Information Notice 1985-79, Inadequate Communications Between Maintenance, Operations, and Security Personnel

Inadequate Communications Between Maintenance, Operations, and Security Personnel

ML031180318
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date:	09/30/1985
From:	Jordan E NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-85-079, NUDOCS 8509260122
Download: ML031180318 (4)

SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-79 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 30, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-79: INADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MAINTENANCE,

OPERATIONS, AND SECURITY PERSONNEL

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or

construction permit (CP), research and nonpower reactor facilities, and fuel

fabrication and processing facilities using or processing formula quantities

of special nuclear material.

Purpose

This information notice is provided to alert addressees of the need to ensure

that actions of a temporary or permanent nature taken by operations, maintenance, or other personnel that may affect the integrity of the physical barriers used

to control access to protected, material access, and vital areas, or other por- tions of the overall security program, are coordinated with the organization

directly responsible for security before being implemented. It is expected

that the recipients will review the information for applicability to their

facilities and consider actions, if necessary, to preclude a similar problem

occurring at their facilities. Suggestions contained in this information

notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or

written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

During plant walkdowns and/or inspections, NRC and licensee personnel have

identified instances where actions by plant organizational elements other than

security have resulted in the degradation of protected and vital area barriers

and other security/safeguards measures without proper compensation. Some

examples are:

o removal of portions of protected and vital area barriers, including

fences, hatches, or other portals that allow unauthorized access to

the protected area or vital areas

o removal of equipment that had formed part of the barrier, such as

piping or valves that would allow passage of small objects into or

out of a material access area or vital area

o creation of holes in protected and vital area barriers to facilitate

construction

8509260122

IN 85-79 September 30, 1985 o leaving vital area-door alarms in access mode after work is completed

o removal of essential telephone lines from an independent power source

o building or placing equipment, structures, or vehicles within the

isolation zone of the protected area or within exterior "clear" zones

of sensitive facilities, such as storage vaults

The incidents that lead to the issuance of this information notice have resulted

in the degradation of protected and vital area barriers and access controls

necessary for protection of vital equipment and, in one case, the loss of the

means to communicate with local law enforcement officials or emergency response

personnel. In many cases, the loss of this protection has been accompanied by

the failure of the licensee to notify the NRC in accordance with the applicable

provisions of 10 CFR 73.71, depending on the degree to which the security system

has been degraded.

Discussion:

A review of each incident has indicated that the modification or repairs that

degraded the protected and vital area barriers and communications systems were

made without an adequate, or in some cases any, notification of the facility's

security organization by the organization planning or performing the modifica- tions or repairs.

The likelihood of degradation may be substantially lessened at sites where the

organization responsible for security is part of the planning or scheduling

phase of any facility modifications or repairs. In such facilities, the

barriers and equipment necessary to provide security to the facility are

identified and the proper compensatory measures planned and scheduled to allow

for the efficient implementation of the planned modifications or repairs. An

integrated planning system allows for all facility organizations to have input

to the planning and scheduling phase of maintenance and facility modifications, especially when the actions taken can negatively impact on the effectiveness of

other essential programs.

The reporting requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 may apply to security incidents of

the type described above, depending on the degree to which the security system

has been degraded.

IN 85-79 September 30, 1985 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the approprate NRC regional office or this office.

ari ordan, Director

Divisi nAf Emergency Preparedness

and Eigineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

R. Rosano, IE

(301) 492-4006 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 85-79

72 September 30, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

85-78 Event Notification 9/23/85 All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

85-77 Possible Loss Of Emergency 9/20/85 All power reactor

Notification System Due To facilities holding

Loss Of AC Power an OL or CP

85-76 Recent Water Hammer Events 9/19/85 All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

85-75 Improperly Installed Instru- 8/30/85 All power reactor

mentation, Inadequate Quality facilities holding

Control And Inadequate Post- an OL or CP

modification Testing

85-74 Station Battery Problems 8/29/85 All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-70 Reliance On Water Level 8/26/85 All power reactor

Sup. 1 Instrumentation With A facilities holding

Common Reference Leg an OL or CP

85-73 Emergency Diesel Generator 8/23/85 All power reactor

Control Circuit Logic Design facilities holding

Error an OL or CP

85-72 Uncontrolled Leakage Of 8/22/85 All power reactor

Reactor Coolant Outside facilities holding

Containment an OL or CP

85-71 Containment Integrated Leak 8/22/85 All power reactor

Rate Tests facilities holding

an OL or CP

85-70 Teletherapy Unit Full 8/15/85 All material

Calibration And Qualified licensees

Expert Requirements (10 CFR

35.23 And 10 CFR 35.24)

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit