Information Notice 1992-42, Fraudulent Bolts in Seismically Designed Walls

Fraudulent Bolts in Seismically Designed Walls
	ML031200252
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	06/01/1992
From:	Rossi C; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
References
	IN-92-042, NUDOCS 9205260265
	Download: ML031200252 (8)
	v • d • e

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                                    UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 1, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-42: FRAUDULENT BOLTS IN SEISMICALLY DESIGNED WALLS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees to fraudulent anchor and through wall bolts found

in seismic structures. It is expected that recipients will review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in

this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific

action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

From March 30 through April 10, 1992, an NRC engineering team performed a

special inspection at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. The inspection

included masonry block and poured concrete walls in the building housing the

diesel generators that provide emergency electrical power for the plant. The

team discovered that many of the bolts in these walls which appeared to exist

and provide lateral support, did not in fact exist. The bolts were apparently

installed during plant construction by a subcontractor to Brown and Root. In

many instances, heads cut from bolts had been attached to the angle iron that

was designed to provide lateral support for the walls during an earthquake.

The bolt heads made it appear that there were bolts supporting the wall, but

without the bolt shanks there was no support. In the worst case, more than

85 percent of the bolts installed in one wall were either fraudulent or did

not otherwise meet design requirements. For some of these bolts, the anchors

had not been installed. In other cases, the bolts were too short to ade- quately engage the anchors. Other bolts that should have completely pene- trated the walls did not.

Some employees of Carolina Power and Light Company, licensee for the Brunswick

plant, were aware of problems with bolts in some walls in 1987. Nevertheless, the licensee did not take effective action to determine the extent of the

problem and correct it. Initially, the licensee used feeler gauges inserted

under the angle iron to determine whether or not the shanks of bolts were in

place. In some cases, because the licensee's inspector could feel the anchor

sleeve, the licensee assumed that bolt shanks were present when they were not.

However, during and after NRC's special inspection, the licensee performed

9920526026 57----

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- -1 IN 92-42 June 1, 1992 inspections and evaluations that were progressively more thorough. On the

basis of that work, the licensee concluded that certain of the walls were not

capable of performing their intended safety function and the licensee has shut

down both reactors until the problem is corrected.

Discussion

The block and poured concrete walls separate the four trains of emergency

diesel generating equipment and ensure that all of the trains do not become

inoperable because of a common hazard. The masonry block walls and the steel

plates attached to them provide missile protection for this equipment. The

walls were intended to withstand the design-basis earthquake. The capability

of the walls to perform their intended function has been compromised since the

fraudulent and deficient bolts were installed in approximately 1973.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any question about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

- Charles-E.- Rossi-,--Director e__

                                   Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: John Thompson, AEOD

(301) 492-8091 Roger Woodruff, NRR

(301) 504-1152 Attachment: List of Recently Issued Information Notices

,Filed ivJ"A14

Attachment

IN 92-42 June 1, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

92-41 Consideration of the 05/29/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Stem Rejection Load in for nuclear power reactors.

Calculation of Required

Valve Thrust

92-40 Inadequate Testing of 05/27/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Emergency Bus Under- for nuclear power reactors.

voltage Logic Circuitry

92-39 Unplanned Return to 05/13/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Criticality during for nuclear power reactors.

Reactor Shutdown

92-38 Implementation Date for 05/12/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

the Revision to the EPA for nuclear power reactors, Manual of Protective non-power reactors and

Action Guides and Pro- materials licensees auth- tective Actions for orized to possess large

Nuclear Incidents quantities of radioactive

material.

92-37 Implementation of the 05/08/92 All Nuclear Regulatory

Deliberate Misconduct Rule Commission Materials

Licensees.

92-16, Loss of Flow from the Re- 05/07/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Supp. 1 sidual Heat Removal Pump for nuclear power reactors.

during Refueling Cavity

Draindown

92-36 Intersystem LOCA Outside 05/07/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Containment for nuclear power reactors.

92-35 Higher Than Predicted Ero- 05/06/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

sion/Corrosion in Unisol- for nuclear power reactors.

able Reactor Coolant Pres- sure Boundary Piping Inside

Containment at A Boiling

Water Reactor

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

K..-' K2 IN 92-42 June 1, 1992 inspections and evaluations that were progressively more thorough. On the