IR 05000528/1997018
| ML17313A200 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17313A199 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-97-18, 50-529-97-18, 50-530-97-18, NUDOCS 9802120254 | |
| Download: ML17313A200 (30) | |
Text
ENCLO RE 1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
License Nos.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:,
Approved By:
50-528 50-529 50-530 NPF<1 NPF-51 NPF-74 50 528/97 18 50-529/97-18 50-530/97-18 Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 5951 S. Wintersburg Road Tonopah, Arizona November 30, 1997 through January 18, 1998 Jim Moorman, Senior Resident Inspector Nancy Salgado, Resident Inspector Dan Carter, Resident Inspector Charles Paulk, Senior Reactor Inspector Dennis F. Kirsch, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch F ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment 1:
Supplemental Information 9802i20254 980204 PDR ADQCK 05000528
i
EXECUTIVE UMMARY Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 NRC Inspection Report 50-528/97-18; 50-529/97-18; 50-530/97-18
~Oera i ns Control room operators generally demonstrated good communications skills within the control room and while communicating with personnel outside of the control room.
Operators were knowledgeable of plant conditions and of activities occurring within the plant. Plant operators were attentive to the boards.
Although an isolated case of unauthorized reading material being briefly brought into the control room was observed, operator performance during routine operations of the plant was good (Section 01.1).
The Essential Spray Pond System (ESPS) was maintained in good condition. The updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) review program effectively identified and tracked discrepancies for inclusion in the next revision of the UFSAR. Safety evaluations for changes associated with the ESPS were thorough (Section 02.1).
Three Operations Department self-assessments were thorough, provided good insight into the assessed areas, and were effective in providing early problem identification and intervention (Section 06.1).
ain enan Routine maintenance and surveillance activities were generally conducted in a safety conscious manner by knowledgeable technicians.
An isolated weakness in misplacing a work order during the performance of one work activity was observed (Section M1.3).
During plant tours, the inspectors consistently found that plant equipment status was well maintained and that plant material condition was generally good and well monitored by the plant staff (Section M2.1).
Maintenance technicians demonstrated good procedure adherence and work practices during performance of the Unit 3 "B" charging pump preventive maintenance and pump repacking activities (Section M4.1).
Instrument and control (l8C) technicians were very knowledgeable of their duties and demonstrated good use of procedures while replacing pressure transmitter RCDPT-101D inside containment (Section M4.2).
The Maintenance Rule program was effective in identifying the declining trend in the performance of the pressurizer pressure transmitters.
The decision to recommend the evaluation of two transmitters for the establishment of goals and monitoring requirements was conservative (Section M4.3).
0 l
(
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e
Pl n Personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation work practices.
During plant tours, the inspectors consistently found that contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted and that area suweys posted outside rooms were current (Section R1.1).
R o
De il Summ of Plant Sta u All units operated at essentially 100 percent power for the duration of the inspection period.
I. 0 era on 01, Conduct of Operations 01.1 b
rv i n f on r I Room A iviies a.
Ins tin c
e 7177 Inspectors observed the conduct of operations in the Units 1, 2, and 3 control rooms during normal and backshiff periods.
rv i n Fi in Control room operators generally demonstrated good communications skills within the control room and while communicating with personnel outside of the control room.
Operators were knowledgeable of plant conditions and of activities occurring within the plant.
Plant operators were attentive to the boards.
On December 22, 1997, during backshift observations, the inspectors 'observed a licensee employee briefly enter the Unit 3 control room with unauthorized reading material. After entering the control room, the employee promptly exited. As the employee was exiting the control room, he called a licensed operator to meet him in the secondary technical support center, just outside of the control room. The employee briefly discussed the material with the operator, left the material in the secondary technical support center and exited. This observation was discussed with the site manager.
The site manager stated that this did not meet operations management expectations.
Conclusions Control room operators generally demonstrated good communications skills within the control room and while communicating with personnel outside of the control room.
Operators were knowledgeable of plant conditions and of activities occurring within the plant.
Plant operators were attentive to the boards.
Although an isolated case of unauthorized reading material being briefly brought into the control room was observed, operator performance during routine operations of the plant was goo i
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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Walkdown of PS Unit 1 a.
In i n Sco 71707 On December 18, 1997, the inspectors conducted a walkdown of the ESPS including the ultimate heat sink. The inspectors compared the system to as-built system drawings M-SPP-001, and M-SPP-002, "P8 I Diagram Essential Spray System," Revision 26 and Revision 11, respectively, and UFSAR Sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2.
rv i n d Findin The inspectors reviewed licensee drawings of the systems and verified that all accessible valves in the main flow paths were in their correct position. System instrumentation indicated expected values and was within the calibration periodicity. By observation of the installed system and indicated water level, the inspectors verified that all non-safety related piping that had the potential to siphon water out of the ultimate heat sink during an accident did not extend below the, technical specification minimum water level of the essential spray pond or had siphon breaking devices installed.
The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR description of the ESPS.
The inspectors questioned the licensee on several changes made to the UFSAR and reviewed two 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations associated with these changes.
The 10 CFR 50.59 reviews were thorough.
The inspectors observed that two valves in the discharge path of both essential spray pond pumps had been modified to remove power from their motor operator.
However, Table 9.2-3 of the UFSAR still indicated that the control room had indication of these valves on the main control boards.
Control room indication had been removed several years ago when the valves had their power removed.
This UFSAR discrepancy had been identified by the UFSAR review group on September 9, 1997 and was being tracked by the licensee for correction. To correct the discrepancies of this nature, the licensee would initiate a condition reportldisposition request (CRDR)
to track all identified items when review of a system was completed.
Changes were then incorporated into the next UFSAR revision. At the time of this inspection, the licensee had not generated a CRDR for the ESPS system.
For the ESPS system, the licensee's methodology for tracking UFSAR changes was effective.
Conclusions The ESPS was maintained in good condition. The UFSAR review program effectively identified and tracked discrepancies for inclusion in the next revision of the UFSAR.
Safety evaluations for changes associated with the ESPS were thoroug /4 N
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Operations Organization and Administration 06.1 Revi w of 0 era ion Self-As s m n R o
Ins ction Sco 71707
~brvati The inspectors examined the "Operations Self-Assessment Report" conducted during July 29, 1997 to August 15, 1997, by the Operations Department and two Operations Department mini-self-assessments titled "Operations Department Communications" and
"Operations Standards Anchoring." The mini-assessments were conducted during the June to August 1997 time period.
n i
in The "Operations Self-Assessment Report" assessed the work activities of auxiliary and reactor operators, control room and shift supervisors, and work control personnel.
Crew performance during simulated emergency conditions was also assessed.
The report identified 6 areas as strengths, 11 areas as satisfactory, and 7 areas as performance weaknesses.
Areas identified as performance weaknesses were further documented with a CRDR to ensure follow up.
The mini-assessments were used as tools for verification that standards were being met and to aid Operations management in identification/correction of declining trends.
The assessment on communication involved a total of 33 observations by shift supervisors and department managers.
There were no observations of failures to meet the standards.
Two observations were made of occasions when standards were met, but improvement was needed.
The conclusion from this assessment was the department had a clear understanding of the performance expectation.
The assessment on standards anchoring involved a review of behavior performance in areas such as STAR (Stop, Think, Act, Review), team STAR, procedure use, alarm management, control board monitoring, command and control, and communications.
A total of 231 observations were conducted by shift supervisors.
There were no observations of failure to meet standards.
Seven observations noted occasions when standards were met but improvements were needed.
The conclusion of the assessment was that the department had a clear understanding of performance expectations.
The inspectors observations of operations activities were consistent with the findings of these'ssessments.
C.
Conclusions Operations Department self-assessments were thorough, provided good insight into the assessed areas,.and were effective in providing early problem identification and interventio Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1 I
e ic n Ev n Re o
R 5 -5 9/97-'002-00:
Technical Specifications (TS) 3.0.3 entry due to noncompliance with TS LCO 3.4.9. This LER described an instance where charging pump A developed a cracked block. The charging pump was isolated and the licensee exited TS 3.0.3. The charging pump block was replaced and a root cause analysis determined that the most probable cause of the cracked pump block was high-cycle fatigue.
No new issues were. revealed by the LER.
This LER is closed.
I intena c
M1 Conduct of Maintenance M11 e
r I
m i
na A ivi i a.
ns i n The inspectors observed all or portions ofthe following work activities:
WO 792085:
Remove Emergency Light Fixture From Locked High Radiation Areas WO 795577:
Six-Month Inspection Of Charging Pump No. 3 31 MT-90CH01: Charging Pump Disassembly and Assembly, Revision 12 s
in n
i During the performance of work order (WO) 792085 the inspectors found that the WO was located outside the door, approximately 30 feet away from the work site, and not in the possession of the maintenance personnel.
The maintenance personnel performing the work had inadvertently misplaced the WO. The WO gave directions for the permanent removal of three emergency lighting fixtures. The licensee initiated CRDR 9-7-1938 to address/trend this issue.
The inspectors concluded that maintenance personnel had inadvertently misplaced the WO and that this was an isolated weakness in the performance of the work activity. Allother aspects of the job were fulfilled adequately including, the radiation protection briefing, radiation protection personnel accompanying individuals into the locked high radiation area, and communications established between operations and maintenance when Hatch A-1H03 was opened.
The site shift manager was to be informed prior to opening the hatch because it affected auxiliary building essential ventilation.
For the remaining activities observed, the inspectors found the work to be professional and thorough.
Allwork observed was performed with the work package present and in active use.
Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned task i
-5-M1.2 General C mments on Surv ill n e Activities a.
Ins ec ion co e 6172 The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
73ST-9AF02: AFA-PO1 Inservice Test, Revision 7 36ST-9SB13:
Supplemental Protection. System Functional Test, Revision 9 36ST-9SE01:
Excore Safety Channel Log Calibration, Revision 11 73ST-9SI06:
Containment Spray Pumps and Check Valves-Inservice Test, Revision 4 b.
rvations and Fin in The inspectors found these surveillances were performed acceptably and as specified by applicable procedures.
M1.3 n lu ion on n
of in e nd u
el IVI I Routine maintenance and surveillance activities were generally conducted in a safety conscious manner by knowledgeable technicians.
An isolated weakness in misplacing a work order during the performance of one work activity was observed.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 R v'ewofM r
I d'i nD rin Pla a.
Ins c ion c
Routine tours were conducted to observe the status of plant equipment and evaluate plant material condition.
b.
Observation an Fin in The inspectors noted a significant amount of boron crystal accumulation around and below the Unit 3 "B" high pressure safety injection (HPSI) outboard bearing.
The licensee was in the process of using deficiency tags to locally identify all equipment identified as having a deficient condition. At the time of the inspector's initial observation the licensee had not placed a deficiency tag on the pump to indicate that a deficiency had been previously identified. The existence of boron accumulation was discussed with the Unit 3 Operations Department Leader.
Subsequent to the discussion a
deficiency tag was hung. The condition of the bearing had been reported by the licensee on November 14, 1997 and work was scheduled for February 10, 1998. The pump was operated on January 16, 1998 with very little leakage observed.
The inspectors also noted a significant amount of boron crystal accumulation around and below the Unit 2 "A"HPSI pump inboard bearing and a slight boron accumulation around a plug on the outboard bearing.
There was no deficiency tag hanging to indicate
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-6-previous identification of the problem. The inspectors determined that there were two outstanding work requests for the "A"HPSI pump. One of the work requests identified the condition of the seal plug on the outboard bearing and the other identified an oil leak on the pump outboard bearing.
Leakage through these seals would not cause a
problem during an accident with the pump running in the injection mode.
Ifthese pumps were used in a post-accident scenario in the containment recirculation mode, leakage could present a problem with high airborne activity. Through discussions with the system engineer and review of previous test results, the inspectors determined that seal leakage for both pumps was well within the analyzed limits of 100 cc/hour.
Additionally, the boron accumulation was removed from both pumps prior to the end of the inspection period.
c.
Qgggli,lions During plant tours, the inspectors consistently found that plant equipment status was well maintained and that plant material condition was generally good and well monitored by the plant staff.
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance e
M41 r v niveM 'n a
nd c in h
a.
e i n in nl 3 On December 17, 1997, the inspectors observed maintenance technicians perform WO 795577, "Six-Month Inspection Of Charging Pump," and the repack of the 8 charging pump. The inspectors also reviewed work control clearance 97-02123.
rva ions nd Fin in s The inspectors verified that the licensee's clearance tagout of the B charging pump was correct.
The tagout was properly signed off by the work control senior reactor operator and all tags were hung in accordance with station procedures.
The inspectors observed the team of technicians, performing scheduled maintenance on the charging pump, following approved procedures.
The technicians demonstrated effective foreign material exclusion practices.
Alltorque wrenches used were properly calibrated in accordance with the measuring and test equipment program.
Radiation protection personnel provided good job coverage of the pump repack activities.
Conclusions Maintenance technicians demonstrated good procedure adherence and work practices during performance of the Unit 3 "B" charging pump preventive maintenance and pump repacking activitie il I
H i
-7-M4.2 I cement of Pre ri r Pressur Tran mi te RCDT-101D Unit 1 a.
Ins ec ion Sco e 62707 On December 31, 1997, the inspectors observed maintenance technicians install pressure transmitter RCDPT-101D inside containment.
The inspectors reviewed WO 826078, temporary modification (TM) 1-97-RC-007 and attended the pre-job briefing with operations, maintenance, and radiological protection personnel.
b.
Observa Ions an Findin The pre-job briefing included a discussion of all procedural hold points to assure worker understanding.
IBC technicians discussed the work activities and the installation of the TM. The TM was being installed to allow technicians to use measuring and test equipment to slowly pressurize the transmitter prior to placing it back in service.
The l8C technicians performed all work in accordance with work procedures and were very knowledgeable of their duties. After installation of the transmitter, all lines were properly filled and vented prior to placing the transmitter in operation.
EC technicians communicated well with control room operators when pressurizing the system and placing the transmitter in service.
The technicians experienced some unexpected difficulties which required them to exit the containment and obtain additional equipment.
The licensee does not relamp the containment during power operations and lighting in the work area was poor. Two overhead lights in the vicinity had burnt out light bulbs, which required the technicians to hold flashlights for much of the work. The technicians were prepared for the poor lighting conditions since their tool package included the flashlights.
c.
Conclusions l8C technicians were very knowledgeable of their duties and demonstrated good use of procedures white replacing pressure transmitter RCDPT-101D inside containment.
M4.3 Main enance Rule A lica ion B
on Pressure Transmitter Failures a.
Ins ection Sco e 62707 The purpose of this effort was to evaluate licensee performance in the area of implementation of the Maintenance Rute program.
The inspectors reviewed CRDRs 1-7-0188, 1-7-0343, 1-7-0355, and 2-7-0282 and interviewed maintenance and system engineers, and Maintenance Rule personnel.
b.
Observations and Findin s Several Barton 763A pressure transmitters used on the pressurizer experienced significant drifting during 1997. The first occurrence was on May 11, 1997, on
u
<f
-8-Transmitter 1JRCDPT0101D (1PT0101D); the second occurrence was Transmitter 1PT0101D on June 29, 1997; the third occurrence was Transmitter 2JRCDPT0101C (2PT0101C) on September 3, 1997; the fourth occurrence was Transmitter 1PT0101D on December 6, 1997; the fifth occurrence was Transmitter 1PT0101D on December 20, 1997; and the sixth occurrence was Transmitter 2PT0101C on December 24, 1997.
Licensee engineers have been communicating with the vendor to determine the root causes for the drifting. The first time that Transmitter 1PT0101D drifted, the transmitter had been installed for approximately 6 years.
The first time that Transmitter 2PT0101C drifted, the transmitter had been installed for approximately 18 months.
The inspectors noted that the only time the observed drift exceeded the operability criteria for the transmitter was the December 20, 1997, occurrence.
The inspectors found, therefore, that the engineer's determination that only one Maintenance Rule functional failure had occurred was correct.
Although the quantitative performance criteria (i.e., unavailability and functional failures)
had not been exceeded, the inspectors noted that the system engineer had recommended that Transmitters 1PT0101D and 2PT0101C be considered for the establishment of goals and monitoring requirements in accordance with the Maintenance Rule program and 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1).
The inspectors determined that the engineer's basis for making this recommendation was the declining trend in transmitter performance and availability and found the system engineer's recommendation to be conservative.
The inspectors noted, however, that the expert panel had not been presented this information by the end of the inspection period.
The inspectors noted that the unavailability that was monitored was that for the reactor protection system.
The monitoring was being performed at a channel level for the various parameters.
In this case, the monitoring was for pressurizer pressure Channel D in Unit 1 and pressurizer pressure Channel C in Unit 2. The inspectors found this level of monitoring was appropriate to demonstrate that the performance of the reactor protection system was being effectively controlled through the performance of preventive maintenance (surveillance testing) such that the reactor protection system remained capable of performing its intended function.
Conclusions The Maintenance Rule program was effective in identifying the declining trend in the performance of the pressurizer pressure transmitters.
The decision to recommend the evaluation of two transmitters for the establishment of goals,and monitoring requirements was conservativ t i
E8 IIiscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8.1 Clo ed Viola ion 5
- 30/97-05-02:
failure to follow approved electrical cable specifications.
As documented in a correspondence from the NRC to the licensee dated June 27, 1997, this violation was withdrawn. This item is closed.
. IV. Plant Su ort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 Gener I
o n
nR i
I i aIPro
'
o r
I 7175 The inspectors observed radiation protection personnel, including supervisors, routinely touring the radiologically controlled areas.
Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation work practices.
Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted.
Area surveys posted outside rooms were current. The inspectors checked a sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and all were in accordance with requirements.
V, a
n s
X1 Exit IIeeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 7, 1998. Tne licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identifie 'l
TT HM NT 1 PARTIA I T P
RSON ONTACTED
~iceneee D. Carnes, Unit 2 Department Leader, Operations R. Fullmer, Director, Nuclear Assurance J. Hesser, Director, Engineering V. Huntsman, Department Leader, Radiation Protection W. Ide, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering D. Kanitz, Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs P. Kirker, Unit 3 Department Leader, Operations A. Krainik, Department Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs D. Mauldin, Director, Maintenance D. Marks, Section Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs G. Overbeck, Vice President, Nuclear Production T. Radke, Director, Outages B. Rash, Department Leader, System Engineering C. Seaman, Director, Emergency Services D. Smith, Director, Operations W. Stewart, Executive Vice President, APS S. Terrigrino, Manager, Strategic Communications J. Velotta, Director, Training P. Wiley, Department Leader, Operations M. Winsor, Department Leader, Maintenance Engineering
I i
-2-IN PECTION PROC D
R ED 61726 62707 71707 71750 92901 92903 Surveillance Observations Maintenance Observations Plant Operations Plant Support Activities Plant Operations Follow-up Engineering Follow-up P ND L
DAN DI D
50-529/97-002-00 LER TS 3.0.3 entry due to noncompliance with TS LCO 3.4.9 50-530/97005-02 VIO failure to followapproved electrical cable specifications
E
-3-ESPS UFSAR IS.C CRDR Essential Spray Pond System updated final safety analysis report instrument and control condition report/disposition request LER WO Licensee Event Report work order HPSI TM high pressure safety injection temporary modification
It II II i