Verify the adequacy of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

3. Test the communications network and systems.

4. Check the availability of emergency supplies and equipment.

5. Verify the operability of emergency equipment.

The results of the exercises will form the basis for prescribing action to eliminate identified deficiencies.

3. Planning The site Emergency Preparedness Manager will be responsible for the planning, scheduling, and coordinating of exercises involving off-site agencies. A sample format for exercise scenarios appears in Table 7-1. All exercises and drills involving the plant are subject to the approval of plant management.

EP3:4 7-1 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.1 Exercises and Drills (continued)

3. Planning (continued)

When an exercise is to be conducted, the site Emergency Preparedness Manager, in conjunction with plant management, will:

1. Schedule a date for the exercise in coordination with the primary State and County emergency response agencies.

2. Obtain the approval of plant management.

3. Coordinate all FPL efforts with other participating personnel, organizations, and agencies.

4. Offer Federal, State, and local officials the opportunity to observe the exercise.

5. Assign personnel to prepare a scenario.

6. Assign personnel to assist in control and evaluation of the exercise.

7. Discuss and evaluate the exercise with observers and principal participants.

8. Ensure that for all identified deficiencies, corrective measures are recommended.

9. Prepare and submit documentation in accordance with plant procedures.

An Emergency Preparedness Coordinator may complete or coordinate completion of any of the above items. The site Emergency Preparedness Manager shall retain oversight and accountability through the requirements of EPIP-13, "Maintaining Emergency Preparedness -

Emergency Exercises, Drills, Tests and Evaluations."

These exercises will simulate emergency conditions and may be scheduled such that two or more drills are conducted simultaneously.

The site Emergency Preparedness Manager will normally notify the off-site emergency response organizations and agencies at least 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of an exercise.

EP3:4 7-2 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 7-1 EXAMPLE SCENARIO FORMAT (Page 1 of 2)

1. Basic objective(s) of exercise

2. Logistics 2.1 Date(s) 2.2 Time period 2.3 Location(s) 2.4 Participating organizations

3. The simulated events

4. Time schedule of real and simulated events

5. Narrative summary describing the conduct of the exercises NOTE 5.1 through 5.5 are examples of subjects that might be discussed in Section 5.0 of the scenario.

5.1 Simulated casualties 5.2 Off-site fire-fighting assistance 5.3 Rescue of personnel 5.4 Radiological monitoring deployment 5.5 Public information activities

6. Duties of controllers 6.1 Specific observer assignment by area 6.2 Material provided to observers (i.e. check lists) 6.3 Pre-drill meeting A. Date B. Time C. Location EP3:4 7-3 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

TABLE 7-1 EXAMPLE SCENARIO FORMAT (Page 2 of 2)

7. Critique/evaluation 7.1 Date 7.2 Time 7.3 Location 7.4 Suggested Participants EP3:4 7-4 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.1 4. Conduct of Exercises, Drills and Tests (continued)

1. Exercises (Integrated Drills)

A radiological emergency response exercise will be conducted at least once every two calendar years to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. Any exercise that will provide for coordination with and participation of off-site emergency response personnel, organizations, and agencies including those of Federal, State, and local governments will escalate to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. The exercise scenario will be varied from year to year such that all major elements of the Plan are tested at least every 8 years.

The major elements that should be tested include the following:

Off hours staffing (6 P.M. - 4 A.M.)

Activation of Joint Information Center Use of fire control teams Use of medical support personnel Use of Security personnel for prompt access to emergency equipment or support Use of one or more portions of backup communications for notification Field monitoring Capability for determining the magnitude and impact of the particular components of a release Assembly and accountability Initial recovery planning activities EP3:4 7-5 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.1 4. Conduct of Exercises, Drills and Tests (continued)

1. Exercises (Integrated Drills)

Additionally, in each eight calendar year exercise cycle, the content of scenarios during drills and exercises must provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to the following scenario elements:

hostile action directed at the plant site, no radiological release or an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public protective actions, an initial classification of or rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, implementation of strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under 10CFR50.54(hh)(2), and integration of offsite resources with onsite response.

This emergency response exercise will be critiqued by Florida Power & Light Company controller/evaluators and other evaluators, as appropriate, from Federal, State, and local agencies.

During the interval between biennial exercises, adequate emergency response capabilities will be maintained by conducting drills, including at least one drill involving a combination of some of the principal functional areas of emergency response capabilities.

The principal functional areas of emergency response include activities such as management and coordination of emergency response, accident assessment, protective action decision-making, and plant system repair and corrective actions.

During this off-year drill, activation of all of the emergency response facilities (TSC, OSC, EOF) would not be necessary, there would be an opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised instruction would be permitted, operating staff would have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather than have controllers intervene, and the drills could focus on on-site training objectives.

EP3:4 7-6 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.1 4. Conduct of Exercises, Drills and Tests (continued)

2. Radiological Monitoring Drill A radiological monitoring drill will be conducted at least once every calendar year. These drills will include collection and analysis of sample media (i.e. air). As an integral part of this annual drill, communications and the understanding of messages between the off-site monitoring team(s) and the TSC RP Supervisor will be tested. Radiation Protection Department personnel will participate in health physics drills semi-annually and one of the semi-annual drills may be incorporated into the radiological monitoring drill.

As indicated in Chapter 14,Section III of the State Plan, off-site radiological monitoring drills will be conducted and these drills will involve the collection of sample media.

3. Medical Emergency Drill A medical emergency drill involving a simulated contaminated individual, with provisions for activation of the plant First Aid Team will be conducted at least once every calendar year. Participation by local support services (i.e., ambulance and off-site medical treatment facility) will be tested separately once per year or as part of the annual medical drill.

4. Hostile Action Based (HAB) Drills/Exercises Hostile Action Based drills will be conducted to support the exercise (Integrated Drill) schedule.

EP3:4 7-7 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.1 4. 5. Fire Emergency Drill Fire drills are conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.I.3. The Fire Protection Program is described in greater detail in plant administrative procedures.

6. Communications Tests and Drills Communications with State and local governments within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will be tested monthly. Communications with the NRC via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) will be tested monthly. On an annual basis, communications to the State EOC, St. Lucie and Martin County EOCs will be tested. As part of the annual test certain information will be exchanged. It will be determined whether or not the content of the drill messages was understood. The annual drill may be performed as part of an exercise.

As indicated in Chapter 14,Section III of the State Plan, the State conducts communications drills at least annually. These drills include "communications between the nuclear power plants, State, and local emergency operation centers and field assessment teams...". Chapter 6 of the State Plan indicates the equipment tested during drills.

7. Unannounced Drills At least one communications drill per year will be unannounced.

This unannounced drill will include notification to all primary off-site response agencies (i.e. DEM, Department of Health, County Departments of Public Safety) and those FPL emergency response personnel required to be notified based upon the drill scenario. The unannounced communication drill could coincide with an exercise, or an actual Emergency Plan activation.

EP3:4 7-8 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.1 5. Evaluation During a drill or an exercise, controllers may take measures in response to actions taken by the participants that might affect the planned outcome (objective of the drill or exercise). Minor errors in procedures, techniques or inappropriate prompting by controllers will be noted and discussed during the post-drill/exercise evaluation.

Following an exercise, the site Emergency Preparedness Manager, plant management, FPL controller/evaluators, and principal participants in the exercise will discuss and evaluate the exercise. Drill evaluations will also be conducted, though personnel involvement may be different.

The evaluation should be based on the ability of participants to follow emergency procedures, the adequacy of emergency procedures, and the adequacy of emergency equipment and supplies. Plant management and staff will be responsible for recommending necessary changes in the Emergency Plan and/or Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) to the site Emergency Preparedness Manager.

The site Emergency Preparedness Manager or designee in Emergency Preparedness, is responsible for making changes to the Emergency Plan and/or EPIPs.

7.2 Emergency Response Training

1. Objectives The primary objectives of emergency response training are as follows:

1. Familiarize appropriate individuals with the Emergency Plan and related Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).

2. Instruct individuals in their specific duties to ensure effective and expeditious action during an emergency.

3. Periodically present significant changes in the scope or content of the Emergency Plan.

4. Provide refresher training to ensure that personnel are familiar with their duties and responsibilities.

5. Provide the various emergency organization groups with the required training that will ensure an integrated and prompt response to an emergency situation.

EP3:4 7-9 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.2 2. Training of On-site Emergency Response Organization (ERO)

Personnel Training programs have been established for personnel working at the plant site. The programs include initial indoctrination and subsequent retraining.

The training program for members of the on-site ERO will include practical drills, in which each individual participating in the drill demonstrates an ability to perform assigned emergency functions.

Participation in a drill or exercise is not required for initial training qualification in the ERO. Training requirements are delineated in EPIP-12, "Maintaining Emergency Preparedness - Radiological Emergency Plan Training."

The Site Training Manager is responsible for the conduct and documentation of initial training and annual retraining programs for on-site FPL Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel.

Specific training is specified in the following subsections. The site Emergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for the content and accuracy of the Emergency Plan Training. Each new employee permanently assigned to work at the St. Lucie Plant shall be given initial orientation training. For employees not assigned specific responsibility or authority under the Emergency Plan or Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs), such training shall, at a minimum, provide information describing the action to be taken by an individual discovering an emergency condition, the location of assembly areas, the identification of emergency alarms, and the action to be taken upon hearing those alarms.

Training must be current to be maintained in the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). Emergency Plan Training records for Security personnel are maintained by the Site Training Manager.

EP3:4 7-10 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.2 2. Training of On-site Emergency Response Organization (ERO)

Personnel (continued)

The following provides a description of the training provided to personnel filling the indicated positions.

1. Emergency Coordinator

a. Interpretation of plant and field data and how it relates to emergencies and their classification (i.e. Emergency Action Level (EAL) determination per Chapter 3).

b. Prompt and effective notification methods, including the types of communication systems.

c. Method of activating the Florida Power & Light Company Emergency Response Organization (ERO).

d. The methods used for estimating radiation doses and recommending off-site protective actions.

e. Emergency Plan familiarization.

f. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) familiarization.

g. Communications and record-keeping methods.

h. Accident assessment and corrective action (licensed operators only).

2. Shift Technical Advisor

a. Emergency Plan familiarization

b. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) familiarization.

c. Technical Specifications (in-depth understanding)

d. Specialized training in power plant and reactor specific core operating characteristics (normal and abnormal)

e. Familiarization with other related plant programs, plans, and procedures with emphasis on accident assessment techniques.

EP3:4 7-11 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.2 2. 3. Technical Support Center On-site Staff

a. Emergency Plan familiarization

b. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) familiarization.

c. Communications and record-keeping methods

d. Training for the various technical personnel that make up the TSC staff with emphasis on accident assessment and corrective action.

4. Other Emergency Responders

1. Radiation Protection Personnel

a. Use of air sampling equipment

b. Performance of radiation/contamination surveys

c. Determination of air activity levels, and stay times based on DAC hours

d. Determination of radiation levels.

e. Emergency Plan familiarization through RP Emergency Procedures

f. Record-keeping methods

g. In-depth knowledge of personnel and field monitoring/analyzing techniques

h. Communications and coordination

2. Security Personnel

a. Emergency Plan familiarization through the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

b. Personnel accountability procedures

c. Site ingress and egress control procedures

d. Deployment of Security Personnel

e. Communications and coordination EP3:4 7-12 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.2 2. 4. 3. First Aid Team

a. Emergency Plan familiarization through Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures familiarization

b. Communications and coordination

c. Description, storage location, and application of supplies and equipment

d. Sequential steps for the assessment of contamination levels and treatment of personnel injury

e. Familiarization with personnel decontamination procedures

f. Procedures for the evacuation of contaminated persons to off-site medical facilities

g. Team members will satisfactorily complete the first aid portion of the American National Red Cross Standard (ANRCS) First Aid Course or equivalent and will re-qualify every three years. Requalification does not require completion of the CPR portion of the ANRCS course.

3. Training of FPL EOF Emergency Response Organization Personnel The Site Training Manager is responsible for the conduct and documentation of initial training and annual retraining for FPL EOF Emergency Response Organization personnel.

1. Recovery Manager

a. Prompt and effective notification methods, including the types of communication systems.

b. Method of activating the Florida Power & Light Company off-site Emergency Response Organization.

c. The methods used for estimating radiation doses and determining Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).

d. Emergency Plan familiarization.

e. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) familiarization.

f. Familiarization with the Emergency Operations Facility and the Technical Support Center.

EP3:4 7-13 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.2 3. Training of FPL EOF Emergency Response Organization Personnel (continued)

2. Emergency Control Officer, Emergency Information Manager, Governmental Affairs Manager, Emergency Security Manager, Emergency Technical Manager

a. Emergency Plan familiarization

b. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) familiarization

4. Training of Non-FPL Off-site Emergency Response Personnel Off-site agencies who may be called upon to provide assistance in the event of an emergency shall be offered briefings annually. These briefings will discuss basic concepts in radiation protection, plant operations and security, emergency classification, protective action recommendations and emergency response as appropriate. The following groups will be offered these sessions:

A. Fire and rescue B. Police C. Medical Support D. Principal decision makers for State and county emergency response agencies

1. Police and Fire Fighting Support As indicated in Chapter 15, Figure 15-1 to the State Plan, police and fire fighting personnel will receive training and retraining. Chapter 15 describes the details of training.

2. Local Emergency Management Officials As described in Chapter 15 of the State Plan, disaster preparedness personnel will receive training and retraining.

3. Emergency Action Levels (EALs) Review On an annual basis, the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) shall be reviewed with State and local governmental authorities.

EP3:4 7-14 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.3 Planning Effort Development Overall authority and responsibility for radiological emergency preparedness and planning lies with the Chief Nuclear Officer. As described below, through his/her staff (at the Plant and at Juno Beach), the FPL emergency planning and preparedness program is implemented. Major responsibility in this area has been delegated to the site Emergency Preparedness Manager and has been described throughout this plan.

1. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs)

Written procedures will be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities associated with Emergency Plan implementation.

2. Review of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures The Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures will be under continuing review by the site emergency planning group.

A comprehensive review of the Emergency Plan will be conducted annually. The Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures are reviewed during drills, exercises, and actual emergencies and revised as necessary to correct identified deficiencies. The Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures will undergo a thorough formal review at least once every two years and be revised as necessary. Notification lists and rosters will be updated at least quarterly. If changes affecting emergency response are identified, these changes will be made as needed. The revised Emergency Plan will be distributed with the latest revision number indicated on each page. Revision indication along the right margin will be used to indicate where changes have been made.

If during these annual reviews no changes are needed, this will be documented.

Changes to the Emergency Plan will be submitted, in writing or with pages marked for revision, to the site Emergency Preparedness Manager, or designee, in Emergency Preparedness. All proposed changes to the Emergency Plan shall be reviewed by the On-site Review Group (ORG) and, prior to implementation, approved by the Vice President - St. Lucie Plant, the senior executive responsible for the safe operation of the plant. Revisions to the Emergency Plan will be sent to the Corporate Functional Area Manager (CFAM).

The effective date of the revised Emergency Plan is determined by the site Emergency Preparedness Manager based on the Station work schedule and pre-implementation training, coordinated implementation with other documents and other appropriate considerations. The effective date should not exceed the approval date by more than thirty days.

EP3:4 7-15 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.3 2. Review of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (continued)

Changes to the EPIPs are performed in accordance with plant procedures. EPIPs are approved by the site Emergency Preparedness Manager unless changes are identified for evaluation by the On-site Review Group (ORG) with approval recommended to the Plant General Manager.

Document holders will receive revisions to the Emergency Plan as they are issued. The site Emergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for coordinating the periodic reviews of the Emergency Plan. The site Emergency Preparedness Manager will ensure that elements of the emergency organization (FPL, State, local, Federal) are informed of changes to the Emergency Plan.

The site Emergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for maintaining emergency preparedness. He/she maintains a roster of the Emergency Response Organization participants and their alternates.

This roster is reviewed and confirmed periodically, typically once each calendar quarter. Each participant is responsible for advising the site Emergency Preparedness Manager when his/her duties are changed such that he/she can no longer participate. In the event of transfer or termination, the site Emergency Preparedness Manager should be notified by the employee's department head, and a replacement named and trained.

Responsibility for day-to-day emergency planning coordination lies with the site Emergency Preparedness Manager.

3. Review of Changes with On-site Personnel The Site Training Manager will ensure that on-site Emergency Response Organization personnel are informed of relevant changes in the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

4. Review of Changes with Off-site Personnel Periodic correspondence and/or meetings will be held to inform off-site FPL emergency support personnel of changes in the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

EP3:4 7-16 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.3 5. Audits The FPL Quality Assurance Department will perform an independent audit of the Emergency Preparedness Program. The audits will verify compliance with federal regulations to include evaluation of the adequacy of the interfaces with State and Local governments, and of drills, exercises, capabilities and procedures. This audit shall be conducted either:

1) At least every 12 months, or

2) As necessary, based on an assessment against performance indicators, and as soon as reasonably practicable after a change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could adversely affect emergency preparedness, but no longer than 12 months after the change. In any case, all elements of the Emergency Preparedness Program must be reviewed once every 24 months.

The part of the review involving the evaluation for adequacy of interface with State and Local governments must be available to the appropriate State and Local governments.

Plant management, Corporate Functional Area Manager (CFAM), and the Chief Nuclear Officer will receive audit reports. Corrective actions, as delineated in the Quality Assurance Manual, will be assigned.

The audit findings shall be retained for a minimum of 5 years.

6. Document Distribution St. Lucie Plant Document Control is responsible for distribution of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures to identified personnel and to Emergency Response Facilities. Document Control also distributes the Emergency Plan to off-site agencies and organizations. The Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures provide sufficient information to assure a thorough understanding of the various emergency response duties and responsibilities. Appendix F contains a listing of the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

The locations where The State of Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan is maintained are listed in Appendix D.

EP3:4 7-17 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

7. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (continued) 7.3 7. Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Training Most training of FPL Emergency Preparedness Coordinators is through on-the-job training related to Plan preparation, periodic revisions, and drills and exercises for two nuclear facilities. Other training may be received through seminars, meetings, and discussions with other industry groups. FPL is a member of and participates in emergency planning programs sponsored by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the Southeastern Utilities Emergency Planning Group (SUEPG).

7.4 Emergency Equipment Maintenance All designated emergency equipment that is maintained in each Control Room, the TSC, OSC, EOF and the Site Assembly Station will be inventoried, operationally checked, and inspected at least once each calendar quarter and following each use.

7.5 Letters of Agreement Agreements with supporting agencies will be confirmed annually (by direct contact, telephone, or in correspondence). The Letters of Agreement (LOAs) will be updated every third year. Purchase orders/contracts will be renewed as required.

EP3:4 7-18 St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE EAL - HOT BASIS EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS HOT BASIS (RCS > 200°F)

COVER PAGE REVISION: 6 HOT CONDITIONS EAL -HOT BASIS ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL EP3:4 (APP-A-1) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE HOT CONDillONS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES PAGE REV HOT CONDITIONS TABLE INDEX Blank Page. . ... .. . ..... .... ..

INITIATING CONDITIONS MATRIX .. .... . .. ............ ... ...... .. .. .... ... . ... . ..... 2 Blank Page. ....... ..... ...... .

RECOGNITION CATEGORIES R-Abnormal Rad Levels I Radiological Effluent 4 Radiological Effluent Basis ............ .. ...... ..

Radiological Effluent...

Abnormal Rad Levels Basis Abnormal Rad Levels ..

Blank Page. ................... .

F- Fission Product Barrier Degradation . 10 3 Fission Product Barrier Degradation 1 12 / 3 Basis............. .. ... ..... 11 Fission Product Barrier Degradation 1 12 /3..... ........ . ........... ..... ......... . 12 Fission Product Barrier Degradation 415 f 617 Basis... 13 Fission Product Barrier Degradation 415 1617.......... ..... 14 HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Blank Page.. ........... . ...... 15 S- System Malfunctions 16 (RCS > 200°F)

AC Power & Failure of Protection f Criticality & DC Power Basis..... ................ 17 AC Power & Failure of Protection f Criticality & DC Power.................. .. .......... 18 Annunciators & RCS Leakage & Fuel Clad & Tech Specs Basis.. ...................... 19 Annunciators & RCS Leakage & Fuel Clad & Tech Specs.... ...... . ..... ................. 20 Communications Basis.... . ..... ... ... ............. .. ... ...... ............ . .............. ... .... ...... 21 Communications....... ....................................... . .. ........................................ 22 Blank Page............. ..... . ... ... ... ... ... .. . . ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. . .. .... ... ... ... ... .... .. 23 H- Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety . 24 Security & Control Room Evacuation & Natural or Man-Made Events Basis...... 25 Security & Control Room Evacuation & Natural or Man-Made Events.. ... 26 Natural or Man -Made Events Basis.... . ......... .. ... ... ..... .. . .......... ...... . .... . 27 Natural or Man-Made Events... ........... ... .... .... .. ...... . .. 28 Fire I Explosion & Toxic f Flammable Gas Basis....... ....... .. .. . ... ...... .. ... . ..... 29 Fire I Explosion & Toxic f Flammable Gas.. . .. ... ... .. .......... .... 30 Discretionary Basis........ ... .. ....... ...... .. ........ . ....... .. ....... .. .. 31 Discretionary............... . .. .. .. ... .. . ... ..... 32 Blank Page....... ........ ..... 33 E- Events Related to ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) .. 34 Events related to ISFSI Basis .... .. ....... .. .. ... . 35 Events related to ISFSI... . 36 Blank Page.................. ..... ... .... .. ... .. . ........ ... .. 37 HOT CONDITIONS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES REVISION: 6 EAL -HOT BASIS ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL EP3:4 (APP-A-2) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE HOT CONDITIONS TABLE INDEX PAGE INITIATINGCONDITIONSMAl RlX .. ..... ....... .. ............. .............. ............... .. 2--

RECOGNITION CATEGORIES R-Abnormal Rad Levels] Radiological Effluent....... ......... ............ .......... . 4-a Radiological Effluent. .... ..... .... ..... .... ................ ....... ........ .... ..... .. .. ..... ......... ... 6 Abnonnal Rad levels... .. ....... .. ....... .. ............ .. .. .. ... ... ............ ... ...... ... ......... .. 6 F- Fission Product Barrier Degradation.... ............ ... .... ........ ... .... ............. 10-14 Core Exit Thermocouple Readings.. ........................... .. ...................... ... ........ 12 Containment Isolation Failure or Bypass ........... ..... *-************** ***** *** *** *** *******- 14 Containment Pressure. ........... ..... .. ... ..... .. ... ... .. ... .... .. ... ... ...... ..... .. .. .. ....... ..... 12 Containment Radiation Monitors........... ... ...... ..... .... ..... ...... ............ ......... .. ... 14 Emergency Coordinator Judgment........ ... ...... .. ....... ... .... .... ... ...... .. .... ............ 14 Primary Coolant Activity LeveL .... .. .....*.. .. ..... ... . ... ...... . .. ............ ... . .... .... ...... _ 12 IRCS leak Rate.. ... ... ... ...... ... .. .... .. ........ .. ....... ..... .. .. ......... ......... ................... 12 Reactor Vessel Water leveL.. ...... .... ..... ................ .. .... ..... .. .. .............. ... ...... 14 Safety function Status...... .................. .... ........................... ..... ..................... 12 S/G Secondary Side Release with P- to- s. leakage.................... .. ......... ....... 14 S/G Tube Rupture.. .. .......... .... ....................... ......... .... .... ...... ...... .. .. .. ... .. ..... . 14 HOT CONDITIONS TABLE S- System Malfunctions.... .... ... ............... ............ ............................. ..... 16-22 (RCS > 200°F) AC Power.......... ......... .................. .... ...... .. ........................... - -*-*****-------------*---**--

Annunciators .......... ................................ ...... ....... .. ... .... .. ........ .......... ..........

1.6 20 Communications.............. ................... ....... ...---*****--*-**** **********-****----------------****

• 22 DC Power. .... .......... .. ......... ... .... .............. .. .......... .......................................... _____ 16 Failure of Reactor Protection f Criticality.............. ..... *******************-****************-----* 16 Fuel Clad....... ......... ......... .... .. ... ....... .. ... ...... ....... .. ......... ... ........ ...... .. ... ........ 20 RCS leakage........ .. ... ... ....... ....... ......... ........ .. ... .... .. ... .... .. .......... ... .. ....... .. .. 20 Tech Specs........ ......... ......... .... ....... .... .. .... ...... ........ ............. .... ............... ... 20 H- Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety..... ... ..... . *-----*-- --- 32 Con*t rol Room Evacuati.o n....... ....... .................. .................. ... .... ....... ............ 26 Discretionary.. ........... ... ............................................................................ ..... ........ 32 Fire f Explosion...... ..... ....... .. ....... ..... ...... ........ .. ... ..... .................. ......... .... .... JO Natural or Man-Made Events. ......... .... ........ ...... .... ......... .. ... .......... .. .... ..... ..... 26-28 Security ........ __ .. .. ....... ..... ....... _ ... ...... . ********-***********************--*---------------------*-----*- 26 Toxic I flammable Gas ...... .. ...... ............................ .......... .......................... .. JO E- Events Related to ISFS1 (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) .. __ 34-36 HOT CONDITIONS EI\L- HOT B.-\SIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCJE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL HOTCONDffiO ffl EP3:4 (APP-A-3) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE This Page Intenti onally Left Blank HOT CONDTIIONS 1 E...!U.- HOT BASIS PAGE RE\liSION: 1 ST LUCIE PL<\NT CLASSIFICATION TOOL HOT CONDITIONS 1 EP3:4 (APP-A-4) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

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~m Len of A.'4Y T'o~ o a~ers A.o..ID L..ou erP-a~ ntl e! Lc u.Cif ttte t!'lnt t M'I'I er.

L.on: c.r Pc~ Leu d ltNY t *"O t~en...

ANY LOSS c:r AN Y Pc.tenlla!L.DSJ.cf EITHER FUel tau:! OR RC-n.

ANY Ll:IU or III-IV Po1ental Lest. of ettnblne..~t.

0

§1 -;9 k:l:HI b an E ~ENTVt.l. AREA IS Ptcn:.tlttea D ue T.o R~te <J1 Tarlt:,

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Mp hy~, .a r FI:unm ~ G.U 19

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P gs . 1 ~* 1 A Pgs. 12*14 Pos. t ::!:--14 f'P -.12-1* c cr:c1!1'oe, ~ant 01'"R4t::.fnll tte Deeme d D.c1n m cr~ t:1 NORMAl..

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AC Pcwe r CapatOI:)' 'To E meqj~M'J Bune~ Rea::ea To A B3'1c;:c. Pa*er Sotn:c For 15 Minutes cr Len ger Let~~. a! A'l Ofkllr: AI! PO&'rf" b

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z:' o~ra Con:tltlclns E:zl~t:l"-0 Wnl:b I! 01ner Ccnl!lle~ns E:Ctlnll ~\lrJcl'l tn Other C411:Urcr:s. EJbet~g\\ll lch 1n 0$:1er Condll1ant E1!2tlng W hl::tl tn z

0 p theJue:Jtnerrtof1ne Emeraer.cy ~..c Ju agm eetoflt!e Emerg.ency tne JIUI~;m ent cJ~eErneroe ney lr~e .lU~om cr.r: c l lhe Er::e:~:y i=

SG2 " SS2 SA2 Po. 1s sua CCionllnar..r ~'Jarrr.t Decl:lr::::c.nof Get~ e:r&l Ecagen...")'.

Co:lr:l r..3to r WllrrantDedatlltbnot Bllr: Arel Emergency.

CC<<Cinatu l\'lmlt'.tOecl.srdcn an ~rt.

ct coora~~'br w~ D ~l11t!ltG!I NotltcatlcncfUnusuai Event a1' a cz (N OUE).. 0 i!S Au:~lll! cTrt;lt ~d AllillAn~

AC'tbns Fan b :31tu~ :7* n ,_..e ~a:3:!

Aub:lm:m: Trt p F;,15 tD Bhc;!!laan the Ru :~er AHO t1at::U31 Actto ns T:~tc:n Al;!:.:n atlc 1T.p Fans~ srnttdcwn th e n cactc:r AN[)tn e f.IAr.:Vai A..'11Cr'..S Pa. u Pa. l2 P~.l ~ Po. l '2 '-'

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UNPLAN N£!1 Lou d Zl.s'.dy .s-.tsteo Ati!Wti~Cn ot lnCI CIII Dft In ltle UNP"LAN..'4 EO LOn aof Bll~tf 3~"c!n Ann unclll11cn o r klllt:;a.n:n ln -ttle

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,...,, :!l HOT CONDITIONS 2 EAL-HOTBASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PW\NT ClASSIFICATION TOOL HOT CONDITIONS 2 EP3:4 (APP-A-5) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE This Page Intentionally Left Blank HOT CONDITIONS 3 EAL-HOTBASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL HOT CONDITIONS 3 EP3:4 (APP-A-6) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE RECOGNITION CATEGORY R ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT R-HOTOONDmONS 4 EAI.. -HOT BASTS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL R- HOT CONDmONS 4 EP3:4 (APP-A-7) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert RG1-Basis: RS1- Basis: RA1-Basis: RU1- Basis:

This IC addresses ralfl03divirj re!eoses thil! resu~ in cfoses a1 or beyood Tms IC addresses radioactivity releases that result n doses at or beyond The EmE<gency Coord""""' should not wail Lilli the *Jllllicable time has The Errergency Coadinirlor shtJ.ld Mtwa:.1 until !he app5c:a!l~e fme has me site bouncbry thai exceed 10Y. of the Environmemal Pnxedion Agency elapsed, but shoufd deela-e me e.renr: as soon as it is detemihed that the el~. *t:u. sholM declare the event as socn as it is determined thl! the

~~=~i:'~d=~~~i~~~~~c:'~~ *Protec5ve Action GlAdes (PAGs).. R~ases cl lhis maglitude .ilf'e ccndlicn wJ &~ exceed the app6cable 'time. oondition will likely @meed !he appi'cii!:lle fine.

necessary. Releasesddis rr.agtitude are associated with thefail~e a associil!ed with !he t.Dll1! of p ant~ needed fer !he prntedion of the plont systems needed for the p!t>ledicn of thepolllic ind likely i'Mllve fuel public. The funcbtnenbl basis of this IC is NOT a dose or dose r.W!. but The fundimenbl basis of this IC is NOT il dose or dose r.Jte., but d"""'l'!- Wtlle these~ are addressed by other IC!io. this IC ~des r.ollm' the ~dation in the lew! of Sillely of the plant implied by the rolher the degr.odalioo in the levot of s>fely of the plant implied by the

\\hile these failures are i1ddressed by other ICs, this IC pn:Mdes appropiate diversity a1d addresses events wtiJc:h may not be able to be uncontrolled release. Ttis IC.addnsses.an actual a-~tantiillpxental uncontrolled reiNse. "ilUs IC ad!tes.ses a potentia deaease in dte level 1-z w

~~~~~~~~~~=~n~:Zb~r the l1"'Cft 5eii'Ef'e a.cci:fenls the~ nu:ybe unrrcnitored <<~may classified on lhe basis eX plant st%us ak::ne. It is irrtpor1alt to note that for themoresewreaccidalts lhe release maybe urmonitcfedorthere mfl'j bebrget.meert:ainliesassocicr.edwi'Jlthescucetamat!d/cr~.

~;::~~..:~::~~ ~:~="

time.

.. of safely of the plantas indiCille<l by a radioicljca release that elOICleeds rt!9'.iatcf)'oommi"JTE1ts for <m extended pef.od of time.

) be large unc

ertainties a.sscxii!ed w!h the sourt:e b!nn and!'or rreteordogy. Nuc!ear pcmer plants iloapara:e fea1ures intended ro can:rol ftle re'ease

..J Nudeir power planis inc:crpor.lte fearLres it::ended to control !he release of 1'3dioa:tive effluents 1D the env:i'tnnent. fumier. there are admiri:str.r.iw

u. of r.ldioactive efBuents ID !he emrin:nnent. Further, there are a~ ocntrolses2:11istted to~ unin1entional re~ oroc::ntn::ll and u.

w 1lle EPA PAGs are expressed in terms of l!te S\.111 of~ etrec:ive dose  ::~~1J~~=':F~:~.::r~,.. oon!Jo's. These controls are bc31ed in the Olf..s:-.e Dose CaiOJiaOon rronitor intentional reJeases.. These c::orrtto:s are kx:aied i1 the Off-s':!e

..J ~(EDE) and !he ccmM11!d Sleaive dose equivalenl (CEDE). cr as the thj<oid cxmn'tted dose equivalenl (COE). For the pwpose of these Manual (OOCM). The ocx:trn>nee d extended. lllliXII1imled r.>dioocf"" Ooseean.tationMarwi(OOCM). lhe""""'"""'of-os1he thjrcid OOimlitied dose equNolenl (CO E). For !he purposed ihese ICIEAI.s. the dooe q...mity !Dial el!edi"" cfose equNa\Ent (TElE). as ~to the enviratment is incfcative of a degradation in the fea3e5 unc:orr.ro:ted ratfoacfvereleasestothe environment is in:icati'lle a 5(3 IGroAI..s. !he dose C!llill1lily tDtaJ elfedive dose eqlivolent (TEDE), os defined il 10 CFR 20. is used in lieu c:l ..sum d EOE ard CEDE"'.

defned in 10 CFR 20. is used in lieu of~Sl.mdEOE and CED~. ondo'orC01111'01s. degadation of 1llE>e fea:lres andlcr c:on.,ls.

The TE!lEdooe is selill 10%dtheEPAPAG, whlethe 500 rrrernthyroid The OOCM mJit'ples ore spec:if.<d in RIJI and R-'.1 only to <fstingJish Th<> OOCM nutlip~es orespec'fied in RUt and R-'.1 only to distinguish 0 The TIDE dose is set il!l!le EPA PAG, whle!he5CDD rm!m1h)"'id CDE CDE ,vas estil::-lished in ccnsi~ at the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for between l'lQn-emergency ccnditicllS. and ITom each other. \\ble dtese belw!en ncn-erJ1<19"f1 c:ooditions, and from ..ac:h other. WJee these

-' was established in considE!I'3.tiondthe 1:5r.Wodlhe EPAPAGfcrTEOE TEDEar>d~dCOE. multiples obYioosly eotre.Sf'Cnd to an ~site dose cr dose J'ilte, ttw m.Jtliples otMously c:onspond 10 21 dkire dcse or dose rate, the 0 and thyrcid COE. etrq:Jhasis in classifyitg these everus is the ~WI the lE"aa!!d ~in ~ngthese events is !he degtad31ion in the level of i5 The m::nitcr l st in EAl ~1 indudes mcnil.crs on oill paterrtial re:ease safety of the pW1t. not lhe magnitude d ~ ~ecf dose cr dose rate. ~of the pin not the ma:J~itude of the associated dose a dose rate..

~ The roonitor tis!! in EAl i t includes mcnitors on all pd.ential release pothwoys.

pathways.

Releases should nettle praa:ed or averaged. For ex3mple. a release Releases sholtd mt be prorated or averaged. Fcrexarlllle, a release

§ Since dose assessment is based on actual metea'Cllogy, ~as the-Since dose 3SSeSSI'nEt'lt is based on ild:u3l meteorcl'ogy. Mseas. too ma'litor reacfng EAL is. nat. the results from these assessments may exceecing 600x OOCM ftr 5 nUm.t.es doE!S no1: meet the tllreshold. exceedlig 4x OOCt.l fa' 30 rn'1wt<s dce5 nc< meot the tl'rEshold.

~ men iter rea:fing EJIJ.. is nat, the ll!Slils ftcm these assessments rrny m icate thai the dassification is not W3'TiJI'It.ed, or may indicate that a This EAL inc:kKies;rryrelease forv.tlich a radioactillity disdla:rge pennit This E.AL includes ~Y re:'ease b" wtich .a radioadiv.":ty disdlalge permit w

..J indicate that the dassTICation is not~ or may n:ticate tha! a higherclassificaticnisW3'T3rlted. For this reason.~ =~~=~7.-=%~~~~~ :t,t~1a-ed.~d'~tt;::.~~~~~~-~ :J:Y.~~~~7~~~:~\~o,~inun 0 iiT!'Iemen:'rlg ~,...should coil a the timelyperlormonceof dose assessments using actual metea-ology and release infonnaticn. If the opptic:ablepemit. appJcable pemit.

assessments us'rlg actual """"'"'logy ar>d release Fo!ama6on. If the re:Uts of these dose assessments are availab'.e when the classffic:atx:ln is

~ resultsofthesec!cseassessmentsGreavailaiXev.hen the classifiC3tion is made (e.g_ initiated at a lower dassificaticn level). !he dase assessment EAL 11 is irt.ended for s!es that ha\'Oe estatlShed efHuenl ti'P"Iitcring on EAL#1 addresses radioactivity releases. that for wha".E!VEf' reascn, C3USe elikJent radiation moniro- reatfngs: to exceed lhe ~old idenijfed in the

=~~~~~""t~~-~~~

..J made (e.g., iritiit.ed ill a lower dassi!ication IEYO!). the dose assessment ...Uts override !he ma'lita read'ng EAL results OYefTidl!. the monitor reading EAL IC. This EAL is i'ttended for sites 1hat have established eftluerc rmnitor~

~ limK the OOCM linit or100 times tie beshold values used in RUt . This ts true eltcepl for t.e dvesho{ds Itt the Seam GeneriJicr Si:Jwdown on non-routine release p;r.hways. fa' whX:h a disch;,ge permit YOJ!d not nonnalybe prepared.

cr: ~- en both Un1 1 and Unn 2. the colculo'.edvolues exceeded the 0 range of the I"I'IOI'it.cl's Therefore, the values l6Ed ftr the Ste..n Gener.ta EAL #2 addresses radioactive reeases thirt. for "hi11eVer reascn, cause z

m

~~=by"=~~=~=:e~~==~the ElcMdown Mlnitors ow 95'Y. of fi.JU scale. This lesser value is siill

<t rxicaWeof a loss ofcootrol d radirocfo.oe miilerial WEll in a:cessoflhat I

oonstiuilg anlhlsuol Event. a.ssoc'.a:ed vith a planned ba:ch release. or a ccntinoous n!:lease pa:h..

cr: EAU2 acta.sses ~releases,1hal fa'v41ateverreason, cause EAI.. #3 addn!sses uncontm:ed releases thillare de1eded by s;wnp'e eff:uent radiaDcn rmnitor re~ to exceed the threshcid Oentffied in lhe an~ is. p.llfalarty on unmori:a1:!:d pathways.. e.g.* spills of radioac!ive IC established by the radicoctri1y disdlarJlE permit This volue may be liqli<fs irt.:o stam drains, heat exchanger le31Cage in riverwJter systems..

associated ~th a pbnned bab:h release, or a cmtilUous release p.lth. etc.

EAI.. 83 o.ckRsses unc:mtrclled <Eeases 1hal.,. detected by sarT;~Ie

=J~:~~~~~~~~ra~

etx:.

R- HOT CONDIDONS 5 EAL - HOTBASIS PAGEREVISION: I ST LUCIE PL<\NT CLASSIFICATION TOOL R- HOT CONDIDONS 5 EP3:4 (APP-A-8) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Alert RG1 Qn.stlo Oosf.! ResulllnQ frcm an Acttml or IMWJNENT RS1 Off-slte Dose Re-sumng an an A<:tual a IMoWNENT Rc:loaseo of RA1 Any Retr::ase orGa~rus or Liquid Radloae1 r11ny tot~e Envrronment RU1 AAy Release ot Ga'.OeOJs a Lr~ld RBGoactMw to thc Relene 0: Ga5CO(tS Ra.dicectNIIy Greete r Then 1000. G5seOJS Rad"ostblllty~ ~M r Than tOO mrem TEDE oc 500 Gr~ater Thiin 200 TlmM tne- ODCM f:M I 5 Minutes <N" longer. Etl*ouoome nt Greater lhan 2 Tunes the OOCM fr;y 00 rcsr mrem TEOE or 5000 mrrm Thyrod COE 10( the Actut~l u mrcm Th:trold COE IQI'" !he Actual Of Frqec tec:l Dut.J!Ion cfllle Monute-.. or Longe-r Projected Ou~t.on of tr.e Release U~ing ~c:uar Relea-.e.

M~eeto!ogy. Opltfat lng Modo Ap pllcablllly: All O porallng Mode Applicability: All Operating Modo AppllcatMllty: All Operating llt ode AJ:lpllc:~billty: All EAL V<~lues: EAL V.a1u~s:

EAL Vl)luas:

EAL V01lun:  !!l!!Jl l!m.!!

Note Th<: El'l'"lf:lr;r:;<<"t CoordJ110'1<< .lhoVId not 1\'*M UMhl I he ttpp.'cltt:Jie rune r.r~t~ Tho Ermrg~ncy Coerd*n~lor :t~twJQ no! wall u!llll ff)e- opP>>cvble Ua: Emergency Coordinator .Jhoufd ncll'l'arf unl4 tm: IJpp.'.~eM: tm~ dapUJd. bul.shoi.Jt1 dedt¥e rhlt eYCn: as soon a..s 1l1s dF!Itl!fTIMt!d lhal t/Jeo tlrf1:7 i'.as cWps.t:d, bul shaWd decliJre me t.'"Vt'n! as soon as it is

!l!!l!! r.:/f::ss.e. dvtilbOn hl.l$ eu:.c<<Jed. or 1\"11/Ue(y e.-c.eed, the appf,i;aCJc IJJriC. In the deJermined r~r !l:c rcl<:tue d.ntl"on nos r:;xcc<<Jed. or wu'l hltcly T"" E:mer~r.cy Coordm;ra should no: Willi un f,~ the appbc*bJe nour eJ~pU!d, bUt s-nould .o<<JatD the evt"nt as .soon ;u* rr rs dctertr'lned time h~s ef:Jp~C'd. buf snouki declare !he c~nt ~s soon ~s II Is; ma r th(: releose du;, DOn ha: ~~ccoedcd. orw1J1 M<.cty exceM cDe 11b~Cf! oldara ro thecomrary. a~urn: !hat IJtcnr:casF!Idllab-:lrt M.s c~ cr:t!de'rJ eAcet'd, lhr: app:fJ("ab.'C :irre. Jn 1tte abscrn:e of Gl;tta f!J we de!errrrned olhat t/Je"Jelesce d~.Xatx:m h&s f!~~. or 1'1'111 M<t'ly epp/ICd0/1! rmre 1r dose 45:teSJmenr re:ullSA'fl!' avaJ!Bble or th~ 1Jin.!' rnc t~~/Ca~ ~ rf err 011gomu rc!e-a..c is dctec.ted and /.ht! rdcll&o ..S:f9ft r.-me ctrnrt.a:y, as::u~ lflat I~ retease d~>'ra!Jon t;,u ff).~t::dcd rhr:

et.cced. rhcspplx:<Jb.icli'n1C'. lfdO!!:as~.r.sfn'!'nttesu/:~;llr: or decfaraticn, the cklssdica!Jon .sOOuk:l be Da~ on dOse JSttttknown opPiocobJc t~rne If an Oi1gomg rck!.cr~ I$

• ree~ and the r ~eiJ~e S:ar!Time J::tm~-nown iJI'8ilab.b ~~ tflco rirrc oJ dcclara!J()I), !he c/{lsst!icatlo:l &houfd btJ aS:e$Sment 11Ulr:1d of m:1r111ct" \'it/(((;.S Do not dc.~y decfVtJtion b!lscd on dOse DHcs.rmenJ in~l!!Dd of morular values. Do not aw!Jili dose BSSt!SSmt'n: r~sults 1. VALID reading on ANY oflhe foiiO"A'Ing gcetetl.han the Reading shov.n f<Y 15 minute s or long er.

de'.!l**dedaratnnawa

• 1, VA\,1 0 toldL"lg on doseassc.ssm:ntrr:wJrs A t~ Y o!the f~!o"NIT'I!J rtJdll!lQrt mOtltet") !JICCIIt!r

1. VAU D rc-!JtJII\D en AHY or me ioiO'II.'InQ ra diobOIJ monltor11 g-eater tn1n the reodlr.g !lh~NT'I fet 15 rr*lllle~ Ot ftflgcr~ UNIT1 :

1. VAtlO readin-g on ANY c.fthe ldlow*n9 greo~er l!"lan me Ree()n9 snCNm r~ 60 mnute'J e~ langor ...z UW\Che reeding si'I~IM ror 15!'fllnute-sMklf'lger ftll)'11tc;r Chr:rnnel Filti'IW~:f Rt!irliino Uti1 T1 : w UNIT1 : Montta Channel R~diJlf/  ::>

UNIT1; Mautor Ch anne:t Pllln'A'Ii"/ Rt'00.1ng RSC 26-IH PrentV~nt iPVI t:orm& l g_,E-01 uCVCc :PillnWOY PtM! Vent CPV) u.

t.!OOI!Ot"Channd P;~olhw<!'/ Ralld.vt9 RSC 2&-1H P111fi!'VenccPVt e 2 E

• OO UCl/cc: RSC~1H A11nl Vent I PVj ' 11 E1'01uCtlc:t.

RSC 2&- I L 14on"n61 Opi, 94E*D3uCI1tC u.

w Flam Vent iPVI Plant Vent \PV)

N<:'<<TllIOps pos!.SIAS RSC ~6- I H P0:$1.*S\JIS l1 E*G1uCIItc .....

lt~ E

• OiuCII.:c ASC 26-1~

RS::!6-tH riO!m310ttt Pl*nt Vent {PV I 9 . SIE~liCtiCC RSC 26-1H Plllr.! Vc:r~tcPVr po-;t-SlAS

• A' Main steam Une 9,9"E*01 UCJ!t:C RSC 26-<:1-1 RI:!G-62 Fu..l H~~ndlnQ cFHBl 91.1114'lg

' A.' tJ,.,InSie t m llne 53 E*OOuCU..:.c 27 Et-01 uCllec RSC 26....aL RSC 25-:tH f uel Hane:SnQ &11dtn!)

tFHBI 5.3E-D2:UCL'cc ...z <(

u 5

-SIAS RIZD-62 MC:fl*O' 2.4 802 uCIICC MO'"IIIOr w 0

• e

• Milln STeam une R l26-~

• e* l.~n Stertml1fte 2 7 E+O I UCIICC

~1:!6-62

'A' Mtm~eolm rklutor l.lnc 27E-01 uCttc.::  ::> .....

UNI T 2: R\26-63 M~:J~ft<<

~ .C E*Ol uClla: 110'\ltot ...J 0 u.

Mcnltor Chttnnd P!!lhway Raadir.f; AY*:!'39HH ,

• ~.* S1G Bta....oo-om 9 5 E*OS<;1m Rl'l&-6'3 ' &' MtJU'i &cum Uno 2 7 E*Ol uCik.c u. 0<(

UNIT 2: Ch*4

"""'"" w RS"2&~. PJani Vf!fltiPvl 90E--<:~t uCll(c Mcn.1crCh~tnnel Pathway Rl!IMI'In!1 RY*:Z3~2().1 ,

• e* S.JG EJc<~Vdown 9.5 EtOScotn RY*"23!JIO*I, Ch *U

'A. SIG Blc-ltdcwn 1QE* 0 4 tpm ...J a:

RMCS li1Z Hotmbl 0P1' P!antVcnT(PV) cn*s RY*ZJ!/20* 1,

<( iii RS:ZG-'90 0 ...J RS26-00, RMCS IU~

RMCS 1!13 Fflnt Vent t PV)

- *SV\S wfF HC~ne<::lto 9.9 E.. O~ uCll!:c RMCS 622 RS26-90.

RMCS 6::!2 tlormetCos Prant veni!PV)

~*SIAS 9 0 E*OO uCUt"c 9JJ E*Ol uC!ke MtAitor Channftl UMT 2:

Pattr.vay Reocnl1(;

Ch<S

~ e* 5TG BIO/o'OOWII Ut11T2:

2 SE* -IN (pn'l g

...J w

[;

RS2G-00, wl F116 o.-..ent-f;S ro RS ~6*90 . PlontVellttPVI RMCS 62.2 Pl:tnt Vtat 'fta Shfdd a.zE*<l t uCIItc R$26-90 Plr.N Vent ..,. Shield 8 2 E*OO uClke RMC:S S.,.... U<<ml l 0o5 1 OE*OO tlf 't r"~ t-t~nl!a Channel Pll!ti'M.*II:,< Re!d:nt} 0 c E!utll!tloVen:hlatlcn RMCS 622 Bulldin Ve-ntdn\101'1 RS26-SO. PlentVent tPVl R$2"6--SO. Plant Ven,~PV~

1 QE.{I:>uClkc 0 <(

• A. Mllm Steom RMCS 622 PO!ol..SIAS U E* 01 uCi 'cc RM*:S 6.:?1 Ncnnat 0 <( a:

RIM2~71 .

RMCS !i31 Mon~or l.m~

5. 0~3 nlRJht w/ FHB DN~tt!!'d to RS26-90. F!Dnl Vern (PV) 1 I E-01 tiCif.cc a: ...J RS:!G*90 , RMCS 62! POst*SlAS <(

RlM26-72.

• a* Mll!n St~em Une Allnt V ent vtll Shr~a S.C. E-01 uCllcc:

1., Dose a s-5tstment U'llng aduaf meteQ"olog'tlndiCII.!e-11 COWiO RMCS 632 lo! O'"II'!a-9.G E* 03 mR1T"11 RMCS 612 BulltJtn venttlllhM RSZ&-90, wl fHB Owen~ to  ::;:

gteoter thM 1000 I"I'Yem TEOEOR 5000mfcmlhyt01d r:c:: at~

RS2U.12. Fue.l Hl\ndlng tkltld.nQ o...,ertedloPianc R~':CS 6:!t P111nt Vcflt 'fifl" &ticld 9 4E-~3uCilc~ a:

beyond tt1e $1!1! bor.mttary. Su\IO:n Vel\lll etiCJ"I 0 iUIJ.:S *ltJ. 1FHS1 Venl RIMZa-.7\, 'A' l1....,10 Steam lJtre RS2&12.. fuel H.~~nd.!ng B.rtlding

~ . GE-m<uCIIee z

2. OO!ie u~o:ssm~nl u~ng Dctuol mt'!ecrolog'J lndcotes d ~es greater RMCS 631- Merillat 10 E* CO mR,.,.,r RMCS .cu fHIBI lXI

<(

thin 10Q(N"cm TEDE OR 5QO mrc:m lhJ'fold COE 11 or bcymd the RIM::$-1:!', *e* M~lrt Ste~m Une RtM:Z6-71 "!*.,'MrunSie:smlln(l J. Fr~d w~y rasutts lntti"cole closed Yo1nOO'oll ~t- t Bie~ orcater I OE*DlmR~ t LOE*Ot lflR.tlt I than l OGO mR'/llr e"tpect~d 10 cc::nu.nu~ lor mcc~ tn~e~n O!"le hour. OR ~11et>amdary , RMCS 6:32 J.lonitor RMCS 631 Mt:>n~Ot*

analy.;es <tll'irld~urvey-snfl"l!l cs Indicate lh)'!"Od CDE gto~lerli\an RS-26-S. . ,.,.SJGez~ S5S03uCihnl Rt~~ 25-n, *a*MiltnS!camllne a:

RMCS 1?t 1.0 E

• Ol mRAu

!iOOQ mremfCTQ"le h<<JJ cllnM:btiort. t l orb~wd Sltebol.llld~ry RMr:S 612 Uoo.1or l . Flela $U.OVCYresull~ maleate cJ~dwlnoOo¥ n~o rnt~ Cletllff m11 n Rs-26-8. R$-26*5.

' B'SJG Blo-.voo-...., ~ 5 E-03 UCIMII

• A' 00 Bfi)W0o:P"1!. 25 E-0-4 uC'"..tml 100 mRillr~;~~;pec:ac 10 c:crn.-.ue ror fOOI'e:lhon onc-nCRJr. OR AMCS 122 RMCS 121 DE!PlNfnOH OX U!.*IVSC!'i ol frdd survey umplos ln~Cille thyroid CDE Qft:'.,ltr 11"1.11'1 ~5-3-0 500 rnrem roc one hour of lnhl!ll.."'tlon n.t et beyond the -sne boundo.r1 RMCS 1.22

• a* SIG BIO"NIJ~'fl ~5E-!M UC~I IMMINENT - fi\IIQ6tion Bcti011'!. hl!11e ttl!! tn.trtee1Ne, acJcltJOn11 llctlOO"S are nC( expecte<:\ to~e sueces$ful , 111\d !rende" 2. VAllO telllingan AllY emuen t mond<< lh&t e:s;ceea~ 200 limn !he olenn

~!!-:!pOint e-sta W shed tor a current ra ~oadrJPY G!.Charge pe-rmtt tor 15 m lnut~s Jnform!!lttoo ~ dlca\es thilt tho event Of cood!im *...,:! oteuT. Vlhe re vnra bo/g eh3nn<:t-s we *!ill cod the: dl!I>1Mt rv.ng~s CM:tlap, ll'le CIIOOIJe<" 2. VAUDreaOng en A.N Yet11uen! mon.tor reai31ng grutl:r tnan 2 tMI.tltJENT 11tnef11tmes ore !lpcci!Setl ll"ley Shttll attply mOM':lt reacllr.; 15 v:lli4 c:n ~ltler -c:nanniY.

liMe$ tht: &lbtm t;etponl es:tA b!iShed by b cu n en! rodioacllvl ty VALID - An ~<fa::~tton . repo.1. or conOibon. i-s; eon~dt:rcdlo be 2.. F<< Unh 1 Ebe-rline channri'J o otli~Wn cufletll: dll13' dlschsrge- ~rmlt lor 60 ml n ~rtes a longer.

VALID when It I<; 11erlted Oyl l tan m;uument cnann tJ crrrdc {21 Ef.IT ER ttlec<:'IJimana(OATAICil.lMf!I IO !ENTER I indlc:ortion-s Ot"l rclatt'd or red undtnt tndle~ lor<; . Of (3} b~ dired 3. Ccnrtmcd SIHT'!Pie Mlll~es for gll.R<:~Us or liquid teh:as~::s ln licnte~

~~tvflll~ ~)' plont pet~nel. suctl l hlll dOI.lt~ teiM<<< to the 3 U~ ~Jorm01l OPS 1:\ro.;t~~d u lli~~ PI~ I VeN ~eM' h:.s l:loen: concentralfon-9 o~ r~!~s-t talt;5 !)re:flter then 200 trmer. ODCM L.-n1ts. fOt 15 in dle<~ta *s ooerabihty, the condition's exist r::nc:e, cr :he rt"tJort 's t..o.."f/re<lduetowto!!:loll.il saAS mlOU!esO'Iooger 3. Conntnled s:aml){e an&fyS.es for Cl'ieous a DqUid re1eo~

ttcevrocy tS remco1 td. Implicit in I h.!~ do~nition I$ the n eetl tor OR tnt:Jca le:< <o<1CCntr.Jtion'i OR rdeo.'i~ r..te-soreo iC1" Uun 2 tltne5 time!yas~e~srnent Untt 2 Ol'iV- R.aiS>3d dl.ll! TO~cc~.;..;fuJ 11MY~on on FH8 OOCM Umlts f.oi GO m'llutH or re..,gtt

~o<en~~olBIII10t"l l otiY.:'A.Jr*vem PAGE: 6 RE VISION: J R -I lOT CO:-J DITIONS EAL

• I lOT BASIS ST LUC IE PLANT CLASS IFICATION TOOL EP3:4 (AP P-A-9) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Rec.

Site Area Emergency Alert RA2- Basis:

Thls.lC oc!tlrHieS. rl~s.ln radatlen <<lO"Se ntes wllhln jient buUOings, ana T1'ri1. IC addres.s.es t-l~l!.!ec1 r adM!Ot'l lf:vels as a te-sult of wt~l~r levd rnay De 1 vrecwsC( toil taGIOO>:ti"J'lty release to tne environment. Th eo;e fo"Nenngbut a t;o~ the Reactcr ?ressare Veo;sd fl!l nge or ~o/'t'niS that tl avtS e-.*enl$ represenr. o l o~-.. ef .cootrOI O'tet rod;oat(we rnaten e:l and r~resen t resol!ed. ot may reWlt In UNPLANNED Mst- m mdl:rl: on dose ntle~ Within an er.luat ot sutlstanbil.l ?CCential dC!1tadalion In the leVel Of safcty ornte plant bllld1ngs lh~e ra aa: u:t~ levet s r~u'ie n\ .a IO$S o l contrct ~ ~

plant re dl ooctN~ m!lc:no.l end mayrepres.eru e potenllal d~gra.dallon In !he 1~1 o f Sll fdy oHhc plant.

These ~:Yen t s escala te trom RU21n that tuM !llctMty has be~ teJu s~d. u 1-; antlopD ted di.ie te> fuel neatup. Tnts IC awhf!s to spen; fuel reQUmng lhe r efuel Q p~:hwO:~ Is a corn!J!netJon o f ca\lllres, tu~. con011s <1nd wc1er eo'J'efl)ge onlf lS net Ul!ended to odare ss ~ntluel wnteh *slleensed pOOls V\ll'llle a rl)dil)tlen I"'Y..f\1!01 could del e~ 1111 1 n::r~s-e o ns~ In Mse icr~stOfege r~1e aue to a drop In Ute water level , l1 ITI.!JII not bee reliab le lndJtetlon ol whcthC'I' a- net the luetls CO'olerecl Fo- refu etng events wtlt!!rt! tne weter EAlll l iNficat.:~os include water le vc l m dict~lon ond per5Qnnd n:ports , levrl drops boloN !he Rue!.<< Pr tS:w re Vcssd ft!l'l'ijC cles!.rllcalron would tle Vllil C UZ l h E!. ~e!l! esc:alo.tes to :an .AJMl pl!:r IC R~ 1i lnaChllll~ d fuel EAL #:! adar~s~s rad. atlon monitor lndtc.atloos of 1lJ e1 u n.co.-ery l!lndl'Q' fue-l ou1slde the rut!()(' ~sel ls Vl\ CQo/1! fed For e~-entio tnvolv.ng lrraC!I& ttd aamavc il-D-PC:aliM cl thls EAl r~ues und ~standnQ of tho nc:ual tuff In the reactor ve-sset. escafol lon wou ld be .,,a !he Flsslon Product

~ re&::IICSJ~csl condrtiOflt p-~ 1 ~n 11'UI <t~tu'l'IY of IM~ mon.ttot soniet Tobte. lot o~nts. tn oPf!ft~h.riQ IJOOcs 1- 4 w

, Ra1sed ven tllatton mc

nltcr- rcaclngs rNybc tndlc;a11oo ot a n'llioam*My ADpltuiiOn ol th t~ ~ reQulrC'$ UJld<:~oftd!ngoflho attull fll.dloiQJl'tel

..J r ~leii'O rr om tile fuel . connnNng tho! domllge-has.occu"e<l lnctel:lled cond!Hcns pre~ntln lhe vlonll)l ol the monnor

u. tl4cllgoono ILl the llt!tl:llotion m<n!:or due to wa ter level decrease may

u. m:1~ .-c !:lcl~ \lt:ntllllllfl:l' c;( h ilu~ Glroornc lt Cr~\1yanllnt:ecls to be EAl 1':2 addr cs~$ ei(IVJlellln*pbnt fllllh'lllonlcvcls that rtrlf'C$~nla lou ol w ccniid~re<l CO"'tld ot r*6ooa,*.;c moterlal tes:uliii"'Q 1."'1

• po(tntibl dogr&CI O\Ion in Ulc

..J te~-c:l o t '!tc:ty c r !he j)IJAt. ll'lis EAL exou~es nt(!nllenlevel lnc:t~tSM

<t ~\fh.te t radia tlcn rnontta crula Cklec: fin Increase 1!1 dose tale aue t o a lhlll tesutt trc:m plaM!!d actMtles s uet\ as use of radlooraptrk: 'SOUices ~ nd

(.)

a0 drop In lrlc Wil li:!" tevt~l. rt miOhl net be a relrlbh: ln(Jc.a!lonof wflctl'ler or not thefudlsecr.-tred.

mO"Jemenl of udl~dNI!: wMle mot~rlal' A. );l:t'dllc: li~ of NeD R*d' b~ictl MCII'Incr' tA.q: MS} t-.:n otl\!~d as 11 WbUidte~mo::t l he .!lppil~blllly cr lhe Thr~sh d d. The- mtentl-s !O l dentll'{loss d control o tlltloac!l\'<<! ml) l~iat '"

..J Forcxomple, an Area Radiation Monllcr(A.RMI re11dlna m11y lnaease OJc anymcnttorednr ~a: .

0 to pl:utned evaCr:tioos sud'! fl'i head &rrt, ot e'J'Hl a ru~ as'Sembly being c

<(

raised In lrle manlpulator rn.a $1:. Also.

• mona or toUid 1n tact be properly r~sponoog to a kn*""" evtnt ll"'vc:Mng r.ranst.:or << r elo-."'&tla'l or a $ot.an:e Fa l!tllf'tl)le. e rt!!Ueolin9 tlrlage ARM read:ng may lncR"as.!! cl ue to plannecl evdullMi sue:!'! as net~~ II" , or ~n e l\ld 11'5$ffl'.tltybelng fi\IS.ed tne *"

a: S!oreo In or neQr tne IUel DOd Cl r t""M)nding too plonofd evOiubM such i':i mantpu!ator mast .AJs.o, 11 monitor coo!d In lil a ~ pr~rly re-spoodlfl!JIO a o; removo.J of lt\e re actor httcl. Gcn.ec*lly, Jl\cte*sed rttOrcbon monitor ~naNn evenl lr. YQMng troon:sfer ot reloea!IOI'I Of e $0Ut~e. -stored 111 or nc111

..J Indica lions will ntoed to be combined v.1lh encdler incical or (cr ~rsonnel lhe tuel pool or rcSPO"'dng loa Dlil nned evoiUI Ion SijCh as remo*.'tll ol the w repert)of""'a!nl05s r ePJctor he~d . Gen~Ml!U V. Inc rt!:l:St!dflldletlon monrtor rn d:.calltx'S will n et!d to

. canb!n e.

l Wltn onotnerlnc%itll ta t or personn~ reporl ) d'Ntll~ loss w Est.sl.a lloo Oftnlscmergmc*telas'!.ifleallon le'lld. i1.apprc:pn111e. woolll De

..J btsed en IC RSt.or RGI c

<(

a: RA3 Basis:

..J This IC ;,dllt~s~ raised ra!lla tJon levds that lrJll4ct eon!!nued cperetl cn In

~ lllrell requlrinoconttnuou$ OCC\I ptncy In oracr zo marnltln safe operofl cn a: or to ~rform a se fa 'ibutdov.T'I. It*~ thii imp 'rea .ability to C9CfiiiC UH! plan1

!h*l results In the actu!ll or potc.:r.tl lll sutntanlial cleoradolim crflh e !~el ol 0 sa fety of the plant, lh~ c ause and/or magnuuce ot the rise In ra.o.a:loo 2

CD !r:<.*t!s Is n01 a cone em of thi>>IC. The EmergC"ncy Cocn:tna:or mU'it

<( ~cn '§.iOe r th e 5011n;c or cause- oftha raised radiation ~eVds an d dcoiC'rmlnc d I any Olher l C mav De tnvchred a: Ate a$ requlnng r;.ont;nuou1 OCC\Jplncy Include th e CQ'IIIQI Rocrn ond Central ~rm St illiOn cCA.Sl REV ISION: 3 R - I lOT CONUIT IONS EA L - I JOT BAS IS ST LUC IE 1' 1~\ NT CLASS IFIC.-\TIO:\ TOOL EP3:4 (APP-A-10) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert RA2 Damage to lrradi<rtedFue1orlosscfWa1erl.evel thzH.ls Res1.1."1edor RU2 UN?LANNED Rise In Plant R.:ldlatiall.evels.

Wil Result in fheUnoovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reacta" 1011 Vesset

""'~

Operating Modo App6cabili!y: All Openting Mode Applicability: All EAL Values: EALValues:

1. A wa!ff" le>.<el drop in the reader refuefng CiNJ.y, spent fUel pcd OR fuel

~ canal1hi11. wll result il iTadiilted fiS baconing uncovered. 1-~~:)'b~~l'peoo~~£~avf=~

grea:er m... .:.a fe.el:)..

.Q!!

AHD

2. A VAllO alarm on AHY ot the tlllavring due to damage to irradia:ed fuel OR lossofvaer~et b. VAl!O rise in area radiation reading on ANY of the follow:hg:

1-UNIT 1 ARM Cbomels zw o.te= Ta No.

RE26-3-1 D.

il3 5CI1 ContainmEfll as on ANY RE2i}6.1

)

Monitor #fl 1&.

RE26-4-1 ii4 Containmeru CIS ANY RE26-7-1 #7 1&.

M:lnitDr w RE26-5-1 116 Conl:ainmE!f'llOS ANY RE26-36-1 #Y.!

<{

M:Jnitor

(.)

RMCS ~ (5 Oe1oclorTag No. 0_,

a..nnel w R l~~26-2 GAG-Oil2 iii_, 0 RIM-26-6 GAG-006 0 Rl~~2fl-7 GA<XD7 0*

~

RIM*26-G GA<;.OOI! ~

iii RIM-26-10 GAG-010

<{ w Oeie<:torTag No. ~ Oe5cr1xlon Alarm  ::;: >

w Rl"~26-2 GA.G-002 *n Deck NN Rtr..~26-t2 RIM-26-33 GAG-1l12 GAG-003 0: _,

RIM-26-3 GAG-003 Contllmlent CIS MoniiDf A ANY 0 0 z

RIM-26-5

= 2. U~l.ANNED VALID Area Radiation Mon'!or readings OR

~resultsindX:a--.eariseb~afactcror1000avernonn a1' m <{

<{ a:

<{

~

a:

0 z

m

<{

I DEFlliT10N 1101( 0:

HIGH UNPLANNED -AJ)31ilf11eter chanpe or an event that is net the

~lof an intended evolution iWSreqtirescorrective or mitigative ac::fons.

S)"'ems Re,.,;""' 1o ~ntaln Sa.'e Plant Safety MmcEcns.

VAUD-M indication. reoort. cremdition. isconsitB'ed to be VAUO when it is verl"led ~ (1}an ins'!rument chiftlel check. (2) Openting Modo App6C3bili!y: A'1 *Normal lev£$ can be considered as the titttest rwdira in the i'ldiC.llicns. en related Cl' redundant indicators, a {3) bydRCI 1. FaUnit1 Ebeffined'Unne!s-toct!tainc:urremdab: past twentv-fcur hours exc:hd na the "..arent pea\ value.

obsefva~cn by pant persomel, such that doubt related to lhe EALValues:

indicatcr's operability. the condition's existence, a 'the ll!FOrt'S ENTER !he comm3l1d [OATA] dunne! 10 [ENTER]

acauacv is temJved. lmplicit i'l this definition is the need for 1. Dose,.,. grealerlhan15 niVIlr ln ANY of iho follcm'ng areas reqoJiring timely assessment. c:on:iwaus occup;n:y to mai'ttain plant sa!ety fmdioos:

• Ca1!!d Room

• CAS R-HOTCONDffiONS 8 EAL-HOTBASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT ClASSIFICATION TOOL R - HOT CONDffiONS 8 EP3:4 (APP-A-11) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE This Page Intentionally Left Blank R-HOTCONDIDONS 9 EAL- HOT B.'\SIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL R- HOT CONDIDONS 9 EP3:4 (APP-A-12) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE RECOGNITION CATEGORY F FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION F-HOT CONDmONS 10 EAL -HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL F - HOT CONDmONS 10 EP3:4 (APP-A-13) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE I~ FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION TABLE (APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3, & 4 ONLY)

FUEL CLAD BARRIER- Basis REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER- Basis PRIMARY CONTAINMENT BARRIER- Basis The Fuel Oad Barrier is the ~real loy or ~nless steeJ rubes thai: c:cntain the fuel perets. The RCS Barrier includes lhe RCS p~a-y side an::l its ocmecticns up 10 and The Canlai111T\ef1! Bifiier Includes the ccntairrnent I:Uicfmg and connections up to and inclurfng the wtennost fnduding thf: pressurizer sa.~ and rEef vaNes, and cthef connections up to and c::ontainmem isolation valves. This banier also indudes lhe rrain steam f.:edw<o1er, and bkowdO\\TIIine: ectensklns indutfll"lgthe JXill\1fYislmticln v.alves. outsX!e the cootainmentbuikfing up to and incJIJI:ing the outennost seconctarySde iscfalion val~~e.

1. Safety Function Sbtus 1. Safety Function Status 1. Safety Function Status lllefl! "no uoss ...,...c asscca:"\' WI'JlllliS 11em. flere IS no LOSS 'tl.1n trliS t1Em.

I =uncoveryand is!==n7re~ r~~~u~c::=r:~gru.cau supemea11ng iW1 Potential LDss. threshold 1 - RCS Pressure and Con:rcl Safety Fooc:6::n not met Caltainmenl T~ and Press\.re Safety fi.Jncfon not rn£1{ inlfea::es an extreme trollenge to the safety Polential.l.oss. ttTeshold - RCS H=at R.emcml1 Sa.'ety Functicn net met indicates the tfrina'l.e he.i! ~an~ challenge to the 535:!yfunction derived fn:m app'Opri~e ~~ ftcm appcplia:e instn.mem: readings ancfklr san¢ng results atd t1us represents a poeent!aJ 5ass Snkfundion is under extreme cha!Blge..

Potential loss Uweshold 2 *Heat Removal Sa.'e!y Fmc5cn net ,..e incf:cates the CondiUons leading to a potential loss of ocntainrnem b..-rier resttt from RCS barrier ami'Dt'fuei Clad barrier loss..

ulfml:e heat sink ilnaicn is under extreme challefV!. Thus.lhi* thn!slloid is pimarily a~ b<llveen S1te f>Jea Em!rgency an:! C-eneral Emergency rep,..entiltl a pctentiiilloss cf lhe mird barrier.

2. Pr!'!wy Coolant Activity lewl 2. RCS le:ak Rate- 2. Contlirvnent: ~

z Thevciue isSOO~ilgm 1131 equivalent A.ssessmentbytheEAL Task F~ iolfcZes that. this 0 amcmt of ax>!ant activity is YEll abCM! d1at e:q:JEded far iodi're spiltes a'ld e:orresponds to less than i= 5% fuel c!ad ~This amoun of radioa.divity incfca:es signific:arrt dad damage and~ the C!i Fue!OadBarrieris<Xll'lS)deredlost

<t 1'heri! is no Paterrtiallos.s ttweshold as.socicrted mlh this item a: The Pctentiall.Dss threshold is bJsed on the inatlility to maintain normal iquid This ildica.tor mies on operator ret:q11it'cn of CWt Wlexpected response for the ccrn[tion iftllfterefore does nee fB 0

irM!ntoryw!l'in the ReiiCIDr Coolant System (RCS) by""""' opera.'icn d 1l1e 0\.argirlg System 'Aitich is ccnsidered to lle the flow l'3te eqU:vcient to cne durging have a speciEc value associirled *\~ th i1. The~~ re:;ponse is irrc;lortant because it is the ~dicatcr of a oontainment bypass condition.

a:

w =~~~~~~~so:~~~~=~

RCSie.ikagepathsudlasa~leakexists. Tbeintentdthlsc::on:it'cn Existence cl an expbs:ve mixu-e means a h)'di'1)9Efl and oxygen CXlf"Cen:ra::cn cr at least the lower ~ioo limit ctliW exists.

ii: is met tf ~ ro isola!e: L.etdcMTl iJre OOT suceesshd. Additlcn.al c:Ntgng pumps a: being required is in:fica!ive of a stmtwia! RCS leak. The ttird Potentiall..oss ttnshold represenis a potential loss of oontairunem: in that the ccntairment he.:Jt removal.fclepressurization system are either lost or p~ in ad~ manner. iiiS incfr:itleo:t by ccntaimlem ca ~tngeatE!r tlwl N sepctnt at IM'lich the equ1pm;nt was 51.1pposed to have actuated.

1-g 3. eon. Exit Thennocoup!* Readings 3. Core Exit Thennocouole Reading 8 I ne uoss tnr<!SIICOC c:cm!Spcncs 10 sgnmcant Sl.llEfi>Oa'ng or tne cx:olilllt. rtere IS 110 LOSS IJ"U'eSS'llOO assoc.\1l~ W:ifl 1 IS L1em.

g: The l'olenliall.oss lm!Slold corresponds to loss of subcocling. The conditions in these ttnsholds repesent an IMfiGNENT core m:Jt sequence which. if not c::orrected, Ol\ld fead z ~=:~~~~~G"~es-~=~fru~=~n~i~~~~~~~~

RCI LEAK RATE -com:r.seocfmENTlFIEI .... UN1DB(TifiEOI..ENVIGEas cle!n~ ErTE~gency-loss dtwo b.miff5 an::fthe ~ bss of athid.lf lhe t.mal::n resD'a!icn procedures are 0 D)' Tecra1al~ inetfedive, there is no ..success'" pa!h.

iii IMI>UNEKT- MEgafcn a<funs hiM! been ine!fedive. ilddifonal adions are not UNIDBfTIFIED l1AKAOE -Lab~ W.lth Is ncai:IEKTIFIEO L.ENV.OE ~

Ul ii: r~-~;~~~:n-=~~~~~Dfcmrfiioo CCNTROLL.ED L.ENWJE.

~=~=4~~~~~~~~~lf:e~~~~~~

I COHl'Rou.aJ LEAKABE-&11.-rllo-* su~fl'a'llle re:Kbr CIQCtanlp:mp sn~~. vess~ water level is riSng.

u. FAULTED-In asteomgeneralor, !he exis1ence of secondary - leakage thi1111!5ults IDEHTJflED L.EMAOe man uncontrofed drop i1 steam generator pre;sure <<the steam genera:or lleing Ll...ea:t;te (ez:q:f: COVTRCL..LED LEAK/GEt l'"..!ao ~0~ ~J==etns. Stl:tl D J:U!rQ s~ ar \'Jhetheror n:x the procedures 11 be: etfect:ve shoolcl be apparent \\'itftln 15 mimr.es-. The Emergency Coon!natcr

~ydepressurized. ..or~,::o~gl:atsltUII:r:c::optll"ed , zr..dD:indUtf£11baslll'll)ctCD'Iedl."Qtllnt.,cr should ma\:e the declara!'.on as socnas It is deternmed !hat the procedures have been, Dl'will be ineffective.

b..Lt:uagr;ll'11:itnc~n::n~Umzttn=h:'nsaun::Je5N:eretmsoe:ttdtJ~X-=c:~

FULl. lRAIN OF OB'RESSURIZATION EQUIPMENT [112-EOP-03)- andJncraneM~naltDl!t:c1erelldUI~c:s:entiiOncf De~d~~ctncttl Twe Ccnt3innent Spray He~ers- Flow in each header is aJ le3St 2550 (2700) ~e PRESSIJRE BOUNOA!tY LE.'\K.II.GE. cr gpm o.RE:IICICfCCC1.2!'1:S)'Sicn~a~f"~llslellmQenCBb:rta-tMsetancbrysysl=:n

--OR - - 4 Prl-~~~~;a!!).

Four Contaiment Coolers- Rt.m.ing

--~-

T!Ml Cootaii"'!Tee'1t: Coolers- RuMilg AND One Con:ainment Spray Header- fbw in the header is a.t ~ 2550 [2700]

gpm F-HOT CONDffiONS II EAL- HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL F- HOT CONDffiONS 11 EP3:4 (APP-A-14) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION TABLE (APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3, & 4 ONLY) c:t FUEL CLAD BARRIER REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER PRIMARY CONTAINMENT BARRIER LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTE!ffiAL LOSS LOSS POTE!ffiAL LOSS

1. s~ Function s trtus 1. Safe(~ Function St.rtus 1. Safet~ Function Status

-~:;-~~~~;r=1~* me< -~===Y1;m~~t ' me NotApplcallle . ';:;;'~.";yintopoc<dure 112 ~~~ Not Appli::atle .~:00 '::8i':::fAN~:;;:;

prooed!Jre 112 EOP-15

--ll&--

2. RCS Heat Removal Sa.'e<y func.1icn NOT met

!f ~;o perlonnany~in . 112EOP- 15, Then entryimo 112 EOP-1 5 hasbeen met ANDE<I!<y into proce:ilre 1/2 EOP-15 !f safety function cannot be ~red within 15 rnino.r:es, then tha! safetyfunctOOn is NOT met for P"l>>Ses ol dassilica1ion.

OR OR OR 2.. Prirm!l': Coobnt: Activi!!!: U!vel 2. RCS leOlk Rilte 2. Cordajnment P~

• OoseEqulva"ent~rc~~.;;::r; - ~~..~~~~~~~~~cf . ~~ ~:=j~gE!au!r marlOU Q~ -~~;rn.U:C::~::.:'may a .p;;.:;~*!l"'""""""

procedure CY.SL-100-0004. Goidoftles far RCS nininun subcoolilg pres ......

Collecting PcstAI:ci:!Ent Samples) -ll&-

I . '!l ........ M t;t

See also SU4. Fuel Cad Oegracllfun.

'i\M1

• . ~GNIMUM SliBCOOUNG- lso!a!ic:n cl Le!:li::w"J is ID cfi5fir9Jish beb\oeen

- - OR - -

2. Containment pressure OR SIJlTfJ level f'6JlC11Se NOT~W!b. LOCA.

2. Centairunent H)'tfroga1 greater than 4%

- - OR - - z 0

Not App>cable Determiru!:on is made us'.ng RCS leakage <n:l eves leakage and is conditions i=

Agu-e 1A 118 n 112.-EOP..QQ. performed 't4ten p roo~required.. 3. Pressuregre-tlun 10 [5.4] psig

. See also SU5, RCS Lea.\age*

AND

a. Less than ooe FULL TRAIN CF

<(

c

~

(,!)

CEPRESSUR!ZATION EOUIPr.tENT w opetating c a:

Q!l. Q!l. Q!l. w 3.. Core Ex:it Thermocouple RRdi:ngs

1. Core ExitTherroo~ es teadilg l)'l!:a'ler1han 1. Core Exit Therrroa:luJies reading gEater

3. Not Applicable 3. Core Exit Thennocouok> Re~ ng

1. Cae Exit Thennocooples reading greater than a:a:

1 2D ~F !llan 700"F 1200'F <(

m I fu leasi two (2) Core El<t The!mccouples II ""leas<..., (2) Cere E>it 1hermccooples ITllst exceed the threshold.

. ~=\~~~d the ~

AND Funct.=cna! Reoove.ry (1J2 EOP-15} for RCS and Core Heat Rem:wal NOT effective within 1-()

)

c must exceed l!!e - ld.

. ~s!so~'tl:a~~e lllreshcld.

15ninules 0 a:

c..

--OR - -

(alt. z

2. Cae *EmThennocot.;llesre at:fng~th<ft 0 7DO' F u; U)

AND u:::

Noca~cab le BOTH of lfle fo!klW"ng apply. I u.

Ncl applicable Not applicable

• RVU.tS indica.-:es Sensors 41hrough 8 NOT catered

--DR--

TlfOT AND REP CET difference grmterthan 20' F (LOCA NDT in JXOIIress)

--OR--

Grea.ta'"Uwl22"' F supertleated *on REP CET (LOCA WI progress)

A!lll

• FundienalRe::ovory(1f.!EOP-15)fcr RCS and Cae Heal Rerrcval NOT e..'fecti\-e wiihin 15minu".es CCcntinued~ next oaael (Continued~ nex! paae) !Continued~ next paQel F- HOT CONDillONS 12 EAL -HOTBASlS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT ClASSIFICATION TOOL F- HOT CONDillONS 12 EP3:4 (APP-A-15) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPE NDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION TABLE (APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3, & 4 ONLY) - Continued FUEL CLAD BARRIER - Basis continueat REACTOR COOLANT SYSlEM BARRIER Basis continued PRIMARY CONTAINMENT BARRIER Basis continued 4.. ReactorVt'SSel Waterl.eYel 4. SGTubeRupture 4.. SG Secon clart S i~ Releasewith: P-to-S l.eak!!Oe Ttis L.oss ttftshold ll!COjJlizes V\a.t SG tube 163kage can represent a bypass of 1he col"'tiftrnalt There is no Loss threshold associa:ed W:.'ih this item.

~=~~=nm':/r~=~~~~tf'Pi-u~s~c:'mmihe barrier as well as a bss of the RCS ba'rier.

The indication fur the Potential L.ms Unshold represents a ~ near the top of the active fuel-Rea= VessEl - SS1SC<S 001 ""'"""' "THOT and REP CET di!ferenoe Jll'ill<r llun 20 "F leakage is large EflOUitt ID cause ac:tvalion o!ECCS (SI~ (Ul-1 6011 psia arid U21736 psia]. This is ecm'su!nt to the RCS leak rate ban"..er Potential LDss Uw"eshold 2. By b:self. this threshold WU result fn the dedarattoo of an Alert. Hcwever, if the SG is a1so FAULTED (i.e... two barriers biled), d1e Theu..o loss ttuesh.olds desoibedcot.td be oonS.deredralmdant The uses Emergency Prot:edure conm:mly used tem1S like "RlP1lRED cn::l inFclusion adds the AULTED"'of a ttnsholdthat to (LOCA NOTi'l prngress)crgeat.<than 22'F supe<heil1ed oo REP CET (LOCA in progess) indica'.es S"Jbccoling has been lost and that some dad dan.age rray oocur. cfedar.iii!Dl escil\ates to a Site Area Emergency per Ccnbirmem bil'rier Loss Wesholds. ease of the clasS:fication J:fCOESS and has been included based on this human fa~cr concsn.

There is no Potential L.ms tiTeshllld asscc:iated wiO\ this item. Ttis thresho.'.d results in a NOUE forsmalerbreaks that (1} donctexteed the nonnaf cha'Qing capacity tflreshdd m RCS leak /'il'le barrier Potentiall.Dss thleshrk!. or (2) do net resu."t in ECCS DB'INITION BOX ac:ua.:ion fl RCSSG bb: rupb.Jre batier Loss tlRshold. Fa larger llreaks. RCS barriEr dnshold ar.eria 'IO.Jid result in 311 Alen. For SG ttbe ruptJ.Jres which rroy inYolve rmtiifie steam genefil'.ors or FAULTED- In a st.am gener.t.or.lhe e>isienceofseoondary side leakage that results an a1 t.llCXlntrolled drop in !'li:am ~~s=~~~~~::=d~_:~~~~~be generalcr pr155Ul1! a the steam generau being CCrT1Jier.e1y based on "'Pcten.tiallJJss~ of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

deprf'SSOOzed.

'f1lo: fii"St LDss threshcid addresses the condition in whith a RUPTURED s.:~ gener.coris also PROMPTLY ISOLAlED- A steam release to !he envimrment.

~~~~ur,~ona!~~b~~C:S~=~\=~~u~

~e'\k~~:~~~~~~~~on the dedar.llion of a Ste Area Emergency.

z PROMPTLY ISCI.ATED.

The second Lc~ ~d ackn:sses SG tube leaks that exceed 10 gpm in oonjun::tion with an 0 RUPTURED - ., a steam gener3tor, existence of pc'imary-t:rr UNISOI..AB1..E release pa!h to lhe envin::ument fn:lm. the a."fected sream generatct. The l!'tre5hokl for F ~leakage of a ~tude sufficient fD require a cause a ~ishing the lt4lSOlABlE sec:cndary side re'ease is irf.ended 1D be a pn::knged release of

s reactor mp and sa.'ely injection. radioactivity from the RUPTURED S'leam generaD"drectiy !0 the environment (i.e.. SG tube f1.4l(1ft W

'lh c::aoa.Jrratt bss of off-si~ poNer and the RU?l\JRED ~ ~erator is ~irEd for plant

~

(!)

UNISOLABlE -A b'each a leak that cannot be PROMPTLY ISOLATED.

ccddown cc a stuck open relief va."ve). This could be ~ect.e d to occur OOen 1he m3in condenser is un~le to accep:: the conbminil!ed steam. If the main condenser is .avDbl~ there noy be w releases via air e}ector.o. gl3nd seal e.xhaus1ers, alld other sirrilar controlat. <ni often moniraed, 0 palluvays.

0:

w These Jnfhways do nee meet the "ent of an UNISOLABt.E ~ease to the environment. These ii: ~--------------------~5~-~~ ~Ap~~~~ ~~.---------------------i----------------------,S- N<< Ap~~

.~* ~~ ~---------------------r~m~~~~~~~~zo~~~~ ~us~~mo~~~~~;;; * ~~ ~I~C~=---------1 0:

c<~leaselD lhe

a - Applicable {Added to keEp batriernurrt>emg oonsmedj Not Applic

ablo {AddedtokeopbarrierllUJibemg ~I Ttis Threshcld ad<Rsses inromp~

envirorment. represents a lossoltne containment barrier.

1-- The use ofthemcdi6er*cfrecf" in defirDtgtherelease pa'.h disaimir\a:es agains: ~paths u

) ttwough in'.err..

ing liquid sys1el'TS. The exis'.enceof an in-&le charcoal filter does not make a 0 ~ease pa!h inc:5red: since the ieris notEfied:ive airerroving fisS:OO procfuc:t nttlle gases. T~cal fitters have an eff.eieney d 95--99% rerrova! of iodine. Given the m::Jgn:ufe cf the core invert.ory of

~ iodine. signifiC3nl: releases oould still OCCIS. In addffion. since the fiss:on pro::fuct reease wouk:lt>e driven byboililg 11 tne JNC!orvessel. the tigl humidity it~ rE'ease ~c:.., be ~ed to c.

render the filters fteffective in a stat period.

z 0 There is no Pctential Loss thn!41old associ31ed W!h this iti!m.

iiiu:: 6. Containment Radiation Monitoring &.. Conbinrnent Radiation Monitoring 6. Containment Radiation Monitoring lne<e ~roLOss lnresnM assocoa:eownn I!Us nem I cf~~=~=~~~~=:=~co~~lease<m di;'= indicative  ;;~~~~"::~ec~':"fu~~:=~~~.~lh":=:",!li;t";!reaQilg the reactor <:OO(ant notre g;as and iodine .,_'o'e'ltcry associilil:!d with a 5% clad failure ito the cf a RCS leak onty. lf the ratli.a!oo monitor reacfing inc:re.ased to that speclie.d lvj Fuel Clad The readilg is a value \\hi:h incfca:es significant tuB damage we1 in excess of the thresholds Ll. Barrier t1nsllcld. fuel dan&ge woold also be in<fcilted. associa'.edwffh both loss of Fuel Oad ao:lloss of RCS Barriers. A maj::frelease of radioactivity containment amosph""'-

Reac:.::r cooi3I'TI: corte:entralions of this magnibJde are ~I tmes larger than the maxint.Jm There is no Potentiall.Dss threshold associated wi~ this.i~ ~=;:~:~=al~te~~=~~=~~~weoffuel c:cnc::entrations (including iodite Sj:liking) allowed wltin tedrical speC:fications and 4ft!- therefore incf~afiw of fuel dmlage. Regan:fess of whe!ner containment is c:haleng:d, this arrount of actM~:y in conbinment. iC re.'eased, could have sud'! SI!.Yef'e consequenoes that

• is puden: to trea! this as a potential loss cf This value is h~1han that specifiedfor RCS barrier Loss tllrestdd#6. Thus. thisthresh::lld c:attainmenl sutti that a General Emet"yency decl3ration is vliJ!T'i.IDted.

indeates a loss of both me Fu=' Clad barrier and a loss of RCS barrier that appropriZety escaliites the emergency Class:fication leva to a Site All:! a EmE!fgency.

The~ is no Potential LDss fiTeshold asscc:iirted Mlh this it£:m.

~~~:~==::=:=al~,:t~:=~::

mctlitcr~ baniershould also be iooorpcra'.ed il this::treshold as a f3ctcr in EmergencyCoatfinaD-iJ~ lhatlhe bmier may be considered ID<l or po'.B1tially lcQ.

The Ccxl:ainment Barrier should noc be declared lost or pccentQIIyfo.st based oo exceeding Techrical Specificat'cn acton statemer:t aiteria, unless there is an even! in progess requl"".ng rritgalion by the

~~~~:s=:~=~~~~~~=.etherFueiOadant\U F - HOT CONDffiONS 13 EAL -HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PUNT CLASSIFlCATION TOOL F - HOT CONDffiONS 13 EP3:4 (APP-A-16) St Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION TABLE (APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3, & 4 ONLY)- Continued '2":*

Cat.

FUEL CLAD BARRIER REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER PRIMARY CONTAINMENT BARRIER

.=

LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTEifl1Al. LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS

4. Reactor Vessel W atel' level '- SG Tube Ru~ure- .t. SG Secon~ S ~ Relea<ie with P-to-S l..eaka~

lllCIIca""'""""'" 1uvwgn B NOI .::;~~~~(~l 1n a ~atety InJECtion * ><.U* I U t=J => IS a>SO . A ULI "'-' OUISIOe z of 0Jnt31m'!ent 0 F

- .oa- <t ISensoiS 4 tlrn"!t18 NOT a:wred means sensors 4 through a inclusive (all).

- - Jll!.,- -

2. T,,OT AND REP CET difference greater than 2.1'rimary-10-Se<:cndioy leamtegrea-.er than 0

i2 I 2D"'F (LDCA NOT in progress) Not Applicable 10 gpm ~t app li:al:te

(!)

w

- -Jll!.,- - AWl 0 NotApplicZI!e

3. Great-er than 22"F superhea:ed oo REP CET a. UNISOL.ABL.E st6.lft'l release from affected a:

(l.CCA ., progress) SIG to the environment w a::

a:

OR OR OR

5. Not Aoolicable- S. Not .Applieahle S. CNTMT Isolation Failure o r Bypass

. r01 ~ 0! 3JI YaJ.,..In AN Yone ,..,dose

~

~

AND u

Not App5c~e " " Awiicable Not.Appflcable Nee Applicable NotA.wfica.ble 0 a.~~=::~~~ ~

a..

ll.R ll.R ll.R z G. Conbinment Radi~ion Monitoring &. Containment fQdiation Moni~ &. Containment Raal3.tio n Monitoring 0

1. CH.~'A rei:iding greater than1 .4 E-Hl2Rillr " " Applicable

1. MY CIS moniureatfng grea1er 1han 1.5 E+D3 mPJhr Not Applicable Not.Applk:atle

1. CHRRM readir>a greater than 2.7 E-tm Rihr ~

u::

OR OR OR I

1. ~Y cc:rnfrtion in the *op:i'Uon of the

~d=Jr3tor that fndicates loss or

1. NfY condtion fn the q:~i n iond the Emergency Co::nl~ that imf:cii'.es Po".ernial loss of me Fuel Clad Bania-

=cy

1. ANY carni1ion in the opinion cl lhe th C<lonfnalcr tlut inc!i""""' l.Dssof Barf..er

1. Nrf condition in the opin:cn of 1he

~cy CoCI'dinm- that indicates.

F'ot!!ntiall.Css ofthe RCS Barf...-

t~~~~J,f:{d~ ~ indca:e Loss af 1.ANY condtioo i1 1heoj)ni onof the 1. ANY ccntf!icn W'i lhe: ~nionoithe gmergency Coon:fnatcr mat irxfic.Jte Pct.ent!al Loss of ~e Containment Barrier u.

F- HOT CONDffiONS 14 EAL- HOT B.ASIS PAGE REVISION: 4 ST LUCIE PLANT ClAS SIFICATION TOOL F - HOT CONDffiONS 14 EP3:4 (APP-A-17) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE This Page Intentionally Left Blank F- HOT CONDffiONS 15 EAL -HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 4 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL F - HOT CONDffiONS 15 EP3:4 (APP-A-1 8) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE RECOGNITION CATEGORY S SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS S-HOTCONDLITONS 16 EAL -HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: I ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL S - HOT CONDITIONS 16 EP3:4 (APP-A-19) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert SG1 -Basis: SS1 -Basis: SAS-Basis: SU1-Basis:

Loss of all AC power to emef9=ncy busses ~ses aTplant safety l.Dss of all AC pmver til emergency buses CCJ'TlK"Cmises all pam. safEty The c::onc!tion i'ldicated by ttirs IC is the degradation oftheoff..s!e ardon--

~~~~~h:f:~~~mate~*s~~eocv ~~~~~~~~~~J~~~ergency ~~~I::~U:~~~=~'io~~dJ~ltt Prrla1ged bss of all AC pcwerto emergency buses wil lead to loss of fuel Prolonged lcssct N:- pcwerto ~Y l>lseswU lead to a bJ5s of power vi1h a cx.nament faiiLC'e of all but one erna-gency gener3tor ro c1..ad, RCS. and contairmenl dws warranting deelaraticn of a Genefaf Fuel Ct3d. RCS and ContaWrent. thus.ns event can~ to a supr/IJ power to its emergerq buss.es. Anott'le!' r~ated cend:1ion oould be Fifteen mioo:cs was se;<<:1ed as a threshokt to exciJde transiEnt or Enegency. GEner.!l Enegency. the loss of all ofkite power and loss of on-site emergency gfner.tas wi!Jl rromentary losses of afkite pO"o'lef'.

on.'y one tr.in d emergency busses beJ1g backfed fran the wit rro.in Frft:een minutes was selected as a thresttcld to exelucfe transient a-g,:.,~~~~~~cls~~~~=~

The4 hcur ~;oo tirre is based on !he Sta:cn Blackout Coping

~ysis. momentary losses of off-site pcw.er.

loss r:l this sifVe power SOISCewotid esca'.a!e the ellen: to a Site ~zea This IC is speci~ to assure that in the l.dtkely event of a prdcnged Esc.m:.oo ~o General Emergency is via FisSon Produa Barrier Emergen::yin .acea'dance with SS1.

siation tbckou:. fim£ty reco;nition of the seri:lusness of the ewnt occ::urs ~ion a IC SG1. 1'n:icoged loss ol All Of'.-sHe POM2r and and !hat dedar.t.ion of a General Emergen:yOCCI.r.i as earty as is Prolalged Loss cf A! Cn.. ite AC Pc...r.- Fir'.een nirtutes w.JS selected as a thn!Shcld to exclude~ c:r appropria1e. based on a~ assessment of the everit aajedcfy. m:men:ary Sosses cl off-s,_)e poYP-1"-

~~~~~~~c~~~~~~oo rS~S~2"-~B~a~s~is~:-------------------------------rS~A2""--"B~a~si~s~:----------------------------~~S~U~8.-"Bas ~i~s-:----------------------------~

based on crlly a c11anc:e of m~ l!1e eventeo<{d result in a loss of valuatteiime 11 ~cRlgand anplementng pub.'icp-or.ective ac:icns.. Under~ oond'rtions, the reaeior is producing nw;re heat than the Mon.&a.l rf.pactionstaken at the ReactorTurbileGeneratcrBoard (RTGS) rrtmmm de::ay heat loadfor,Wlich thesa!f!roJ systems aredes:gned.. A areanyset of atfcns by the Reac:IDrOpsat:or(s ) m m causes orshoold =al~a=~~~~e~.:J~~

In ~ilion. undertheseeonfiicns. f.ssion ~ bamef'rT'alitorirG Sill! .kea Emergeni:'f is i~ because cc::nditions exist that Bead ro cause control rods to be rapi:!y inserted ru the CCft! and 5tMs dmm ihe Ncficaticn ct lhJsual Ewnt (NOUE)dassifcati<n. This IC e>a:ludes c:apalilty rroybedegaded. IM!.tNENrloss oq xlb!ntial lcssctbath fuel clad and RCS. reac1Dr. ina:fve'tent criticalfties that cc:ar durilg p4amed reir.tivly c:ttanges as.socia:ed wlh J'e.3drt start<.IpS (e.G-. a'".ricaily earlier than estimated).

~~~~~!.~~~"':bf.'l'J:';f't!:,=~~ed"" =)~~=,!~le~.:~~=~="~~" ~e<m~';.,~C:,Sis ':~~~c~~...~~ the The term *sustained" is used il ordertoallaw ~of expected short a C--eneral Emef9ency based on MO majofoooS<feratit'nS: should cause oontrol rods ro lle rapidiy inserted irm the core and shuts ~in l!lat .a front i ne automatic pnteaion systa:m cfd nat fuACticn in term poslive s:artup rates from plamecl can1rol rod movements such as dc\'m the reac:or. response ro a plant tr.lnsient Thus the pl31"1'1 sa!ety has been stwtdown bank \'Withdrawal These Short tenn positi\oe startup rates are the

1. l>re fuere arry presen1 in<f~iJiions that em> cooling is already degra<!ed oo~ because desigl l"m"1S ct llle Ne! may !\avo been exceeded. result cl lhe ina-ease in neutron poptdation diJ! to subcritieall'l"ldtpllcation.

W,1~~~Lcssor~4aLDss of FssionPrcdldSarrBsis =~~~t~:~~1!~~\?:e =~=~2Enk~2:U:~:emial Escalation \\tlll.d be by the Rssion ~ 8a:rrief Table, as appro¢ate to

!he opera!:ng mode at the tirre or the event.

2. If !here zeno present ind.caiionsof such core coo'ing degada!ion,. hem Reac!Dr TUibine Gener.ltcrBomf (RTGB) aresuccessflj i1 shuitinQ ~e likely is it ihat power can be restored il tirre 10 assure thili a loss of two reader dcMl because ~e desi!IT' fm."1s of ~e Nel may have been If rnonJat actions tilken at the ReJ.ctor Turtirle GenEf3tor Board (RTGB) bari.ers with a potential klss d the lhird barrier can be preven:ed? exceeded orbecause ol the gross fab'e of the Re ildcr ?rotedion System fail tlshtJ.dc:Mn the plant. the event. would escalate to a Site Area Thus. in:fea:icn d. a:xrtiming CClr'e a:clir1g degtad31ian rrus:: be based on to shutdown the pliii'IL Emergency.

Fission Prcdu:t Barrier monil:cring wi1h particular Efl'llhasis on Emetgency Escct.afcn of this ewnt to a General Emergency would be due to a Coordi1ator judgnent as it tanes to IMMINENT Less or Potentia1 1.oss of prolonged coneS too !ead:ng ro ~ extreme dlafenge to eilher cxre-cxding fzssion product baniefs and degraded atdty ao mcnircr fission produd or heat rerrova.l.

b~

SG2-Basis: SS3 -Basis:

tklder these ccoOrboos. the reac:cor is producing more heat than the Lo<..s of all oc- comprortiS<5 allility lo monitor and oonlrcl plant

=~~L~==~~cn designedand ~~*~!s.oz~~~~..u dec3J heat <1'\d sensible he.i: in the reactorsysEm.

The E::Geme chalenge to the abEty to cool the core is int!nded 1D mean th<u the cere exit tempefatures are at a appto3Ching 1200 oF a- thll ~ Fifteen rrJnutes was selected to a:clude tl'anSient or rromentary power reac!Dr \iiE5Sel water level is beiON the top of act.Ve fuel aid is addressed lcsses.

by the Con! Heat Rem:Nal S.r.ty Fundicn.

EscillaScn to a General Emergency """ld occur by .Abnoonal Rad The inaliity lD iti6a.Jiy remove heat durilg the early stages of this levels/Raciolcgcal Bfluent. Fission Product Barrier Table.

sequmce [d enegency fe ed.<G:er flow is ilsufficient to~ the arTlCI.n of heal: requi'ed by deSgn from ill! least one steam genaa:or. an

~~~~oonsiden!dtoexist) is~by the RCS IMMINENT- M tgation actiions. have been inefied:ive. adciticna1 actions are not~ed to be suc::cessfuf. a1d trended In the event either of~ chalenges exists at a time~ the reactor has dbmoticn incfcirie5 !hat the event or condition will occur. Vl.t\ere not been brcogtrt be)ow the power associated with the safety systEm IMMINENT tiinetrames are speCfled. they shall app>f.

design a cere rre1t sequence exists. In this srtua'Don. cere degrada.."'ion ecn occur rapidy. Forthis rea:sa'lthe Genaa/ Emergency declu.JiJon is intended to be an:l::ipa!ay dOle fission pn:dJc:t ba'rier table dedaration to permit ma:arun off-si:e il:efYel'ltfcn fme..

S - HOT CONDffiONS 17 EAI. -HOT B.-\S!S PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT ClASSIFICATION TOOl. S - HOT CONDffiONS 17 EP3:4 (APP-A-20) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert a Rtc ~n ltl on COll e orv SG 1 PtOIO'Iged Los.s QlAII Oft'* Sit~ Dnd.AJIOI.*S1!e AC ?o;;er SS1 Lon .of AU OM'* Site &ntJ ,-,:1 Ori*Ste P.J; Po-.tter toErner!j:enc-; SAS AC P O'.v~r Capablftty To Eme,cency St!S~$ Redu¢ed To.; &n.gle P~.ver SU1 Loo.s ot A!!Oif*Y.e t.C PQJ.*etto Etn~!JM¢'/ Bu~~ S.!Of 15 to Emerpeney a,uc-s.. Busses for t5 min\11c~ << lor.gcr. Source Fer 15 Mlnul es ex LCt'l!iel Such That My A&itienal S1ngte F :t~ihne Minutes cr Lonier.

\.;h* ¥Joul d ResultlnSiaUCJ"J e.'ackoul Opt rallng Mode A.ppllcablllt!(: 1, 2, 3, 4 Operating Mode Appllca DIJt ly: 1, 2, 3, 4 Opornflng Mod o Appl lcablll!y; 1, 2, 3, 4 Opor.:Jtlna Modo Applfcablltty: 1, 2, 3, 4 EA L V"lues.: EAl Val ues.: EAl Vi\fua; EA L Values:

1. Lo~sol all Otf*!>ile AND D!f On-sireN:. power to A34 16 KV 1. l~$ Of till OTt*'Stle AN D ~10n* $i!e A.C Power toAJ 4.Hi KV AND 1. AC poN~rcapebllitytoA3 4.16 KV AN O 83 .:..t6 KVb.isses.roeaucc.tltoa s1nG10 1. LMS cla!l Ofl*Sitll .AC pao~o*e, to..c..3 4. t6K.V AN D 83 .;.1S K:Vfor AND 83*U6 Kl/buss.e-s . S.3 *t1GKVou,.se,.for 15 rrrn ut cs Cf iCil~ef po.ver $0llfte for 15 ll'linutes or longer. t SmJnutesorlonQer.

it. EJTKE R d the toCIO<tM!J...

(1) Re;~ottltion cf !It leO$! one emttQency trus l n IC ~ l.ntt.n 4 MOUI~ ~ NOT r.:ltei!J (2) RCS and C ore: Hei\1 Rt!moval Sale~ tunatm Is NOT mci Opt r.aJinll Modo Appllcolb111ty: 1, 2 Opltfatl ng Modo AppUcu blll ty; 1, 2 Operating M o~ Appllc.lblllly: 1, 2 Operallng Moda Applicability: 3, 4 EAL. V.'dUitS! EAL Vill uu: EAL V !Wu es! EAl Vatloos:

t.M autorn"M; tr\pfall~toshutdoA"n there.!! eta 1. An At.ilama11c trip fU ed 10 1hlfldC1Nn the read or 1. U ~l PLo\1-nlEO "SUt::!tineCI DOSI!ive si.on*UP Nl!e ob~N~ on mJ<:Iclltl n t.tru~nlatlc:n

.:1. ALL M<~nua.! !!ctiOO!I failed to stuJtco.vn tne re~aor ers tndu:.ateo a Manual ec:tlon;ra!o:en I liM ReattorToltllne Gene.r~ lCI Boaro a. Me.nuaJ actkAs tn);en al tne Re~ctet Turnme Gelleraror Bo;3ra tRTGBI tfHGal 00 NOT ctJO'Ioo-o~on tho 'CIIIctO"

• s lnclltllled by, succeurullysr~utoown the ttl de~" IS ~O.t4 1 et:~ t::j ALL cltne fO!lowlna

"'

• R~-ct or tlOWt'f Is. PlOT drOODI!'l iJ !O lc:ss tniln !i'K. powor

• All CEAs tue tJOT in~rted

• Reactor tx:wr-r Is riOT ~lngto lcss !Mn !J% power

• All l\:1 strength CEAs. are tl OT1n.s.erted

• Re~ ctCf ll~~r ts <Uopptn!) to )oJ-ss rnnn 5'1b power

• l~egat!ve Sl<liHl.P r-ate

• Au CEAs art! 1n~nc d or DcnlJO'l ln prO?re-s-s

b. EITHER ol:hc fdlO'.-.Ul"eXIst ~ hD'-'C OCCUn'rd Ouelo contmuea ~ower 9Mt1'at!on (1) Core He a.! Rtrnoval Safety Functlc:tl HOT met.

(21RCS Heel Remo*Jitl Silfety f unction NOT lf'l!!.1 553 LOS'!. or All \fl!a! DC PO'.Ncr t01 15 Minutes or long~

Oper.nlng Modo Applicability: 1, 2, 3 , 4 DA  ! fOIIM 88 EAL Voll uo s; 0::

UNPL.ANUEO - A peo/'3meter ct11ngeCJ" an e\'tnl tha t Is: noc !he w

On-s.te AC po-~t.*er may~ pro~1deo tr, the ether Umt s Emergency Olt.'St:'l Gcner.olcr !EOG) b"i suc~s X*tle to r~su l1 of an Intended e~otlllion and reQtstre; tl)"rec!Nt" -cr mlhgatM- ac!ioos. ~

~

t!ll:tet tho:- Jo3or BJ il 16 KV tliJ~

0 c

PAGE: I R REVISION: 2 S - HOT CO:>I DI TIONS EA L

• HOT BAS IS ST LUC IE PLANT C LASS ifi CATIO:\' TOOL EP3:4 (APP-A-21) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE

~R~K~*=-IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~==~======~A Cal.

SA4 Ba~i s :

~Ie~rt~===============l SUl - Basis : SU2-Basis:

Thts IC rs tl\lend ect to recognize 11'le dffret~lt; OS'f.OC!Died wl1l'l moottonng Tl'lls. K: and Us. assoerated EA!.. ore i r.te :~ dedto recognrze the d.Meutw L1mllng COndition~ ofOperetlcrr (lCO$i ttQuire the p\!Jnt 10 be tlrOU!)!'il to a chan!JinQ: plant concStions 'Nithcot !he u!.C of il mater pOOlon d the 0UOI:!atod*...~ h mon1tonng chang.lng plan t condlhCI'\~'<1o11 hou! the use c1' a reqw1ed cperattno mode: 'Hhen the Technical Speoftcatlon f<<lUi rcd br.nuncliliUon or W"'dlt~lla'l eQJ~Qor'r..ent aur sno a ~gnlfiU~nt lrnMh::nt I"Mior por tJcn of the DM\Inoatlon 01' ln'Cicallc.n equrpmen! CQ:\Iigurntron csnnee: be re-..tore(.l oepem;11n9 on the cue~;m$!r:mce~. th1 S may or may na be an emergency a precursO" to 11 mofC ~vere con 01lron t-------:::::--:---=---------; ~Planned* loss r:J annuntlat<T'i or md c-atcrs im:lut~oK sc.neduled Recognition dthe evaiia bl!rty of can~;et basod lndc&tion p rondea l:i'J In any Cilse. the inthatlon of plant snutdCMTl fC!Qulr ed Dy the sr te Te"Chnlca t h:-=--n= ::-:---=S=it:.:e:..:A..:.re=a'-'Eme==rg=en:..:c:::..L_____; ma~ntena.ncc anctte~in!) ~tclMtles. Ol~nbUtodCont r d Sys.l~m and !he OUa t lied S.fety Par.ameter015pl.ay Spea ficatlons req.rlre'S a four hou r report under 10 CFR !i0 .72lbl Non.

~ern e~rge n cy even ts The plan: Is 'olt.llhtn Is safecy e nve\~VI'nen being ~ut SS6 B asis; 11 optxocmately 75*A. of the safely sys.tcm .aMtJnctalors or rndro::atc rs !Ire dONn *.vitn.tn the aUoNab!e octrc:n sta tement time in the Tech N c.:~l lOSt \her* I~ en lncreli!S~ n5k lhflt II 4e{JI'Illd~"PIMI COC'I(!II/M COUld go *Plar.ner:r loss cl tMunci:ators or lnacalor' ~t~ei1Jdt5 'ehedu!ed Spt!!clfteatlon-s An U'l\medrlile Nol-rlu:3h-en 01 UI\U wtl i;;*Jetrt ( NCUCt 1$.

This IC recognizes the lhr4!'at to p.lant sa r~ty asSCIC1il.led 'N'IIh eompletfl Joss undetectee- 1[2}AOP.t00.03 Q~tallsthe sal~)'3nnunc.ators on eacn m alnl en&nce antt testing act!~les require<! wnen me ptar.t is not b'ought to the r~lreo operatrng mode of c::l!lp;aSb!y o r the contlci room !.Ill" to tnOP...1or U:e pl~nt response to a Cootrd Room pan~ . ltls na lnten~ U\al tne Uni'l Supffo'lwr be task eo within thea L:o.vabte<Jctron ~et emt>nl llrne in the f~Ofl nkal ~ee~nel!ltJons .

S~anU'n:.anttranslcnt with maldn[l a 1udgment d!!oSJoo tt-s l owhnher ~~~1t f~l peaamel ore OtJnro~iflc:atl cn i§ arbitrary, tl0'4*e Yl't, il ls csl ltnaU!dllull If appronma!cl ~ DNiarallon cl a NobfleaUon o l Unu"SU'ill Event cNOUEJ !'5 bas.ed on the time r~ulred to provi~ ~up(JI'~ent~f'/ monltonng of '5i ~em ooeratlon 75% ol tne sarety '5)'!.tem annuncla tcts ot *nc11~ tcn ere IDSt, ())ere IS an at-.'fl l:n th e LCO.~~c:ll1fd eelton ~tatement time petlOO. .elapses u~er the

~Piannel!" and 'UNPLMII'lED" aotlor.s nra not dtffercntrated sinc(l tne toss lnCr~ased 119: th a1 -D dtogralkd plant ccndrticn <<.l..IO 90 unc.etected_ sr!e Technrcat Spedlfeatlon-s and i s nd r~at ed to hoN 1on9 a taLdiltM may ofln-:;llumef'll t\tl;;~n ofth!~ ~fl,1\Jde Is of -such si(Jnl!'lc:<lnce ~ rrn p 11: It is further rccognlZedthal most ~ar.t de-srg.n'5 PfCMde redundant sa fety 1121-AOP-100.03 d-etells the sa fety annunciators on eilcb Conttd Room hiJ'IC'alsled_

transient that the: C'llukof!Jlc:los.s Is. not en ameliorl\llno foetor $y;tem ind:c:a!ten powered ~om 'loep~r !ll i:! llnlnte rrupttbje per.... er liVNllrC'$. pcrn.tl It li nee l11l ~ded ltl.ut P11nt person.ncl perfQtm 111 detolled count c:l 0Uilllrftt:atlon Is l!rbttraty, h O'I\'r'V~H . rt tse51lm.'l.l~d tna t lf 3""0XIIn1Uefy Vohlili! 111Uure ol' 11 11uge patlcn of aMuncl!ttOI'S Is more ll~el'f lMan 11 lollure tno .-.~tfu mef111l!Um l~t ElY ! U\.1!.' the v atuo as a juO!)ment U\1~ld Ia 7S%d thc ~~Jet:1 ~st em ann um:i ~10'" s or itu:lc:ata-s Me ~ . the re l'i .:111 o l a large "P0!1lon of mOcDtlcn'Jo. tile cone. em 11 !ndulkd rn tflj s & .t due lo delermmrna lh e ) C\'C'flty at the plant CQI'Idltlorls lnereuea ~~~ thiiJ "~gre:oed plant condtt:cr, cc:o ttl 90 undetecte-d 11 I~ n~ diiTIC\I I!yusocl* tedwl!n a.o;~s1mcn t o f plonr contMion!.. f hc toss cl l ntencl~ that plan t pe.rsonn4!1pedOtm a dele!!ed count o f Utt! socrclrlc, C¥ SC'<eml. sarcty :;"(5tom mdic!llOf!. shOOld tema;t'l a tunct/OtJ of "Is recognized tnol mo~ d 11nt de<)fgils Df()lidcr tcdundJru snld*l SY!>Iem tM itumeflliltion ~ out IJ~ the> vnlu~ u 11 ju(jgnent thre~ho'd for !hilt ~ptdfir: S'f.llem or ccmpooent oper11tri~T Y )'J atur. Tiur; 'fo\11 b-e ildo.rU-.ed 1nd.Jr1:1ti oo powe red !1an. <<'?lllrill\c un..ntenupt*ble po1*;er supptlas. W'h1le th:tetmlntngthe s~'tli!y of the> Dlarnt condlttcns :rr ls afsonoi lntcndc<:l tho r tr'Y 1hi:! lOoc;fic Ttoehnlcol seec:-,r:ct~llon , Tht-ln~lt~ ti cn ot

• Te-:hnlCC)I ~lu r e ct o Iaroe porllon d *nt~undo t tn IS morll hkdy Jtur*n o f411Yttl d ll thaSf!.!n SupeMsor ~ t~<<1 'N I\11: mBkii'IO a judgmet\1 decis:on as 10 Spedftl!!llhOI'I I~~d plan t shu t'"""" rclfll eoto th e lnstr\Jrflellt JOSS Will Oc Iorge: putlcn 01 lndi ~ Uen-,. th e r:cncern 1-s ~nclu!l~d ~ l hls f,.\L Q.le IO W'hetner tuldrbonal personnel are r eQuired to Ptcwlde lncreasml m orutcring re;.-oriellvut 10 CJ!R $0.72 lf lhe st1ut dCHm 1-s not tn ccmpin*nce w rln the ditfic:ulty O S~:!i!l!t:! 'IW!tl G'S!OI!"'SSmetl l at pl>it'll Cotrt:IJ!Jon~ T he 10~!0 ol of sy..lem CQttD.~on T~hn!CO: I Spo~~o~c.a!ion Ottton. tnc tlohnettbon Of Utll.l~ GI EVtnt t NOUEI Is 1(leQiie_or several. surety ~,t ern rnd.CCIOI"i !:houi.Clrcmo:ln 11 runctron Of trusedon S U:<! *Jnabtuyto Reocn ReQU!U!d Shu!dO'A'n \N\thln Technical !Jut! 5(:leanc Sj'Siom a eompcnenl (IC:lerttt:il!1y Stllh.r s This '11.'111 be a ddt~~d ll J!. t.mner re:Oo)IU!ed tnat mo<.J r.I.Jn: deSI!)nS pr~ae reduno'!ar.t safely ~eciflcao~ Umits- by the wecdic TeCflnlcot Soedflcabon The ~nrtiali cn of a Te~ fcl!lt 5'/S~em rndcat loo powered !rem !t:llH1UCI vrumerruptJblc p c*wt-r w o;c;&.e$

~crficntlon Imposed plant s hutd""'n rd11 lcd to !h e lnstr\IITienl lOS'5 ~ be Wl\1le r.R!ftm: or a I or ee p orloon of !ln nu r.el~ t ors is more \1 ~-eiYlt'l llro ll fJllurc:- ~CornperoY. t cry lti ll)ca!t.ons;" tn !Iu s cont-ext ore comp uter MRO ln tOfl'Tlatlon repoctteo via 10 CFR 50 72 If lh~ stl ~c:kum 1s net: In comphane~ wr tn the of o l!ltOC s:or.ion of jn.du:alrcns, thn-contl!m fl ~eNded In tJ"rls EAl Wc !o prcr.'ldod D'f [).stnbutea C.c:nJrd S>fSt~m nnd !he! OU &.:Ift.ed Safety ParameteJ Teth., IC!d ~ ciflcauon aCtion , 1m:! NOCtrtc.aUoo Gf Unusual E*l(:*nt (UOUE I is dd!ctJity U SQCiflted '4l !h 01.~"rr.er.t of plont COII.driJQI'I~. Tllo 101-s cf Orsploy ~em If bOftl

• mljcr PO'IIcn o r trte tMUrtell!ltlon sys.!em and 1111 t:resttl on SU2 " ln&b.hl'ftO Rea en ReQF.nt-eo S'luttlCJWn \.'I!IJ Tecnnlcn t

~ral\ c, a SNetal. sa fety s:;s~tr m ln6Ciltors .5hookl retT~~Jin' runctiM ol ttt ~~ot .5-peonc S:r->U!m q eom.ponent <:c>~eeltrty !.t il~IJ'S Thl!!. w1ll De tt CijtC!"!l~l!

ccrno11tef mcru:oong Ill'" un ava.Jtabfc the Alen lstequlred , SQedfJC!l!i011llmits.:

by the weetflc Te nlcDI Socan~tton . The mtl ~!1m of 11 Technical fll'lceq mlnu;es ""'" sol<<led es a tnrc51-!old to exc:lu!k tranSient er F l ~eo n minute s was s eCec.1e:O as a th101hdd HJ excttrde transJcn1 or Spoed!h:a~lon lmpo"..etloll.~ nt ~hut down te lt ledto the ln~rvmcn! IC4~ ..,\II D~ m~nen t nry pov.'et tosses. momeni!Jry power JO'is-e-s.

r~:1 e dvla 10Cr-R 50.72 11 tn.e sh\:!da.vn 1'5- nct m c:ompUI!Ince w!ththe Teclm!CIII Spec11icaUcn Dakin. t!'le NO(ific.Jtlat o l Unu~uDI E*1ent ~NOUE) I' Thi ~ ~en 'W\11 bc e!tel:llated to a Slte An:a Emergency tl \he Ope'l'ilbt\9 crew This Uctri'katfon of Urv.IS\Io.l Event tNOUEl ~ill be e'iea krled to _,n .c:J<!tt based on S\12 *tna~to Re ach Reautred Shtl\da-~on Withllfl Tcchn l~l c:annot lnOti.IIO' the lreMICtl t in P ! OQI'C S'S OJ~ t l>'ll c:efleurrent I ~S or bned Of\ o conc:urrtn l l~s ot c:ompl::nsotory tnl$coUtJI'Is t¥ 1f n Slgflifio(ant Specl~catta'J Umtl 5 N eempMsa!OI"J lnaJcatiOtl'i wllh a s~nlflcal\1 tm n s.!~ruln progrM"S dunno tne tra nsient r ~"" Pf0!11!SS dunn" t.h&lo;.sbt annunoatloo 01 1nr.tleanon loS'S o r 11nnunclatl0fl or lndteobon.

A Sl!e A~u Emec.g.encyl~ eonstdered to exts: li the cotmOI rocrn Sl.&n cannGt monitor sefet:t tunctloo'5 nre~d for praer:tlort of the public while a SUS B3s is:

Stpt'll6 cen t trans"Je /l.lls- ill pr01Jle1~ 1j:2}-AOP* 1DO Olde:truls the sole'!y annunCJIII~ on C!ach Controj ROOT! oand ThiSIC l$ rOC!UI1e-d OS. t*JtttftcOIJon at unu~DI E~ nt t ~:OUE)be-cau~e It may be a preeuf1.C¥ of mac seriOJ-s c.ctldibons arH1, ItS rcrsu11.1s OCI'Is.ldercd ln d!r:Ell~s needed tomontv sef<<lry tu n*:ttons nccenuy fa prei:ecl!on <lf lobe o pot:e:oti~~oJ deann:l~!lon ol ttlc lcvd o f s.lety ol ttte C(flnt The 10 gpm w1ue fG( the unlde ntJI'i~lland pressur e ba.rnllaryfeak.B9f!' wa'5 se:lect~d as the oubllc m11'St lndude contrd rocm !ndJcr~IJ cns. compu!er ptmer~ted Indications -and de<lfcated annundB.Sion eapab:stty. It 1'5 ob~f\l'ablo 'A'ilh ~ormal control ro::m Indications les'Scr v.atues must gen.erolly be de:etminedthrouflh timc-cotlsuming sutwllllll ce ! tsls (e .g _

"Ccmoenst~ l rxy mclctUICI'1s- !n th ls -cor~ert Dre ~1c:r b;,sed tni\Xmnlk:n mlss bDI30 tH) prOIIO'ed by Di~r.bu1 ed Con!tol ~tem

• nd tho OUa!rfred S:.ttiy Pal"ttmel l!!:l' Rt:llc f Vllt!>.'e notmat c:perallon should be Cllduded Iran IOI$ 1C. 1-tO'Nevt'f, a Oisph!ry SyYam Thts '!.hould Include aU C:OIJlputer wstem~ aw~able for IN~

u ~edt pc:nd ng on ~p~i~ plant deslg:n end s uMequan1 r etrofit ':-

re!;ef vatve l ilt.! operates an!l lat! S!O dose per de~gn !llloula tle ccn-slderea

.p ~to

~tll e To lhls IC If the relrd 'll'llve CIUind be-lso!Di ed f!l:een m!I'\IJIUW4S stieded &!. II 11He:Sl\Oid tOe:tdut:h! lrliMSI'I!tU or momentary po~o*er IMse<io The EAJ.. I<< ldetr1tfled lt:lllr*tlt: IS set o)6 hlgtlu y&Jue due totne Je-sser s.ignl!ic::Mce of tden~11ed leokoge In ccm;>atl~ tounidenll~e a or pre-ss.ure boof\d&ry tealiaQI!' In eltnerca~ . escat.atlon ot tnls !C to the Alen level is

\ " FI:;Si01 Produd B:arner Totlle .

SU4-B asis:

This EAL is. n c!u::Jea o.ecause ~ !s e pc-ewrsor 01. mete senous. cond~lO.'lS 11nC1, as re"Sul! , Is c ons4dered to be a poterrtJat degrati3tlon ol the l~vet of safctyoflh c plant.

This tlueshold 11ddresses cooh1nt sempte-s exc.eed.ng coobnl Te<:hnkal SpeclfiealiCA\-5 for transient loctne sp1kino limit;.

Eioc.i!la hen of tnl; IC ro rne Afert l~ei IS via ftle FisiJon Fmduo.:t B*mer Tebte.

PAGE: 19 REVISION: S - I lOT CO!\" D ITIO NS E.-\L-HOT BASI S ST LUCIEI'L-\ NT CLASSIFIC.-ITIO:\ TOOL EP3:4 (APP-A-22) St. Lucie , Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TAB LE Site Area Emergency Alert ~ ~on 556 Inability 1c Mlnito:r a S~fic:a'tt Translent in Progress.

Operafing M~ ~plicability: 1, 2, 3,4 SA4 UNPLANNED Loss of Safety System ~ cr tndic:ali'Dn in eteCcntrcl RoomW:1h E'.hor (1) aSign'ficant Tr.onsienHn f'n>7ess. a (2)

Call>ensmy blicalnrs Unovailab.'<-

Opo=!ing Mode Applicabifoly: 1, 2, 3, 4 SUJ lN'I.ANNED LDss of Safety System Aruulciation or Indication in lhe Control Room for 15 Minu:esorl.J:nger Operating Mode- Applicability:: 1, 2, 3,4 EAL Values: EALViiilues: EAL VaJues:

The EIDE!J9ef1t"/" Cootr:Jina!or :shoukl not waifrmtil the appljr:abfe time I I ~

The Emetgon:y Coan:lnolcr .oo.ld naf *oil unti !he app/i<able !line h1i5 Tl':e£.merpenc.r co-cr.~mmrshcluldl!Gf!ll~~the has~. bi.t :shotJ~ declare llme the event as .soon as it i$ deterrrined ela~d, bfJt ~the e\Mas ~ ~ lisde/eminedfttat the II *.1-'a!'l~ eft:.ehu .e.~le::fJ II'-~ st:o;J.\ct de-G'a.~ tt:e I

tmt !he con<iOcn has """"""'d, orwi.l lil<e'y "-"""'d. !he~ cmdlti:ln ~ or Kin /,tel; exceed the app.'lcai:Je time.  !'1'e.!!f .U Lm

~ OCII'I,~ll'(f(f~~::flf!.lt~t,do!!Oti.III:S exe-eetre C',Cf'II'.LI *\'V:,'r e:rcee C't')eM~l\:;J.!\'ee'l'l!e.

til

~

1. U~l..ANNEO loss of greater than ~ 75~~ of the following for 15

1. UN?LANNED loss d g.rmter than ap~y

1. =:,:;Wa~-~~n-atety75*f. ofthefor<Wttng fcr 15ni.nulesrK rrinutes or larger per 1[2J-AOP-1£Xl03:

75Y. ~the fo1cwingfor l 5 minutes or longer per 1 ~?-1 011.03:

a. Control Room Safety System il'llluncia"Jon.. .. Cattrd Room ~s~ amunciation.  !:!:

a.. Cattro( Room Safe!y Systsn amunciation. 0 Q!! Q!l z

)

b. Con-.n:l Room SO.'e!y System indX:atia> associa'.ed wilh l!u! ab""" b. Control Roan Safety System indication asscci<rted \~th me above anmroators.. Q!! z anrnnciat=. b. Control Room Safety System n:licalion z

.!lllll ¢ AND associated \\'ilh the a!xnre annunciatcr.;..

BOTH of the folbW"ng a~y:

B rnER of!!te folbW:ng app{y:

• JUffaflllei:lllcMing:

• ANY cf the follawir'g

• Electrical load rejection gre3!er 1hon25% full £:1ectricalload

• Becbical load re)ectic:n {J"eater than 25"1. fuB~.rica! load

• Reacta'Trip

• ReadarTrip til

• Safety Injection Actuation * ~ lnjeclion Actuafun z 0

AND !Jf! i=

0

• ~cs%'stro~~~- AND Qualif~ Safety Parameter Display z

=~=cii~~=~~rfied~P~  ::;)

sus RCSL.e.lkage. ...u..

¢

!0'1 w  :;;

Cl

~

()pe<ating lllode Appfi<:abilily: 1, 2, 3, 4 Safetv SVstem indcaticn c~ net be lost withcut c~ loss of Safety Svs.,"ern amunciation.

I See >lso 2. RCS Leok Rate in the Fission Product BatTier fFPB) Tallie. j EAL VaJues:

t. Unident:fled OR. pressure botmary leak~

grea::erthan 10 gpm.

¢

...w w

1-til til til 0 1 Q!! a:: til

2. 1dentilied lekaae <Wa~erthan 25DCm.

SU4 Fuel C!ad Degra:jalion.

UNPlANNED- A parameter chao;e a an event that is not the result of an intended evoluticn ar1d requires cooecWe cr mitigative actions..

IDENTlREil LEAKAGE:

a. Leakage (excepl COI'ITROU.Eil l.EAKAGE) irt10 e'<lsed sysien's. ""'

()pe<ating lllode Applieabilily: 1, 2, 3,4 su::h as IU'll' seal a valve pac:kir19 leaks that are captured. and 0 RCS LEAK RAlE - Com!xised d IDENTIRED """ UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE as defined bv Tec:hnieal Soeclieations.

ccnducted to a SLntP a colledQJ tank, or I See also 2. Primary Coolant ActMty in !he Frssion Prodtlct Banier{FPB) Table.

EAL VaiW!S: ...

¢ UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE -Leatoge Yllich is no110EN'Ili'IEO LEAKAGE *or CONTROllED lEAKAGE.

h. Leak;:oe into the c:arta:nrrent atn'DsPhere him soon::es that are both specifcilly loca'ted m d known eilher not to il:etfere w."h the operation of leakage de'a:tion systems a not to be PRESSlRE

t. Reactcr Coolzt sample activ:1y valle intfeating fuel clad degodatioo IJI!a!eo'llian:

...w 0

)

BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, cr ;a. eo.o ua.*gn Dose Eqtivalent 1-131 u..

CONTROLLED lEAKAGE - Seal *vater ~ suPI:lied fi"om the re~orcoolant OUJll) seats. c. Reildor Coolant Svstem &e.akaae throoQh a steam oenera1or to !he Q!!

seccnd"l' system (Primaoy-!1>-secoodary leokoge).

b. E~~~~IIian51S.QuC,gm SU2 lnabililyto Reach ReqWed ~

Vmin Tedric;:;;~l Specification Limits. til 0

~ting Mode Applieilility: 1, 2,3,4 w D..

til EAL Values: J:

0

1. Plant is NOT troLqlttorequiredopernting w mode viitm Tectvical Specifica!ats LCO 1-Action Stnemem lime.

S -HOT CONDillONS 20 EAL- HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSillCATION TOOL S - HOT CONDillONS 20 EP3:4 (AP P-A-23) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert ' .

• .~-. ' .. .....

~.,.. ~

SU6-Basis:

The purpose of this IC and its assodated EALs is 1c ret:O!Jize a bss of

~~==i~~\:~S:~~~~~::ir~

fD almmuric.a:e issues vi1h olf~.e authorities.. The loss of off*5ite conmuniC3tions abety is expected to tJe. Sglificantfy mae comprehensille lhan !!I*":Cildi1ionaddressedby1DCFR50.72_

rn z

0 ~=~::!rr!~d=-~:~~<!"i==~btms.

This EM. is intended to be used on.ly \\flen extraordinary mealS (e.g.*

i= reliiYilg of infonna1ion from raSa transnissims. individuals lleirg sent to

(.)

z afk.ite locations, etc.) are beilg used 'io make CXll'l'TI'M'lications possible.

.......J

)

The fiSt fa cn-site COIIT'ITII.Ilicati:ons. foss encompasses the less of all means of commlll'ic.3::ions routmely used ilr operatioos.

The fLS& for off~ite OCifl'YtUlica!fcns loss enocmpasses the less of all means

of commwica.~ routinely used tior cft-site EmergEf!CY nctifica

c.ns..

w Iii 1ii I

rn S-HOT CONDITIONS 21 EJ!,L -HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL S- HOT CONDITIONS 21 EP3:4 (APP-A-24) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE She Area Emergency AI en ' - - ., _,

SU6 Loss of M On-site<<Off.site Corrrnunications Capatilit'es..

(00)

Oper>fing Mode App6cabifrty:

EALVaJues:

1/)

1. loss of ALL of the fdl~ on-si!e comm.uica..flon me!:hods affectng the abirrty to perform roo!ine operatDls::

z

• Ftan!Page 0

1/) i=

• :PiarrtRadio z (.)

• ConmBtial Phones* 0 z

1

!lB ~ u..

....1

2. Less of ALL c:lthe fbllowing off-s'!e COJtlJ'TJ.lficZioo rnetOOds in Q ~

'Commercial phcoes include installed ce1 phones in the Control Rcom. but EITHER box: z  ::;;

1 ::;;

net oerscnal cell phones_  ::;;

Stne and Courly Notifications  ::;;

0 I!!

Hot Rngd""" (HRO)

Conmercia! p,one* (.) ~

1/)

EMnet I 1/)

NRC Notifications S-HOT CONDffiONS 22 EAL- HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE PLANT Cl.ASSIFICATION TOOL S- HOT CONDffiONS 22 EP3:4 (APP-A-25) St. Lucie , Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE This Page Intentionally Left Blank S-HOT CONDIDONS 23 EAL -HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 2 ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL S- HOT CONDffiONS 23 EP3:4 (APP-A-26) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE RECOGNITION CATEGORY H HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY H- HOT CONDffiONS 24 E.l\1.- HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL H - HOT *CONDIDO S 24 EP3:4 (APP-A-27) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Rec.

Alert Alert HG1-Basis: HA4-Basis: HA1 - Basis: HU4- Basis (continued!:

EAL#I Ef1CO!Tllassescororliticnslltlderwlidla HOS11LEACT10Nilas te: These EALs escalii:e from HU1 in that me CJO::Im'ence of the eveni has EAl #3 is to ensure tltat noaications rot- !be iiraaft lnreat are l'!'ade in a

=e:~:;~o~~::,~==:']gtlle ~rn:t=:t:!:e<:~g~:2=~~~~=~

resulted in a loss of physical oontrcl of ESSENTTAL AREAS {CCilltaining Tl17!ely and at:emate corr.m:mioation be.'rien Searify Shift Supen'is\m vZ-lal equipmem or ccntrols of vit>l eqtipiT'Sll) reqW-ed to mantain sa.'i,ty and ttY: Conlrol Room .is ctUCia/ for the irllJ.I:mentat.oo af effecli.-=

funcfioos and ccmcl of that equipm2nt camct be .lr.;nsferre:f to and. Secllit EALs. safety systems in those *souci!Rs evidenced by Coolrcl P.cc:Jm indications rkeat. It is net the intent of lhis EAL 1o rep'aoe existing non-hostile re!lat.ed operated from a<!Cther location. of clegraded sy.;!em respor!SEo a performaooe. The ooc:tm!nCe of VtS!E!LE EALs involving airaafi.

DAMAGE and.U degraded sysliem response is i:ltertded 1o discrirrinate against :lessereverus. The .imial rep01t sitauld net be in1efpreted as This E.~ is met \Wien a plan! receives infoiTNJtion ~nfng an airttafl

=~:u~~~=~~~~=ct~~~

sigrificanoe ~is no~lt13t a par1iictmr system a slru::ture was d3maged,

~~~~il~~:~~~~~~e~~~brP=

m at is made need dedi~:!;' the Um9'.Jal81enl but J:alher, lmtihe evem v..s of S<Jilic:ient magnitude to cause l!lis d~. The NRC Headquariets Operations Officer (HOO) w.ll oomn~ 1o the Escalation ofit!is emergency classification leveL if a~ate. wou'd lle =~h~~~~~:=:;tlo!De:;.:rThe based on Sysiem Malfunctfl:>n ICs. siatus and si22 cf*lhe pl~e may be proi ded by r<<:lRAD !hrougll the NRC.

EALs #2- il6 refer m specific s!nJC%llres a areas l!lat can!ain safety Escalation to Alert emegency clasSfiC<I!icn lao£:! Yloold be 1Jia H>\4 would S)'S1em or corllJOnent and fl.lldioos requilled for safe s'IPJidc\\Tl of the be~ Wthelhreat imlo:...es an ailinerwilhin 30milliii!O of !he planl plant.

lhisconditcn ~an escalilled1hreattoplarn! sa.l;,lyabowtllat ~ta6~~s:lf-Jb~~!:~:;~~~~="due ocntained il the A.>.ert in that a he~ force has progressed from tt-.e aoci3ental a/Erlts or acts of ciilil disobediBlce. sucl:l as small aircraft In EAL #1 Seisnic evems ofi!Us miq~itude can n:stJ1 in ESSENllAL HU1-Basis:

OWN!:R CON"ffiOllED AREA to the.FROTEClEO ~A This EAl addresses the c:oofngency IU a very ra;iic! jlfOgfession of events, irrlxJd, hunters. *~>>" J:hysical ~res beh'leen errpoyees w::tin ibe-

~:~=~~ (OCA}. Those evenis are adequately AREAS beilg Slltljecled to fon:es lleyond ~ limts, and thus damage maybe~ tolu...eOCCIZTI!d loplantsiiletysyst.ems. The US

~s.f~~~~~~r:~i~~nt~:OOeofan eventct sum as lh1t experienced en SepiE!R'Iba- 11. 21!01. *It is not premised solely ~::g1f..,SJ~~.J:~~~~~~~g:,rcnter c..,

an the pol2ntial for a radilmgical release. Rather the i!iSI!e indudes the Note lhat this EAI..ls apJijcablr. for any HOSTllEACT100 occurmg, or EM. #1: Oanuge may be caused ro some J)CI"!"oos of~ !i'te, but sl!lxlld need for rapid a.ssisbnce due ID the possbility for significant and !hiri has occurred. In the OWNER CCNTROl.lEO AREA This.indudes EAl f2 is based an a tomado strimg (tcocbir;g down) or h~'Winds that notafiect4Diilyof sa!etyfmctions toope!a!e.

inde'.erninate damage frcm additional ai', land a water allat:k elements. ISFSis that may be out'lide tile FROiECTEO AAEA but slill within tt-.e hiM! catJ5I!d VISIBLE DAMAGE lo*s.:ruclures ocntaining fwx:tions a

<W.t4ER CONTROl..LED AREA. s)S1ems teqlin!d ilr siR shutdown of the plant As def.ned i111 the EPRkpoosored Glidelines for Nuclear Piant Response The !act:lllal1hesne isundel' seri:tls <lltadtwith minimal fme. availablE; for 110anEarthquake. da'.I!'J October 1989, a e1l ear".hctuake" is: An

!IJ!fber ~on or adi:fitl:lnal assistanoe ID.atrM! requires Offsl'!e EAL #2 addresses the immeliacy of an epet~ !M!at arrival or impact on ean~;ake of suffcient ~y such that (a) the 1lil>r.lby ground rrotion Response Organization [ORO) reatfnessald p~on for the the si~" * ;ul!lati\'l!ly *shorl1irn!!. is felt a! the nucleK plant site and ll!OOQrlized as an earthquake based on .a irrplemB!la1ion cf protective measLJI'eS. HU4-Basis:

This EAL ad!Rsses the potential for a V1!fY ~ progressfcn af even:s The ilteniofthls isle ens!ll"e!hai nalifica.cnsforlhe airlileraltaclt tina! ~~!~~o'1:"~~~tJ!1~~ce~~~:O~=:re

~~~~~=:r;:t::J:~~S:do~

011>: ad:Jvaled.

due to a 1-!0SII.E ACTION. ~ is not inl2nded to address ino'dents !hat a1e T~andaaua!Ecotmll.l!licatioo bellw!en SecuityShil! StJpetvisioo aa:idental ewnls ar acts of ci dsobelfence, such as sm;ill ai'aaft regarding the credible threat Airfner is meant to be a I~~ with !he and the Control Room~ crucial for the inpl~d effec5~ The US Geological Survey(USGS} National E~ake !~en potential fer C3'Slg s9'lificant damage 1o the parrt..

=~~~=*~:~~~~~:;Iller

• EAI..s. Center can CCillfJTn if an eaMOOuake has OOCIJ!I"ed in the area of lite plant.

EAls. Thls EAl is m.et'Whenaplantreceivesinforrnillicn ~ingan airliner Seariy even!s wlic:h cb not represent a poi2ntial degrada'Jon in !he level EAl #2 is based oo the assumption that a !Dmado strikirlg (toudli'lg do<Ml)

Escalaticn *of this emergency classification level. if appropriate. would be 411atk 1hrea! fl'tlm NRC and the aiJtiner is wiihin 31 mrutes of !he plant.

Only l he p'!ant to lAhicb the spec'jic threat is made need deem lhe Alert ~~~ &J:7i 'S~e:~~~3.~fk~ co:; are crh~wiOO.wthin PROTECTED AREA.

based on actual plant status after ir1llad orJ:~ogression of a!1ack. classifiable underHI\4, HS4 and HG1. EAL#3 h = - - = : - - , . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i The NRC Headquarters<JperafiCnS atioer(HOO)wil canmricatetolhe This ~L ad!Rsses the effect of internal fkJcding cao..ISEd by evarts such HS2-Basis: =::~::x=~ca~~~~=~~~lo~~TThe A higher in"rtial dassifcation OOIUid be made based upon the nature and tirrin9 of lhe secuJily llil'eat and potential *c:onsequenees. The ficense.e sh as component bilures, ~i;rnent misalgnmer.rt. a oulage acCvily nishap.s-.

The intent ct tfUs IC is to mpU-e those i!'IIEilllS ~ oontrol of thi! pW1t status and 92Poftlle plane may be provided by NORAD ~ ~NRC. consider upgrading lhe I!II1Sgl!llcy ~nse sra'ius and emergency cannot be re!<sta~in a lime)' manner. In flUs case. expeditious cfassif~e<l!icn le\'el in =dance \\ilh the site's Plrf.ical Security Plan and transfe-of ccntrol af safetysysiems hasnatOWJI'led (atthDI>dl'tfission HAS-Basis: Emergency Plan.

product banier damage rroy ooi )'el be ildicated).

W:ih lite Control Room evacuated, addnional suppcn. monitDring and Reference is made to sile specific security Sli'ft supavisfcn because these The intent cf the EAL is ID estabf!Sh ccntrol *of fmportan! plant eqtipment Cirectfl:m du'ougtl ihe Tecllrical Support Cen'.er ar.dla- olller emergency indiv"..duals iiR! the des~d pE!ISOMel om-site qualif.ed and trailed to and knowledge of irr1Jorlant plant par<meti!IS in a tinely m111111er: Primary response facl'ites may be necessary_ ccnfirm fhat.a security E'>IEni isoo::ming or has oCaared. Trailing en security event dassifoc<l!ion oonfumation is dosely can!rolled due l.o ihe emphasis sltauld be placed on those corllJonents and .ins1Junents lt1at supply pro!ecticn u and intorma!ion aboU1 safely functions. These siilety .lnabllily tb establish plant oontrcl from a.rtside the Conlml Room 1\ill slriC! secrecy con!rols placed on the plant Physi::al Sectmly Plan.

funcfioos are reacfM!y coo::rd. RCS inventory. ami seccnd..y hal escalab: this ewnt to aSile.Area Emergeru:y.

rermval.

~~=:::d':'~~t~o~~'J!".Cly The determination cf \\he!hB" a- net oontrdl is eslaill!shetl at il1e rerncte Ran. Troiling and <l\laffication Pl.n slwtclol'in panel is based on Emergency Cocmnator (EC) judgment. The Eme!gency Coordinm is eJ<pected.to make a reasonable. informed EAL f2 is included 1o ensure 1hat appropriate nmifications for the security

~~~~'l!:U:,~~~~rr:a~~ tbatlheli=~has ="':t~~~tti=i~~~~~~=~~:c=~~

Notification ct an Unusual' Evenl Escalalicn *of this emergency dassiliieation !level, if*appropriate. woold be by Fissim Product a.mer Table ar Aln:lrrr.al Rad l.B!els!Radio:ogical E!f.llerrl The daemmalicn *of"aedilte. is made through use of in!oona!'oo.found in the Physical Secwi1y Flan..

EAls.

!Continued in n~ colunml H- HOT CONDffiONS 25 EAL- HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PL>\NT CLASSIFICATION TOOL H- HOT CONDffiONS 25 EP3:4 (APP-A-28) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert

!HG1 HOSTilE ACTlOO Resulting in loss of ~cal Con1rol of HS4 HOSTltE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA HA4 ~~sr~;noN vi1lm the OWNER CONTROLLED MEA or Airborne HU4 Confirmed SEC'URilY CONOffiON or Thre.a! 'Mlich the Facility. lndicalesa Potential Oegr..dation in the Level of Safety of the Plom Opet-ating Mode Applicabi6ty: All Operaling Mode Applicabc1ity: All Opet-ating Mode Applicability: All Operning Mode Applicability: All EAl Values: EALValues: EAL Values: EALValues::

f.A HosriLE ACTlON hasOCCU!n!d such tha: plant personnel ae 1. A HOSTILE ACTIONis occuningorhasccx:tJm!d wii!Un th;; 1. A HOSTILE ACTION is cccming or has oo::t.m!d wii!Un tb!: OWNER 1. A SECURrrY CONOfTION tlm does NOT invclue a HOSTltE unable 1D op~ equipment n;quiA!d to maimtai'l safety functions. PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Slift SJpEfVisor. CON'TROUED AREA as rej!Orled by the Security Shift Supel'llisor. AcrJON as reported by 1M Security Shift ~rvisor.

.QR :QB. .QR

2. A HOSTILE ACTlON has ciNSed fa'lure of Spent Fuel Coofng 2. A validaled nolffication from liRe of an AJR.INER ai!ack thre;U withil30 2. A credible st luc'e sec:OOty lttreill notitica!iCI!l.

Systems and !Mil ENT fuel damage. is likely fi:x' a FRESH!..Y rrinutes of the S: ~

~u.

OFF-LOADED REACTOR CORE IN POCL .QR

3. A va5ctated notifica.'Coo from NRC providing in5Jrrrolion of an a'rcralllhreat. <{

Cl)

HS2 Ccnlrol Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated and Plant Ccnlrol HAS Comrol Rocm E'llacuation has lleen lniti.nEd. 1-Cannot be Established. z

<(

-l Operating Mode Applicab~ ity: All Opet-ating Mode Applicability: All Q.

C)

EALValues: EALValues: z

1. Conlrol Rocm evacuillicn has been iniliilled. 1. 1~NP- 100.CQ. Ccnlrol Room IBaCCessibE!y. requires Control Rocm i=

AND evacuation. Mu.

u.

a Control of the plar:rt caMOi! be establiShed vi

• 15 rrinutes.. <(

(/)

HA1 Na!ur.ll or Oeslrucf:ve Phenomena Affecting ESSENTIAL AREAS. HU1 Nat~r.~l or Destruclhte PhefiOmena Atfe::tilg t~ z PROTECTED AREA 0 Opet-ating Mod!! Applicmtity: All E 0

Oper.rting Mode Applicability: All EALValues: z AIRUNER- Airli:!er is meant to be a I~ airualh~lh the ,pcten5al for causinll *s~Ecanl damaQe to th;, planl EAL Values:: 0(.)

1. Seiismic eoRnt grea'.er than O;Ieralina Basis Earthq,uate (OBE) as irldkated by ESSENTIAL AREAS -Areas within 1he PROTECTED AREA. ltl3t comam equipmenl; sys!Ems. cornponenis. or material. the failure. seismic insaumentanon (Annunciator 5-36[5-44]) GREATER THAN 0.05 g. 1. Seisrric evem ideraied by ANY 2 ct the fullcwirng: 0:::

destruc!ion. or release cf which could c:bectly or imfrealy endanget- the public ltealth and safety by exposure 1o ra::lia.'"cn.

• Seisrrfc euent conlim-ed by plant seismic monitor w AND ,instruments (Amunciillors S-46 [S-54D  :::t:

• Eamquake felt in p'ant 1-FRESHlY OFF-LOADED REACTOR CORE IN POOL-A fre5Nvolf~oaded reactor co~. in theSpem Fuel Pool. exi~sd!Jma lhe lleriod of 0 iL Earthquake cornlirmed bv ANY of the following:

• US GeologX: Survey l\JSGS) National Earthquake time \\hen co~ olf~Clad beains until cere rebad is ~...e. c

• E..t~ate felt ill ¢ant lnfilrmation Center HOSTilE AC110N -An act lcward a NL!Ciear PmW!r Plant (NPP) or - s persomel !lW irnchJdes the use ofvblent force1odeslro!fequipmert.

• US Geological Smtey (USGS) National Ear1hqua.ke Information Cen'.er z

• Control Rocm ind'.ca!icn of degraded p~ of systems requirEd .QB <{

take hostages. and!or ir.rtimida!e the licensee to achieve an end. This mudes al!aclt by air. land. 01 W3ler using ~ explosives,

~

PROJECTILES. ve!Udes. ar other devices usEd to deliver destrur:tilll! force. Ottler arts.tha!.satisiy the CYB'all intent may be ncbled. for th;; safe shutdown of !he p'anl HOSTD.E ACTION sho nat be construed 1o ioclooe acls of civil c!isdled'ence cr felcnicus acts that are not part of a concerted attad!; on the 2. Tanado *sbiking \~tilin PROTECTED AREA bcundary OR high NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs sflculd be used !o address .such ac:lfoi.jies (i.e~ 1his may indude vicient acts between individuals il the r11mer :QB. wiMsgeater ~n 120 mph. 0:::

cantroUed area).

IMMINEHT- Mi~on actiicos have been ineflecli...e.. addilfcnal actions are not I!JQJected to be successll1. and 1rended infcnnation ildic:ates 2.. Toma:!o siriking OR ligh wnds greater !han 120 rnf*t resulfng in VISIBLE DAMAGE i o ANY of the fcllawing structures ooniailing safety systems or

.QR ~

t:

thai the event or condilfcn IMII oc:aJr. Where IMMINENT tirneframes are specjfed. they shall awfy. component OR Control Rocm irodicafcn of degraded performanoe of these 3. lntemal llocding 1hill has he potential to affecl safety rel;;.ed I

sa6ely systems: equipment required bv Technical Speci aliens for !fie CIJITent OWNER CONTROLLED AREA-Tha'! portion of FPl. property surroundilg and including the Sllucie N\Jdear Power Plam v.hich is ~ub;edt cpera1ingmode in ANY of !he fti'.c*~ng areas:  :::t:

to limiled at:eess and oorC"ol:as deemed ~ by FPL (Ef'lan] P.eiiC!Dr Contailment &ilding and lnlake Coofng Water *(ICI.V) 91ield Building Control Room Intake Strucl.\Jre PROTECTED AREA- The arBa {withn the Otmer Conlrolled heal *=Pied t1t the nudear units and a.ssocialed equipment and facilities en dosed \\ii!lin 1M si!Ciilil'l pefimeter fenc~ The area within \\nich accoorrtaii31Y of r.er.;ormel is maimained in an emeraencv. P.eiiC!Dr Auxiliary Building (RAB) Corrp:Jnent Coding Water (OCW) Cable Spreadilg Room Intake Coclilg Water (ICW) platform an=a SECURITY OONDmON - Any Security &art as listed in the approved secun:ly cootilgency plan that conslitutes a threailccmprnmlse to s~e Vital Swtcltgear Rocm ~nent Ccd'.ng W~ {CCW) se<aity. ilm!atlrisk iD site J!Ersonnel. or a poteoCal degr.ldaticn to the level of safay of the plant A SECURITY CONDITION does not inii'Cive steam Trestle Area ErnertJency Diesel Gener.alor Building a HOS:rlLE AcrJON.

Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Diesel Oil Stornge Tank (OOST)

Steam Treslle A<ea

~;~~i~~~B)

VISIBlE DAMAGE- OanaQe to equiPment 01 structla"e ihal is readily observable IM!fulut measuremen!s. tesma. or analvsis. Oamaae is slllflicient to cause concern reganfllg* the Clt:riinued operab3ty or reliability of i!1e a.'fected sWcture. system. or component Examp'e daJmge Ultimate Heat Si1lc (UHS) Refueling Water Tank (RYIT) Eme~gency Diesel Generamr mc'udes: d'efilrmatioA dille to hea.1 or impact. denling. penelra'Jon. rupil!lre. cracking, and pailt blisteri"J. Surface ~emshes (e.g~ palm Buildiiia

~inoa. saa!ches) shoold nat te induded.

OR OR

/Continued on next ""ael {Continued on nl!llt oaael H- HOT CONDffiONS 26 EAL- HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL H - HOT GONDffiONS 26 EP3:4 (APP-A-29) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Roo. * . - .

Site Area Emergency Alert *_. - . _1 HA1-Basis: HU1-Basis:

E.4L Ill adiRsses 'the effect ct internal flocdillg caused by evenls suCh as EAt #4 addresses main lllltine nxa!ing oomponen: failures af suffident

~=e:~e:r~~~~shaps.tt ~lo:u:::;:~~t~the~";~~~~~

incfustrial silfely hazards (e.g~ electrical sllock) that preclllde necessarJ generator p16ge does. nat meet the intent cf this EAL beoaiJse

• did nat access 1o o~ Cl4" mcnilxlrsafety equipment The inab'lity to access, impact nomta1 cperaijcn af llhe p!anl oper;1le or rnonftor safety equipment represents an actual Of' ~stantial po'.eniial degradation of !he leYel clsafetycfthe plant. Of rn;(pr concern is the pocen!ial for leakage af conibo.Jsi~ fllids Aooding as used in !his EAL describes a c:oruliticn \mece wa'.er is entering lhe room faster than it.s1alled eqtipment is capable of rertlOYal, res~~.ling in

~~es=~~==~~~~~::~~~~~~~~

andHU3.

a rise of waiel' level within the room. C!assificalion of this EAl should nat be delayed \\tlile com!Ciive acEcns are beillg taken 1o i~ate !he viii's This EAL is consistent with 'the definition cf a o!ificalicn of ~I Event ESSEHllAL AREAS- Areas \\ilhin ~PROTECTED AREA. M souroe.

conliins e<tUil:mE!ll. svslerr5. caT'CICnents. Cl4" rna:erial, !he faiiLR, ~o~~l~~~~~~!J~=~~~~~~~~=~izing destruclion. or rele>ase ohmich txluld diealv or intfrealv endanJ:~eo- the EAL iM adiRsses the tflreat ill safety relaied equipment imposed by c!assificalion to~ 1 is based en dama@E done by PROUECTII..ES public hea."fh <rtd safely bv expost.C'e ill rad'iation. PROJECTILES genef'a!ed by man bJJtKne rotating al~ faWres.. generated by !he failurE< or in conjtmcticn with a sieil!l1 gener.rtor b.Jbe There/Ue, this EAL is cmsis.teri \\ith the defrlifion of .an ALERT in !hat t!le ruptwe. These :iereoerus would be dassiEed by the rad'iclogicaiiCs cr PROlECTED AREA- The area (within the OWNER CONTROU.ED po!Efl5aJ exists for at:tual or substanliial potential degada!ion ci lhe level of Fission product Barr'.er ICs..

AREA) oca.Jpied by the nuclear units and associa'.ed equiprr.ent and Safety<Jfihe~

facilities enclosed within ~security perimeter feta:. The area within EAt #5 addresses natural weather jlhenomena of a l:mric:ane Wll!lling and wh'dl aeeotnabilitv or personnel is miintained nan emelliEfiCV. EAl #5 adiRsses vehicle aas.hes \!ilhin the PROJECTED AREA M associia!ed rain fall and stcrm surges.

resu: s. in ViS(Bl.E DAMAGE to ESSENTIAL AREAS Cl4"irldicaticn af damage to safety slrualfts, systems. or txlmpcnenls txlntairing funetions Escalation of this emergencoJdassif.ca:ion level. ifappropria:e. would be and systems le(fJired fa' Sife sln:lt!bMI ci ~plant. based on VISIBLE DMMGE. or by od1.er in plant conditions. via HA1.

EAl i6 adiRsses ather pt1enornena !hal res in VISIBLE DAMAGE to the ESSEN11AI..AREAS cr n!SMtsin indication of damagetostructtres, syslems. orCXIII'IpOOI!r1lconJa:r1ing functfDns.and systems required fur Safe SI:Ntdown of the plant (such as hurricane and s1oon surge) thai can also be preoursars ci mare serious aoelliS.

H-HOTCONDIDONS 27 EI\L- HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLA.NT CLASSIFICATION TOOL H- HOT CONDffiONS 27 EP3:4 (APP-A-30) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert HA1 (Continued) HU1 (Continued) 3 4. T!Sbine faii~S>> resulting in casing pB!elraticn-or dam~ to

-==~=.:e=~::::~~~=~OR Conirol Room inliica1ion cl degraded perlbrmanoe at lOOse safety sysiems:

tulbineorg~seals.

~

n e lnlctllre

5. Na1Jr.;1 ooctmmces affecting the PROTECTED AREA; PHf ci.

Intake Coolilg Wa!.er (lCW) 1hefaiiCHiJ!g:

• Comfumecf hurricane warning is in effect Con-J!onEill Coci 11 \'-ialer (OCW)

• Lon irria'ke canalleYel of-10-5ft. t.n.Wror 1 hat~TOtrmore.

• Voswl s~ by station p~l !!m .....te-levels are Reactor Auxiliary Btnldfl9 (RAB) Eme!gency Diesel Ger~erator Buildirg approar.:ling S"'. oon drain systanc~.

-'0.5 ft. & 1G.5 ft 8evations Sleam TresUe Area QB_ 6 u..

<t

4. ~~~\h!~~~~~~~ny;,~~~~::or f/)

~

oorrponents OR Control Room inliicaiion of degaded perlbnnance of those safely systEms:

z

<t

...1 Q.

C) z~

Reactor ALI>diiary &rildng {RAB) Corrc~onent Coo 11 WatEr (OCW) z i=

plaifarmarea u

~ w Emergency Diesel Generator Building w u..

u..

Condensate Slcrage Tri: (CST) Diesel Oil Slaage Tank (DOST) Q w <t f/)

Ultimabe Heat S'nk !UHS -~ z 0

QB_  :.!:

<( E

E 0 S. Veltic'e crash reslllfitg in VISIBLE DAMAGE fD JIJ.IY cf !he rollcwitg s1ruchJres oontainilgsilfetys:r-;tems. orCCf11POOenls ORCa~rol Room itdicalion at ex: z degaded perlcrrr.ance at lOOse safely syslems: 0 0 u

Intake Coo g Wiils" (ION}

...I ex:

~

ReadorContairment Building and w Shield Bulding :I:

)

~

Reactor ALI>diiary Bllilditg (RAB) Corrflcnent Co<mg Water (CCW) ~ 0 plaifonnarea <(

z 0 z

Sleam TresUe Area Emergency Diesel Ger~er.<lor Suildirg

<t f/)

Condensate Stcrage Tank (CST) Diesel Oil Staage Tank (DOSD 0

PROJECTILE- An object diretled loward a Nuc'ear P<mer 0::

~

l'tant (N'?P) that coo.sld cause oonoem C>cr ils oon:.wed ope13birlty, reliability. or personnel safety. QB_

I:

PROTECTED AREA- The area (wi1hn 1he OWNER I CCNTROLLEO AREA) OOCUJi.ed b*r the md.eartmits and associated equiJ;menl and facilities enclosed vii!hin !he :I:

seemly perimeter fence. The arEa \.ithin ntlich =ntali!ly cl peoscnnel is maintained fn an emergency_

VISIBLE DAMAGE- Oarna.Qe to E!lJJipment or strudl!lle thai is reacfty cbsBvable l'oi!!IculllleiiS'Jil!lTlems. !estfng. a analysis.. Cable Spreadi~ Room ln!ak~ CoOCng Water (ICW)

Damage is suffiC:ent to cause concern regarditg !he corllinued operability or I'Eii of !he affected s1rud!Jre. sys1Ern, or Vital Slfl chgear Room CorrpollEilt CoOCng Water (CCW) 000110nell!. ~le dam<U! includes: defcrma1ion due to heat or irrclact. denliru pE<le!ration. rupture, aacltinQ, and Reactor Aori.Wry Builtli!g (RAB) Emergency Diesel Generator Builditg llGint t listerinp. Surface ble!risnes re.a..llGint cli:lpina. -'0.5ft.& 19.5ft8evatiO.AS scraU:hes) sflould llCl be included.

Sleam TresUe Area H- HOT CONDITIONS 28 EAL- HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL H- HOT CONDITIONS 28 EP3:4 (APP-A-31) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE

- __ .~rl*i:

HA2- HU2-Basis:

VISIBLE OPJW!.GE is USE>d 10 identify1fle magra.'iude of the FIRE or ThE> purpos;: of this IC is to address dE magnitude and ext en!! of AP.ES or EXP'"OSION and 10 <fscrininat!! agaillst ninor FIRES and EXPlOSIONS.

~~~lh~~er~~~7~~~~~eto The reference to~ con!a'ning safEly systems or componenls is degadi'llioo in performance of a5eded systems !hat rn:q re5lit.

cr incii.K!ed to discrmmte aga'nst FIRES EXPLOSIONS in areas having laH probab of affeei'tg safe operation. The sig:lificance here is not that a As used here. detecfoo is visual observa!ion and report by pi<W persam

\YaS latge EOOIJI#t to cause damage ID these systems.

cr a safely system YoG.S degraded but 1he fad that the FIRE EXPLOOION or SEflSClr alarm indica:'on.

For EAL#1. 1t!E> 15 rrinute r:'me period begins w_Th a aedille notif.ca:ion

~ The use of VISIBlE D.AMAGE should not be interpreted as mandating a ltlat .a FIRE is COCIJI'ring. or imlica1icn of a fR detec:¢icn sys:em w lengthy damage assessmelll pria *o dassi~ation. The declaration of an aJannractua1ion. Verification of afi11edetedion s)Siem alaJlll includes

u. /~!at and the activation of lhe echJi.cal StJppo<t Center ,,.;n prouide the aa5ons ihat can be taken 'It

• 1he Gonlml Room to EllSllre !hat ihe alarm

<l: Emergency Coon:fnator vi1h the resoLO:Ces ne:ded 1o perform deta ed is ra spur.oos. An a'.arm is assumed totE! an indicilticn of a FIRE unless it fl) damage asSIES'SIIlB1ls. is di!iproved 1'0ithin lttE> 15 ninute period by personnel cfspGtcbed to lhe 1- scetE>. In ether words. a personnel A:pOrl from *the SoOene may be used i!o z The Emsgency Q)on:lili3!cr also OE>eds to oonsfrler any secwity aspeds of disprt:~~~e a sensor alarm if received \'Oilhin 15 minlites of 1he alarm. bul shall

<t

...J the EXP!.OS!ON. not tE! requ'red to verify tttE> alarm.

Q.

(!) Escalation of !!lis emergency classification level. if 3A!f0pria!e.. \\ill be ThE> intent of this 15 miwte duralion i s to size the FIRE and 1D disairrinatl'>

z based en S)Siem Malfuncf.ons. Rss'on Pnx!uc B..ner Degradation a aga'ns! small FIRES that are reatily *e:xtinguist!E>d. (e.g.. smoldering vas1e

~ Rad l.eYe!s JRadiolo9cal Eflhlent IC5. paper basket).

i=

u IH:AJ-=Eias:JS:--------------~ EAL#2 addresses onlythoseEXPLC510NS *ofsufficient foroe to damage w

u.

~=~o !s~J~~!;J'~~~~= The 0

u.

<l: Gases in an ESSENllAL AREA can affect 1he ability to safely q!erate or oc:aarence of tbe= EXPLOSION is sulfcient for declaralibn.

fl) safely siN!down lhe ~- The EmeJgency Cooo:linator iiiSO OE>eds ID consida- any s!!Ciriy a5ll"'cts cf z The fact !hat SC8A may *bE: wcm does net elirrinatE> 1he nl'>ed !c declare 1ttE> EXPLOSION. - app1cable.

0 F 1he event. Escalation *of lliis erJ!S9!!ncy dassif.ca!'on !level, if appropriate. would be cz ~~~~e~~a:t~~":':i=~:~cran based on HA2.

1-:-:':":::----::--.,-----------------1 0 immeciateihreatofse¥ereexposure1ogases. Thiseotid II"'based~n -Basis:

u doc:wnented analysis, indlcalfcn of pe150nal il E!ffeas from expos'!Jf'E!. or 0:: opemng ~enol!\\;th !he hazards.

w

J:

t-o 0

z

<l:

en hi aspnyxianr is a gas capable of redocing the IE!IIe:l of Oll)91!f1 in ttte body 0 to ctangerous levels. lrlost ccmmonly, asphyxiants work by merely 0:: displac'ng air in an enclosed E!mlirormenl This redUCE!S lhe conce:n:r..tion An aspltyxiam is a gas capable of reducing lhe level of OX)IQEO in lhe body

~

of OX)'gell below the nonn leYel of aramd 19'1., '1\ttich can lead to breathing cfffiaJ!Iii!s. U!lCOflSCiDUS~reSS or e.en death. 110dangerous!evels. Mostcomrmn,"y, ~ 1\wk by merely displacing air in an enclosed en-i.ronmerrl. This red!roes lhe conCE>l!llrafioo

J: of oxygen below the ncrmaiiE'\IE! of aroll!ld 1Q'i'., 1\hich can ad to hi m.oonlrolled release of llaarmable gasSE>S wiihin a fadlity scucru-e has I the potential !c affect safe operation cllhe P'ant by limiting eaher ope13t0r bllea!ling diff:octities, unconscioUSAESS or ewn dea:lt.

J: or equipmenll operations due to the pocenful few ignition and resuf - g

~pment dam~ inj!A')'. AarnmaiiiE> gasses. such as Escalation of m emeJgeOcy classifoea£on level. if ap~priate. would be hydrogen and acetytere, are routinely used to maintain plana systefl!; b<ISE>d 00 HA3.

(hya'ogen) or 1o repair eqtipmentl~s (acetf.E>ne- used in

=~~~concentrations at m chga55 can Escali'llioo to a h~ emef{l!!llcy dassifcation re-.e. if appropriatE>, tE!

based en S)Siem Mall'uncfun, Fission Product Barrier TiiltE> or Abntm\ll Rad l..aol$ J RacfcadiYe Blluen!!IGs.

H- HOT CONDmONS 29 E..<\1. -HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL H- HOT CONDmO S 29 EP3:4 (APP-A-32) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert HA2 ARE or EXPLOSION Affecting Itt~ Operabi[ty of Plant Safety Syslems HU2 FIRE VileYn Ehe PROTECTED ;.REA Not Extinguished REquired to Establish<< Mallta'n Safe Shlllldcmn. Within 15 MinJu!es .afOe\ection orEXPLOSICNwi'.hinthe PROTECTED AREA.

Operating Modi! Applicability: All Operating Mode P\ppficability: All EALValues: EAL Values:

The Em=rgency Coon:;Wafar ~ n<Kwai! unfli ;;ppTx:able Mle has e.'apsed, but Slodrl declare !he EY!!nt as soon as it is I

I =~!: dcJra5oo has exr:eec;lsd, or v.~ m.ery 1m:ee~

DEF1NI1ION BOX 1. FIRE or EXPLOSKJN resu1

• g in VISIBLE DAMAGE ro ANY of !he fcllcum g. 1. ARE NOT extinguished \\ithin 15 ninutes d Con!rol Roan fire z slructures.ccntairmg safety systems or ccllljlDil>!l'lls OR Control Room alarm OR Coo:rol Roam nctiflcation in ANY of the follcming 0 ESSBn1AL AREAS -A!'e3S \'lithin the PROTECTED* AREA. mat contms equipment, SY'o~. ctmponern!s. << ma1erial, the failure, intfcatioo of degraded performance of those safety SJSiems: an;as:

c!estrudioo. or re:ease of whi:::h could died:lv or intfrectlv end.anQef" the plblic ltealth and safety by exposure 1o.ra::tia.."oo.

~~B~~Efll B>cildi~~g and Intake ~ Reac:tr Caua'nrneRt Building Intake Structure iS

...J EXPLOSION- A r.llllid. viotenl uoooofi!ed combustion, a- calastrc!:tticfailure d press..m:d/en~ equ'pm.ent ihal i~ans. enera,~ of and SIU!Id Bw dirg B.

slllfficient force to pctentially d~ perm;;~~ent structmes. Slj'S'!ems. << compooentr.. ><

w Can!roi Room Intake Cooling Wdter (ICWJ ControiRcom Intake Ccoling Wa:s { IC~'IJ FIRE- CorrtlusEcn c!!aracll1!rizE!d by hedt and li~ SOtrees of smoke such as sliJ;Clin~ clrT.ra be!is or CNerhea:.;d electrical EQ\J~t do net ooos1itut2 FIRES. Observaiioo d lbrne is pn;ferred burt is NOT reQUired if lame ~ntites of sm:llte and heat aJ1e *dbsE!Ned. Reactor Auxiliary Building (R.AB) Component Cooli~~g Wa'.er *(CCW) Readt:l' /ti.nciliary Bu

• ng ~nerll CcolingWa\Er w

0::

NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS - Al:ILY.1ies ;n the plant site associa:ed w.lh rt:I!Wne testing, mainteni111C!<. or equip ent operations. in Tu~b'ne Bl.l?ding if ihe fire preCkJdes Emergency Diesel eenerator Building

{RAB) (CCW) u:

accmfance \\ith normal operating or atininistra!'rve procedures. Entry into atnO!Illal Of' emergency opera!ilg procedures, a d!MaliDn from acce5S to !he ~ Tresile. Conlrcl Turbime liuil<fng i*tt~e fre Errergency Oiesel Generdtor normal securitya-lladiological controls postme. is a departure from NORMAl PLANT Of'ERATIONS. RocrnorRAB Conc!ensate Slcrage TiJilk (CST) precluc!es. Buildi!g access o the stEam Tresl!e.

PROlECTED AREA- The area {\..nhin the 0\'I'NER CONTROLLED AREAl oeoupied bv the nudear ooi!S and associated eQUipment and Oiesel OJ S'.aage Tanlt (OOsn stEam Trestle Area Control Room or R"<B ~ensa!e Slof:age Tank facilities encl05e'J wilhirn the security perimeter feMe. The area within wlicll accolriat!ility of persomel is mamaned in an emergency.

Ultimate Heat S".nlt {UHS) Refue&tg Water Tank [RWi) O:esel Oil Storage Tii!lk VISIBlE !}AMA.G E- Damage to e<tJJipment or stru~ llul is readily obsEf\'able w lfulut measurements, test:ng, << analysis. Damage is (OOST) Steam Trestle />rea s'lllflicient !o cause concern reQartfu~ Ehe oonfirued aper.i !v or reliability Cif l!1e a.'fecll1!d siructure, system. or ccJ'!!f)Onenl Exanllie cfame

• des: clefcrmation dtlle to heal or impact, dentfnQ, penelraiicn, ru~. cracl<in~. and p;DU blisterif¥l. Surface bl'emis.hes {e.IJ_ pam lttimate Heat Sink llMS) Refuel inc 'W'ater Tank iR\'\'Tl

~~ ~) should nctbeinduded.

.QH

2. EXPLOSION w 'n lhe PROIECTED AREA.

HA3 Aocessto an ESSENTlALAREA Is Prohibited Due To Release ofToxic, HU3 RE:Jease .afToxic. Corrosive. Asphyxiant. or Flarrmable Cctrosive, Asphyxiant or Flammallle Gases \\ttich JE<:panlize Ope.ra..'ion Gases Deemed Oeirimentallo NORMAL PI.ANT 108) d Systems Required to 1\aintain Safe Operations *cr Safely Shu!do!Ml ine 1011! OPERATIONS.

Reader.

Operating Mode Applicdbility: All Operating Mode P\ppficabilily: All EALValues: EALVallti!S:

If the equjlment i-1 /he :stated area w1!1lfreacrf nap~e, or oat of servi~,

I Planned comlro:::ed activities. su::h as Containment entry ill pcmer. do not m;et the in!ent of HU3 or HA3.

I bef ore /he even! ot:al'll!d; then this E4L should'~ be declaterl as it ~\liT have no ariverre 6npad on the ab.l\ 1y of.lhe plant to safely opeEale or safely s'n!lldcnm beyond that .a.i'eady alf!71J'!!!d t.y Technical SpecifJCatjorn; at the lime .of the event.

QB

2. Repctt b:rlocal. Cotnty or State Cfficias for e.'il.C\Stion *or sheltering ol site per.;ci'IBEI based on an o1f-4'!e event H- HOT CONDIDONS 30 EAL-HOTBASIS PAGEREVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL H- HOT CONDffiONS 30 EP3:4 (APP-A-33) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Rec.

Site Area Emergency Alert HS3-Basis: HAG-Basis: HU5-Basis:

This EAl addresses un<l!llicipa!E<i oonditions nat addn;,ssed expX:1!ly This EAL addn!sses ll!lmticfpated ccndi'Jms not adti'essed apliciliy

=~:J'!:b~~=te~e;~~~~tofall ~1tr=~~~=~Ef=:~~=.=rtofall under !he emergency classificaeon level description fer Site Area under ilE ~Jatificaeoo of Unusl.131 Event {NOOE) eme!y!lrtcy dass..

Errergency.

H- HOT CONDIDONS 31 EAL- HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL H- HOT CONDITIONS 31 EP3:4 (APP-A-34) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE Site Alee. Emergency Alert HG2 Other Corniiioos Existing ~'Jhich in the !Jdgmstt of the HS3 Other Conlf.-ions Existing Whicll in the Jud~ of ihe HAG Other Conditions Existing Which .il the Jud!Jnent of e Emetgency HU5 Other Comf !ioo.s Existing Which in the Judgmem of the EmergBley Coordilator WaiTdllt De::Jara!'on of General EmergBley Coordinator Wanrant Declara:'on cf S':e !<sea Coollfnatcr Wan:am Oedaraiion of an Pl£rt. Emergency Cocrdnalcr \'lamw Dedar.Jficn of a Emergency. Emergency. Notificalion of UhiiiSUal Event (NOUE)..

Operating Mode Applicability: All Operating Mode Applicability: A ll Operating Mo~ Applicability: All OperatingM~App{icability: All ~

w 1.1..

EAI..Values: EAL Values: EALValW!s: EAL Values: <(

1. ether oooditions exist l&hich in fiE jud~ of the E'mergBley 1. Otherconciif>cnsexistmch in the judQment of the EmergencyCocnfma:a 1. 011er o:lnditions exisrwhich in 1M ~gn:nt of fhi< Emergency en indica'.e that ewnts are in progress or have oCCIJITI!d **\flich irntohle actual *or Coordina!cr indicate ihal events are in prog-ess a have 1-Cooo:tinala" ind'icate that ellel1ts are in progress or have occurred z

~'b occurred l&hich indil:atea potential degraEDn cf the level of

\'4hieh imooNe actual *or IMMINENT S!Zstwial core degradation or melting with potenti fer loss of o:lnlairunent integiy or HOSTILE =~~~~=~~~~~~eof~ant!~ safety of !he plant or indicate a security threat to facility ~

ACTlON lhal results in an ac!uaJ fcss of physic conlrolof!M S!e equipmEfll beciiiJISIE< of HOSTILE ACTION. Arty releases are expec:ed to be proteaion has been iritiated. No !eleases of radioactive malierial c..

facility. Releases can be reasoroblyexpectEdtoaceed EPA limi~ ro small fracfuns of~ EPA PROlECTNE ACTION GUIDELINE requiing olf.site response ormDiliraing are~edunless (!)

PROTECTIVE AC ON GU:DEUNE ""Jl'l"llTe levels cff-si~ f.- exposure Jeo.'Els. further degradaticn of *safety systems oectr.i. z more th~ the immerfate site arBa.. i=

(J OERNmONBOX w

1.1..

u..

HOSTILE ACTION- An actlowani a Nuclear fto1'11!1" Plant (NPP) ~ <(

or - per.;omel thai incluc!es the use of violent bee to desh"cy en

~i~ ;:::~~~~;~~~=/=rtousing ~ z 0 0 guns, ex¢~ PROJECTll.ES, veflides. or ether deW:es i= F used to de!i\oer destructi\le force_aher acts !Ia! sat'sfy the UJ 0 a.oerall intent rroy be . ded.. HOSTILE ACTION shoold nat be a: z coos1rued to incluc!e acts of cilril disobedience orfelcrious<IC!s (J 0

thal are 1101! pari of a conceoted al1ack m the NPP. Non- ~ (J iencrism-based Elol.s Should be used to ad<ns.s such ac!ivilies 0 (i~ . this may* e lliolem acts ba.'o'l!en indhriduals in the a:

OWl1eT ccntrolled area}.

w

I:

1-IMMINENT- Mitigation act'cns have been inelfective.. adc!iticnal 0

<IC!iO<IS an: not eJqlECtl!d to be SIICCesslul. atd trended information intfca!es that the event or o:lndition vnll o=r. VI.!~ere 0 JMMI ENr t'me6-ames are s;zecifted. they sltall app':y. z

<(

PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDELINE - Enlliror:mental Prclecfon en

.~ ( EPA) Proteceve Action Guides (PAGs): c Greater !!tan or equal b 500 mrem otal Elfec!M! a:

Dose Eqtivalent {TEJE) ~

<(

QB.  :::t:

I Greater !!tan or equal eo 1000 rrrem Camiited Oose  :::t:

Equivalem (CO£)

[EPIP.08]

H- HOT CONDffiONS 32 EAL- HOT BASIS PAGE REVISIO : 1 ST LUCIE PL-\NT CLASSillCATION TOOL H - HOT CONDffiONS 32 EP3:4 (APP-A-35) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE This Page Intentionally Left Blank H- HOT CONDITIONS 33 EAL -HOT BASIS PAGE RE'\liSIO~ : 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL H- HOT CONDITIONS 33 EP3:4 (APP-A-36) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE RECOGNITION CATEGORY E EVENTS RELATED TO ISFSI E -HOT CONDffiONS 34 EAL- HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL E- HOT CONDffiONS 34 EP3:4 (APP-A-37) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE E-HU1 -Basis:

A No"..ficalion of Unusual Evemt (l'lOUE) in this IC is ca!EgorizEd on !he basis ollfle OCCIJfT'eACe of an event of suffJCieni llli:l!l'iiude 1klt a loaded cast CON NEMENT BOUNDARY is damaged or v'..olated. Tlis includes classification based on a loaded fuel storage cask 00 INEMENT BOUNDARY loss leadilg to the deg:adaiion oi the fuel di.Jring stc.,.

posing an opemmal sa!.;try prottem with respect !D its f'E!I'IC\'al fran cr

~as indicated by elevated radia!OOn readings from the loaded fuel sta-..ge cask.

The resulls of~ ISFSI Silfety Malysis Report (So\R) P=r r, EG 1536 or Sl>iR refer61ced in tile cask's Certificate ofComp5ance and the rela:ed NRC Safely Evaluation Repcrt identify natural ~amena event!; and acc'x!ent oonditioos that codd potentially effect the CONA!':EMENT BOUNDARY. This EAL addresses a.dltiJlPed cask. a t~ed over cask.

EXPLOSION. PROJEC11l.E damage. ARE c!arroge *ornan.al phenomena affecting a cask (e.g.* seismic EVfll 'loolado. Be.).

EXPLOSION- A rapid.. 1riolem, unconfined c:a!'IOOs1ir.n, or calaslrollhic fa'lUR! .af pressurized.\alel'll~ l!(!llipmeru that~

enefliV olsuffJCieflt fcrc:e to ~lv damaQe oennanem s.:rucn.es..

syslems. *Dr ~nts.

ARE- Combuslion charac1Efized IYj heat iWI fight. Scurces ol srn::1te such as slwnQ drive bek or overhe.atai electJical EQ~Jllment do not constiru!e FIRES. Olservation of llame is preferred but is l'lOT rl!<lllired if la!Jll! OJill'ltilies of smck.e and heat are dlsert'ed.

PROJECTILE-An object di'ecled 1owaJtl a NucJear Power PI ani (NPPJ U1at could .cause concern for its continued ocerabilitv. reEabilitv.

or pesoone! safety.

E- HOT CONDmONS 35 E.l\L -HOT B.-\SIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL E - HOT CONDffiONS 35 EP3:4 (APP-A-38) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE

~======:::J!!1!f!!!!!!;!!fi!!~======~l Operating Mod!!Appficability:

Notappftcallle EAlValues:

COHF!NEMENT BOUNDARY- The barrier(s) bel>M!en areas con!airing fadiaactiote ~bsltances and the en\-Tonmerm. 1. Damage to a loaded cask 00}lFIN'£MENTBOUND.ARY.

E- HOT CONDmONS 36 E.-\!. -HOT BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL E - HOT CONDITIONS 36 EP3:4 (APP-A-39) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION HOT CONDITIONS TABLE This Page Intentionally Left Blank E- HOT CONDmONS 37 EAL- HOT BASIS PAGE RE\>1SION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL E- HOT CONDITIONS 37 EP3:4 (APP-A-40) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX 8 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER CHART

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APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE EAL - COLD BASIS EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS COLD BASIS (RCS S 200°F)

COVER PAGE REVISION: 4 COLD CONDITIONS EAL -COLD BASIS ST LUCIE PLANI' CLASSJFICATIONTOOL EP3:4 (APP-C-1) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIXC EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE COLD CONDITlONS UST OF EFFEC11VE PAGES

~REV COLD CONDITIONS TABLE INDEX .. .. .. ... ..... ........ ...... ..... ... ..... . .. . .. ..... . .. . Blank Page. ....... - ....... . . 1 INITIATING CONDITIONS MATRIX ... .. .... .. ... .. ... .. .. ... .. . ... ..... ........... .... .... ... 2 Blank Page. .... ... - ......... . 3 RECOGNITION CATEGORIES R-Abnormal Rad Levels/ Radiological Effluent 4 Radiological Effluent Basis ...

Radiological Effluent.. .. . ..

Abnormal Rad levels Basis .......... .. . ... .. ...... .

Abnormal Rad levels ......... ...... .. ............. .. .

Blank Page.._ ....... - .... . .

C- Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunction 10 RCS leakage I Inventory & AC Power Basis 11 RCS leakage I Inventory & AC Power...... 12 Decay Heat & DC Power & Criticality Basis..... . 13 Decay Heat & DC Power & Criticality. 14 COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Communications Basis....................... ... . ..

Communications .. ..... ....... ...... .......... ....... ... .

15 16 Blank Page. ....... - ....... ... .................... . 17 (RCS < 200°F) H- Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety ... 18 Security & Control Room Evacuation & Natural or Man-Made Events Basis .... .. 19 Security & Control Room Evacuation & Natural or Man -Made Events ..... .. 20 Natural or Man-Made Events Basis.... .. .......... . .. ..... ...... .. . . 21 Natural or Man-Made Events .................... . ............... .. .... .. .. .. .. .... . .. 22 Fire/ Explosion & Toxic/ Flammable Gas Basis. .... .. 23 Fire I Explosion & Toxic I Flammable Gas ......... .. .. .......... . . 24 Discretionary Basis-.... .. 25 Discretionary................. ......... .. ... . ... .. . 26 Blank Page. .... - .... .... .... . 27 E- Events Related to ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation} ... 28 Events related to ISFSI Basis ........ ... ..... .. ... .... ... .... .. .. ........ ..... ... .... . 29 Events related to ISFSI. 30 Blank Page. .... _........... . 31 COLD CONDITIONS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES REVISION: 4 EAL - COLD BASIS ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL EP3:4 (APP-C-2) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE COLD CONOITJONS TABLE INDEX PAGE INITIATING CONDITIONS MATRIX. .... ...... .............. .......... ... ........... ... .... ..... RECOGNITION CATEGORIES R- Abnormal Had levels I Radiological Effluent.. ...... .... ...... .. ......... .... ....... 4-8 Radiological Effluent.. ... .. ... ...... ...... ......... ...... . ..... .......... .. ... ......... ........ . .. .... . 6 Abnormal Rad Levels .. ........ ... .... ...... .. ...... ......... .. ........ ..... ........... .. ........ ... .... 8 C- Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunction .. .. .... .................. .... ... .... 10-16 AC Power. ... ...... ... ... .... ... .. ....... ... .... ............. .. ...... ... .... .. .. .......... ..... ...... ......... 12 Communications....... .... ....... ....... ... .. .. ..... ... .......................... ... ...... .. ......... ..... 16 Criticality.... ... .... ............ ......... .. .... .. ...... ... .. .... ... ....... ... .............. .......... ... ... .. 14 DC Power.. ......... ......... ... ...... ...... .. ... ... ....... ... ..... ... ... ... ... ....... ........ .......... ..... 14 Decay Heat.. ...... .. ......... ............... ... .. ..... .. .. .. ... .. ... .... .... ............. .......... .. ...... 14 RCS Leakage I Inventory.... .... .. ...... ...... ... ... ......... ............... ............. ..... .... .... 12 H- Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety............................ 18-26 Control Room Evacuation. ....... ... .. ..... .... ... ...... .... .. ..... .... ....... ... ................ ..... 20 Discretionary. ............ ........... .... ...... ....... .... .. .. ...... .......... ... ... ........ .... ..... ...... 26 COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Frre I Explosion.. ...... ........... .. ...... .... ...... ...... ... ... .... ... ... ........... ....... .... ........ .

Natural or Man-Made Events ..... .. .. .. ... .. ... ....... .. ... ... ....... .. ......... .. ............. ... ..

24 20-22 Security....... ... ...... ... ... ... ...... ...... ...... ... ... ....... ............ ........................ ... ............ 20 (RCS ,:: 200°F) To*xic I Aamma!Jie Gas..... .. ... ... ....... ... .............. ............ ................ ....... .. ....... 24 E- Events Related to ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation).... 28-30 COLD CONDIDONS EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIDCATION TOOL COLD CONDITIONS EP3:4 (APP-C-3) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIXC EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE This Page lntenti*o nally Left Blank COLD CONDffiONS 1 EAL -COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL COLD CO~iDffiON""'S EP3:4 (APP.:C-4) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert Site Area Emergency Alert

'RG1 RS1 RA1 HS4 HA4 HU4 Off-sle Dose Resulting from an ~site Dose Resttling frt:m an Any Release .of Gaseous or kay Re:ease of Gaso:cus or HOS'nlE ACTlON Res ltg in HOS11LE ACTION \\imin the HDsnlE ACTlON lli!hin !he Confirmed SECURfiY Actual or IMY'IINENT Release of Adl!al cr IMP.fli'{ENT Release a L.ic;uid Ralfoacevity!D lfle Uqlid Ra.dioa:lillity to the Lcs.s of Physical Coolrol of !he PROTECTED AREA OWNER CC<<TROUED AREA CONDITION orThreal 1i'Jhich Gaseoos Ralfoeaillii'J Greater Gaso:cus Ra.dioac:tilrity Great-er Envi tmment Greater Than Environment Greider Than Fa:i[iy. or Airtcme Ai!ack Threat Indicates a PotEntial Than 100011Tll!1T1TEDEor Than 100 mrEm TEDE or 200 Times !!te OOOM fer 15 2 Tlme5 the ODCM for 60 Degradation in ~e l evel of 5000 nTem Tl:ryrtid CDE for !fie 5!10 rrrem T1:ryrcid CDE fcr*lfte Mimr:e:s or Latger. Mnutes Cf' long-er. Safety of tile Ffanl

.~\.dual a Projeded Dura.."ion cl Actual or Projected Duration of p .20 P.20 P 20 . 20 the Release Using Actu the Release. HS2 HA5 Meteorology.

Control Rocm Evacua!ioo Has Control P.oom Evacuation bas Been lnitiii!ed and Plant Control been lri1ia!Ed Cannot be Established Damage ill lrradiat.:d Fuel or . 20 p ~

lcc..s of Wa:er l e.-el dha.! Has HA1 HU1 Resttted a- W Result in tne llrlccY.'Ering of lrradiii!ed Fuel Outside llie Reacta VesseL

_a Rise in Radiation levels w; .- HU2 the Facility Thai pedes Operalioo of Sji51erns Requted FIRE Of' EXPLOSION Affecting FIRE Wilhin !he PROTECTED to Mail!iin Safe Plant Safety the (~erability of Plant Safety AREA Not EJGinguishe:l Wrthin Fut>CiiolllS. Sysbems Re~re:l to Esta!Jlish 15 Minu!es*of Oeiedion OR or llaintain Safe Sl*u!dcn\n. EXPLOSION 1'<ittun (he PROTECTED AREA. X CS1 CA1 CU1

~

Pg. 24 Pg. 24 Lcs.s of RCS lnverrtory Meeting loss of RCS lnverrtory. RCSleakaga HA3 HU3 ct.

Core De=J Hea! Rerroval

a Access ill an Esse ~ Release of Toxic. CoiTCISive, II)

Capatility.

AREA Is Prohi!j_ed DIP- To Asphyxiant, cr Rammable z

0 Release of Toxic, Carosive, Gases Deemed Delrime<t!al lo F AsphyXiant a Aammatle- OORMAL PLANT 0 C-ases Vl'hicta Jeep~ OPERA NS. z Opeoalfoo or Sji5lems Required 0 to *laintain Safe Operatioms or 0 Safely Shutdatm !he Reactor_

less of All Off-s1e and All On- AC Pcw!r Capaliitty To p 24 "'

z

~~~~~~:

sibe AC Pcwer to Emergeru::y HS3 F Busses For 15 mnutes Or HG2 HAS HU5 <l.

Latger. Mrues or longer sudllhal Any F Ad'Ortional SinQ:e F;ilun! Wolid Oilier Conditions E:cisM;! \~'hic:h in !he JUdiJ!lleflt cl' file Other Cond!ions Existing Which in e Jl!l:fgnEn! of !he

'ether Ccnditions Exis" g 'MUch il the JUdiJTl=flt of !he ~

Resutt - Sta!ioo Blackcul

.12 Emergeru:y Coonfnalor Warrant Emergency Coon:lina!or Warrant Emergency Coorcilnalor Warr.mt Declaration of General Declaration of Si~ Area Declaration of .;n Alert..

CA4 Emergency. EmergEflcy.

p 2ll p .26 lnability1o Mlintain Plant n UNPlANNED less of Decay Cold Shu:dc1.WJ. Heat RernoYal Ca!Jabifty W:ih Irradiated Fuel in !he Reactor Vessel Dema(F- IDa loaded caSk R.M P.M ooofnement BOUNDARY.

CU7 30 Loss of Re<!uired DC Power for 15 Mnutes Or longer.

Pg. f 4 CU8 lnadveltEfll Criticality.

Pg. M CU6 loss of All On-sCie or Off-site Comi1Ulica!'oos Cii!JGbiEtie:s.

Pg. 16 COLD CONDIDONS 2 E.AJ. - COLD BASIS PAGE RE\i'J:SION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL COLD CONDIT10NS 2 EP3:4 (APP-C-5) St Lucie, Rev_ 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE This Page Intentionally Left Blank COLD CONDIDONS 3 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL COLD COiNDIDONS 3 EP3:4 (APP-C-6) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE RECOGNITION CA'T EGORY R ABN~ORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT R- COLD CONDffiONS 4 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSillCATION TOOL R- COLD CONDITIONS 4 EP3:4 (APP-C-7) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Rec.

Cat. Site Area Emergency Alert RG1-Basis: RS1-Basis: RA1-Basis: RU1-Basis:

This IC addresses raaJOadilrity re:eases lhal result in doses a! or beyt:md This IC addresses radioactiYily releases that result il doses at or beyoncl The Emergency Coordina:ar sbould no! wait U1d the applicable time has The Emergency Cocroinator shoo'd not w.it untillne app'Xable tin!= has the site oourndary :ha! exceed 10'!. of the Environmental Protection ~ncy elapsed, tut shoold declare the evSJt as soon as it is dE!Iernined that the elapsed, bo.rt sho c!edare the e~~ent as soon .as it is determined thal lhe

~~~~~;r~~:fp~<3~~~~~"=:'~~ Protect;ve, A:ticn G<Jides (PAGs}. Receasesoflhism<IIJlitu~ are condlion Y il:E'.)' exceed the aw'Jcabl~;1ime. condition *viii likely exceed lne applicable tine.

necessary. Releases of flis m>gni de are associated with lhe fail" e of associilled with tliJe of plant sysr.ems needed for ttl!! prateCiioo af the plant systems needed for lhe prclecticn of lhe public and likely inwlve fuel public. The funda!N!ntal basis of this IC is NOT a dose or dose ral2, b ut The fundamental basis of this IC is NOT a dose or dose- rate, but

...z d~-

\~hile 1tlese failures are addressed by ether ICs. this IC prauides While tbe5c taM-es. are atlct'ressed by oihef-ICs- 1!1is IC proYides apprqlriate diversitt and.addresses events wti<:h may not be able to be classified on the bcis. of plant sta!l.rs alone. It is importanl to note that fa-an oc r.lfher the dl!gradiltion in the level of safety of the plant implied by the uncontrolled release. TILs IC addresses acl1lal ~all poOenf.al ralher the degradation in fhe ll!vel of safety of the plant i mplied by fhe uncorrtrolled mease. This ad:i!esses a poteflliiil daease in tru! vel

~~g~d:.:..S~1~~~v:~=~en~le~b~r ~~!:e:n:~~~~as~=~~~~OWall ~~;t~~~~'"!~~=~ethatexoeeds w

1 the l'l'1ae 5E'Jere accX!ents the ~maybe unmcnitored crililere may be I~ uncertainties assooia!:ed W!h the soun:e term andfcr metecro.'cgy.

be large uncertainties associatedwi'.h lhesoun::e tem'l and/or themoreseuereaccidents lhe release may be urm:>nitcred a-there may rneteorologj. tirre.

!!dear pa1.a plants ilcorpeta!e features intended to ocroof the release

u. Nuclear p!lWef plams ina:rporate fea:LP!S iltended to cootrol the release of !Gdioactive eflhJents to !he en'irol'llllSIL Fmtner. there are adminislr.Jtive of raaooel!ive eiWen1s to ~ emrironment Further, !here are adrnilistra:ive cootrols es1abli51ted to pwen! unirrternfiorol releases, or cootrol and u.

w The EPA PAGs are 6pressed in lei'TT6 of the s001 of fue effec5ve 005e ~-=r~b~r~r~t:~~~:J;~~~~or contro:s. These controls are located in the Off-s'ie Dcse Calculilticn monitor internlional releases. ese colillrols are loca'.ed in the Off--si.:e e(jliva."ent (EIJE) and the ccrr.milied effed!ive dose equivalem (CEDE). or as lhe tn..,-oid COilTT\lted dose equhtal!!fd (CDE). Rlrthe pLSposecllhese Maooal (OOCM). The =renee of extended. uncon1m'led radioadfrwe Do5e Ciiculation Maooal (OOCII ~- The ocourrence of extended.

-' as 1he1hyrcid conmt:'.ed dose equivalent{CDE). Fcrlhepurposeofihese ICtiEALs. the do5e qu:anlity total effeciNe dose equivitent (TEDE}. as re:eases lo the enviratment is indi:ative of a degradation in lhe -ea:ures unoon'lldled ra:fuac6ve releases to !he environrr..ent is indica:ive a

<t def.ned in 10 CFR 20. is. used in lieu of "!l!IJll of EOE and CB:l£". anct.'orooo!rols. degadilticn of !!lese fea:~res andfor cootrots.

(..) IOEAts. the dose quamlity lolal eftectiw dose eql.&Jaient (TEDE). as a

0 defined in 10 CFR 2D. is used in liE'Il of "sum of EDE and CEDE".

The TEDE 005e is 5E1 at 10% of the EPA PAG, Ymi:e 1he fiilO lm!ITI thyroid The ODCM mulq:les are SJ!edlied in RUt and RA1 cnly 110 cfsti~ TheODCMnut1j~arespedied n RU1 andAA1 only lodistin~

0 The TEDE dose is set at tru! EPA PAG. vi!Ue tl:Je 5000 nvem lh..,-oid CDE was established in oonsiderati:ln oflhe 1:5ratoofthe EPA PAG forTEDE and thyroid COE.

CDE was est.blished in ccnsiderat'cn of the 1:5 riltio of !he EPA PAG for TEDE arid dtyroid ODE be!wem non-emergBIC!f ocnditions. and from each other. Vl/hll e lhese multiples cbvicusly correSJ!Ond to an off-site dose cr dose ra!e, the emphasis in classifyilg these e~~erus. is the degadaiion n lhe Jeve! of or between oon-emergency oau:litions. and from *ead> oi:her. Wl>::e ihese m.dtiples ctntiously correspond ro an df-sire dose dose rate, the emphasls in c'asSfying these events is lne degradation in lhe level of i5 The mooit.or l si in EAL #1 inc!udes monitors on all potenti I1E!ease safety of fhe jl!ant. no! l!1e magnitude of tru! associa!ed dose or dose rate_ satay cf the plan!, not ,j he magnirude of fhe asso::iaied dose or dose rate.

~ The monitor liS! in EAl ;1!1 includes monitors en all pol!riial release pathways.

pathways.

Releases should not be prorated co- averaged. For el<a/l1)1e. a release Releases sttcUJ oot be porated m averaged. For exalll'le. a release

§ Since dose assessment is based en actual metecrolcgy. whereas lne Since dose asses.smE<Ill is based on adual metean:icgy, \\heeas i!P-mooit.or rea<fng EAl is not. !he results from these assessments may aceecing 600x ODCM fm- 5 minutes does not meet the threshold. exceedilg 4x ODCM ttl" .30 rrilwt!!S does 00'! meet the I!Tesltold.

~ rronitor reaa"ing EAl is not. lhe restils from these assessmerus may lndi<:ate il!la! lhe c!assificaticn is not vunanted. or may irodi~ thai a This EAL includes any release for Mtidl a radioactiYity discharge pennit This E.l<L includes a!Vf release 6:lr Which a radicactrily dischatge permit w ~:"=~~:~~~::ti~p~~;rose d=t=-=~~~c~~~:~.:.~-~~~ ~=tf;f,~~:fs~~~f!,~=:~~~~nitlun indicate that the dassfficiltion is not warranted. <~r may m icate thai a

-' higher c~ificaticn is WiiiTanled. Fer this reason. emsgenc.y implememmg procedures Should call 6:lr the timely performi21Ceof dose assessments usirng ac1u mE!telrclogy and release infonnaliaL If lhe applicable permit app'lcable pemft 0 results.oflhesedoseassessments areavailab'.e wl>en Ill!! classif'cafun is assessments usi1g actual me!lecrololl)' arid release i1tom1aticn. If the

~ results of these dose assessmems are availat!fe m en lhe classification is macfe (e.g~ initialed at a b!.er c!assificaticn level), tru! dose as.sessment EAI. #1 is irt.ended for sites-that have estib~ e~.tent mcnitcmg en EAl#1 add>essesradioodivityreleases, thatfor\*mateverlei'ISCn, cai.ISe

=~~~~~~~~~are~lg..n~0 made (e.-g.* in:tiilled at a lower cfass'fication lev~. fhe dose- assessment results *avenide tl:Je monitor rea<fng E..A.L efiluent radia1ion mooit.or rea<fngs i o exceed lhe thn!shold identif.ed in ttl!!

-' r~ulls override fhe monitor- reading EAL C. This EAL is intended forsit!!S !hat have es!ablished effium rnanitof.ng

~ times lhe ODCM liml or 11!0 limes lhe ihreshcld vall!leS used in RUt . This is jrue e:JX:Etll! *for lhe tlm!91olds fa- !he steam G<ner:ator Bbwdawn an non-roulir~e release pii'Jwla}'5 fc.-wlieh a discharge permit would not nonna1y be prepa!ed.

0:: Mlrilors. ,en beth um 1 and Unit 2.. the calculated values exceeded the 0

z l'iillge of the mcmlas. Then!fore. the values IIISa:l for !he Steam Gener.ilor EJcwdown IVbriitcrs are 95~~ of run scaJ This lesser val~.~e is still EAl #2 addresses radioactive re'eases thal. for \\haiewr reascn. cause efiluent radialioo mooillor realfi.lqs lo exceed lhe threshold identi ed in the m indicatO\te of a loss of acwrol of radioadfrwe material v.oell in excess of that

• eslalllshed by lhe radioacti111ty discharge permit This \laue may be

<C constihlmg an lhlsual Event associa:ed W:th a planned batch re'ease. or a con!inoous release pa:h.

I 0:: EAl#2 addresses ratfoacl[v:ty releases, thai for~ reaso11, cause efflUent ~oo monitor readings to aceed the lhresh!:ld <demlilied in the IC established by the radlcactiv~ cfischarge pe!TI'it This value may be or associated v.ith a ¢lnrned batr.h rElease, a oominuOtJS release path.

E.l<L #3 acll%esses.unc:at:rolled releases il!la! are detected by ~le analyses, partioula!ly ,on \WOOnitored pathways, e.g_, sp'lls of ratfoa.cf:ve liquids into storm dr.ms. heat excllan!Jer akilge in Moa- \'later systems.

etc.

R- COLD CONDillONS 5 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL R- COlD CONDillONS 5 EP3:4 (APP-C-8) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert RG1 C!T*l1l1e Oo-..e P.~lllnglrcm "" Act"oJ a- IMMIIIENT RS1 OR* Git< Oooc Rc*ulllnp frQm an A ctu ~ l 01 IMM IN!:IIT Relotk Df RA1 My Retene or ~~ow* <X LIQU>~ Rodi0<1c;j1vCy lo lhe i:nvncnmenl RU1 Arry Ro leo&e or GGs*OII* "' liquid Rodlood Miy lo the R el~a*~ or Gas e<:<J ~ Rbdi0'3etlvly Gteater r~on 1 000 Gs~eoos RMioaC!t*.i!y Glee.tet Tnon 100 n\rem TEDE or 500 Gteeltt Thnn 200 Tin\tS ttlle OOC ~lot' 15 u t ~$0f loo!)er E n ~ ta'\11'1t-nl GC'tfH efllte.."\ ? Times lhi! 00Cr.1 f<<EO m"'m TEDE or 5000 mrem ThyrOid COE fe< &.e P.ctuaf << mrem Th-,roid CDE tor tno Adual a PTojecled Ouralk>n o( tho ( c.&J M1nu1es or l moer.

Prc;ettcd DuraJJcrJ of the Rele11s e U 'Slllo.A.ctu i~l R-et ease Mete-Cf'Ol'ogJ. Op eratin g lolod e App llcabltlly : All Op* rollng Mode Ap,p ll caDUity: All Op e<alln g l>l odo Appll c.> bl!lly: All O p Ot" ~ l l n !) rlt Qd o Appth;4hll l1y: All EAL Valu us:

EA.l Valua!i!

EAL V J!uet: t!!ll!. tJo re The Ef>>t!:f"ency Cocrd,ll ttJta sht:NJkJ ~o l wll1f unr.:.~ the Dpplic4b.J.e tl rr eo fl.2:t Nor~ The Emergency C-O'".IC,*~ta!'ot &nou>d r.~or :a1t unr..' ff'lt! spp.'tc.abY.!

The c/11et']~r.<)' Coo<d;n*rot shO<J>'cl IXlf ~*a *l vnJl !he Dop/.\;4JJ/c ~**.,.

els;aed, but Sl'>>tJid deeliiltJ ~ ~vem !JS tC!Oft *s ~~ u dt! l~mu*~cvJ i!hitT rhe No I& >e hos ol~p;t:<J, btltshol!ld<<ef>.'ti *I~C'<er.IO$ :<>on lis ill$

The EnY'.I*gency Coc:rdJDD!ty '~ nor *,\-.termt.~ rho ~tf'Pt.c~Otc hot ~Jot)~ b:t f sP'Ioa1kJ d~ta rtJ rhl: C"~n r .n~ :::oon JJS i~ i$ der~rmr.t:d '""'"'" dtralron h*s C>.cecdC'd, or w;~ t~oo/ exceed. lhc app/w;ab/1: time In Ill<> cf~Tetml f'lf:d ti'N ll?e- ~ ft!ll~d iA" .On1::1 n h.Qs ttAceedt'd. a w.lllt.Aer'y

&bsenc.c of Onto to -!.he contrt11)', a.rst.'1l'l": tJra: the refc.orc d1.r'J tion has CJ.CCedcd t:mi' ll.,!JeJopsed, but sheUJddf.tc(l:9e lJU!~\.1NI! S$ .toon.u !1' Js 1/Mt the ft'lease> dlKaDOJJ na" e11c-~t!!dttd. OfWII'f#kcfy-r!Xe<!<<<, UY.J IHO'eed fM SJppl}c41Jkt t'.rnc. fn fiM O b St'~ Ot d .IU!i ~D J.ht-r;,e app!k;eblt! tl,.,r J.r an oogomo 1t£M!e 1-5 d~~~ sr>d ti'Je ~~.a~ stftll n'm!!

rJe~trwnct:J lhal We re:~ 1u e Glrat.On hiM ~!i~rJ~. or wm J1Jie,Y appll:uote Lvnc tf cJo.s.e as.ses.smconr resut!J srtt av3XtJtJ(tJ at~ tme CO!lt/.ilfy, a-rst.ttn!' that tmr~Jease duratJOn hiJ S t'.\CfJIJdcd the J'fUi'l.I(I'104.Vn.

e.<< .et!d lfltt tJPP.'if!4~ r.me 1/dos.e a~sst"D!tt'lle.tuJ rs l!t~ ot cfedtf~ UOi1 . tntt cl9s.!ur?eat.-btt shourd be be~~ anoo:te- tJpprichb~ ll~ Jtan MgolnQ i ere eseJ!tJe.l~ !e::1and lhe re<.ease svai.J.abb D'l rht: ..tlme of C'k:t'Janrr.'ot"l. me cJos..'ltf.carion shouki be as.sc.ssme- nr lnsre~d ol nx:~rula v-.tll.lC$. CU nor cM/8)' decJDf'iUOI'I .srwr r,m~ is- unf.nO'..-.*n

1. VALID re&d1ng oo A tl Y ortht follo-mno gr~'ftt l!'rl1l an ll'l{! Rtad1ng ~ ho"'" ror 15 ba5cd 011 d~c lr$$t"..Smlt'111 msrcOOof momtof val""~- Do .oot .rrrroi:J.r;r;dost!O&I c .s.smr:ntrc.suft.s d~ tav d~iaratXJ!ld-WBit.'OO do!tt .s!se~-s.ment r~suJt t.

rnnute-$ oc long~r I. VALIOr<>odmgor1 A N V <>I tho fotiO'I<I n q""'l~ cn mon~or'.g-. tor UNIT I:

1. V.Uli O re ~di l"'!g 0'1 AN Y al l h.e fd!oMn1f gr~n l er t h o n til e Reou~ no s h ~n fCif 60 mrnule-s. t7 'tl'fgt:r ,_

1 . VALI D ftantng on .M i Y Oftn.e toUO#itng raoetlOit mooacrs g.,ater 11 n 1hereaa g shO!Im tor 1 ~ f"N n'Uto~ at 1onocr z 111 nlh e tea(!!njlsh&NTI I ~1Strun ute. Oilll<l~ : Monlll>"' C~un n~l P"~ l ~ ny Re!OJJ~ Uti!T t: w UlliT t ; R en tVent {P\11 Monlt<< CMnnel Pe i ~WIIY R~t><Mll

J U t IT 1 : RSC 2&-IH Noomal Cos 9 A E*01 u ct/ee ...J Mcnltot cn:annel Pe thW.l'f Rc~KMQ u.

M0<1rtorC~wmttl Pal~w**t RcorJ/ru; Phnl Vent (PV! u.

Pl;mt Vont iPVI Rant Vent (P\11 RSCZG* L JH E.OluCIIoo RSC2S.tH 8.Z E* OO I>CIIt< RSC~S.H! 1 1 E-01 uClloc Norms! <los w Nonna~ post*SIAS f'IQn l Vent (PVI Ptoo1Ven l lfVI RSC 26*1 H 1 1 £.()1 u CVcc ...J llSC7G- 1H t2 E.~ OI UCI IC~ Fuel Hon0.9 &nli1n D -=*StAS llcrmlllOos RSC26- ~ H AB."it\fer'lt (PVI pOO<* StAS

!1.9E

• OI ~1: 1 /<:c RSC26-4H If Hill 5 .~E-00uClk<:

RSC26-IL Fuot Hanctng: Swldmu ,_ (!jct

(.)

PloM Venr l PVI *tf' ..Oin Steam Un.e M.l:~~:rm Lme

• 3 E-<J ZuC(I<o

~ 0 RSC~1H 9 '9 E..02 UCI/CC RI1G-62 ...A' 2 7 E-01 uCI!cc RSC26_.H (FH!l l ros!-SIAS R l 26-52 2 4 E* 02 L"CI!cc Mmlor

• a* f\~ ln ~earn Une Rl 26-63

• a* ,.._.'"Steam uoe 2 7 E* OI uCll<c R l ~lJ.-62

• A*M!!lnsoeomUtte 2.7 E-Ql uCJkc _, ...J0

)

U~ I T 2 : Rl ~6-Gl Ma~tor 2 4 E

• O~ u:Ctl:r: M<Y>Itor t.laiQor MoMC!Cho.1n<l PntltWD1 Re:Jdlll)

RV*23910.1.

Ch~4 "A" SIG aowcfOWII 9.5 E~05t;prn R12&-63

• a* MM Se1tm Un.e Mon ~O<

2 .7 E-01uClltc ttw a RS<G-90, RMCS 622 Plant Vc.nr (PV I IU>'mol Op~

~O E.O I uCil;c M ORli<YC~an n el UNIT 2; Poih'""'JI R<Jlld;f19 RY*l3920.1 ,

Ch .S "I!' S.'G IJOWd"""' 95E*OS<pm RY*23910 *1, "A.' S"G81<1NO<>*'l ' oc* .~ cpm

_, ~

ltS26-90. P1:anr Ven11 PV,

.Ch <4 ct Cii RS26-90, Pl or~ tV..,t{PVt 901:-00uO/Qc RYC~J:r-1 'S'SIGBI""'"""'" l.5 E*~cpm

(.) ...J RMCS 622 DOSl*SlAS D'9 E.. 02 uO/cc RMCS 62:2 RS2G-9Q.

llonnol()p-.

P\o n i i/~" IIP'Ji UNIT ?:

a w RMCS 6<3

'HI FHS O...-e1~er:s to RMCS 6:!:? -"osl* SIAS 9.9 E- 0 1 uC!kt: ~'""'"' Cll<lnrtel P~lrt,.'ily /<f!&</JJ'lfl UNIT Z: _,0 w

...J A~::~~VI RS 2Jil..SO, RSR!c~* 622 Flont Vent "' S~ leld 8 2 E.O I uOict RS~&-90 ,

WI FHB DMonc<t lo RMCS 622 1 (I E*OOuC il"-0 r-.~a'l llcr Chn_rmet

""'11'11'3'{ ~ dr ng 0 0 Bm!di10 V*nlllol""' Rl.lCS 62::!

Pit lll V<'ltl via Shield SulldlnQVentJ.o.tl o ~

6 2800..Ctll'..c RS 26*00 R ~ n l Vent i PVl 11 E.. 01 uC"i ~ ~ RS. '2~90 ~,,,Vent\ IVJ a ct

~

R l.~::s sn pcr..t*SIAS I 0 E*lnuCVce 0:

RI M 26-7 1, ..A . Mnln Sieam Uno RMCS 621 tlormoiOp'.;

90 E-03mfll11t w/ HIB Owerle<llo ...J R MCS 831 Moo~or RS26-110. Phr.11J'ent (PVJ

2. O~a ao;suswem us! no o~!l.:rl ~tcqdogy lnd!cntel'i doses RIM2S.72. *s* t.lbln Se11m Uine RSR~*$22 Plant V. lll "'"Shield & 4 E*01 uOJc<: RMCS 1>22 ~1..s!AS 1 E*01trCitcc ~

RMCS 632 Mc:rMor M E-03mRitot  !!olldina VcnUIIIlton RS:z.;.110. w/H!EIOi....,t*dto :E

~reo t<rt~on 1000 mr em TEDE Of! 5000<1\r*m l*yrold CDE *

• a-oeyoncf * -"' * <>ooMary RS 2>S-12 Fu*l HIIJIIMO Bulldn Q D<¥ened to !'!on! RMCS ~ :! P"'ot Vent \10 SN<f.:l ~ 4 1;-ID CUcc. a:

RMCS ~ 13 lf HBl V(lnt Bul!6no V.d<<ilo t*"' 0 R I M ~71 "A' k:.Oin ~com Uno t O E

• 03mR.'I\t RS:Q;. l:!. Fu*l Hooding Bulf.:j;ng z

2. IJ<lSe es~essmen t u ~o actu meteorology Wid eeto$ doses grelller RMCS 631 MCYILtOr RMCS ~ 1l 4 6 1:.01 uct.*co CD (FHBI

l, F"lelC surveyre'Stl\tS ln licate.ci~.O MnC:O~~t ~rates QfHI C'f !Jton 100 nuemTEDE OR 500 rnrem l h)'rDdCOE Of orbeyondtnq RIM :;!>;-72. ..B. r.I..Jtn S1eamL ~r\'e I OE *<XlmRI!! r ct RMCS 63~ MoM or RI M -7 1

• A.. M*lrt Stternltne I 1h*n 1000 mR>hr,..<oectl!<l to oonlltllle l<<m<<< lhon coo nour, OR ~ obcund ilry 10 E* OlmR>hr RMCS 631 Monffcr a nAiy<e~ or t<!!d ~, sa~J,. ,ndtetl!* tll :t<old COE ~~'""'" ' 1 rm R S.~B-5 RMCS 121 "A

• SIG B:owd.,.*n 9.5 &0?. uCJmJ RI M ~/2 *5* f.tmm Sle~m Line a:

5000 mrrm fCI' onohwr of inhJkltioo , 111 O""bcytlfld sttebounCS..ry 1 II E~ OI mR<!1r RMCS e ~2 fAon 11oc 3,. Fle1l 'JUr.*~ t C'M.l J lf"!dl~t¢ l;i'OKd '.wM!dOII( Q;n.o: r ~C1J (fi'IC~tcr lhGi n t OOmRIIltoxper.ted toc O<\Itnue formoro1.!1.11rt e<~o hour OR R~~S t22 "B ' SIG Bowdo'o\'11 !t5 e.ro uCI.Iml RS-26*5.

• ~* SiG BlowOOim 25 E-04 uCtm\1 RMCS 121 Ol!fiNITIOtl80lt ***lyse-s. ol11cld "'""'~ s<~rr~ 11140111< th; TOo<lCOE 11reatcrlhon 500 trti!M foe cno ~our of I~Mlblfon , At "' be)'M<! the t.Jt~ b01l11<111r ; , R&2G-6.

'B'SIG BiaO'dcmt 2.SE*04 IJQ/m1 RMCS 122 IMMINENT -IAtf!l<lliOO ~ction o ~~vc b<<r. io ~~ r1 e , Dd<atio<>ol actloo'S are no: expected to be succ-esst

• and ~ncreo 2. VALID rea ding on AN V emttenl monta !hat rn:oeeds ~D l l mesthe alnrm ln fOtmltJon WlClicatK thallh ~ event or cor:dltlon .,.;, occur. 1Mltre s.ctpcint esl.atA1sJ1.cd f01 a c:u:rrc-nl radiooctr.t.ty disctJ Olge permit for 15 m n1-ute -;

I. V<ihrretwo ch:annci:s :sr~ ~ ~ed , tne ch31nnd Gnge":io O/ef1'ap. !it'M: or E IYig~r I ~MIIJEN T l im'.!'~"'~ ><<' speo fi*O. Ihel *-'1*11 rkf mc-t~itor re4dli'IQ tsvalld oo tlth~ manM 4!. VAU O reecin!l 01 At4Y cl'ifi LJ C'~>l monl!O"" r~~ng .')ft:oler ~ h o n 2 QR llrntK t."lot alarm '5 elp-ant f'Siabh!ihe'O 'I a currenl radiooctMt;l VAll O -M lnOIC.aliCO. rl!'port ortcndtticn . ls COM'SlOelti CIIOl:\e 2. fu Unit ' E~ri*n~ ch3flnd~ - to cilt:lin CUI'Iert d:~.1a~ dt-s.chiuge oermt for EO minutes<< ICJ"JQ:Cr

'/~.LIOwhen 1~ I~ VCflfled b)! (11 an Instrument chann' l cn:eclt. ~Z*

lnd:ea!J<On'i a' related cr redund:mt lndlearcrs. or C31 t:f.J dllred E.'ITER tlto CU'nman~ [O.*TAJcl-.am l!fiD IE*rrERI I 3. Ccnfl'ml3o 'Sampre an.alyses rtr OBSCOIJ'S or ~qJICJ rcte.a:scs ln ll.ta1e-s cctteentr&UOO!l OR relt!a~ re tes gre-e l ~ rth&n 200 times OOC.M Urruts r(t' 1S OOse:r.ratloo by pl!u ~ P-tnONl d, -such ~ha l tloubl tdiJtcd to til c 3. Us.t!!! Ncn'l'l at OPS trlfe~cfd u.nl~s Pbnl Vent nON hit-s beef) lndt;attr s operubJIIfy, th.(l con-:ition' s CJ:i~ence. or tho n:pGtfs

• l(),VII!ted!!t05Utcf!'SSI\JISIAS rnnutes. <<longer 3 . Confirmed S.!'lm;X.o anai)'SJ!1t for s;;i)S.eru'i a *qotc:: rde11ses a.caJracy 1-s remo~~ed.. tmpll ctt In this de11nlltOn IS the nf'ecJ for OR tlme:Y e:s.sessmenr .

• Ur'ai t 2 o r'tly - RJI ~d to du~ 'o iU-oti:'iSI'UI dA"'!f5iooon FHB

~nh:~ to lh4RiJrtV~I I lne!c:a.tes coo~ n1re.uoos. OR rete.ose rat~ s gre,.eler the n 2!ime-s OOC ~ Unuts fG< 6<1 nunut.,; or tonfll'r PAGE: 6 RE\lS IO?\: 3 R - COLD CONDIT IONS Er\L

• COLD UASIS ST LL:CIE PL. NT C' L.*\ ' SlFIC.-\TIO. TOOL EP3:4 (APP-C-9) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Cat Site Area Emergency Alert . u RA2- Ba.'ils: RU2- Ba..ls:

This IC addres ses,;...,. In mdlatlon doso rates within plant buildings. and Thi'S IC .addre~ses elevated r:adlation lo\*els a~ a re-su of w ater level m~y be a pre~ursor to o rtdloa~I*>AIY rdeo$e to the envirooment These lowennobul obO~ !h e Reactor Pre$S<J<e Vessel nanoe or ewms th t 1\o~

events re-pres..ena e ross or contra: oll!r rna.oacdve m!:terfal and represent resulted, crlll3yresull . tn ur;PL.Al*Jr ED rtse tn radleli on dose r 1es Wl!hln an actual or substantial pc:(cntial degradEIIlion In tho level of safety dthc plant butdings. Thc:s.o r.adlatJon l cvcls rcprese t .a l os~ or con ol O'll'l:C' plan1 ra-dloachve rneteriBI and may repre-sent a pdte.ntlal dt.'9ntdatJon tn the level o*fsafclyofthe plant _

The$<> events tse&l~te from RU21n that tuela<lil>1ty h8$ been released. or Is aMielp3ted aue1o fuel healup . This IC applies to sp.eM toel reqolrtng The refuel g pa1h'Nay 1 ~ a -comb!na1ion ofca ties , tube-s, canal s. end water CO'IOtage and i'Si nO( intended to address spent fuel which Is licens.od pools. \lVhlle a rad ah01 monitor cotJid dete-ct .ani cre.as'(" 0 ri$-t' m. dost toe dty >lor~ge. m rote d\Je Ia a drop the woler level.lt mis;tr l not be a r<li~t>Je 11\diClllion o1

'Nhdhtc a net the fue l 1S oovoe~ed_ For refuel g event s 'Nhere H1e water EAL # 1 Ina ~tlons ,ndude wottr level rndleollon and per'SO\net repooos. 1-evd drops betow' the Reactor Pres."Sure Vessel no~ge cl as~lfta~ on WOJ id be via CU2. Thts e~nt esc.~la t es. I*Oan AI~ per IC RA.2 if llradlated fuel EAL #2 ad-dresse-s rBdlotion morutor Indication-s cf fuel u ncO'ICry o.ndJcr fucl oU!'Sid~ tho reoc1or vess'lf is un-co.rered. Foc ev~nt'S lnvotvillg 1rrodu1ted

...z ~m;,ge . Applicalloo "Of lhi!i EA.t requ - ~ un de.r~a n <ing of lhe nctuol re6eiogleol eondii>M~ ~re~enlln the ...,cJnlty or the monitor.

fuel in th e reactor ve ~se l. e-!icaletion woold be VIO 1 c Rssion Product Bomer Tobie tor events In opt<31in!l *loc!os 1-4 w

> RaiS<!d von llallon manrt01 readlno; may be indlcobon o! a radio.*clr¥1ty />4Jpllcatlon or lh Is E."'l fCQ>JirOS understancflno or lha actual raodoglcal

..J re lea.s~ om the fuel. e:mtim!irt. s t_hdt dama.ge h11s occuned lnc.rcased cGndlboos pre!iont in tho Vit lnJty of l he monitor

u. background el th.e vtntlolation mc::nllot Due to 'A'I~et J e~~et dlocrM~ m11:;

u. mas!i mcreased veq~IB1I on eXhaust strbomc ec~IVJty ana n~sto t1oe £AL q2 eddre-;ses ~r~tea *plem radlalloo leve ls that reJ;>'esent e loss of w coosldered. contrcl of radioactive mnler~o l reStJ~I n g In o po l en~al degradallon In the

..J levd of ..,rely of e lll*nJ. Th ~ EAI. &dudes reda on tevel lncreases

<(

(.) Vlhllo a ra~e rlco mmlta coutd d C!~ect an tncrcaso tn d ose mtc due toe that re1tttt from pten od adtVI ~5 ~uch e-s usc ofrndiogrep l c: source5 a d a CIT<>P "' 1 e Wlller level. It mtghl ntt ~" o retl*ble lnc:fc11~a.1 ol whether or the fu d 1'5 c.overe a.ot mQOII!m~nt or ro<llooctlve woS!e materl,l$. A 1pedtc b* c:f Ale ~ R dl ~l<on MoMas (ARI* 5~15 net required as would r e~rlct the applh:1>blllty clthe g For exampf.o. an Area R11dlallcn Mor*lt.or CAR ~, r reading may mere a-sa due Threshdd. The intent Is <> IO.nttly loss of coni rei ol racoaal**o matenatln aN'/ monltOfeC! area 0 to l)lanned evolu~onS$uch ., he ~ d ~n . <rreven tuet as~mblybti~O 0 ra~d In the manll>'i\l!lor m * '-~

• AJ*.,, a morular could In ract be ~~Y For ex*"l' le , e retueing blidge ARM roadng maylt>Ctease aue to p lann e<t

~

respond a to 1 known c"onc lnvctvlng transi cr cw reloc.o Jon ot n source cvduuons such * ~cod II~. oc even a fuel a*~bly bcln!1rnl5ed ln the

'!:lat!d In or nee1 the fuel pool a respond!RO to a planned e'<olu1tOrt ~uch u m*nipulatO! st Jl.Jso. a morular could In ract be pr op~rtyr~!pol>dlng lo a

(/) remOVBI ot Ill<! reodot hoa<l. Generally. inae.,.ed racllatlon mOM<r knoNn ~nl lnvd vmo tlansferorfeloca on of a-source. sto~aln orneer

..J lndi~tton s Will need to bt c:cmblnod'v.'11M t nteher In eli( tor (or pe ~onMI the fuet pool or *e~'P<)ftdi~O to e pltMecl evctut*an w~h os r<tna"'\1 <rrl re w ropoctl Cl( wa ter toss. rotador hi~!D d. Generally, incceaRd ra-diation mondcw lndica11oo"' 'IMd nl!'cd co w comblnt!d 'Niih oooth.,- 01r:atc:r (or oorsonn r:1 report) Cl( wu1er loss.

..J EsCIIIobon of this emer§ll.'ncy closs;ncobon h:vc4. II *wr*cpriote. woulcl be bo~d on IC R51 0( RG1 0

~ RA3-B a'ils :

..J

• ~

This IC o<ld"'"'"" ****td l r4dllltlon reo; tllt1 lmpoct cc-JII*vcd C>Petlltlon In ar~as TI!Qu(lln l] c:ontln uc.&~ s e>:rup*nat In order to maintain saf<t! operauoo 0:: or to pe<f"'m * ""'~ sl!uido'~TL II Is thl

• omporred 3blli~* tc> operote the plont 0 lhet r e~ultsln the$etu*l a polenllal 'u~laniW degedn ion oHhe level o!

z safely altho pia The couse and/or mo9n~ude oflh~ nso ., rndiobon ICNel* nota cone em of lhl s IC. The Em~rgcn cy Coordn~lormu51 CD

<( consldor th e sourco or <:-au'Se -o! Lho n!S(!Id radiation love-Is and determln~t if onyah<< rc mov t>elnvdvod 0::* Arc! as roq.linng coo1Inuous occupi.1ncylnclude the CG'tlrc:j Roan ana Cenlnll l'lnrm S!A !0<1 (CASl.

PAGE: 7 REV!S!O)J: 3 R - COLD CO)J D!T !O, S EA L - COI.D BASIS ST LUC IE PLANT CL.-\ SS!FICATIO)J TOOL EP3:4 (APP-C-1 0) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Damage to .Irradiated Fuel or Loss ofWaier Level i hali l-Ias Res1tted or RU2 UNPLANNED Rise in Plant Radiation l..eoi'Eis.

Wil Resu~ in fhe Unoovering of Irradiated Fuel Oulside the Reactor 10111 Vessel f.EI Operating Mo~ Applicability: All Operating Mode App1icab11ity: All EAL Val111!5: EAI..Values:

1-~~~==~~~~ ~1c=~~~=

1. A. wa:er leY! drop in the reader refuel'rtg ca....:ty, spatt fuel pool OR fuel lransfs- canal !hat wll result n iTadia!ed fuel beoorring unCOII'ered.

gliea!B" man 58 feet).

.QR AND

2. A VAUD alann on AN'f cf the 6:lllawiAg due to dii!T13QE! to irradia:ed fuel OR loss of vr.ter 'ie-1& b. VAIJD rise in area radiation ~ingon ANY of i!E fol low'ng:

z w

1 u.

u.

w

<(

0 (3

~

WI. _.

0 iii a0

...1 0

~

~ en

..II ...1

<(

E ~

w lr _.

0

.QR z 0

<(

all

2. U IJWl~ED VAUD Area Radiation Mon!or~dir>gs OR

<(

0::

SIIJnteyi'ES'Jits intfcate a rise by a factcrof11l00 overnOITllai' <(

levels. :2:

a:::

0 z

m

<(

I OS:ItiTION BOX 0::

UNPLANJlED- A parameter charQe a an ellefltihali is net the resul1af an intended ewlution and reqtires COJredlve or miligafiveactfons. Rise n Radiation lEvels \\\thin fhe FaciEty That l"l'edes O;!eration of Systems Req.rired to Maintain Safe Plant Safety Funcfons.

VAllO- Pn indication, report, or coodition, is considered to be VALID Ymen il is veml!!d bv {1) an inslroment channel check, (2) Operating Mo~ .App6cability: M 'Normal levels can be considered as the> ~idlest reaal!l;l in lhe ltdications on rela!e.d or ratumdant micators. or {3) lvi <free:! 1. Fa Unit 1 El:lerfinechanne!s-roobtain <>JrT'I!R! dab: past twemy-four 1-oours exx:ltJdillQ the current Dea'k value.

observation by plant persomel. suCh that c!oubt related to tfle EALVal111!5:

ltdicalcr's operability. the condition's existence. a-the> ~rfs ENTER lhe command (DATA) channel ID (ENTERJ accuracv is rero\oed. Implicit in !his definition is fhe need for 1. Dose ra!e gn!alerihan 15 mWhr in AN'f of llile follaling an;as !lequiriAg 1imelv asse5S111enl 0011!'nu01!1S OcaJP~cy to mail:ain plant safety fundions:

• Coo!rol Room

• *CAS R- COlD CONDITIONS 8 EAL-COLDBASIS PAGEREVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PL~ CLASSIFICATION TOOL R- COLD CONDITIONS 8 EP3:4 (APP-C-11) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE This Page Intentionally Left Blank R- COLD CONDffiONS 9 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISIO : 1 ST LUCIE PLI\NT CLASSIDCATION TOOL R- COLD CONDITIONS 9 EP3:4 (APP-C-12) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE RECOGNITION CATEGORY C COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS C- COLD CONDITIONS 10 EAI..- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIF1CATION TOOL C- COLD CONDITIONS 10 EP3:4 (APP-C-13) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE CS1-Basis: CAJ.- Basis:

This IC ~epresems the inability I.D restore and maintain ReaCIOr Pressure Under the condition~ specif.ed by !hi~ IC. ~ IOM!ffng in RCS le¥el Loss of. AC power compromises al J!fant safety systems requiring This IC is a pA!CtiiSilr c:l mere seril>'.JS ocn!ffions am! is amsidere::l1o be a Vessel level !b otc:we fl>e ~ of active fuel \\ith otriaiunent challenged. is indi!:iiWe of a loss of * *.artay controL lnvEntay loss may~ die tn aot eiec'.ric pm'il!!r inlcltJding SDC, ECCS, Containment Heat Re<r<J1r.ll, SpEnt potemiiil degra:iafon of the level ofsafetycl'lhe plant Fuel damage is pldlab'le cr Rea.ctor-Pressure Vesseill!llel c:anoot be RCS breach.~ llound:uy leakagE-. or continued boil'ng in the Fua Heat Removal and the Ufrrla!e Heat Sint.

resbored, asa'lr.ilabledeca-yheat\\ill cause bofng, iunl>erro:du~the R~ F'lessllre VesseL Thu~. dedaration of a Site />.rea Emergency is Rlefueling ~.utions iha!! ICII'M RCS water revel below lhe Reactor Reactt:r Pressure Vesselll!llel With the CONT MENT breached or warranted. The E!lll!M can be c!assilied as an ABt wile!> moo'd Shu:dcwl ..refueling. ?ressure Vess~ ft~ are carefully plar~ned and proeed..-ally coo::rolled.

An Uf\?l.AiNNED event thai re51.L'1s in.vs:er le'l'el dea-easi!1g belovt the

~~~~!~~!~ih~=:re~~the cltallenged them the patemi fer urrTIOOi!bred fisioo product release 1D the environment is hiflt- This represet!s a direct path for radio~ m-entory The EAl #1 value of 10 inches is belmv !he mirimurn level for Reactor Pressure Vessel11ange. orbelmY ihe planned ReS Wa!er ll!llel f<J<'

1o ~ reeased to !he environment Tnis is ocosiste5tt \\ith the deflliten of a sludol\n cooling sys1em opernti:ln. emergerncy tosses. relative r.o lhiil specffied ll:lr !he Si!e /Vea Emergency the {jven evchruon (if the planned RCS v<ater I~ is already bel mY DE>

GE. The C-£ is dedared on !he o:x:urrenoe ci the ross a-I~I NENTlcs.s of EJ>L Reaclor Pressure Vessel Range}, YliiiJ'an!s dec!ar.ltion *of a No1ilicalicn of fl!I1Ciimc:l~ers. The EAL #2 value of 0 inches is lhe doses~ rrEasurement to the tap ol Fifteen rrirwtes was selected.as a threshold to adude lrimsient ar Lhlsuiil Eveu (NOUE) due to the reduced RCS imtBiltlfy1hat is ~le active fuel rromemary losses c:l off-sf:e paNer. llO keeplheall'ecouereci Anumbaofvariaties canna-~ a sigri:ficant ifT.pact on heatre!l'.aval capab31y cilallengillli! the fuel dad barrier. 8<arJl;les ino\Jde mid-'.a0 p, Fa- EI>L #3, as water fevel in the ReactOr Pressure VessellaweJS. the d'ose Escalating 1D Site Area Emergency. if <IP!lfUP.riare. isbrf Abnormal Rad The allowance c* 15 rr.inu!es was chosen be<:alls.e il is reasonable !b reduced levell'jJillllge level, head in place. callity *ftooded. RCS venting ra!e.atlcve lhe cere w itaease. The dose ra!e dae 1D ens core ~in!> leol6s I Radiolog'cal Bllue<tt. assurre 1l:w level can be restcl'£<1 \..nhin !his lime frame using oru< or ITICfe sl!ategy. decay heiil remavaf sysl!!m desf:gn, vai.exing prlHfsposi!ion, or str.uld resutt in Containmem High Ran~ Radiation r~ (CHRRM) of !he red!Jndanl means of refill thai shou'.d be available. lf level carmci! be

(/) sleam genera't:lr LJ.t:ube <hiniw,;. inaiCa!ion and llcss'tle alatm. Nonnal RCS lew! and Read:orPressure

~~~~~~iJiltuiijjl~-fia~~~~~~ ~~in lhislimefr.mE l!len itmay indicate a rmreseriOIUS contffun

~~:r"~= C e : : ~~=.:=~):=

1 5i= AnalysisTndicaleslha.l core d<mJge mayo.."CUr 1\ilhin an hourfo:ov.ing confnued core~ then;fcre, 30 miwles was ocnservalivelychosen.. (mdudillg the atilit*rto monilor level visually) to assUJE !hat th!! ability1D Continued loss.of RCS Inventory re Jit iB escala!ioo to

• e Alert

~ PSLshllftb~~n<:arniingenC'Jplansprovidefcr~ng ~:d=~on:~~~!bry~i!~===: W,':/=~=~==~n~=gl~~~~ planl This-IC is lBcll.iKted as a No!iilication llf Ullll5'.ral Event (NOliE) because it is errerg:ncy dassit:-caiim le\'El via *e !her JC CA1 or C.~4-

> CONTALNMENT a.OSURE fclltmilll!J a losorheat.rerroval cr RCS deternine that Reac!Dr PreSSIJI'e 1/essel inventory less was =ing by Thedilie<12m:e beilveenCU1 andCU2dea;s\\ith lhe P.CS ocnditionslhat

~ inventory M!ciions. cbSENing 5IJm!l an::l tank level d!anges. Slimp and lank level rises must inverc:ory; exist between cold sh!.!ldom and refuelilg' modes-. In IN; rel\:.lelipg mode 1

~ ~~~a:i:~=:.=:u'! ~~~~=~~

l!le ReS is not irttJcl and Reir.!cr Pll!<Ssure Vess le\'El and irwemory are 1hee<5iys!ag5 of acoreLmOovayl!llenl

• is oolikelylhathydrogen Relief valve I10fiiHil operiltion shoold be exd'A.Jded from ens IC. HO\vever, a rmnitored by diflerenlmeaRS. *In cold shutdovm !he RCS mn:J!ially be

a buildup due to a con! unccvery could resuij in an e:<piDSive miX'!lre of leakage. The 30-rniR.l!e duration £o\\s sulficie<!l. time fa' .iidions to be ~f~'k;'~~~~':J.:f= =be~auld be cornsidered. =rat~ standard RCS ilwentcryand levelmani1orirlg mea~ are ilJ ~~~~fu~~~~cm:~~~"";~~ pelfonnedtorecovernee<!ed coof11geqliprenl t; General Emergency dedared 1f ~is detem-Jned lhi'll an explosive miJ<1:!1re Esoala:'on w a GeneraL Emergatcy is via CGl or RGI. Prolonged loss d RCS IIM!II'Iory nuy result in esl:alalilll!l to the.Aiert IE!IIel EA!..# * \Cives.a .lcmering in RCS level be1crn1he lr..pof1he Reactor ih e:<ists. Adartionally. post-'Tllr.eeMl'.e *lslan::lstudiesirniicated1hattt.e~ed viaeilheriCCA1aCM.

PJ.esswe Vess fla19! tha\ continues fer 15 min!J!es due *!b an UN?lANNED euent. This EAL is not applicab'.e !o ltmering levels in l!le

~ ~=~?~~J=~~~-~grEtov!=~~ ~~~'!t~si.oo'4dt':~~~'f:=::~~~ ~=-==:~=~~~~~~s.,:n~::~

oodedfleiil'cililil'/le\'El. \\tlich is.a.i dresse:i byRU2 EI>L 1, -such f.me as the level de::reas5 to ~ ""'"" a the 1/eSselflange..

EAL#tb represenislheinabOitylores1DreandmantainReadci'Pressure ~~

b~::!t~:co~~e~':1::: ~?ressure \fes,;el ll!llel contillUES to \\'ef' am !'=aches !he point

~ ~~ ~~:!'~~U:P~~::ItJ:~~~~~~~e_,l eot '-"'A7"--r~;::-:-------'C.::..::..:....::.._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-; ~~ stancfald RCS inventoryand level monitoring means are at ~m.'dl a loss Oi sw:ticn b de::ay heal remmr.d systems has o::rurred, w probable ~ RE!3Cior F'ressoJre Vessel level cmnot be restored, as a-.llil'abl!;

to 1tten escal31ion CA.1 *u:>uld be awropri~.

These EAls se<Ve as prectJr!i'J<> 1D a loss of ability to adequa'.ely c:col the 0::: decay heat 'II causelxliling. r.rrtherrelluciJig t l>eRsactor PreSSilreVessel fu!?l. The magnitude of this loss c:lwater in<fca!es lbal malce141 syc..lems EA!.. #2 addlesses cooditions in l!le refilelilg mode \\tlen nama~* means of level. Post-Three Mile Island srudies indicated !hat file ir1sttled nude.ar tme- not been ~an:! may not be capable of prewnting ut1er cere c~erallm! indication aBd RCS level indica..'icn rn;;y -not be available.

z instrumentalicn>\ill operate emrtically *Aflen the core is llllCOIIB>!d. Reacla' ~ Vessellevellowemg and poilrii3l c:oi'e uncawry. llilli Redundant means of Reador Pn;sswe Vessel Jeoiel indication ,.;u noonally

~ condition v.ill result in a mitimum emergstcy c!assifioat-cn of Alert. be installed [IOO\ldi11!J1he ahlity!bmooita!evel 'lisulally) to assure thatlheo 3:

58 Sump and tank level mJSt be evalua!cd agaiBst c01er poien'lial soorces c4 lea~ sua. as codlilg wil'a scuoes insid!? 1he contaimlent to atsure they are

• icative of RCS leakage.

EAL #1 at)ojresses1he imability to restae aBd nBrlbin level al'ler reacl1ing be a were to lost dllling less of RCS :iwen!bry e'o'ent.lhe opl!w.D!S need io dE'Iennin!! .that Reactor Pressure Vessel irr..e!I!-DI}' loss was

\vot/Jj abi[ty I.D morullr leY~ viii not be irilemJpled. HovteVet, if alllever iDdicaEon

!his ~int woold be ind'c.Eive .of a failure of !he RCS barrier. 23:2 inches

J.1hil! iDE> lctss of suction 1o decay heat rem:wal systems has cCCIJIT'i!1g by obssmg Stmll' and lank l11'11e1 changes. Surrp and tank leYel

I: As \va'sl~ in !he Reader PFeSsure V~ Iewers. the dose ri'lle aba~e ina-eases nwst be~ aga'nst olher po'.e~li- SOLI!CE!S of ka~

(/) the core~ increase. The d:>se ra:e due I.D lhis o01e snr.e should resti! in =.:,.a;.~~~~~ j111Sid£.1hecontailmentto ensure iheya~<:

0 Containmem High R:Jnge Radiation Mon.~ (CHRRM) indication and EAL #2 is appf.ca!lle \\tJen all level i!ldica!Son is lost~ a loss of RCS

..J po~sible alarm.

illvenlofy l!!o'enl. tile cperarors woi!ld need to detemline !hat Reactor 0 E=latian 1D Alert emetgency dass'f~e;;lioo I~ woofd be Ilia Eil!ter CA1

(.)

z:~~~~m:"!l~C::I:!:ri~~~fu'~~~.:; or RCSheatuplria CA4.

I potential sources oi leakage SIUdlas coolilg wa:er~ insid!? !he 0 ccntahmentlo enstSe IIley are m icaliY!! of RCS !eakag!!.

DEFIHil10N BOX The coodition indicated b-y !his IC is the dega:ii;fo o c lhe clf-.site and oo-ln 1he cdd sl:lutda\\n flllde. nonniil RCS level and Reacla' PressLre s'le AC pcme!' S)Stems such 1hat any additional S'ngle faiiUJE would resufi Vessel ~eYe! irls'lrumentation systems nil! usu"" be avalable. !he in a.station blac\oo.n. This co mi l ion ooufd occur due to a los'S of otf-siea IMMINENT- M~jgalioo ac'Joos have been ineffective. adtWarral refueli119 mode. r.cnnal means of Reactor PleSSir.! Vessel level indication action~ are not expectEd to ~ successM. and trended may not be avatla!lle. Redundant means of Read:lc< ?resSllll! Vessel level power *'lith a cooaJJTert failw-e of all biJJ! cne emB!gency gensator !o informiJ!ioo indicatesihatC!eevartaconditionv.ill ~-'<'~here IMMINENT iimed'rames are specified, they shoa:apply.

indication wll u.suaty be installed (lllduding 1he ability to mcnita level visu ) to assure t!m the abBy b morila-level wi1 not be interrupted.

~~~:e~~~cy~~~~~~~~~~~-

The 15-mnute dlr.llicn ~ ihe loss a level indicat'cn was chosen is half oftbeCSI Sit;, Area EmeogencyEAL dtr.!Eoo. Signifuantfu because F.."'tl!en mir1u!5 \vas selec1ed as a lhreshold to exc'I.Jde lransie<!l. or rmmenbry los.s.es of pCII'Il!T.

da!roge is not o=xpecced !o occur until 'lhe oore has been tw:oYered for

• w-eater than 1 00..IJEI' the analysis referenced in lhe CG1 basis, Therefore this EAL meets !he definlicn fa' an Alert lf Re4dor Press~Se Vessel I!!Vei conti'nues !b lower !hen esca'db'on to S'te Area Emergency*~ be viaCS1_

C- COlD CONDITIONS 1 1 RJ\1.- COlD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 STLUCIE PLANT CLASSIDCATION TOOL C- COLD CONDffiONS 11 EP3:4 (APP-C-14) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE R&cog nlllotl Site Area Emergency Alert Cato e>ry CG1 Loss of RCS I""""I"'Y Affocuno fuel Cl*d lnregnty wtth CS1 less~ RCS frT'Itfllcry ANocnn-11 Core D""' ay Heal RCIT'.c'al CA 1 t oss of RCS lnventcxy. CU1 RCS Leakage Contalnmtnl Cho ll en~d Copa btltty.

ICII)

Op er ati ng M od e Appllcoblllty: 5, 6 Op ~r<1llna hlod o Appllcablllty: 5, 6 ~ r a ti ng Mod e Appll calllllty: 5., 6 Op~r at frl!l Modo Appli cabi lity : s EAl Voluos: EALVol un : EAL Voluos:

EAL Values:

No tP The E.tmr(]t ncy Cocrdin., ~ cr sho11Jd nor wgn u ntil the uppllalble f.!J'ne" 11lU eJ:rpse<'. tJtJT ~uk:t d ed-Me- f/)11! 6"VV!nt as soon ~5' it JS do~~n ~ rhot the ccmd?'Jo n \'fi.'l Jikcft rucccd rhc: sppt'Cabk:

rlrre.

1. Ccntolnmont cho nge indi ca1od by A NY o r the foiiC>~oing- 1. 'M.th CONTAINMENT Cl OSURE NOT estobllshed RCS level less 1. RCS l&vd lo ss than.

• CO I TAINMENT C LOSURE NOT esro she<! tlln n*

• 2321nchescn li*1 11 7 0R LI* 1117-1 1. RCS leakagoc resu lts the lnobR<y 10 maintain oc rnSIC<<! PZR It' ?!Jt;!, to 35% rpr !5 rn1nytr:5. w !ooger

• UN I"LANNEO n~ In tonlamm<nl pre>S<Jre

• 1 0 1 nct~eson ll

• 11 1 7 0R ll* 1 1 1 7* 1 >-

0:

• Contelnment !-lyOroQen !)!t31~r lMn ~ % (/)

0 2

2. 'Mlh CON TAINMENT CLOSURE eslablls ed IICS level 1<!55 th an*

2. RCS le,* con n ~ be mcn lt orcd lor 1 S minulos or lon1w CU2 UI IPLANNEO Los~ ol RCS l:l*~t<>-y *~ 0 AtlY orrc oC tho ldiCM'tno opj:CJ.s

• 0ino;llcSonli*1H7 0R U* 11t 7*1 w i=

Oparalf.n g l~oda Applleablllly: 6

> 0 2

a. C or~ ~n=* ryfor30mlnulo*s << l t<~gor *~ indicalod by. a. loss of RCS invenlcry *,. dicmed by unoxplolned 1"""1nso ln ArlY oltl!o ~  ::::>

IOIIo-Ning- u.

RCS lev* I fe-os than* 3. RCS lcvol con a l:J<"~""' d for 30 ~.,.or lcngc< *Nrll1 o los-. cl

• Co!> t ~t Su mp w ....1

(!) <!

• 0 mcnes en U -11 11 OR ll*1117* Roacta ~'""' Vessel Inventory as lndca ted oy AN Y of tho

• Reactor CaYity Sump fc1Ja*1ng

• Safegu rds SUrw

<( ~

~

• C<n e<Ji 111 Renge Radtoltcn t.l<Jrllor rea<mg !l<Bi>l<>r

• Hcldtlp T*n~s ~

b. RCS tevel eannct oe monl!or!!'d W\ cae u n tO'VMy tnBea !ed by MI V oltno faluN1ntl k>r JO m i nut e~ or JQI1gcr itl.. n .3 E*~ Rtttr

• Etratlc:sourcera.nge mcn*cr lndlcaltM

• Uft~1~Am ea It'" II~ In ANY Cl IM !(lllc;.,.,ng

• Reruollno Water Tru k

1. UNPI.AH NEO RCSievel O'OP ulltdii:All:<l by EITH ER <>I l h~

OIJowlng:

~

(/)

~

(/)

• Contannwnt High Rrmoc RradiMJoo rv'.a\itC4' l ~di P !J

• COllainm ~ t Sump

• RCSw.atel leval drop Pt:!CM' 99 1n cheson U - 1 1 17~1 tor 15 0 >-

(/)

gre~*er tl'l~ n ~ Jl. E ..... ~r

• Reoctor c ,.,IY $u1Tij> mnutcs fJT langcr "W'nc:n the RC5 li.'Yel bar.-c1 I s c:~ til~ h eo a: C)

• Errtl c 1;0Urcc ranee: momla lnclc:atJan

• s. roguanl~ Sumo above the Reacta Pr~so r e Vttssel ft:ange.

• UllPI.ANNEO loVcl n *~., AllY oflhe fala Ntn g.

• Hcl d ~p T oll k1

• RCSwe.!erlevel d rop be!ON lAC! RCS i evelbaBCl fa 15 2

• Corrtammont sumv

• Rei\J lngWa e r Tan~ r1111utes a- l ooper,. en the RCSle,..,t bond ls e<Ublkh<<l ~

• R ~o c torCavltySum p t.:io'.vtho R~oo::orPreo:w<o y.,_-;et non go. w

• Sef~pu 6 r d:s Sump u.

• Holdup ranb w

• R~ I\Jelng Woter Ton~ 0::

2. RCS f!!'vet cannac ue mort QC'e Owtln a 1M'S ot RCS 1n~n t ary as ln(lle-t> rcd 1:1:1 en unexpl&lned l e~l n.e In AN Y ol !n~ fell,.,lng 2

• C(lnta ni SUmp ~

• ReDctor Cu.'lltty Sum.p 0

• Sa!~ua~ Stlrll)

• H<:ldup To*~~ ~

• Reluelln aW l er l<Jttk  ::::>

t:

(/)

0!1'1111' 0 11 IIOA ' - 0 min *~~ o- Lcng<J Sinlll* 1'0-t~cr Sour<ttfo-15 ~ 1n..S<>rtonacr51Jch thnt ...J

~~~ tOSl AnyAddffional Smgle Fa w-e Woo Rasuh. tn sta!lon 0 CONTAIIIA1ENT ClOSURE - Tile l'(<<tdtmiii V"<l<! fin ed at1101n R anneo e**OIUl*ons 10 te~ . m1n ate. repnlr. Slttf<>-m mamtdU!nc tfiXC!n to secu re ccr1t a!nm ant ano Its 'ilssa::fateo strueturM .ot mocMleal!ons ~O: S"_rat rms and <!Q:ulpment t at rMUI!ln en EAL value Bl*clrOlll 0 1Y51emo;t nndccmp01e s ;na fun ~u;na l barrter to-nssiCI'l ~ng tnt1 <>r ~~-*~!leO are n.- subje ct to dontfte o en '"" acllv.llloo I

Opor orln!l Mo a o ADI)Ile.'l!llllty: 5, 6, Defueled Op or.,ln Mode Ap p!l cabffil y: 6, 6 prOClJ rel'lase unt11tt e :d~1110 plant .c:a'lo.tlm s .requirements .as lm g as Jne e"ldUlion rproc.t-edS :t'S plaMtd onct Is 0

-within thv cpoaloono l limllo 01s imp~e d by Qt o sp<:~cllil: oo crottng EAL Valuos:

UNI'LAN NEO - A poramettrc:hanoe cr *n ~<ent lllat ls na4the llcmso . [Sl. t ucl* Technlc.l Sas<S. Setl!on 3.91 E A L V~l u u.:

0:

result ot an Intended I!IYoluhon .a d r equirescocrectwc or m ~ I1)11We ac r:ns.

w

~

0 Q.

0

• c t I. AC pC>Ner ca pabrldy 10A3 * .16 KV AND Bl4.16 KV reducedlo a smgle OO II' N sour.;o for 15

• utes Of longer On-s..te AC poHer mey be pr011ded by the olhl:r Unit's Emergency Dlil~ el Generotc:r CEOGl by succe~srul X*be l o ~i:l tne AJ o r ro 4.15KV bu<. a. ANY aDCiltron:u slng.!e pOt\'"er swrc-e e11ure w.a re-sult tn Station Blor.l:oot.

P:\ GE: 12 REV ISION: 2 c - coLD co:-mn10N EPII'-0 1* 1'03 ST LU CIE I' LA~'f CLASS IFICAilON TOOL EP3:4 (APP-C-15) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Rec.

Site Area Emergency Alert CA4 - Basis : CU4 - Bas is :

For EAL # 1. the RCS Reheat Ourairon 1hr.,.ndd toble .odar~ses e<mpltte Thl ~ IC may be a precurstr o1 more se-nou-s con ditions and '1:$ a rcwll ts loss c(functiOfls r~ired for core cocflll g for g rea ter !han Sl)fJ\lSIIr.~ con sid""' d to be a polenlti!l d"1)rada on of th<t 1.-*el of safe!)' cl the plan t during reluct Q and ca d shutdO'Iro mode* vmen RCS integrity is 1<\taa. In cold ~ hu td own the oblllty ! o rom"'" d oc;,y ~a t rohes 1l"fflOrfyon l oo;od RCS lntogrlty S11ould l>e ccn5lderea 10 be In pl*ee When the RCS presS<J re cocfm g ~cw . <>:> era on ole h~ system.rhet pro ~ 1< forced cooling may boond* JY l*ln d5 hO<m* l coruitlon lor th e cold *hutoow. mode of ooe,.tlon be i<O!>ardlz<>d due to th e unlil<ely iM s of ~ leclri<al powu cr RC$

(e .g .* no freeze soals or nozz!e dam s). The sl:ll tus ofCONTAINMEIIT lnventay. Since the RCSusu o: y rcmelns ln:act in the tad sh utdC'*

CLOSURE In tnfS con d.tiC/1 Is lrnmnl enal !t*en that th e RCS Is pr<>oAdng o mode a la r~~ inventr.s:y o!wa t MIS -ava lt.abte t a.ke~ th!' COff! cove.ret1.

high pressure bam er ton s""" .,.~CI reloa so to the environment Tho 60 lmlulf: UrM frame should oil<>., sutllclent lime 10 restore cocL:ng *..ttn oot Enriyi:IIO e<>ldiohUtd""'" cond>11ons mayt><> sttamedwtt~tn hOurs at there bting a substantial d egr~<la llon In p lant safety. ope rabn~lll PO'Nor. Etltry lnto t he re e~n~jmc.deproc ed~,.llym a yn<<

()ecur ra 72 hO<.Jrs << tooge r STI*erthe react<:t h8$ be-en ~ I,!.Jt dO<An . Thu'i the Th e RCS Rehea1 D-un1t1on Threstt otd 10~ also addre:s~"!. th~ c ompl ~ e Jl el!:l llp threat and here ore 1he th re:~t to.di!.tnagl\g the futt dBdm.ay be lOS$ c( lunctiO<IS required for coro c<<:lo<~ a !0< l)reotCf than ZGm u'o~ Co-"'C:f for ~n ts thot ocwr In 1 c;- cC1utlJno mode wl-!h lrfo.dltl tc c! fud In tl'te dunno re f\Jeh.ng and-cold .s. utel ~n mode$: when CONT AJNM E NT Rtaclor Pfessure Ve'S.ut (note th at the heat p th reo~ <eculd be IO'Ner ror CLO SURE Is <tSi abll<he d 001 RCS l nt<'<} rd~ k nol "'l a~shed"' RCS co*d s huldowncond ! tl~s l! tne enlrylnto cold shulda..n \NB S folloMfng a en tnve nto<Y ** reaucea te o.* n>tl-toop ope<OUOfl tn PWR* I M Oi~u s~ rc ro~ngJ In ~conv.>n, rne ~rur o.-. snoota 0<: oore to monitor RCS 2 above. RCSint egmy<ll<>ula be oSSllmed tolletn ploeewh cn

• RCS ~emperet u re nd Re-ador* PTe-s.su~ Ve-'5 s.ef ;e-f!'l s.o wat escarati0f1to lne 0 prMS<lrc bou ndory I> In It* n""""l ce<~d1llcn for the cdd ..O<>I down mode 01 oh: rt l ev~t~l '\11lt CA.4 or CA1 wm OCCCP' 1f r~ ed t=

(.) CJ!l*to<ic;tl (e g no freeze $Uis 0< n<>Zzte dam*) T ~e ~U~d :ro n1nute t e frumc wn lnctuded to afJOW operator a.ct.lon Cofos.tor r: 1 c ho.ol 0 Uf1rtQr~fuo[mg lhe lcn*d"' the Rcrs:clor Preswro. Ves~c l Yrlll normGilyb<C 2 rem~ lllnoiiOO>.ll po"l e Th<: &ll~dt<ne f<ltne I~ r:on.lto~enlwlln tt>c M11lnl l~td &b<M! t~e Re&tl or PrenweV~Ue l nlfllje Re uellno

I tJU idancepro-.\ oao by G~:r..c. Lebsr ~17, 't~ s ofOeca Hcnt Removal"'

u.. t'! 'ld 114¥\-s.th.at.dor.:-eaSJe'IA.>n lerlr,o..oe l DcloN e Rewctor Pfes-sureVo"S""Set

-J (di"5Qtt;S.Od ta ler In 1hls bo.sasto nd IS boh.cvect to b" c<JY.,arvotwe gNcn that nan1)o o*e c or c !iJII~ pi*M od one ll'IXC<l<rrally cootr.-lod. Los. o! lorted

• et*

~

a lew pr~r e CO<'Itol nment Dornet to ns!Sion prodl>tt se t* o~y hOO t r<m.,....~l 01fcd1Jced J,.,.,n l orymllyrcsu~ in more raolcl

"" *bi*>h~ lll Cl'"~ I'5C:l in RCS tempr.r!.nwas d~ntfing- on the tunu 'SJnc~ ~da<<n

Al~o ddlouo<l ls a C001plol* *oss Ol lunollons 11!qullad ltv core cool.:>g Normal mt.a.ns ol core t*ll"l>.....turf.' lndcalion

• nd RCS "'"*l lnolcalloo may w durin1l rcfuolinoand cd d

• hutda.m rnadcs when neftncr CON1 AI MMEr net be avll.lloblc :n tho relu "'Q m<>de R odundunl m c~>n* ol Rcacla l-en CLOSUR E ncr RCS Integrity ere est*bli.shed RCS ntogrlty l sln place Prossun! Vf.'ss!!l le~l <natctUJ:>n"'" tl>erefore I"OG<durelly lnst allou to

>en wnen the Rcs*oros'MO boundar{ Is m Its norma l cco t111on Ia the cdd a ssu ~ lho1 tM al>ti<ly to monlto- lowt wtU n01 be ~n t<<rup t od . H ""'**-* II shll101>'NII m0<1e Of operetloo t e.g , no ee>:e seats cr nozzu. <lams) r o alt tevet end t.,pcrnture inatC!J ~~" t o~ IQSlln ~ n .. lhe roa

(!) cl<!tay timers all""<!d tt~c~usec th e ~p oretoii "'actor coolant that m *y ~ or shuld<M"n Ieruollng modes. EAL 1 woold res.uot11n aeclaroltro of 2 rele osod 10to c Coo alnment aunng tr>ls heoluo cond*UQn cOJI<l I~ be N<-~1 cotiCil of tlnusuel E""nt ! NOUEtil bellltemperaturo *lllltlleii(>J

J dlreotly released to llle environment jn dlcoltlln oonocl: be rutor..d wltilln 1S mlnotes rom t he loss <Sf bee w m*~"' ofl~cl>e ' Oil E-11\tlon iolllert '"*ll" be~ CA t bo~ oo on

I The n o1e f ') lndca!es l h!tl tills EAlts nd e::oplle* rf oetlons aro lo *tMtcty 1os1 or CAC bas ed M !l: c~clnQ ds t~rnPeretur e- trt1!U!l u.. Slltt<tSs!ul ln rf:S!onng SOC toopemtlon one RCS ~poorntur>t Is bt!tng w (td<Joe4 ...,thln i~* ~olkt<f time '"'t CU7 -Basis:

0::

In *w :n, !he t O p~ pr..swr~tn:r ""~"' *<~ch ~~es si1ubtiont "th*"'* d<Jelo Thepwrpose ol l*lC:ana lt~as~oamod EAl s ts to Jt<:0!711Ze a lou of DC 2 hlgll dee&y near le>a d$, tne1nte p rOVIded fo r!$lo<e tern;perallne ~lrol , POI>Cr Ct\m!>!oml!ling tho 0 ijolytt> 11\l:tliiCO 8t1dc011fr(l the '-OVIII 01 Oec.>y

!: Sl!o uld bc lc51 than 60 min~ tes ~eo t ll!JII<lg Ccld S.utdOW'II C< R~ru* ~ng O!>OfiiUons 0

0 Escltlo tla> t o SJto l'lel Emtrgency'l*'ould llc! via CSt S ooldbolllng rt"SO>II he toss ol L!\e o poorelll\g tc perabf* l trwn !S 10 be const.de< NJ lrtnts l oss 1- tn srgmflellnl Reoaoc Pt...ssotf\1 VeU<IIollel i ~ teodurg t t>~ct~ uncoYt<y

1 <<'SUns in the m obility lo ma.nt cold ..,ul<lown . th< os..-..Jatle<1 to an Alert X: *..tu QeoorCA4 This IC and *ts Uli'>OC1*te4 EAls 11."' IJ.>kd an c<>r~com s rot~ byGenertc en L~fttf88 * , "t~:le>! D etll~~u i R 0Volt*A n u~roft:Jhe<o(;(l1tnt Th~ In catca ws VOlt a ~ I<; ba.socl on Inc mtn~mum bus vel tape neces..ary 0 w .ch as Jl<e~surlzali<l1 . vcnoxi"g* steam generator U'lubt! drelnmg. RCS fa tile ~ntt i an otufet y relotod equipment. This ""IIBlle IIBkl" Sitoul d

-J loYtd Orte rence s when operebno n1 11 ml o~l.oop con a,tl on ~ !Sei:ll'{ l'lcilt 0 I caporote ~ morgtn of ot least 15 rT>Rutes 01 oper011Qr1 bcfae the oosot </.

.(.) removt!l system t!Joslgn, and l&el lnstrumenlnilon prrbleons can Ieat! ro inoblllly to e"Oie ttrose ton<!S cm dilions *~oherc doCIIy ll**l romoval i s l O!.l nn tl ce<t unoo*; ory em~ <>:cur I NRC 1lna1Y""...e' shON thst tner.e ore st-QUences 1he.t ca.'l cause c or~ F l~een n> n ul~ w6s ~ lecl ed u o l hrUl'.o'd to e.o:lu~ tllJI~t:t\ 1 or

(.) un co-~ryi n 5 to 20 minutes end .5-eYft'f! care domoge w\lh1n hour a ncr m('tl'ltnt sry pt:tJ."'f!f losses detiJ'I h.,.t '" mo*r *lls losl A toss ol Technl<:*l Spea~ootlan COllpon en s aron e tt nctlnte ndecl!a CU8-Basls:

ooo-'S(IIut~ t~ n AJe:rt The !S.!ttne js true ot:a momenh.ry UNP1.ANN£D CONTt.I IIM ENT ClOSURE - 11'1~ j)'oeedu~ de d ftciiOI\S Thi1; IC oddr..,ses altl ca.~ ty event* at OOCUJ In Cdd 9ru1dO'Nn a excurston eb<Neth e T*Cil cal Sp ~1 oetiCil cdd sn utdown temperotu re taken to s:ecur.c conta.lnment end Hs as:sodefe-d 'S1Ncl res. llrrtt When che f\eil\t rfn'I0'41 runettM *S ttva*l&ble R.efue:ltn*9 mod!'s such as 1uet mls-toadlng events oa d l.f"ladvet1f!!n! d!ul~on

~ems.. ~ nd compon(nts. t\~ ~ tu nctlom.l\f barrlel to fi-s\ion ~n ts . T si Cindico tes o pclentiol d egrao alion oltl>e !evel Ol sa ftr.yd the product retlf:aso un d"~ r erxlsl ing piGnt conditions. p lant , warran

• Q a Jotl~catt o1 of Unusual Evtn l (NOUE) classlfie<~llon The Emergency COOfdillalor mu~ rem31n llle:t lo eve nts ot cOfld~lon$ th t lead to t~e ~on<l u s< on !hat ~ee e alno e EAL fs IMMINENT II in the I MltfEUT - Mll rgetton a ctlons h3Ye b een metfec ve. ad d~tOOB I Tho tOfm *sus.tained" k ti"SI!O In ora2r to a lioN exctusrcn of expe ctC'd shoo jucfgncnl oH I1e Emcrgenc*; C oordin ator. an IMMI NEIIT ~u oll cn Is or actloo5 are no: expe cted 1o bo 5tJCt'e"SsM. and lfCndcd cerrn postltve<Siartup rates. em planne-d ruel bundle or ccn trol rOd h$nd, the dns~o rr.:nt t on should be m ode a~ lithe thrc >hd" h3~ been

!nb"maUon lndlcale$ that 1hc cvt:nl or c c:ndl on wWI occ:ur 'Aiherc

~ xc~ d maYements d unn9 core a eratlon These short term poSltl\,~ startup rates.

IMM itJ Ern

• umefram e-s are spe-Cifi ed they 'Sha ll ap pl)l. are the re1,u11 Of~he 11\<:rec.so tr. neutron populo on du~ to sube:nttcal muttlpl:(a 'on .

P:\G E: 13 RE\'J SION: C - CO LD CO:-.: DITIONS EPI P-0 1-F03

• T LUCIE P! .A \IT CL:\ SSlF ICATIONTOOL EP3:4 (APP-C-16) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert CA4 lnalil!y to Ma:main Plasrt in Cold SilM.dctM'L Operating Mode Applicability: 5, 6 Oper.rting Mode Applicability: 5, 6 EALValues:

EAL Values:

1. An UNPI..AN ED e~~enl results n RCS len:pera!ore greaiEr lhan 21l0"F fer grea!er !han lhe specified duration <m table.

(/)

Table: RCS Reheat Duration lltresholds z 0

RCS i ntl!grity Dta-ation i=

u INTACT Q:IJ: NOT Res REDUCED N!A 00 1. Ar1 PlANNED event re9Jfts in RCS !em~ exoeed'ng z minutes' 200'F  :::1 INVENTORY) 1.1..

..J NOT INTACT OR RCS REDUCED INVENTORY Eslatlished NOT Ega!Hished mi.;:!.es' m~l.es 2. loss of all RCS temperature AND RCS level indicatioo for 15

~

minutes or longer.  :;

• it SOC is in oper.ilion ~thin !lis time frame and RCS !emperatlJre is being w retlo.rced, the EAL is NOT ap iil:le.

Iii QB_ in

2. An UNPLANNED event results n RCS F'ress!n lise greater ti1an 10 psi due to (!)

O~~ ~~ng. (This EA!. doesNOTa~y in SCUD PlANT z

i w

l

.r '* CU7 loss of Required DC PaNEr for 15 Minu:es Or Longer. u..

w Oper.rting Mode Applicability: 5, 6 a:::

INTACT - lthe RCS can be pressurizedw'fu minim ~ra!or actions {w~n 10 ninutes). Then lhe RCS is INTACT.

z REDUCED INVENTORY -A slMctc~ cool~ conditfcn 1\tlen fuel is n lhe Reacll::r Vessel and the Reacta Vessel w-..!H leYEI is b~en 3 S':

lea b~v lhe lop of thE! Reactor Vessel F!anDe ;;nd eQI13llo the IXlQ of the £lew ~a of the RCS hot leQs oozzles at the Reaclor 116sel (33' lo31" l" bvT\'!IOnl. IAOM~9.141 8

~

SCUD PLANT OPERATIONS- When !he pre551Jrizl!r is filled and tru! Res is in a wa.:er-solid conditioo during healup and coddown between  :::1 hat shu!dcm and re!fuelitg ccncfrtions. (DBO-RCS- t /2] :I:

(/)

UNPLANNED - A para!1'18erch~ or an even! fhal is not the res of an * *- d!:d ~ and reQ.Uires.corredive or ni~ actions. 1. less than1 12V on 1[2!A AND 1 [2]B~uired 125 VDCbusses c

..J for15 minu:es or lcmger.

0 u

t  ! CU8 lnad~~ertent CMica[iy.

I Oper.rting Mode Applicability: 5, 6 u

EALValues:

1. UNPlANNED suslai.-.ed J!Csi!M: startup rate observed oo ood'ear instrumemalion.

C- COLD CONDffiONS 14 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: l ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL C - COLD CONDffiONS 14 EP3:4 (APP-C-17) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE CU6- 'Basis:

The pllTJ)O'Se oflflis IC and its associ3t;:d EALs is to re-w"'Od!liz:e a s of conrmmicalions capahlity that eifuel" defeats the pl;w qJlffiilions s1aff abiE!y :Ul pafcrm routine taS'ks necessary for plan! operations or the ability ro COIIIII1Ul1'ca:e issues vilh off-s:te allillcrities. The loss of clkile conrmmicalicns ab , is expeded ID be !ilgnificanlfy mere OCI!TIJ:Il!hmsi.oe man me condition addressed by 10 OFR 50. 72.

~=:i~~~~~~:r~~1~:~~~- This 8!1 is intended o be used only when I!Jitraortfnary means (e.g., relayitg of il."mna!:'cn from radio transntiss'oos. in:LYXiuals beng sen:t to off-site locations.. ell:.} a-e being *&ed to make corrmunicalions possible.

The list for on-site corrm!Wcalfcns. ss ernoompasses the loss of all mearns of commurica!icns ro.Jtinely used fer oper.tJoos.

The lis! fer off-site COimltSlicalfcns loss eoocmpasses the loss of all means of rommulicalicns routinely used fcr ofkite emergency nctiffca.tons.

I u

C- COLD CONDITIONS 15 E.I\L- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL R- COLD CONDffiONS 15 EP3:4 (APP-C-18) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert CU6 loss oJ All On-site or 0ff-s'1l!Co1l1111Aricalions Capabilities.

(llB)

Oper.rting M. . Applicabi6ty: 5, 6, Oefueled EALValues:

1. loss of ALL cf the 1011or<i11g on-siee commurica:tcn mefhcds

.alfecfrtg the ability 1D perloim ~ine cperL.cns:

• PfamPag;;

• Plant Radios

• Carrnereal Phones' Qf!

Notifications NRC Notifications

• Emergency Not:lication System (ENS)

• Commen:i phon~:*

C -COLDCONDIDONS 16 EA.I.- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL C- COLD CONDillONS 16 EP3:4 (APP-C-19) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE This Page Intentionally Left Blank C- COLD CONDITIONS 17 E.AL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 3 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL R- COLD CONDffiONS 17 EP3:4 (APP-C-20) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE RECOGNITION CATEGORY H HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY H- COLD CONDIDONS 18 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL H- COLD CONDITIONS 18 EP3:4 (APP-C-21) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE EAl #1 EOOOrTJlasses coo:filions unde!'vilich a HOSTILE ACTIOI'lhas re: These EAts esC<Ilate from HIJ1 in 1ha! the ~ce of the evem has EAL #J is to ensure th:atnotJicalioos tcrlhe o'rt:l'aftma! are rmde ina Ttmely and aocur:afe ootmzmicalion belv.'E'En Sectnily Shift S~1'sian 0

~=~~!~~ ~o~~s~=~~the ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

resulted in a loss of physical control of ESSENTIAL AREAS (containing Y.1al equipmem or ccntrols af vital eqtipment) reqtired to ma:ntain salE!y .an:/ the Coltrol Room is crucial for~ inp.!emenlation of effective famctioos and ooollcl d that equipment carw:t be ir.msfeTed to an.d - EAl..;s_ safety srstems il those s:ruclures £Yidenced by Cootrol Room indications ~at It is not the irrlentafthisEAltorep!ace&isting nm-hoslile re1a!ed cp!!!ated from another Jo::ation_ of degraded s)Slemresponse<<perfc""""""'- Theoc::ooo-e:noe of iJ'iSl!llE EALs ii'IIIOMng aircralt DAMAGE and!or degraded system <esJ)Oilse is intE<!ded 1a disairrinate against lesser e~~E!IIts. The iri:tial repofl! shculd ncx be inlefpreted as This EAL is met \'lien a plant receives infimr.ation ~ng an ain:taft

=~~~l:~:'~~~t!d~~1~~~ ~7~~d~~~y~~~t~ewN~j; ~b~p~ffi~

sigrilicance here is net that a parlfctbr system oc slructure was damaged, mat is made need decla1e the Ur:tllS'sl E""nl btrl rather, !!tat !he E'Uenl was of S'!Jfficienl magnilude to cause this degada':'cn_ The NRC Headq,uariers Clperooans Oflicer*(HOO) w:l l ClQIT'I!rU!ica!e 1a i!1e

~ Escalilfion of this energency classiflcalicn level. if appro¢ate. v.'OU'xl te ~~~th~~~J~~~=r~':~=~'D~:~~:?.rne w based en System Malfunct'cn s.. stilus and size af the plane may be pcc.Mded by !WRAD !~>rough lhe NRC.

u.

<(

E~#2- iromerro spe::ificslruci:uresor areas thatrorttm safety Escolatian to Alert ew.ergency dass'fteilficn *Ia~ "'"'.rld be via 1-!1!..4 ~::uld en ~fl or cetll'DI>!>f'lt amd ftstcflOIIS requi~ far safe sh!OO'mm cf the be awoptin; .If the lhr'eat .irtv:i\'eS an iirlinll< vlilhirt 30 minutes of !he 1- plant z Thiscoo:fitcn represents an est:alalEdlhmat to plani sa!eiy abovelrot ~~5msAC:xJ.1t~~ :!:'J~=~=~due sa.. contained it the Nat in that a ho&i'.e terce hilS progressed from ih2

• O'.~NER OCNTROI..LEDAREA to the !?ROTECTEO A!1!:A.

accidental E.¥ents or at:1s of civil disobe<iieooe. such as small -aircraft irrpac!.lwn1ers, or p!v;'Sic dis~es beh\"een employees ~ ..lin !hi:

In EAL #1 Seism'c even'.s d this magnitude can I'E!Sdl in ESSENTIAl AREAS beilg sOOjected to fun:es ~nd ~ limits, and thus damage may be assumed fD haw~ to pW1t safety systems. The US

(!) This EAL addresses ttte conmgeru:y tbr a very rapX1 ~sion of l!lll!l'ds, ~~~~~AREA (OCt.}- ThoseE'VS15 areadequii!Ely Gealogbal Survey (USGS) Nilfional EarthquaJie lnfOttna!ioo Carter can These EALs are cate~ en the basis of the OCO'.Im!B::e of an .....,nt of z such as tltatexpefieooedooSeptember 11, 21!01. It is not premised solely ccnlit:m if a~ £oarlilqilab! ha5 *OCCUlTed n !he area cf the plant S'llfficien1 nugn'1JX!e to be of coocem to plant opEfalcts_

j:: en ~e pctential fer a r.ltf'lo'.ogiC<Il reease_ RathE<' the issoae indudes the NOO. that lhis EAL is app'lcabl!!fur any HOSlllE ACTION occunillg, <<

u need for racid assistance dliE! to me possbility for significant and !hal: has oCC\IITE!d. in the OWI'<ER CCM"ROLLED AREA 1his includes EA!..i!2isbasedon a ranado striking (touching c!a\\n) orh~ winds that EAl #1: Oanuge may t:e caused to some por5cns of e,e site, !Jut should w indeiemmate damage fi00'1 addieiooal ai', land or \'filter allack elemerJts_ JSFS!s ihatmay l!e outsJd'e the PROTECTED AREA but still ~n the hil\le cal6Ed VISIBtE OAMA.GE lo struclures ccnta'IRYigflmC!ioos or not affett a.!Miity of sa!'E'ty flJndions to cp!>r.l!e.

u.

u. CwlerControl:edArea systems reqaTed 6or safe shutdown of lhe p.'ant As c!efned in 1he EPRI-spoos.."red Gtid!linas far NUdear Plant Respoose

<( The factlilm tttesite is under serious a11adcwith rrinimall'irl!! oro~a~labJe,for to an Earthq..ak<:. da'.Ed Oc!ober t GBQ, a "fa eirilq.uake" is: An ftZthEr ~on or aOdilfonal assis!ortce to am~ requires OIIS!!e en EAL#2 addresses the immediacy of an expe~ tlreatarriltai or iw.pact on ,~~!!IIJ*I!~~~~~~g;~~~~~

z 0

RESJlOnse Qrs:anization (ffia) rea:fness an.d pn;par.Jtion far the irrplemematim of pnxecti"" mea=.

ih~> site Y.L1h'n a refatiiiEiy shoot time.. h earthquake af sufficient mlensi.tyso.r.h that{a} ihe vibta'.my ground rrotion is fett a: 'the nuclear j!lant sile amd re<:ognized as an ea!ti>quake based on a F This EAL addresses tile potential fer a lla'f !aJlid progress'on of BellS Thein:eruofth'Sis:t.oensurelhalnotificatiansfortheairmeratock!l1:eat ~.;..~~:/c':u~n~tJ!~;~~,!'>;,:r!.

iO~~~~~~~=:f::'!;t~~~~~d ~~ T~anda~oatrJ!111.¥licat~':m"een Seat.ritySMSup&Vi~ion 0

0 due to a HOSTilE ACTION_ It is not intended to address in£:ic!en!s ihat are aWVdieli z accidental events or acts of C: disoiletfe<tce, such as small a'n::al! regarding 1M aedilte ihreat Airfner is meant io be a large aiiaaft with the andtfle Cantml Room is oCrudal for t.'rei~Jllf~ of eJfedille The USC-eological Survey (USGS) Na.'ional Eanhquake ln3::tmatian 0

u =3~-gsAJfE~~=~s~~~=~~b~er potallial fCr causfng.silJnificant damage to the: plant S - EAts. Center can ccnlirm n an ear!h<;uake has ClCCim'ed in the area of the pi aM.

0::: EALs. Thls Eft!. is met volben a plant recei""s m!Cf1'llafon rep:ding an :airlil'let" Secuityeven!sWh'chdonatf'E$l<'eSE'ma pcll!ntial d~a'tioo in lhe IE'II EAl#2 is b<ISed<l<ltheassurnp!ion lhata lomado striking (toochingdol.o.n) w ~"!adt 1hreal from NRC and the ailfl1er is Ylilhin 30 mtr:JJI.es of !l)e plant

J: EScala~cn of ihis ~cydassificai!ion !'eve!, ~ appopria'.e, wculd be Only :!he plant to v.tlich ihespeclictlreatis made need declare the Alert. ~~Vff~~~ase=:~~~s~~~1JJs~~ Ol:J:are crhi!#>'..mds *>ilhin PROTECTED AREA-1- based on adual pW1t sb~JS after irJl>at:l*or progression .of a."tack 0 dassifiable uncfer HM, HS4 and 001_ EAL#3 c This EAL addres..es the elted of imtemaJ flooding CiPJSEd ~ evatls SIY.:h z as component failures, equ~t misalil;nmem, <<oo.Jiage at:!:vily

<( rrishaps_

The intent of this IC is io cap1tR ihose evenis w!tere centro! of lhe p'ant en cannot be reestaltisbed in a time!ly tmnl'lE!r- In trns case. expeditirus c trans!S'cf- ccntrol cfsafety5'JSI2mshasnot oocuned (althcllgh fiSSion 0:::

prod.Jct banier d~ may net yet be itdicaiEd).

~ Vl~ih tfu! Control Room evacuated, additir.rol ""lJpori. roonilllring and Reference, is madE! to site specific securityslift s~s(()n because these The intent of the EAL is 1o establish centro! af irrtporbnt plam equ'pmE!nt. directi'on l!lro"ijh W: Techrical Suppcrt Cen1Er ..,dlor other ernergenct rooidu;Jls ""'the designated persoonel on-site qualif'ed and trailed to

J: and knowledge ofirrllorbnt plant paramete<s in afmeJy mOillllel'_ Primary response F.a&ites may be necessary_ confirm that a security !!\lent is occuning .or has oro.m:ed.. Trailing an I emphasis shculd t:e plaoed*on those COIT'ponents and <<ts1n.ments t1tat sea.uitoJ event dassifr.ation confitma!ion is dosely oorrrolled due !o the Sllpply prolectian ti:lr and infarmafion aOOut Siifety functiORS_ These safety l nabtlity!o estatlish plant control from ool side the Comro! Room 1\ill slrict seaccy controls placed oo the plant Ptlysical Sectlilj' Plan.

J:

turu:lioosare react,vity oootroL RCS i~ry. and secondary heal escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

removal.

~~=::d~~~t~~~-0~~=~~

Plan, Tr.ining <M Quaffi::ation Plan_

The determination af \\ttelher cr not ccntrol is estibliShed <II: ih2 remote s!UJI:dcml parni!l is based co E'mergenc-J Ccodina!or (EC) judgment. The Eirergency Coordina'.or is e:*pected eo make a reasmable. informed EAL #2 is included to ensure that apJlltlllria1e notificat'icns for the seaJrit.)*

~~~U:~~e~t:rt~~dc~~~'lhBtihe li:ens~ has ~=-~i;'f:~t~ji~~:=~~~~:ci.:~

Notif.:ca!km a an Unt1SU31 EliiEf'll Escolaticn of !his en:egency dassifx:alion level. ~ ap~ria'.e. would be by Fission Prod~ &me' Tatle or Aboormal Rad Leve~!i~Racfdagical EJEuent The de:ieminatian of "aedilie* is~ lhroogh use of irtama':X:n fo!lnd in EAls. the Physical Secur<ty P1an.

(Continued in neJd column!

H- COLD CONDffiONS 19 E.~- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 STLUCIE P~ CLASSIDCATIONTOOL H- COLD CONDITIONS 19 EP3:4 (APP-C-22) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIXC EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency HG1 1-105TllEACTICf.l Resulting in Lass of Phys:X:aol Canlrdof HS4 HOSTilE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA HA4 HOSTILE ACTION ~i:llin the OWNER CONTROLLED />REA or Airtxlme HU4 Confirmed SECURilY CONDmOO or Thre.a! 'Mlidh lhe Facility. Artack Tl¥eat Indicates a Potential Degradation in the level .of Safety of the Plant Opefaling ModeApplicabiHty: All Clper.iting Mode Applicability: All Operating Mode Applicability: All Oper.rting Made Appllcability: AU EALValues: EALValues: EALValues: EALVilfues:

1. A HOSTILE ACTION has~ such !1m pion personnel are 1. A HOSTILE ACTION is OCOJI'Ting a has ocetm!d 1\i!ltin ~ 1. A HOSTilE ACTION is occuring a has cxx:tm!d v.ilhin ~ OONER 1. ASECURITYCONOfTlON thai does NOT involve a HOSTilE

!nlble to op~ equipment required ic maintaft safety functions. PROTECTED AREA as report,ad by the Securily Slift SUpet>*isor. CONlROtLED AREAasr£1Mlr1ed by the SeCJrity 91i Supenrisor. ACTION as reported iby 1t1e Securily Shift Supervisor.

QB. QR !lB

2. A HOSTILE ACTlml has caused fa'Jure *of Spem Fuel Cool'ng 2. A validated notlication from ~ .of an AJRI..INER attack t1weat wi'.hn 30 2. A credible S1. Luc'e sea.i!y threat noti alien Systems and IMI< ENT fuel d~ is likely for a freshly off- rrinutes of the s'!e.

~

loaded reactor core n JPOOI. .QB

3. A va!idaled no!ificaf'on ftcm NRC flrovidi'IQ inf<xmalicn of an LL al-ctaft threat. <(

en HS2 Control Roam Evacuation Has Been Initiated and Plant Control Canna! be Established.

HA5 Canlrd Rocm Evacua!ion has been Initiated.

z !z

<(

0 ...J Operating Mode Applicability: All Clper.lting Mode Applicability: All i= Q.

<(

l (!)

EAL Values: EALValues:

0 z i=

1. Control Rocm evacualioo has been initiated.

AND

1. 1[2i-ONP-100.02. Control Room lnaoce:ssib :1)1. requiles Control Roan evacuation. ~ (,)

w LL a: LL

<(

01. Control of the plan: cannot be established wiilm 15 ninutes. 0 en HA1 NimJJal a Destrua;ve f'tlenomena Afiecting E:SSENTlAL AREAS. HU1 Na!tral crOestrudivePhenorrenaMe::tfrlg~ z PROTECTED AREA. 0 Operating Mode ApplicZ!ility: All E c

Oper.rting Made Applicabirrty: All DEFNT10N BOX EALValues: z EALValues: 0 AIRUNER- Airfner is meant 1o be a I~ airaalt ,,;Jb lhepeeential for causira siJ:Jli aon1 d11m3Qe to the plant.

1. Seismic ewnt IJ'E!M than Operating Basis Ea!thquake (OBE) as indicated by (,)

ESSBmAL AREAS- Areas within the PROTECTED AREA. lhat contails equip men!. sys1ems. canponen!s. a material. the failure.

seismic instn.nentation (h!nunciaior S-36[5-44]) G.'lEATER THAN 0.05 g. 1. Seisrric e>Oent idat::fie<! by ANY 2 of the follol'ling: a:

w

• Seisme event confrmed by p ant seismic men iter cies:rudicn. or n:tease cf wtlidh oould cfrealy or ind'red!ly endanget" the public health om:l safety *by exposure 1o radia::on. ~

FRESH!.Y*OFF-LOADED REACTOR CORE IN POOl- A fresllly olf.Joaded reactor cere. in the Spent Fuel Pool. exis!s dlrtiQ lhe I!Eriod of AND ins1rumerus (Arwmciators S-46 [S-54D

• ~u efett inp<ant ....

a. Earlhql:lake cornfirmed by ANY of the fcUDI'Mg:

• US Geclogeat Suvey (USGS) NaticnaliEarlhquak>:

0 time \men core olf.Joid beQins umil CCt1! relood is CQmli:Ere.

• E~e felt in plant Information *Center c HOSllLE ACTION -An act toward a Nuclear Pol'lei" Plant (NPP) or s persomel !hal incllldes the. use of violent force to destroy equiPment.

• US Geclogicaol Suvey (USGS) National E.arlhql:lake lnfcnnation Center z

<(

take hosbges. andfor intimida:e the licensee to achieve an end. This inc'udes atlack by air. land. a water using guns. explosives,

• Cordrol Rocm ind'caticn of degraded performance of systems requifed !lB PROJEC LEs. vehicles. a olher devices used to deEva- desindiw face. Other acts that salisfy lhe eve it:ent may be included.

HOSTILE ACTION shou!cl not be construed ttl include acts of c:MI c!isobed'ence or fielonious acts that are nat part of a concerted atlack *on the fer tile safe shutdown of the plant

2. Tanado ~biking \\ilhin PROTECTED AREA boundary OR hiJ;fl ~

NPP. Non-terrorism-based EAl.s should be USEd I.e ad:lress sucll act¥.lies (i.e_lhis rnav include vi00er1t acts between individuals n the auner :QB. \'<inds gealer lhan 120 mph. a:

OOIO'clled <1!"51~.

IMIIIINENT- ~li~!J3tion attiloos have been ineffa."live. adc!itfcnad a.."lians are no! expected to be suocessf!j, om:l trended information indicates

2. Tornado s1rllci'1Q OR liig/1 w::Ods g-eater than 120 mph resullfng in VlSIBLE DAMAGE io ANY of *the following structures Cl!ria'ning safety sys1ems a

!lB ~

~

thil!tlle event orcondit'cn \\ill occur. Where IMt.IINENTtimeframesareSJiecifed.th~sl!all a!llllv. OCX"nflonenl OR Control Rocm indica!'on of degraded perfolmomce of those 3. lntemallloo<fll1Q that has ~ flOtential to affed safety rela!ed I sa!'e!ysystems: equi!:rnent required by Technical Speci aliens fer lhe ctm'ell!

~mode in AI<< ofltle~\ing areas: ~

OWNER CONTROLlED AREA- That portion of FPI.. p~ sunt1U11a11g and including the St. lucie Nudeaor Power Flam 1\tlich is sub;ed to limited access and corod as deerr.ed appropria:e by F?L [EP!an) ~:"B~d~t &ilding and lnlake Coo&lg Wale" {IO.V}

Control Room lntak.eStrucl!ure PROTECTED AREA- The~ (within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREAl COO!Jilied by lhe rwcleaor ...Uts and associated eQUipment and facili!ies enclosed within 1he sewritv Jlerimeter fence. The area Ylilhin wtidl aocoi.IUabilitv of persomel is mamaned in an en\E!riiE!IlC'f. Reactor Auxiliary 8\Jila11g {RAB ) Con1xment CocDig Water (CCW) Cable Speatfng Room Intake Coolilg Wa!er (ICW)

.P'alfonn area SECURITY CONDmON - Arry Security Event as Jis:ed in the "IP"""ed secumy comi1gency plan that consiilutes a lhtea!loomprorriise to sile Vital S\\itdtgear Rocm ComflOneru Co W=r (OCW) sea.ily, lhrstlrisk I.e site flE!I'SOnnel, a .a pccen5al degradation to the level of sa5ay cf the plan!. A SECURJTY CONDITION does not involve Steam TresHe Area Emergency Diesel Geru!rator Buil ding SIIEam Tres11e A.~

a HOS lE ACTION.

Condensate Storage Tani: {CST) Diesel Oil Storage Tallk (DOST) ~;ft1~ci~~(RAB)

VISIBLE DAMAGE- OamaQe to equiPment a strucaR 9\al is readilv observable wthcut measuremenis, tesErlQ, a analysis. DamaQe is.

suffic'ent to cause ooncem reganfitg the coofuued operab:ily or reliability of lhe ~cted s7uclure, systern. or ~nl Exam!te damage Ultimate Hea1S'nk [UHS) RefLJeling Water Tank (R'o'IT} Emergena1 Diesel Generm WlclJdes: deformation doo lo heal or impact. denfng. pen6raticn. rupl!se. craclcing. and pam blistering. Surface l:lemishes (e.g~ painl Buildiila

~ira. saa:ches) shDUid not ~ induded.

(Continued~ next oaoel OR (Continued on next ~ael H- COLD CONDffiONS 20 E..o\1.- COLD B_.<\.SIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSillCATION TOOL H- COLD CONDITIONS 20 EP3:4 (APP-C-23) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE E."'l. !fladd!esses lft~ effect of inll!mal flooding caused hy BII!fl!ssuoh .as EAI.. #4 addresses main !:labime rolali~ canpcn~ failures of sufficient

~f::de:!~~=~~~a~:!:tshaps. tt :r::em:u:;=~~~~~:~=~F~

iAC!ustrial siifety haz3n:!s (e.g~ ~ledri&al sllodt) 1ha1 pr:Educ!e necessary generator ptEge do~ nm meet the intent of1his EAL beciiUSe

• did not ilca!SS to operate or monitor siifety equipnalt The imdility to access. irrpact I1ClfTroi cperaticn of !he plant qperate or rronitor safety e~pmem represents an actual or substantial poladal degr.ldation of the Je\IEI of safery of 1he plant Of ma;or ocnoem is 1he potential for leakage of oomOOs!ib'.e flllllds Flooding as used in iflis E."'l. desaibes a condition *\tl""" wa!a" is enterirlQ ~r~~=i~o::=~~=l!t~~~~~~tief'..,

1he room fas!er than i1stafai eqlipment is capiible of rernc>Val. restiiing ., andHU3.

a rise of water 1!!\IE! within lhe room. Classification of this EA!.. should not be delayed *..tlile corrective ad:'oos are b~ taken to isolate the Yla!a" This EAL is consistent wlilh the definition of a Notification of Uoosual Event ESSENTIAL. AREAS - Are;;s 1\ilhin the PROTECTED AREA, that

~~~,~~=~1!!l~=~~=:.e~r;!~~izing source.

contins e<:~Uitmm. svst.ems. corrc>Onents. or material. the faihre.

c!e5tructim. or release ch\tlich could di'ecttv or ind'n!cttv enclanAerlhe E."'l. #4 adl¥esses the dtreat 1o safety rela:e<l equi~ imposEd ~ classification to Hl\1 is based on damage done by PROJECTI..ES public heil."ih .and siifety by expostR lo radiation. PROJECTILEs generated by main t!Jrbime rolalingoomponenl iailures. ger>era!E!d by !he failure or in conjuncliarn with a steam generator b.Jbe Thererore. 1his EAL is COf1SI51ent N 1he delimion of an AlERT n that llle ~ ~la:lere\IB'IlsWJUidbeclassifie<lbytheradiclcogical ICs ar PROlEClED AREA- The area (wi1hin 1he 0\\'NER CCNTR<JLLED paiEft:ial ais1s for actual or substantial potential dEjJriida!ion of lhe level of F15Sion J!rcduc:t Barf.er 'ICs.

AREA) occupied ~ the nuclear units and associ ale<! equiJ:IIlErlt .and safety of ihe plant facilities enclosed wi1hin Itt~ seC".Ditv perimeter feru:e. The area \\ilhin EAl.. #5 addresses nalutal we a'.her phenomena of a hlnicar>e warning il'ld whdl accctmabilitv of perscmel is ma'nl:aine<l i1 an ernerpencv. E."'l. i5 adl¥esses vehicle crashes wiflin the PROTECTED PREA. that ~rainfall and sl:oonsurges.

re5ltls in VISffiLE DAMAGE 10 ESSENil."tl.. AREAS or Wlication of damage to silfety struc:::tfiS,. systems. or CCf1!4Jonenl:s ccntairing runaions Escalation of !his emergency classifica.:'on vel. if appropria:e. would be and sy,;iems re~red for safe shlll!lc>MI of !he planrt. based oo VISIBlE DAMAGE. or by dlter in plant ccnditiO!liS, Yia HA1.

E."'l.li6 addresses other p.enomena tim restlf in VISIBLE DAMAGE to the ESSENTW.AREAS cnesults in indi::aliarn of damage to structtRs, sy.;lems, or compona1ts contining fun::tfcns and system; required b safe S!>u!l<tO\\T'I cf1he plant {such as hurricane and s1Imlswge}ihal can aJsc be prec1J1'501'S cl mort! serious events.

I X

H- COLD CONDffiONS 21 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL H- COLD CONDITIONS 21 EP3:4 (APP-C-24) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert HA1 (Continued) HU1 (Continued) 3- =~~=!~~~g.::.n~==:r=oR

4. Ttn!ine faii~R resulting in casing penetration or damage to 1url!ine or generalor seals.

Control Ream indica1ioo cl degaded performanoe of lOOse *safety~:

.QB 1..0/Mlti! KOOO lntakeStructllre

5. Nat o ClC>OOO!!ncesaffecting the PROTECTED AREA: AHY of C<ib".e Spreading Roa-n lntake Coclilg W<Ur (JCW) 1he folloting:

• *Confirmed hurricane waming is in elfecl

'J;1aJ S!1ilchgear Room Cc:n-ponent C g Water {CCVI~

• lo'lt imakecan IB'elof-11l5ft *ILW for1houronn~-

• Vis!fal.si~gs by sta:oo persomel lrot water levels are

~actor Amoliary Building (RAB) Emelgfficy Diesel Generalor Building .a;zpmaCh'ng sWm1 drain system capacly.

-'11.5 fL & 1115 It Bevations

~

steam Trestie Area QR ~

<(

~=~~~~~~~~~~ing s~~~:or (/)

4.

CCil'!JOnents OR Control Ream inlf<:alion of degaded performance sa:ay systems:

of those 1-z

<(

-I

~:"~~d:tn1Tlef1t ~10<119 ana Intake Ulomg vvater I_IVI'I) a..

(!)

z

~actor AuxiEarJ Building (RAB) Ccn-pcnent Coa'Sng Water {OCW) plaffcrm area i=

(.)

w Sle;;m Trestie Area Emerga~cy Diesel Gater:iilor Building ~

~

Condensate Storage Tank {CSD Diesel o;rs~ge; Tank coosn <(

Ultilnate Heat Silk (UHS) REfueling Water Tank (RWT) ~

0 QR E 0

S. Vetlicte cash re5UI&!g in VISIBLE OAMAC-E IX) ANY of the followilg structures oonbinilg safety systems, ex COI'nponents OR Coo!rol Room ildicalian of z

~performance of lhose safety.systems:

0

(.)

Reader Containment Buildill!l and Intake Ccolitg Water (ION} a::

w stUeld Btilding :I:

1-Reactor Amciliary ll<Jilding (RAB) Corr-pooent Coa'Sng Water {OCW) 0 plaffcrm area 0 steam Trestie Area Emerga~cy Diesel Generator Building z

<(

CoOOensate Storage; Tr i {CSD Diesel o;r ~ge; Tank coosn

~

PROJECTILE- An object directed tcwanf a Nuc'ear Power Ultimate Heat Silk (UHS) Refueling Water Tank (Rio'IT) a::

~

IP1ant(f'$1P) 1hat oould cause c onoem fori'!sCCO!f"rlued QPerability. refability. or personnel safety. QR PROlECTED AREA- The an!a fv1ilhn 1he OWNER

r:

G. ~ral occum!llCI!S n!Stili:tg in VISI:BLE OAMAGE to ANY of 1he followi119 I CONTROUED AREA) ~d bv ihe mro'.ear units and iiSlSOCiiiled eq,uiJ:1!1ent and facilities enclosed within 1he ~~as~~~~:~~~of~e:;ed~~~  ::r:

secwi!y pemneter fence. The area \~thin "tlich accountabJcy l!lose sys!emS:

cl p~ is rnaii1tained in an emef!;leflcy_

lntatle:>tructure VISIBLE DAMAGE -Oamai:le to eouilment a- slru~ lha! is realfly obseiY<Ible 1\il!lout measurements. testing, Cf' analysis.. Ciil:4e Spreading Rcom lnla.te CoOCrlg Water (ICW)

Damage is sul![ci;nt to cause cona!m regarding ihe <Xllllinued QPer..bility a- ~i of 1he affeded structure. sys:an. Cf' \IGI 9n!chg:ar Room Component Coo:'ng Water (CCW) oonwnl!f11 Exam:lle damil!le includes: defarma!ion due to heat Of 1r'nPad. denli!;u penetr-ation.~ aacbll!, and Reactor A:wd'5ary Buillfrlg (RAB) Emerg=ncy Diesel Gene.ra:a- Buildilg paint t lislerinll- Surface blemishes (e,o.. paint ~il1!l. -0.5 ft. & 1Q.5ft BevaliOilS scra!ches) should net be included.

S'.eam TrestleArea H- COLD CONDIDONS 22 EAL- COLD B.I>..SIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PL~ CLASSIFICATION TOOL H- COLD CONDITIONS 22 EP3:4 (APP-C-25) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert HA2-Basis: HU2-Basis:

VISIBLE DMMGE is used to identify the magri'tude of the FIRE*or The pu!jp06e of this IC is to addfess !he magnitude .and e.'C!em of ARES or

~~~~k~~;~I~~ru~~~e to EXPLOSION and to cf:s<:Rrmate against rrinor FIRES Zld EXPlOSIONS.

The noference :o SlruCitfts conttning safely systEms or componi!IJts *is degradaiicn n pe!formance .of ~ected systsms that may I'ESt!ft imciOOed to cilscr'm'nale aganst R RES or EXPLOSIONS in al'eaS hiiliir>,} a lew prcba!ffty of affecl:ilg safe operation. The s iglificance hE!Ji!! is not that As usa! here, deteo:'cn is visual obsava..'ion and report by plam pascnne!

a safEly system was degraded IJIJt the faa lhat the FIRE or EXPLOSION or sensor alarm irnc!icafun.

was large eruJ~ to caused~ to these syslems.

RlrEAL #l, !IIA< 15 rrinute tine paiod begins vi~ a aedillenotifii:a..'ion

~ The use of VISISLE DAMAGE Sllould not be interpre!.ed as mandaling a lflat .a FIRE is oroming. or in:iicalioo of a lin= etec!ion systan w lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. The declardticn -of an alii!'ITVactuation. Verificatio111 of a lire detection sysiem alamt incllJC!es u.. Pff:rt and~ activation at me echrilc:al ~port Cent2r\\;n pi'O'IIide me adions :!hat can be l3kien w..... - :!he Conirol Room to ensure that ihe alarm

<(

rJ) Emergency Coordilalor w'ih the 1'1!5011'Ces needed lc perform d~ is ncx spUJious.. An alann is as~d to be an indicatioo of a FIRE unless it damage assessmaus. is disJYCWd\\tlhin !!1e 15ninute period ~ personnel~ to the

!z The Emefgerncy Coordinator also needs to ocmicfer any seamty aspects of SCSle. In d:her viCftls. a pE!SOOileii'I!J!Crl from the SCBJe !Tia'/ be t.ISed to a

disprove .a sensor alann re::eived \\tthin 15 minutes cf the alarm. but shall

<(

the E.l'lf't.OSlCN. not be reqtired to wrify

• e alarm 0.

C) Escalation of !!lis emergency c:lassiliCation level, il ~Jlllropria!!e.*\~11 be The intent of this 15 minute dura1ion is to size the FIRE and to disafm'nate based en Sysiem Malfundiions. Fissial Procila Bomer Oegradation or aga'nsl small FIRES that are readly extinguistle!l. {e.g.. srrnldering vGS!e z AlloDmliil Rad Levels I Radiologjcal Ef!ltJent ICs. P<~per llas.kP-i}.

i=

(.)

w 1-HAJ~=-----=a=-a-SI~

. s-:-----------------+ EAU I2 addll!!S5eScnly tba6E EXPLOSIONS of suffiC'ent force to c1amage u.

u.

Gases in an ESSENTlALAREA can affeotille ability !o safely c.pera1e or

~==~o~~J\:~~::~~~a=

cCCIJITeOOe of the EXPLOSION is su!Ecient fordE!<:Iii!'alfon.

The

<(

rJ) safely~ the reaclcr. The EmergencyOx*dina'.cr also needs ID consider any sectr;ty aspeas of z The fad lhat SOBA may be wan does nct E!irrinate the need to declare e EXPLOSION, - app:icable.

0 I= the I!Vl!lll Escalatiomof iRis emergency dassifc-ca:ion level. if apFOpria:e. would be based on HA2.

0 Decliitalion shalld not be delayed fa< mnfumation from aboospheric z ~the~mx:r~o:~ oa::';,~:,~:db=d .;,'; 1-H - -----------------l

-::-:U-::-3----=a=-as-i=s-:

0

(.) doc:lmlented anilllysis. incicafun of person iBe!ffeas from e>:pO!llll'l!. a 0::: oper.lting experience with the hazards.

UJ

I:

1-0 0

z c(

rJ) hi asphyxiant is a gas capable of red1.1Ci11191he lelle'l df CX)'gell in !IIA< body 0 lo dangerDt.ISiewis. Most oommooly, asphyxianis worf< by merely 0::: displacing air in an enclosed enWcm1ent This reduces ~ conc~on A11 aspllyxiam is a gas capa!lle of n;duc~ng the level of o:ryg;;n in 11112 body

~

of oxygen beiOYIIhe nmmal ~ at aR:Und 19~.. \\hidh can lead to breathing d:fficult:es. llllOOOScioosness cr e'\IBI death.

to dangerous levels. Most rornJ'IlOilly, asph'()i'ants '1\ tlrl< by mEfl!ly

<( displacing air in an enclosed Effl. nment This ~.roes the ccnceml3ticn

I: An t6!COOirofied J'i!lease of flamnable gasses ¥l ith- a facility souctr..-e has of oxygen below !he normal 11!11 of arcwu! 19::'** l..tlidl can lead to I brea:ling di!EcWies, unconsciousness or l!ln!n dea!h.

the potemial to affect safe *operation of lhe pMI ~ limiling e'ther opera:cc

I: orequipmEfll operations due to ihe poeenlial fa< iglilion and n!SUtitg-Escalation of llis emergenC'/ dassifcca5:>n level. jf appmpria!e. would be equipmerl! dam~ersomel injwy. Aammable gasses. sud! as based on HAl.

hyl*ogen Zld aceylen.e, ore rcutine.y used to maintain plant systems (hy:irogen) a to repair eqtipmentloCfTll<lnems (acel:jl'.ene - used in wehfng). This EAI.. assmlE5 conceniraiions at mdl gases can ignit&sUJlJl<lrl combustion.

Escalation 1D a h~r emergency dass!Tocatioo lew!!, 'if appJCpriate, ~ be based en ~tern Malfundfon, Fission Product B.arri..- Tab'e Cl' Abnoonal Rad l.elle!s / Racfoaellite EflluEflliCs.

H- COLD CONDITIONS 23 EAL ~ COLD BASIS PAGE RE\o"'SION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANf CLASSIFICATION TOOL H- COLD CONDITIONS 23 EP3:4 (APP-C-26) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE HA2 ARE a EXPLOSION Affecting the Opl!filbi[1y of Plant Safeey Sysiems HU2 FIRE \',llllin the Pl<<)"TECTEO AREA l'tlt Extinguished Required to Estlblish a lolail!a'n Safe Shu'.dcY.n.. Within 15 MimJ:es-ofDelection ill" EXPLOSION vlithin the PROTEC"TED AREA.

Openling Mode AppliC<lbility: All Oper.rting Mode Applicability: All EAl Values: EALValues:

~

The~ Coold'na!or should IIOt waifoofli appf.~::able lime has elapsed, but Mlocld decJate the 8'eiJt as soon as it is delemlned that the dura5on las exce~ oriD'V Brelj emeed, the cab.~llme.. E 1.1..

1. FIRE or EXPLOSION re9Jiti!g in VISIBlE DAMAGE ao ANY oflhe l'ollcmng 1. ARE HOT extingtished 1\ithin 15 ninutes ofComrol Room z ~

siructures contailing safety sys:.ems or components OR Control Room ARE alarm OR Control Room noti'ca1icn in ANY of !he 0 ESSENTIAL AREAS -Areas within the PROTECTED AREA. !!tat contails equipment. s:;s'.ems. ccmponenis. a material. *the failure. imfcation cf d~ performance of tOOsesafety sys.1ems: toliot.vng areas: 1-deseructiOI!l, *or te:ease of vmieh could diectlv or indiecl:tv endanQer the public lleallh and safety by exposure 1D racia!'on..

Reactor ContaitmEflt Building and Intake SlrucltR Reacta Corta'nmen1 Building Intake Structure tS_, z_,

<(

Sl!ield BuJding and Slield BuJding Q.

EXPLOSION -A IO!Ilid. vident unconf'l1ed combustion. or ciJ!as1rnliUcfail..-e cf ~enetlized eqligment !hal i~arts en..-!l'l' of Q.

suflic'ent force to potentially damage permanent stru::rures. S.)siems. a ccmponents. X Coniro! Room Intake Cooling Water (ICW) ControiRcom Intake Coolilg Wa..>er (ICW) w (!)

ARE- Corrbus!:'on characterized by heilli and lis:llt SctiiCI!S of smoke s.uch as slippnp driue bels or Cllefhealed electrical equipment do nat z

Reader Auxiflary B<lilcfmg (RI<B) Camper~ em Cooling W<tB (CCW} Reactor Auloliary Bu ng Con-pcnem Coolilg w~

w i=

coos.litutl! FIRES. Observa'Jon cf flame is prefgred but is NOT reQIIired if 111e Q\lanlit.es of 91101<e and heilli ;w observed. ~

NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS -AcfvJies at the~t site associa:ed Yith I'Oilline testing. main!En;mce. or equiprnem cperaticns. in Tur!ine B ng if the fire precU:les Eme-gency D'.esel Generator Bu -ng (RAB) (OCW) u:: ~

1.1..

accordance \~th normal operating or attrinis:ra:ive procedures. Entry in:o allnarmill or energency oper..:i!g proc:edlJres,. or deo.'m'oo i'cm iiCa!SS to the Steam Treslle, Control Turbine Builtfllg if the fre EmeruS!CY Diesel Genera'.or 1.1..

normal s.eaJrity or radiological controls pcs:ure, is ad~ from NORMAL Ft.ANT GrERATIONS. Room or RAB Condensate Slcrage Tank (CST) predOOes Buihfng <(

access to the Steam Trest:e, t/)

PRO"TECTED AREA- The area *(within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREAl oa:upied bvlt!e nudear mits and associated equipmeU and Diesel Ol S!orage Tank (OOST) Sleam Treslle Area Control Room arRAS ~ensillie Slorage Tank z facilities enclosed within the s.eaJrity perimel2r CEOOE. The area within W!:ich actXU1:allility of persomel is mailla'ned in an eme<gency. 0 D'.ese!OiiSIDfildi!Tank VISIBlE DAMAGE- O;mage to equipment a s!ruttlse !hal is. readty observable 1\ilt!cul: rnea5Jllrelllenis, tesfng*, a iU!i!lysis. Damage is (COST) Steam TrESI!e Area E suflic'enl to cause concern I'EQ'ard'llll the C!llliinued operab':il'f or reliabifrtyof me a.'fected siructure. svstem. or co._m. Examp:e ctlrnaRe 0

inc'.udes: deFormation dLJe iltl he;u or impact. denlfnQ,IIE!nelralicn. rui'Ue. crackinp, and p

• blisterinQ. Svrfaoe blems.hes (e.R~ pam z

clillpirrQ. scra:ches) shoold net be induded..

0

(.)

~

w

t:

Access 1D an ESSEN11AL ARf.A Is Pronibiied Due To Relez;e ofToxiic, Corrosive, Asflllyxiilnl a Aommallle Gases Villich Jeopardize Opera::icn Release of Toxic, Corrosive. Asphyxian.t, or Flammable Gases Deemed OF!.tmental i1t1 NORMAL PlANT b

0

!Gill ci'Systems Required to :.laintain Safe ~oilS or Safely Shu:tbm !he roa1 OPERATIONS. z Reaclor. t/) <(

~

<(

Operating Mo~ Applicability: All Operating Mode Applicability: AU (!)

~

EALVallll!s: EALValues: _,

w

~

CD <(

<(

If the equ.jlm:rlt .;, li'l!! stated area was atread'-f inopeRble, or oot of SCM'~, :t:

~

befote.li'l!! event~ then this EAL $houldno.! be declaied as it 1>111' have :i I Plillltll!d Clllltn:O!d act:vities, suc:h as Containment entry a! pcmer, do no arJver.;e impact an the abil!y of the plant to safely operate or safely :t:

not meet the irl'.ent of HU3 or HA3. :shttdor.n be}Qid that already allrTM!d l:y Technical SpedfiCaOOns at the lime c!

the event.

5 1.1..

-;:'rx~:.r:iit~~~~j,~~~~

1

.QB

2. REpat by local. 'COIS1ly or State OfficialS tor E'iaCI.fation or sheltering cf srl e personnel based en an cff-!iie event.

H- COLD CONDITIONS 24 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PlANT CLASSffiCATION TOOL H- COLD CONDITIONS 24 EP3:4 (APP-C-27) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE This EAl addresses unan!icipa!erl cooditions not addressed exJ)!Cilly

==~f~=b':r!~b~fu'e'Eme:~~tofall under 1he emergency classifica!'on level desaipticm fer Site Area Errerg6\C)'.

H- COLD CONDIDONS 25 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSillCATION TOOL H- COLD CONDITIONS 25 EP3:4 (APP-C-28) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert HG2 Other Comffions &.isti11Q Which in 1he hlgmatt of the HSJ Other Condlicos Existing Which in lhe h!QlllSll of the HAG Olher Cooditicns Existing Vltlim il the Jud7nent of e Eme!gency HUS Oltler Ccmfficns &.isling '*llhich in lhe.lut!gmem*of ihe Emergency Coonfnator Warr..nt Declara:':on of Gener:al Errergency Coordinator Warrant Oetlara:'oo of S':e hea Coortfnalor Wanam Oedaration cl an N£rt. 5mB"gency CooRfmtcr Vlarrani iJedara!ioo cl a Einergmcy. Errergency. Nclif.ca!icn ofUnusual EIIEllt {NOVE}.

Operating Mode Applicability: All *Operating Mode Applicability: A ll Operating Mode Applicabi'lity: A ll Opeming Mode Applicability: All ~

w Ll..

EAI.. Values: EALValues: EALValll£'5: EAl Values:

ct

(/)

1. Qber cooditiOI!lS exist ....tlich in the;rogmem of the Emagency 1. O'Jller oanditions eJCis1 \\ttich in lhe i<Jdgnem of the Emergency 1. Olha-condlfons exist vllim in lhe juc!gmeni of the 5mergency Coordina:a 1. ~ ooncfrtions exist 1\nich in i!le judlJ!TlElll of Ehe Errergency Coordi1atcr indicale lhatE'IIEflts are in progress or have oootm!d indicate that E!o'Ellls are in progre;s or have ocxured ~~ involve actual or 1-Coordina'.or indicate !hat E!'lents an! in ~ or hiN!': oct:tm"ed potential *substlntial d~lhton of the leU!!I of safety cllt!e plarrt or a 5~1)'

Coordina!or indicate !hal events are in pr<:gess or biro~: z r::c~= p~~c~~£nTI,~c#J~~a:~~~ru!eded whl::h irro.ooNe actual or IMMINENT ~al core degradation or o::curred ....tlich indicate a potenti degrada!'.cn or the level of meHing with pcrterntial fur loss of oontainmem i~ or HOSTllE event ihal involves prd>able life llveale!ing risk to sttE per.;oonel or damage to safety of i!1e plant or indicate a security lhre;n iD facility ~

ACTION ilia! resuHs in an a.c1uallcss of ph)'S'ic con1rol of tru; inlert'onai c!amage *or malicioos ads; (1) tcwaro 5::e personnel or s!e equipment bec;wse of HOSTilEAGnON. Any releases an! expEcted to be proleelicn has been irilia!eti No releases of radior.ive rnataial a..

farility. Releases can be rea500l.lbly expected to exceed EPA equipment tha! could IE!ad to Ehe like.y fai"lure of cr. (2) lhal J'll'IIB1l limibed to *small fracfcns cllt!e EPA PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIOELJNE teqUm g clkite respmse or ll'ICIIitcri11Q are aped:ed unless C)

~..e acoes to eqlf'prn.ent needed for lhe procedioo of i!le pl1!f1C.

PROTECTIVE ACTION GU:O more lhillll the immed'abe site area.

E expo5IJn! levels cXi-site fa eJIPOSUrt! le!ie!S. further degradalicn of safety S}oslems ClOCifi. z

X~~~~~~~~t;lb~~i~~~e:ls i=

u beyonc! the site oou!lldary. w DEFIMTION BOX u.

u.

HOSTilE ACTION- An act llm\lald a Noclear Power Plant {NPP} ct or s persomel lila.! includes the use of violent force lo deslroy C/)

':J:i~ :!i ~~~~~~.=~~Si11Q z 0

g?Jns. exp~-es. PROJECTI!.Es.. 11ehicles, or other devices used I=

io de1iver c!esauc!ive force. O!l1er acls that salisfy the ouerall in':ent may be intluded. HOSllLE ACTION sholid noe be i5 ccrtS1JUed to inci!Jde acls of ci'lil disobec!ience << teorilcus acls z lila.! are not part of a conoe<ted attack m !he NPP. Ncn- 0 leri'Crism-based e..:.Ls should be used lo ad:Rss such ac!ivities u (i.e, !his may

• e !Jiclem act5 beh.een m i!Jidllais in the a::

w cmner controlled area}.

I:

IMMINENT -llmfgalion adfcns ha>te beE<> ineffective. addilicn 1-aclicns are net expected to be successful. and tn;nded 0 irlfamation ind'ca!es that the event or condition will *occur. Vl'here c IMMNENTtineli'ames ...e specifiEd, they smll appy. z ct I'ROTEC11VE AC'nON GUID8LINE - EtMrcrwnentaJ Protectcn C/)

Agew:;y (EPA} Protective Action ~des (PAC-s): 0 Greater ~ or equall.o 500 fM!m Total Elfeclive 0:::

Dose Eq!jvalent {TEI:E)  ;:5 ct QR :I:

I t:f!:'(c[)Ejqual l.o 1*000 rrrem Cmm:'lt.ed nose :I:

[EPIP-08]

H- COLD CONDIDONS 26 EAL- COlD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSffiCATION TOOL H - COLD CONDITIONS 26 EP3:4 (APP-C-29) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE T his Page Intentionally Left Blank H- COLD CONDIDONS 27 E.AL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL H - COLD CONDITIONS 27 EP3:4 (APP-C-30) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE RECOGNITION CATEG ~ORY E EVENTS RELATED T~O ISFSI E- COLD CONDffiONS 28 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL E- COLD CONDffiO_ S 28 EP3:4 (APP-C-31) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert E-HU1 - Basis:

A NcE:fu:ation of Unusual Evern! (NOUE) in this IC is categorized en me basis of the ocaJm!I)Ce of an event ci surficien: ~t!Jde that a loaded caslt CONANEMENr BOUNDAR\' is d~ or \".dated. Tti.s inchldes dasslli::ation based en a loaded fuel storage cask COfiFINEMENT BOUNDARY loss leaditg to the degradation ct the fuel during storil';le ar posing il!l operalional sa.."e!y prob.em with respect *io its ll!fTlOiiaJ from s11:cage as indicated by elevated radialfcn readings fit:m the loaded fuel (i) siaage cask.

u..

~ The resultsof l!le ISFSI Safely Anal~ ~port (&IR}p!r EG 1536 <<

0 SAR referalced in the, cask's Certifi~ ctCorr¢anoe and the rela!ed 1- f'mC Safely Eialuatioo ~ identify natural P!enomena events and 0 aoc:'dent conditions that co potentially effect ihe CONFINEM:NT UJ BOUNDARY. This EAl addresses a dlqlped cask. a tipped aver cask, EX!'LOSM:H, PROJECTILE damage. FIRE c!amage -orna:tsral phErulm.ena

~

...J affecting a cask (e.g.. seisrrJc event tomm. etc.}.

UJ EXPLOSJON- A rapicl. \liclen!, unccnfined ccmllOJslion. or 0::: catas.~hic fa'lure of llCI!Ssurized.falerQized *eo.uipmen: that~

er>efJlV ct suffic::ien: force to llQtaltialtv damaQe penroneflt swcillres.

~ systems, or co~

z UJ ARE -GombllSlion chil'ilclEfizal by heat a1d ighl Scurt:es ci smoke Gi such as sliPC!inQ drive be1s cr overhea:i:d elecirical eql!iJlment do not ccnstituiE FIRES. Observation of ftame is preferred but is NO I IE'CillirEd 1f liJIIII! QUill'l!ities of srrd <.e and heal are obseNed.

w PROJECJU.E- An dljec:tdi'ecled toward a Nuclear Pc\\'E!l' Plan!

(NPPl lhill could cause amcern for its c.cntinued Clllerabilitv. reliability.

orper.;onn safetv.

E- COLD CONDffiONS 29 EAL- COLD BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL E- COLD CONDffiO:l'\'TS 29 EP3:4 (APP-C-32) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE Site Area Emergency Alert E-HU1 Damage 1D a loaded caslt CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.

l======~~~~c=====~l Net applicable opemngModeApplicability:

EALValues:

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY- The barrler(s) between areas ccntaiting radioactive sOOS!aOOES iWI!be env.Tonmenl 1. Dilm3QI! to .a loaded cask CONFir~MENT BOUNO.ilo.RY.

L-------------------------------~ 1 E- COlD CONDffiONS 30 EAL- COin BASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIFICATION TOOL E - COLD CO IDffiONS 30 EP3:4 (APP-C-33) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION COLD CONDITIONS TABLE This Page Intentionally Left Blank E- COlD CONDIDONS 31 EAL-COIDBASIS PAGE REVISION: 1 ST LUCIE PLANT CLASSIDCATION TOOL E- COLD CONDIDONS 31 EP3:4 (APP-C-34) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX D THE STATE OF FLORIDA RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN The State of Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan is maintained on file in the following locations:

1. St. Lucie Unit 1 Document Control Center *

2. Technical Support Center

3. Emergency Operations Facility

4. Site Emergency Preparedness Manager EP3:4 (APP-D-1) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX E TECHNICAL SUPPORT AGREEMENTS The Annual Confirmation Letters and the current Letters of Agreement with each of the agencies, which under earlier revisions resided in this appendix, have been removed.

These documents are now maintained in the Emergency Planning Department files. FPL maintains agreements and/or contracts with the following organizations in support of St .

Lucie Plant emergency response.

1. Westinghouse Electric (ABB/CE)

ASS/Combustion Engineering (CE), now Westinghouse Electric, is the Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor for the St. Lucie Plant. Westinghouse Electric can supply emergency technical services and resources as provided by the Purchase Order.

2. URS Corporation URS Corporation is the Architect/Engineer for the St. Lucie Plant. URS Corporation can supply emergency technical services as provided by the Purchase Order.

3. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) maintains industry source lists for personnel and equipment which can be made available for support services during an emergency.

4. U.S. Coast Guard The U.S. Coast Guard can provide maritime, air and security support. Can establish a safety or security zone preventing vessel movement into U.S. navigable waters.

Can transport response personnel, equipment and injured personnel.

5. Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE)

FDLE, by statutory authority is the agency responsible for the coordination of state law enforcement resources. FDLE is responsible for the command, control and coordination of all state law enforcement personnel and equipment to support local law enforcement agencies.

6. St. Lucie County Sheriffs Department Provides initial containment of incident, traffic control and site security. Support teams include Special Weapons and Tactics, Bomb Team, Crises Negotiations team, Dive Team, Aviation Unit and Maritime Unit.

7. St. Lucie County - Ft. Pierce Fire District St. Lucie County Fire District is the primary responder for Fire Rescue and Emergency Medical Support. Other specialized services and equipment include hazardous material, foam and foam applicators, mobile SCBA refill, ventilation equipment, lighting equipment and monitor nozzles.

8. City of Ft. Pierce - Police Department Ft. Pierce Police Department can provide traffic control, security at Jaycee Park, marked police units and support a multi-agency mobile command post.

9. City of Ft. Pierce - City Manager City of FT. Pierce has authorized the use of Jaycee Park for emergency parking in the event of an emergency.

• EP3:4 (APP-E-1) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX E TECHNICAL SUPPORT AGREEMENTS

10. Martin County Sheriffs Department Provides resources and support for law enforcement functions, including traffic and crowd control.

11. AREVA NP Inc. (Framatome Technologies)

AREVA can provide engineering, technical support and field services to assist FPL in the management and control of an emergency.

12. U.S. Department of Energy (Savannah River Operations)

This division provides advice, detection and identification of radioactive materials, and/or monitoring and assessment actions essential for the control of the immediate hazards to health and safety.

13. U.S. Department of Energy (REAC/TS)

Provides backup support for the definitive care and treatment of seriously irradiated persons. The ORAU Medical and Health Sciences Division operates the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the U.S. Department of Energy. It studies radiation and radioactive materials in diagnosis, therapy, and research. Its specialized facilities are available for the care and treatment of possible radiation accident victims.

14. Lawnwood Regional Medical Center The facilities are equipped and staffed with physicians and nurses capable of treating a contaminated injured individual(s). The physicians will provide for medical examinations, treatment, and laboratory services for those employees and other persons, designated by Florida Power & Light Company, who have been involved in a radiation accident.

15. Martin Memorial Medical Center The medical facilities are equipped and staffed with physicians and nurses capable of treating a contaminated injured individual(s). The physicians will provide for medical examinations, treatment, and laboratory services for those employees and other persons, designated by Florida Power & Light Company, who have been involved in a radiation accident.

16. Bechtel Power Corporation Bechtel can provide engineering, procurement and construction operations support for FPL in the management and control of an emergency.

17. Martin County Fire Rescue Provides Fire Rescue, Emergency Medical Services, Hazardous Materials Response Team and Technical Rescue Team resources.

18. Martin County Department of Emergency Services Authorization to use Jensen Public Beach parking area as a staging area during an emergency at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.

EP3:4 (APP-E-2) St. Lucie, Rev. 65

APPENDIX F EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES PROCEDURE TITLE NUMBER EPIP-00 Discovery and Identification of an Emergency Condition (Including Chemical, Fire, and Natural Emergencies)

EPIP-01 Classification of Emergencies EPIP-02 Duties and Responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator EPIP-03 Emergency Response Organization Notification/ Staff Augmentation EPIP-04 Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center EPIP-05 Activation and Operation of the Operational Support Center EPIP-06 Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility EPIP-07 Conduct of Evacuations/Assembly EPIP-08 . Off-site Notifications and Protective Action Recommendations EPIP-10 Off-site Radiological Monitoring EPIP-11 Core Damage Assessment EPIP-12 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness - Radiological Emergency Plan Training EPIP-13 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness - Emergency Exercises, Drills, Tests, and Evaluations EPIP-14 Dose Assessment Using the Unified RASCAL Interface RP-SL-1 05-1005 Emergency Equipment RP-SL-1 00-1005 Radiation Protection Emergency Organization RP-SL-1 01-2000 Emergency Personnel Exposure Control RP-SL-1 02-2005 Environmental Monitoring During Emergencies RP-SL-1 01-2001 Personnel Access Control During Emergencies RP-SL-1 02-2002 In-plant Radiation and Contamination Surveys During Emergencies RP-SL-1 02-2003 Emergency In-plant Air Sampling RP-SL-1 02-2004 Analysis of Emergency In-plant Air Samples RP-S L-1 01-2003 Monitoring Evacuated Personnel During Emergencies RP-SL-1 01-2004 Personnel Decontamination During Emergencies CY-SL-1 08-0004 Guidelines for Collecting Post Accident Samples CY-SL-1 08-0007 Establishing Remote Laboratory for Analyses of Accident Samples 0-AOP-72.01 Response to Security Events SFI-6307 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures EP3:4 (APP-F-1) St. Lucie, Rev. 65