Information Notice 1997-91, Recent Failures of Control Used on Amersham Model 660 Posilock Radiography Systems

Recent Failures of Control Used on Amersham Model 660 Posilock Radiography Systems

ML031050007
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	12/31/1997
From:	Cool D NRC/NMSS/IMNS
To:
References
IN-97-091, NUDOCS 9712310254
Download: ML031050007 (9)

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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 31, 1997 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-91: RECENT FAILURES OF CONTROL CABLES USED ON

AMERSHAM MODEL 660 POSILOCK RADIOGRAPHY

SYSTEMS

Addressees

All industrial radiography licensees.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert

addressees to potential failures of control (drive) cables used on Amersham Model 660

Posilock radiography systems. It is expected that recipients will review this information for

applicability to their radiographic equipment and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not

NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

Recently, NRC became aware of several instances where the control cables used on

Amersham Model 660 Posilock radiography systems became disconnected from the source

assemblies. In each instance, the control cable broke at the male end of the control cable, and

emergency procedures were implemented to return the source to the fully shielded and secured

position. Three recent cases are described below:

Case 1: On November 16, 1997, a licensee was performing routine radiographic operations at

a temporary job site. At the completion of the ninth radiographic exposure, the radiographer

attempted to retract the source assembly into the radiography camera, using the remote drive

assembly. The radiographer observed that his survey meter reading did not change as

expected as the control cable was being retracted. Furthermore, the radiographer noted that

the self-locking mechanism on the radiography camera had not actuated. The radiographer

operated the remote drive assembly again, but did not succeed in returning the source

assembly to the fully shielded and secured position. The radiographer and his assistant then

implemented emergency procedures, maintained control of the area, and contacted their

radiation safety officer (RSO). The RSO responded to the temporary job site and successfully

recovered the source assembly, placing it into an Amersham 650L source changer. The

licensee then reported the source disconnect to the NRC Operations Center. The licensee also

submitted a 30-day report to the NRC.

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-IN 97-91 December31, 1997 Case 2: On December 8, 1997, this same licensee reported another source disconnect, also at

a temporary job site, where the control cable failed in the same manner. In this instance, an

Amersham representative retrieved the disconnected source assembly. The licensee reported

the source assembly disconnect on the same day of the event. In addition to these two source

disconnects, this licensee reported to NRC that it had two previous source assembly

disconnects on Amersham Model 660 Posilock radiography systems, both having similar

failures of the control cable. These disconnects occurred in 1995 and 1996.

Case 3: On November 21, 1997, another licensee was performing routine radiographic

operations at a temporary job site. The radiographers noted that the source assembly had not

retracted to the fully shielded and secured position, implemented emergency procedures, and

notified their RSO. The RSO and a former RSO responded to the temporary job site and

successfully recovered the source assembly, returning it to the radiography camera. The

control cable failed in a similar manner to the previous two cases. Normal operations were

resumed using another control cable. The licensee did not report the source disconnect to the

NRC Operations Center within the 24-hour timeframe, as required by 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2), but

did submit a 30-day report.

Discussion

In all the cited cases, the control cable failed at a point approximately 0.33 - 1.25 centimeter

(0.125 - 0.5 inch) behind the male connector. The failed equipment from each instance has

been returned to the manufacturer for failure analysis. A metallurgical analysis has been

completed on two of the control cables with the results indicating failure from fatigue and failure

due to corrosion and/or fatigue. The cause of the remaining failures is still under investigation

by the manufacturer. Due to these failures, it is recommended that the control cable be

carefully checked before each day's use and during the quarterly maintenance checks, as

required by 10 CFR 34.31 (a) and (b), for indications of corrosion, metal fatigue, or other early

indications of cable failure. It is important to note that these control cables can be purchased

off-the-shelf and may be used on radiography systems manufactured by various companies, and, therefore, these failures may not be limited to control cables used on Amersham

Model 660 Posilock radiography systems.

Each of the source disconnects discussed above required the radiographers to implement

emergency procedures to return the source assembly to the fully shielded and secured position.

Implementation of emergency procedures is crucial to successful source assembly retrieval as

well as to ensuring that exposure of radiographers and members of the public remain as low as

is reasonably achievable. In all three cases, after identifying that the source assembly had

become disconnected from the control cable, the radiographers adequately secured and

controlled the area surrounding the disconnected source assemblies. In addition, the

exposures to the individuals involved in the source assembly retrievals were well within

regulatory limits. Therefore, it is important to implement and adhere to emergency procedures

when source assembly disconnects are identified.

IN 97-91 December 31, 1997 A source assembly disconnect on the Amersham Model 660 radiography system can be

identified by two methods. First, upon completion of retracting the control cable, the self-locking

mechanism should engage, revealing a green dot. This can be identified by observing the

indicator (lock slide) on the locking mechanism. Failure of the self-locking mechanism to

engage would cause the red dot to remain visible on the lock slide, thus indicating the source

was not secured in the fully shielded position, although not necessarily indicating a source

assembly disconnect. Second, when the survey to verify that the source assembly has been

returned to its shielded position is performed after each radiographic exposure, as required by

10 CFR 34.49(b), typical dose rates around the radiography camera and the guide tube should

be observed. However, if the dose rates observed are not typical for a fully shielded source

assembly (e.g., the dose rates may be lower if the source assembly remained in the collimator

or the dose rates may be higher if the source assembly is located within the guide tube), then

the situation should be further investigated. Therefore, it is important to use the survey meter

and to pay careful attention to its readings and the self-locking mechanism indicator to identify

circumstances that are not normal.

In cases of unintentional disconnection of the source assembly from the control cable or the

inability to retract the source assembly to its fully shielded and secured position, licensees must

notify NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, pursuant to the regulations in 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2). The notification

must be made to the NRC Operations Center. In addition to making a notification within

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the licensee must also submit a written report to NRC within 30 days, as required by

10 CFR 30.50(c)(2) and 10 CFR 34.101(a). One report can satisfy both of these requirements, but it must include: (1) a description of the equipment problem; (2) cause of each incident, if

known; (3) manufacturer and model number of equipment involved in the incident; (4) place, time, and date of the incident; (5) actions taken to establish normal operations; (6) corrective

actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence; and (7) qualifications of personnel involved in

the incident [10 CFR 34.101(b)]. Additional information on reporting requirements for industrial

radiography licensees can be found in Information Notice 96-04, "Incident Reporting

Requirements for Radiography Licensees.'

Reporting such problems to NRC is important because it provides the opportunity for NRC to

verify that the material has been properly secured and has not been released into the public

domain. If notified early, NRC can help ensure that all necessary regulatory actions are

completed. In addition, NRC reviews this information to determine if trends or generic safety

issues exist that have the potential to cause a significant safety hazard. If a generic safety

issue is identified, those licensees that may be affected will be notified and informed of the

proper actions to reduce or eliminate similar incidents in the future and to protect the health and

safety of both the occupational workers and the public. It is important to point out that these

failures have not been identified as a generic safety issue at this point in time, but that the

recommendations provided in this information notice should be considered by those licensees

who use Amersham Model 660 Posilock radiography systems.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (hereafter, Commonwealth) has been informed of all the

cases discussed above and is working with Amersham on the determination of whether these

- 'IN97-91 December31, 1997 failed control cables represent a generic safety issue. NRC will coordinate with the

Commonwealth to determine if any actions are necessary, based on the findings from the

failure analyses being performed by Amersham.

This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below

or the appropriate regional office.

onal . Cool, ctor

Division of Industrial and

Medical Nuclear Safety

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: Larry W. Camper, NMSS

301-415-7231 E-mail: Iwc@nrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

S Le' St'- D-rkl

-

Attachment 1 IN 97-91 December 31, 1997 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

97-89 Distribution of Sources and 12/29/97 All sealed source and device

Devices Without Authorization manufacturers and distributors

97-87 Second Retrofit to Industrial 12/12/97 All industrial radiography

Nuclear Company IR100 licensees

Radiography Camera, to

Correct Inconsistency in

10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility

97-86 Additional Controls for Transport 12/12/97 Registered users of the Model

of the Amersham Model No. 660 No. 660 series packages, and

Series Radiographic Exposure Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Devices industrial radiography licensees

97-75 Enforcement Sanctions Issued 09/24197 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

as a Result of Deliberate Commission licensees

Violations of NRC Requirements

97-72 Potential for Failure 09/22/97 All holders of OLs or CPs

of the Omega Series for nuclear power reactors

Sprinkler Heads and fuel cycle facilities

97-65 Failures of High-Dose- 08/15/97 All high-dose-rate remote

Rate Remote Afterloading afterloader licensees

Device Source Guide Tubes, Catheters, and Applicators

97-64 Potential Problems 08/13/97 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Associated with Loss Commission medical tele- of Electrical Power therapy licensees

in Certain Teletherapy

Units

97-61 U.S. Department of 08/06/97 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Health and Human Commission medical

Services Letter, to licensees, veterinarians, Medical Device Manu- and manufacturers/distri- facturers, on the butors of medical devices

Year 2000 Problem

I

Attachment 2 IN 97-91 December 31, 1997 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

97-90 Use of Nonconservative 12/30197 All holders of OLs for nuclear

Acceptance Criteria in power reactors except those

Safety-Related Pump who have ceased operations

Surveillance Tests and have certified that fuel has

been permanently removed from

the vessel

97-89 Distribution of Sources and 12/29/97 All sealed source and device

Devices Without Authorization manufacturers and distributors

97-88 Experiences During Recent 12/16/97 All holders of OLs for pressurized- Steam Generator Inspections water reactors except those who

have permanently ceased

operations and have certified that

fuel has been permanently

removed from the reactor

97-87 Second Retrofit to 12/12/97 All industrial radiography

Industrial Nuclear Company licensees

IR 100 Radiography Camera, to Correct Inconsistency in

10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility

97-86 Additional Controls for 12/12/97 Registered users of the Model

Transport of the Amersham No. 660 series packages, and

Model No. 660 Series Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Radiographic Exposure Devices industrial radiography licensees

97-85 Effects of Crud Buildup 12/11/97 All holders of OLs for pressurized- and Boron Deposition on water reactors, except those

Power Distribution and licensees who have permanently

Shutdown Margin ceased operations and have

certified that the fuel has been

permanently removed from the

reactor vessel

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN97-XX

December XX, 1997 Commonwealth to determine if any actions are necessary, based on the findings from the

failure analyses being performed by Amersham.

This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below

or the appropriate regional office.

Donald A. Cool, Director

Division of Industrial and

Medical Nuclear Safety

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: Larry W. Camper, NMSS

301-415-7231 E-mail: LWC@nrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: c:UtN97-XX.BWS

l OFC l SSSS . Tech Editor I SSS3 lLJ Ij -J0 l

NAME BSmi&L EKraus//EK SBaggett a er/LC UVC

DATE 12/I19712118/97 12/ /97 1 __7 __2__9 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 2A

IN 97-XX

December XX, 1997 cables represent a generic safety issue. The NRC will coordinate with the Commonwealth to

determine if any actions are necessary based upon the findings from the failure analyses being

performed by Amersham.

This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below

or the appropriate regional office.

Donald A. Cool, Director

Division of Industrial and

Medical Nuclear Safety

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: Larry W. Camper, NMSS

301-415-7231 E-mail: LWC@nrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: c:\IN97-XX.BWS

IOFC I SSSS I Tech Editor Ill SSSS I li IMNSI

NAME BSmith EKraus SBaggett *Mpr DCool

DATE 12/ /97 12/ /97 12/ /1 9 7 12/ /97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

~ 6 97-91 December31, 1997 failed control cables represent a generic safety issue. NRC will coordinate with the

Commonwealth to determine if any actions are necessary, based on the findings from the

failure analyses being performed by Amersham.

This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below

or the appropriate regional office.

Donald A. Cool, Director

Division of Industrial and

Medical Nuclear Safety

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: Larry W. Camper, NMSS

301-415-7231 E-mail: lwc@nrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: 97-91.1N

I SSSS Tech Editor I Ss l Il IMNS

NAME BSmith//BS EKraus//EK SBaggett LCamper//LC DCool

DATE 12/22/97 12/18/97 12/ /97 12/18/97 12/30/97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY