Information Notice 1992-67, Deficiency in Design Modifications to Address Failures of Hiller Actuators Upon a Gradual Loss of Air Pressure

Deficiency in Design Modifications to Address Failures of Hiller Actuators Upon a Gradual Loss of Air Pressure

ML031210653
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	09/10/1992
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-92-067, NUDOCS 9209030017
Download: ML031210653 (8)

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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 10, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-67: DEFICIENCY IN DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO ADDRESS

FAILURES OF HILLER ACTUATORS UPON A GRADUAL

LOSS OF AIR PRESSURE

Addressees

for nuclear power

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits

reactors.

Purpose

issuing this information

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is problem pertaining to

notice to alert addressees to a potentially significantvalve actuators upon a

modifications made to address failures of Hiller Information Notice (IN)

gradual loss of air pressure, as discussed in NRC Loss of Air Pressure." It

82-25, "Failures of Hiller Actuators upon Gradual for applicability to

is expected that recipients will review the information to avoid similar

their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, information notice are not

problems. However, suggestions contained in thisor written response is

NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action

required.

Description of Circumstances

preheater bypass

Valve assemblies for three Shearon Harris main feedwater for Q Class

isolation valves were specified, procured, and installed

the valves and the

application. The Anchor Darling Valve Company supplied

associated Hiller actuators.

discovered several

On January 7, 1992, Carolina Power and Light Company of the three main

to the actuators

components associated with the air supply qualified for a Q Class

feedwater preheater bypass isolation valves were notpump in the non-Q Class, application. Specifically, the failure of the air accumulator could

non-seismic instrument air supply to the valve actuator from detecting slow leakage

prevent pressure switches upstream of the air pump

lines. The pressure

in the Q Class, seismic portion of the actuator air sending an automatic close

switches were installed to ensure valve closure by

of the actuator air

signal if the instrument air system pressure (upstream

pump) dropped to 66 psig as discussed in IN 82-25.

function as containment

The main feedwater preheater bypass isolation valves signal. The function

isolation valves upon receipt of a feedwater isolation

air supply pressure from

of the air pump is to raise the normal instrument pressure drops from

70 toJlO-.ps4s to approximately 150 psig. If accumulator

I

_r003017/X

J

IN 92-67 September 10, 1992 150 psig to 122 psig, the main feedwater

not close within 10 seconds. If pressure preheater bypass isolation valve may

it may not be sufficient to close the main drops to a value as low as 20 psig, isolation valve and keep it closed against feedwater preheater bypass

across the valve seat. the maximum differential pressure

Upon discovery of this condition, Shearon

interval for verifying that the actuators' Harris established a surveillance

properly and that the accumulators were fully components were functioning

1992, non-Q components were replaced with pressurized. On January 12, completed satisfactorily. suitable components and testing was

On January 15, 1992, the Shearon Harris

deficiency in the Hiller actuator for theSafety Committee determined that the

isolation valves was reportable under 10 main feedwater preheater bypass

of the possibility that these valves mightCFR Part 21 (Attachment 1), because

related function to close within 10 seconds not be able to meet their safety- for containment isolation. of a feedwater isolation signal

Other air-operated valves may be susceptible

to similar failure mechanisms.

This information notice requires no specific

you have any questions about the information action or written response. If

the technical contact listed below or the in this notice, please contact

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. appropriate Office of Nuclear

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Patricia Campbell, NRR

(301) 504-1311 Attachments:

1. Carolina Power and Light Company

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Part

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information 21 Notices

'-I

Attachment 2 IN 92-67 September 10, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

92-66 Access Denied to NRC 09/01/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Inspectors at Five Star for nuclear power reactors

Products, Inc. and and all reci pients of

Construction Products NUREG-0040, "Licensee, Con- Research, Fairfield, tractor and Vendor Inspec- Connecticut tion Status Report" (White

Book).

92-65 Safety System Problems 09/03/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Caused by Modifications for nuclear power reactors.

That Were Not Adequately

Reviewed and Tested

92-64 Nozzle Ring Settings 08/28/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

on Low Pressure Water- for nuclear power reactors.

Relief Valves

92-63 Cracked Insulators in 08/26/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

ASL Dry Type Transformers for nuclear power reactors.

Manufactured by Westing- house Electric Corporation

92-62 Emergency Response 08/24/92 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Information Require- Commission licensees.

ments for Radioactive

Material Shipments

92-61 Loss of High Head 08/20/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Safety Injection for nuclear power reactors.

92-60 Valve Stem Failure 08/20/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Caused by Embrittlement for pressurized water

reactors (PWRs).

92-59 Horizontally-Installed 08/18/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Motor-Operated Gate for nuclear power reactors.

Valves

92-58 Uranium Hexafluoride 08/12/92 All Fuel Cycle Licensees.

Cylinders - Deviations

in Coupling Welds

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 92-67 September 10, 1992 150 psig to 122 psig, the main feedwater preheater bypass isolation valve may

not close within 10 seconds. If pressure drops to a value as low as 20 psig, it may not be sufficient to close the main feedwater preheater bypass

isolation valve and keep it closed against the maximum differential pressure

across the valve seat.

Upon discovery of this condition, Shearon Harris established a surveillance

interval for verifying that the actuators' components were functioning

properly and that the accumulators were fully pressurized. On January 12,

1992, non-Q components were replaced with suitable components and testing was

completed satisfactorily.

On January 15, 1992, the Shearon Harris Safety Committee determined that the

deficiency in the Hiller actuator for the main feedwater preheater bypass

isolation valves was reportable under 10 CFR Part 21 (Attachment 1), because

of the possibility that these valves might not be able to meet their safety- related function to close within 10 seconds of a feedwater isolation signal

for containment isolation.

Other air-operated valves may be susceptible to similar failure mechanisms.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Original Signed by

Charles E. Rossi

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Patricia Campbell, NRR

(301) 504-1311 Attachments:

1. Carolina Power and Light Company

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Part 21

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: 92-67.IN

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

• C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

GHMarcus

0("/7/ \08/31/92 OGCB:DOEA:NRR *EMEB:DET:NRR *C/EMEB:DET:NRR *D/DET:NRR *RPB:ADM

NCampbell PCampbell JNorberg JRichardson TechEd

08/ /92 08/17/92 08/17/92 08/28/92 08/11/92

IN 92-XX

August xx, 1992 150 psig to 122 psig, the main feedwater preheater bypass isolation valve may

not close within 10 seconds. If pressure drops to a value as low as 20 psig, it may not be sufficient to close the main feedwater preheater bypass

isolation valve and keep it closed against the maximum differential pressure

across the valve seat.

Upon discovery of this condition, Shearon Harris initiated a surveillance

interval to verify that the actuators' components were functioning properly

and that the accumulators were fully pressurized. On January 12, 1992, non-Q components were replaced with suitable components and testing completed

satisfactorily.

On January 15, 1992, the Shearon Harris Safety Committee determined that the

deficiency in the Hiller actuator for the main feedwater preheater bypass

isolation valves reportable under 10 CFR Part 21 (Attachment 1), because of

the possibility that these valves might not be able to meet their safety- related function to close within 10 seconds of a feedwater isolation signal

for containment isolation.

Other air-operated valves may be susceptible to similar failure mechanisms.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Patricia Campbell, NRR

(301) 504-1311 Attachments:

1. Carolina Power and Light Company

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Part 21

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: LOSSAIR.IN

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

CERossi GHMarcus

08/ /92, A// 8/ /92 OGCB:DOEA:NRR *EMEB:DET:NRR *C/EMEB:DET:NRR D/DET:NR~b QRPB:ADM

NCampbell PCampbell JNorberg JRicIrd n TechEd

08/ /92 08/17/92 08/17/92 08/1)X/92 08/11/92

6,1

IN 92-XX

August xx, 1992 150 psig to 122 psig, the main feedwater preheater bypass isolation valve may

not close within 10 seconds. If pressure drops to a value as low as 20 psig, it may not be sufficient to close the main feedwater preheater bypass

isolation valve and keep it closed against the maximum differential pressure

across the valve seat.

Upon discovery of this condition, Shearon Harris initiated a surveillance

interval to verify that the actuators' components were functioning properly

and that the accumulators were fully pressurized. On January 12, 1992, non-Q components were replaced with suitable components and testing completed

satisfactorily.

On January 15, 1992, the Shearon Harris Safety Committee determined that the

deficiency in the Hiller actuator for the main feedwater preheater bypass

isolation valves was reportable under 10 CFR Part 21 (Attachment 1), because

of the possibility that these valves might not be able to meet their safety- related function to close within 10 seconds of a feedwater isolation signal

for containment isolation.

Other air-operated valves may be susceptible to similar failure mechanisms.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Patricia Campbell, NRR

(301) 504-1311 Attachments:

1. Carolina Power and Light Company

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Part 21

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: LOSSAIR.IN

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

CERossi GHMarcusff

08/ /92 08/.31/926M

OGCB:DOEA:NRR *EMEB:DET:NRR *C/EMEB:DET:NRR *D/DET:NRR *RPB:ADM

NCampbell PCampbell JNorberg JRichardson TechEd

08/al/92 08/17/92 08/17/92 08/28/92 08/11/92

_wF,-tr

The air pump raises the normal instrument air supply pressure from 70 to 100

psig to approximately 150 psig. If accumulator pressure drops from 150 psig

to 122 psig, the valve may not close within 10 seconds. If pressure drops to

a value as low as 20 psig, it may not be sufficient to close the valve and

keep it closed against the maximum differential pressure across the valve

seat.

Upon discovery of the condition on January 7, 1992, Shearon Harris initiated a

surveillance interval to verify that the actuators' components were

functioning properly and that the accumulators were fully pressurized. On

January 12, 1992, non- components were replaced with suitable components and

testing completed sati c torily.

Other air-operated valves m sbe susceptible to similar failure mechanisms

addressed herein.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Patricia Campbell, NRR

(301) 504-ES3&

Attachments:

1. Carolina Power and Light Company

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Part 21

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DISTRIBUTION:

Central Files

DOEA R/F

OGCB R/F

N. Campbell R/F

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFFICE: OGCB:DOEA *RPB:ADM EMEB:DET 4B S ET

NAME: NCampbell:db TechEd PCampbell J ere

DATE: 08/ /92 08/11/92 08//f/92 08//7/92 OFFICE: BC:OGCB:DOEA D:DOEA

NAME: GMarcus CRossi

DATE: 08/ /92 08/ /92

,qaq42 i.1_ tt

isoVen1 2 Upon-dlsewery-1/te condition on January 7, 1992, Shearor-Hrr4 initiated a1 surveillance to verify that the actuators' components were

ote,'e&V

functioning properly and that the accumulators were fully pressurized. On

January 12,'-H002J non-Q components were replaced with suitable components and

testing completed satisfactorily.

,--t n~ wes-iwUth er air-operated valves may be susceptible to similar failure

mechanisms addressed herein.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Patricia Campbell, NRR

(301) 504-2836 Attachments:

1. Carolina Power and Light Company

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Part 21

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DISTRIBUTION:

Central Files

DOEA R/F

OGCB R/F

OFFICE: OGCB:DOEA RPB:ADM EMEB:DET BC:EMEB:DET

NAME: NCampbell:db TechEdJM?,' PCampbell JNorberg

DATE: 08/ /92 08/u /927 08/ /92 08/ /92 OFFICE: BC:OGCB:DOEA D:DOEA

NAME: GMarcus CRossi

DATE: 08/ /92 08/ /92 FILENAME: LOSSAIR.WP