Information Notice 1997-46, Unisolable Crack in High-Pressure Injection Piping

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Unisolable Crack in High-Pressure Injection Piping
ML031430199
Person / Time
Issue date: 07/09/1997
From: Slosson M, Weiss S
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-97-046
Download: ML031430199 (3)


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Home > Electronic Reading Room > Document Collections > General Communications > Information Notices > 1997 > IN 9 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 July 9, 1997 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-46: UNISOLABLE CRACK IN HIGH-PRESSURE INJECTION

PIPING

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees to the discovery of a leaking cracked weld in an

unisolable section of a combined makeup (MU) and high-pressure injection HPI)

line at Oconee Unit 2. It is expected that recipients will review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in

this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific

action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On April 22, 1997, at 12:50 p.m., Oconee Unit 2 was shut down because of

unidentified reactor coolant system RCS) leakage exceeding the technical

specification limit of 1 gpm. From the time of initial leak indications on

April 21, at approximately 10:45 p.m., until reactor pressure was sufficiently

reduced, the leakage rate rose from approximately 2 gpm to a maximum leakage

rate of approximately 12 gpm. A subsequent containment entry identified an

unisolable leak in the MU/HPI line 2A1 from a through-wall crack in the weld

connecting the 4U/HPI pipe and the safe-end of the 2A1 reactor coolant loop

(RCL) nozzle.

Discussion

The Oconee 2A1 MU/HPI nozzle assembly consists of the MU/HPI 2 inch diameter

pipe/safe-end/thermal sleeve (see Figure 1 - Original Design). The sleeve is

attached by contact rolling to the inner surface of the safe-end. A 1-inch

diameter *warming' line taps into the bottom of the MU/HPI pipe immediately

upstream of the pipe/safe-end weld where the through-wall crack was found.

This line permits a small continuous MU flow (3 gpm) to reduce nozzle thermal

transients due to changes in normal MU flow. All Oconee units have two

combined MU/HPI lines and two additional HPI lines connected to the RCS.

However, the thermal sleeve configuration in Oconee Unit 1 is different from

that in Units 2 and 3.

Preliminary analysis indicates that crack initiation and propagation in the

weld was caused by high-cycle fatigue due to a combination of thermal cycling

and flow induced vibration. The

9707020306. IN 97-46 July 9, 1997 metallurgical examination of the weld determined that the crack consisted of a

3600 inside surface flaw. The flaw depth increased gradually from about 30

percent into the wall until it became through-wall over a 770 arc length (see

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-commlinfo-notices/1997/in97046.html 03/13/2003

Information Notice No. 97-46 Figure 2). The examination found a gap in the contact area between the

thermal sleeve and the safe end, indicative of loss of contact that caused the

thermal sleeve in this line to be loose (see Figure 1). The thermal sleeve

was found to be cracked, with portions missing from the end that extends into

the RCS flow path. Significant wear damage was observed at both the upstream

(the rolled end) and the downstream end. Cracking was also found in the pipe

in the vicinity of the warming, line nozzle. Video examinations of the other

thermal sleeves of the HPI system showed no evidence of damage. Ultrasonic

Testing (UT) and Radiographic Testing (RT) of the welds and the thermal

sleeves in the other HPI nozzles showed no indications of cracking or

loosening, or other signs of degradation. Figure 1 shows a comparison of the

original and new thermal sleeve designs. The thermal sleeve in the 2A1 MU/HPI

line was replaced during the current outage with the new design thermal

sleeve.

Although the root cause of the cracking is not well understood, the licensee

has identified a number of thermal/mechanical conditions that may have

contributed to the crack propagation of the 2A1 pipe to safe-end weld. The

precise contribution to cracking of each of these conditions is not presently

known. However, the licensee has hypothesized that, in addition to the

thermal cycling experienced at the nozzle during heat up/cool down and other

plant transients, a likely contributor to the fatigue may have been the

alternate heating and cooling of the weld by intermittent mixing of the hot

reactor coolant leaking through the gap in the contact area between the loose

thermal sleeve and the safe-end, and the cooler normal makeup water flowing

through the associated MU/HPI line. Although the precise contribution of the

gap is unknown, it is believed that a gap may be a prerequisite for cracking

in the piping since the cracked pipes also had gaps between the thermal sleeve

and the safe end.

This phenomenon was identified as the probable cause for similar safe-end

cracking observed at Crystal River and other B&W plants (including Oconee) in

the early 1980's. This issue was previously addressed in Information Notice 82-09 and Generic Letter 85-20.

Recent re-examination of radiographs made in April 1996 of the Oconee 2A1 nozzle revealed that the licensee had failed to identify the gap which had

developed in the safe-end/thermal sleeve contact area. The licensee also had

failed to follow the original recommendations for augmented ultrasonic testing

(UT) as listed in NRC Generic Letter 85-20, High Pressure Injection/Make-Up

Nozzle Cracking in Babcock and Wilcox Plants," issued November 8, 1985. The

licensee performed the recommended UT of the safe ends of the MU/HPI lines;

however, they did not inspect the adjacent piping as recommended. In

addition, the licensee failed to UT the weld between the safe-end and pipe, a

discontinuity where cracking would be expected, and did, form. Also, NRC

Bulletin 88-08, Supplement 1, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor

Coolant Systems,' issued August 4, 1988, emphasized that, because of the

difficulty in identifying the types of cracks that were occurring due to

thermal stresses, the need exists for enhanced UT and for experienced

examination personnel to detect the cracks..

July 9, 1997 The licensee also reviewed the 1996 radiographs of the safe-ends in Oconee

Unit 3. The 3A1 MU/HPI line was found to have a gap in the safe-end/thermal

sleeve contact area. As a result of the gap in the 3A1 safe-end, Oconee Unit

3 was shut down on May 2, 1997. UT examinations identified apparent cracking

in the 3A1 safe-end. This safe-end has been removed and is presently being

metallurgically examined, but a visual examination has also revealed cracks in

the thermal sleeve. Minor gaps in the other safe-end/thermal sleeve contact

areas were determined not to have grown, the rolled area of the thermal sleeve

was acceptable, and UT examinations of the other Oconee Unit 3 HPI nozzle

assemblies revealed no cracking.

The Oconee Unit 1 nozzles have a double thermal sleeve design (Figure 3).

Radiographic inspection in the period from 1983 to 1989 indicated that no gap

existed in three of the four thermal sleeves. The thermal sleeve in the 1B2 (HPI) line had a gap; but, the gap had not grown during the inspection period.

Advantages of the double thermal sleeve as stated by the licensee include:

(1) greater stiffness; (2) greater thermal resistance; and (3) reduced flow

area, with corresponding increased flow velocity.

General Design Criterion 14 of Appendix A to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code

of Federal Regulations requires that the reactor coolant pressure boundary be

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rmldoc-collections/gen-conm/info-notices/1997/in97046.html 03/13/2003

Information Notice No. 9746 designed so as to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, of

rapidly propagating failure, and of gross rupture. The related generic

communications listed below discuss several other similar events, and the

actions that licensees were requested to take to reduce the probability of

additional similar events occurring.

Similar Recent Events

On December 14, 1996, a non-isolable leak on piping connecting the safety

injection system to the reactor coolant system was found in Dampierre Unit 1 in France. The damaged pipe length was examined and a through wall crack

located on an uninterrupted portion of straight piping (not on a stressed area

such as a weld or a bend). The licensee has not identified the root cause of

the cracking, but concluded that the most probable cause was temperature

variations produced by cold water coming from leaking valves located upstream

in the safety injection system. The licensee also concluded that the presence

of a through-wall defect on a straight portion of a pipe is likely to raise

questions about previous assumptions made regarding the root cause of the

cracking.

Related Generic Communications

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 82-09, CRACKING IN PIPING OF MAKEUP COOLANT LINES AT

B&W PLANTS," dated March 31, 1982.

NRC GENERIC LETTER 85-20, RESOLUTION OF GENERIC ISSUE 69: HIGH PRESSURE

INJECTION/MAKEUP NOZZLE CRACKING IN BABCOCK AND WILCOX PLANTS," dated November

11, 1985.

IN 97-46 July 9, 1997 NRC BULLETIN NO. 88-08, THERMAL STRESSES IN PIPING CONNECTED TO REACTOR

COOLANT SYSTEMS, dated June 22, 1988.

NRC BULLETIN NO. 88-08, Supplement 1, THERMAL STRESSES IN PIPING CONNECTED TO

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS," dated June 24, 1988.

NRC BULLETIN NO. 88-08, Supplement 2, THERMAL STRESSES IN PIPING CONNECTED TO

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS," dated August 4, 1988.

NRC BULLETIN NO. 88-08, Supplement 3; THERMAL STRESSES IN PIPING CONNECTED TO

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS," dated April 11, 1989.

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-19, SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM WELD FLAW AT SEQUOYAH

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2," dated April 18, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

signed by S.H. Weiss for

Marylee M. Slosson, Acting Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Barry Elliot, NRR Eric Benner, NRR

301-415-2709 301-415-1171 E-mail: bje@nrc.gov E-mail: ejblQnrc.gov

Kamal Manoly, NRR Mark Hartzman, NRR

301-415-2765 301-415-2755 E-mail: kam@nrc.gov E-mail: mxhQnrc.gov

Attachments:

1. Figure 1 - Thermal Sleeve

2. Figure 2 - Warming Line Flow

3. Figure 3 - Unit Thermal Sleeve

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rmldoc-collections/gen-commlinfo-notices/1997/in97046.html 03/13/2003