IR 05000528/1996015
| ML17312A984 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 09/27/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17312A983 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-96-15, 50-529-96-15, 50-530-96-15, NUDOCS 9610030202 | |
| Download: ML17312A984 (28) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
License Nos.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved By:
50-528 50-529 50-530 NPF-41 NPF-51 NPF-74 50-528/96-1 5 50-529/96-1 5 50-530/96-1 5 Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 5951 S. Wintersburg Road Tonopah, Arizona August 12 through September 25, 1996 C. J. Myers, Reactor Inspector M. F. Runyan, Reactor Inspector Chris A. VanDenburgh, Chief, Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Attachment:
Partial List of Persons Contacted List of Inspection Procedures Used List of Items Closed and Discussed 9bi0030202 9b0927 PDR ADOCK 05000528
-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 NRC Inspection Report 50-528/96-15; 50-529/96-15; 50-530/96-15 This inspection evaluated the licensee's efforts to complete commitments to Generic Letter 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," and actions taken in response to previous inspection findings. An initial closure inspection was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-528;50-529;50-530/95-23.
Several areas of the licensee's program remained incomplete at that time.
The scope of this inspection was limited to a review of the incomplete program areas identified during previous NRC insp ction 50-528;50-529;50-530/95-23.
Encnineering The inspectors concluded that the licensee had adequately demonstrated the existing design basis capability of untested motor-operated valves within its Generic Letter 89-10 program.
The licensee developed and implemented adequate long-term measures to maintain motor-operated valve design basis capability.
Consequently, the NRC's review of the licensee's Generic Letter 89-10 program was closed (E1.1).
The licensee was in the process of revising its program documents to complete the documentation of its final data reconciliation and the basis. for completion of its Generic Letter 89-10 program.
The licensee had scheduled this documentation effort to be complete by September 30, 1996 (Section E1.2).
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had grouped its motor-operated valves utilizing a method consistent with Supplement 6 of Generic Letter 89-10 to demonstrate the design basis capability of untested motor-operated valves within its Generic Letter 89-10 program (Section E1.2)
~
The inspectors verified that the untested motor-operated valves within each valve group displayed adequate margin to demonstrate existing design basis capability (Section E1.3).
The inspectors noted that the licensee had not evaluated unwedging loads in its determination of the opening capability of motor-operated valves.
The inspectors considered this to be nonconservative in cases where the unseating load exceeded the differential pressure load.
In response to this concern, the licensee revised its program to evaluate unwedging loads (Section E1.3).
The inspectors noted that the licensee had significantly revised its trending program since the last inspection.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's trending program was adequately developed and implemented for completion of Generic Letter 89-10 (Section E1.4).
The inspectors noted several inconsistencies in Licensee Event Report 95-06 regarding sheared motor keys in Limitorque actuators.
In response to questions related to the licensee's basis for reportability and the past operability of affected motor-operated valves, the licensee submitted a revised Licensee Event Report 95-06-01 to clarify the past operability of motor-operated valves found with sheared motor keys (Section E8.4).
Re ort Details Summar of Plant Status The plant was operated at 100 percent power for the duration of the inspection.
III. En ineerin E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Overall Assessment of Motor-0 crated Valve Pro ram a.
Ins ection Sco e Tl 2515/109 On June 28, 1989, the NRC issued Generic Letter 89-10, which requested licensees and construction permit holders to establish a program to ensure that switch settings for safety-related motor-operated valves were selected, set, and maintained properly.
Subsequently, seven supplements to the generic letter have been issued.
NRC inspections of licensee actions implementing commitments to Generic Letter 89-10 and its supplements have been conducted based on guidance provided in Temporary Instruction 2515/109, "Inspection Requirements for Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance."
Temporary Instruction 2515/109 was divided into three parts:
Part 1, "Program Review"; Part 2, "Verification of Program Implementation, 'and Part 3 " Verification of Program Completion."
The Temporary Instruction 2515/109, Part 1, program review at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-528;50-529;50-530/91-25.
Subsequent inspections, conducted under Part 2 of Temporary Instruction 2515/109, were documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-528;50-529;50-530/93-32and 94-11. An initial closure inspection was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-528;50-529;50-530/95-23.
Several areas of the licensee's program remained incomplete at that time.
The purpose of this inspection was to verify completion of certain licensee's commitments to Generic Letter 89-10 in accordance with the guidance established in Part 3 of Temporary Instruction 2515/109, Revision 2. The scope of this inspection was limited to a review of the incomplete program areas identified during previous NRC inspection 50-528;50-529;50-530/95-23.
Specifically, the area of trending of motor-operated valve failures and performance monitoring had not been adequately developed.
Also adequate justification for grouping of untested valves had not been established.
The process of "closing" the staff's review of a licensee's Generic Letter 89-10 program can be best defined as verification that the licensee has satisfactorily applied the principles contained in Generic Letter 89-10 (or suitable alternate methods) to demonstrate the design basis capability of each motor-operated valve
-5-in the program.
The closure process does not preclude additional inspections in this area.
Additionally, there remains an expectation that the assumptions and methodologies used to develop the Generic Letter 89-10 program will be maintained for the life of the plant.
Additionally, the licensee will be expected to address any new motor-operated valve performance issues emerging from industry experience as part of its long-term motor-operated valve program. This concept is commonly described as a "living program."
The closure process does not convey final NRC acceptance of a licensee's approach to the areas of periodic verification or pressure locking and thermal binding. These areas, to be reviewed under new generic letters, were reviewed on an interim basis for closure under Generic Letter 89-10.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors reviewed the licensee's method for grouping untested valves within its Generic Letter 89-10 program.
The inspectors reviewed the existing capability of each untested valve and the revised trending program established to monitor and trend motor-operated valve performance as established by the licensee.
c.
Conclusions The licensee adequately demonstrated the existing design basis capability of untested motor-operated valves within its Generic Letter 89-10 program.
The licensee developed and implemented, adequate long-term measures to maintain
'otor-operated valve design basis capability.
Consequently, the NRC's review of the licensee's Generic Letter 89-10 program was closed.
E1.2 Grou in Method a.
Ins ection Sco e
In response to concerns expressed during a previous NRC inspection (NRC Inspection Report 50-528;50-529;50-530/95-23),the licensee revised their motor-operated valve program to establish groups consistent with the method recommended in Supplement 6 to Generic Letter 89-10. According to the licensee's revised grouping method, the design basis capability of untested valves in the licensee's Generic Letter 89-10 program was justified using either a high margin approach or a grouping approach.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's grouping approach.
Observations and Findin s For untested valves, the licensee utilized either a high margin approach or a grouping approach to demonstrate the design basis capability of each valv (1)
Hi h Mar in A roach For most of the untested valves in the licensee's program, the high margin approach was used due to the excess capability available in the original design of the valves.
The licensee justified the opening capability of 93 valves and the closing capability of 114 valves using this approach.
The licensee assessed the capability of each individual valve on the basis of low design basis requirements and large available capability.
The licensee considered that the design basis capability of gate valves was demonstrated if an excess thrust margin of at least 15 percent could be determined by analysis under worst-case conditions assuming a valve factor of 1.0.
The inspectors found that the licensee also assumed a 0.2 coefficient of stem friction with a 3-5 percent allowance for degradation and a rate-of-loading of 25-35 percent.
The inspectors considered the licensee's justification for its high margin approach to be adequate.
The inspectors emphasized the need to clearly establish the minimum
'erformance characteristics allowable under this approach as the basis for operability in the licensee's program documents.
The licensee was in the process of revising its program documents to complete the documentation of its final data reconciliation and the basis for completion of its Generic Letter 89-10 program.
The licensee had scheduled this documentation effort to be complete by September 30, 1996.
(2)
Grou in A
roach In its grouping approach, the licensee utilized four methods of establishing groups of valves based on expected dynamic similarity.
~
Method 1 grouped valves which were expected to exhibit dynamic similarity because of similar system conditions and component configurations.
The baseline tested valves used in situ-plant test data and were all of the same manufacturer, pressure class, and size.
System conditions, such as differential pressure, flow, and temperature, were also considered to be similar.
Method 2 grouped valves based on component similarity using in situ-plant test data and were all of the same manufacturer, pressure class, and size.
Method 3 grouped valves based on component similarity using in situ-plant test data and included several valve sizes. but all valves were the same manufacturer and.pressure clas Method 4 grouped valves based on component similarity using industry-test data and included several valve sizes, but all valves were the same manufacturer and pressure class.
Within a group of valves, the licensee assigned a common group valve factor to all valves in the group irrespective of whether the valves had been tested under dynamic conditions.
This group valve factor bounded the valve factors demonstrated by the tested valves in the group.
Using this valve factor, the licensee determined the design basis capability and required torque switch setting for setup.
The inspectors found the licensee's use of group valve factors for dynamically-tested valves to be conservative.
For the various groups, the inspectors considered t<<e licensee to have selected group valve factors sufficiently conservative to account for potential differences in valve performance that might occur from variations in valve size or service conditions.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee had established adequate grouping methods.
E1.3 Ca abilit of Untested Motor-0 crated Valves a.
Ins ection Sco e
The inspectors reviewed various plant documents and held discussions with the motor-operated valve engineers to determine whether the licensee had acceptably demonstrated the design basis capability of each Generic Letter 89-10 valve.
The expectation was that at this stage of the licensee's Generic Letter 89-10 program (following the licensee's notification to the NRC that activities pursuant to Generic Letter 89-10 had been completed), each motor-operated valve in the program would be qualified on the basis of in situ-design basis testing or well-justified, test-based design information.
The inspectors focused on several design parameters used to predict the operating capability of motor-operated valves, specifically:
(1) valve factor, which correlates differential pressure to stem thrust requirement; (2) stem friction coefficient, which quantifies the transfer efficiency of actuator output torque to valve stem thrust; and (3) rate-of-loading (a.k.a., load-sensitive behavior), which reflects the change (usually a loss) in deliverable stem thrust under dynamic closing conditions as compared to the available closing static thrus b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors found that all untested valves within the licensee's groups displayed a thrust margin in excess of the minimum required to demonstrate design basis capability. With the exception of two valves, all untested valves showed at least a 10 percent excess margin.
The inspectors considered the existing excess margin to be adequate to account for potential valve factor degradation until the licensee's trending program can validate the extent of any actual degradation under service conditions at Palo Verde.
(1)
Valve Stroke Histor Used to Justif Lack of Valve Factor De radation Allowance The inspectors'oted that the licensee did not include a margin for valve factor degradation.
The licensee reviewed the stroke history of the two marginal valves which were determined to have less than 10 percent excess thrust margin.
The licensee determined that valve factor degradation would not affect the capability of the valves due to infrequent operation.
The licensee included valve factor degradation as a performance parameter in its trending program to further justify this assumption.
(2)
Seat-Based Globe Valve Anal sis The inspectors found that the licensee analyzed the pressure area of globe valves using a seat-based assumption.
The inspect'ors discussed increased thrust requirements due to guide-base pressure area of some valves.
The inspectors observed that the reported valve factors for some of the licensee'lobe valve were unexpectedly high, indicating that they were inaccurately derived.
The licensee acknowledged the source of inaccuracy in determining globe valve factors but considered the use of seat-based pressure area to be appropriate for consistency in the analysis.
The inspectors found the licensee's method to be adequate in determining the required operating thrust for tested valves but cautioned the licensee in using data from other plants.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors'oncern.
(3)
H drostatic Tests The inspectors found that the licensee used hydrostatic testing in some cases to demonstrate design basis opening capability.
However, the licensee had not justified the use of hydrostatic test data in determining valve performance under design basis flow conditions.
The licensee considered the hydrostatic test to be a reasonable simulation of design basis differential
-9-pressure conditions to determine valve-specific performance.
The licensee intended to document its justification in the final program documentation.
The inspectors considered the specific valve factors derived from the licensee's hydrotesting to be reasonable compared to valve factors from other sources for similar valves.
(4)
Unwed in Loads Not Considered in 0 enin Mar in Determination The inspectors found that the licensee had not evaluated unwedging loads in its determination of the opening capability.
Rather the licensee had only evaluated the differential pressure loads following unseating.
In response to the inspectors'oncern, the licensee revised its basis for determining opening capability and included evaluation of unwedging loads.
The licensee reviewed the capability of all affected valves and determined that all remained adequately justified.
As part of its final documentation effort, the licensee, intended to change the acceptance criteria for future diagnostic testing to evaluate unwedging capab'ility.
The licensee stated that they planned to establish reduced allowable thrust settings based on unwedging loads extrapolated to design basis differential pressure conditions.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee had adequately demonstrated the existing capability of grouped valves within their Generic Letter 89-10 program.
The licensee will need to remain aware and incorporate industry experience as it becomes available regarding long-term aspects of valve factor degradation.
E1.4 Trendin of Motor-0 crated Valve Failures and Test Results a.
Ins ection Sco e
The licensee had committed to implement recommended Action (h) of Generic Letter 89-10 related to motor-operated valve trending.
Action (h) recommended that each failure and the corrective action. taken, including repairs, alterations, analyses, tests, and surveillances, should be analyzed or justified and documented.
The documentation should include the results and history of each as-found
)
deteriorated condition, malfunction, test, inspection, analysis, repair, and alteration.
The recommended action further suggested that the data be periodically examined as part of a monitoring and feedback effort to establish trends of motor-operated valve operabilit l
-1 0-During the previous NRC inspection of the motor-operated valve program, the inspectors noted several weaknesses in the licensee's program to monitor and trend motor-operated valve performance.
In response to NRC concerns, the licensee revised their program for motor-operated valve performance trending.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Maintenance Department Guideline MDG-39INS-001, "Motor-Operated Valve Performance Monitoring and Failure Data Trending."
Observations and Findin s The inspectors found that the licensee had implemented a comprehensive program to trend performance data for motor-operated valves.
The licensee had included trending of additional diagnostic data to develop meaningful performance parameters.
The inspectors noted that the licensee intended to trend only static test data.
The inspectors expressed concern that the licensee's design assumptions regarding dynamic coefficient of friction and valve factor degradation were not included in the trending program to validate the licensee's assumptions from dynamic testing.
In response to the inspector's concern the licensee revised their program to include dynamic test data to validate these assumptions.
The inspectors noted that anomalies in the diagnostic signatures were not addressed as part of the licensee trending program.
The licensee identified that the evaluation of anomalies was included within existing evaluations of diagnostic signatures.
The inspectors found the licensee evaluation to be adequate but emphasized the need to focus specific attention on diagnostic signature anomalies to assure that the unexpected characteristic does not evidence improper operation which could affect the design basis capability of the motor-operated valve.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee had adequately developed and implemented a program for trending of motor-operated valve performance.
E8 Miscellaneous En ineerin Issues J
E8.1 Closed Ins ection Followu Item 50-528 529 530/94-12-02:
Apparent Conflict Between Supplements 4 and 9 of the Palo Verde Safety Evaluation Report.
This item concerned an apparent conflict between statements made in Supplements 4 and 9 of the Palo Verde Safety Evaluation Report regarding the configuration of valve CHA-HV-524. Supplement 4 of the Safety Evaluation Report stated valve CHA-HV-524 had been modified to.supply it with Class-1E power, implying that this valve would have a secure power source to permit remote repositioning during accident conditions.
However, Supplement 9 of the Safety
-11-Evaluation Report endorsed a modification to lock valve CHA-HV-524 in an open direction, stating that this would improve the reliability of the charging system.
Because the valve was locked open, it could not be closed without local operator action.
The licensee explained in interoffice memorandum 315-00714-TCC, dated June 21, 1995, that the position taken in Supplement 9 had superseded the position taken earlier in Supplement 4.
The same memorandum explained that the change in the configuration status of valve CHA-HV-524 had resulted from an unexpected performance of this valve during a Unit 1 loss-of-load test in September 1985.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had adequately resolved this concern.
Closed Licensee Event Re orts 94-06 and 94-06-1: Spray Pond Pump Flow Greater Than Design Basis Calculation.
The licensee identified that the flow-limitingorifices in the Unit 1 spray pond return lines were oversized.
The oversized orifices had been installed in error during original construction of the plant.
The licensee determined that the only adverse operational impact of this configuration defect was that it allowed increased flow in the spray pond system, resulting in an increased rate-of-water inventory depletion.
The licensee reported that a slight deficit of inventory could occur during a design basis accident.
During Refueling Outage 1R5 in April 1995, the licensee replaced the orifices with proper sized orifices.
During the interim until the orifices could be replaced, the licensee reanalyzed the inventory depletion calculation using lower evaporative loss rate due to lower temperatures expected prior to change out of the orifice. The licensee also established temporary procedures directing the operators to throttle the spray pond flow to reduce the rate of inventory depletion during a design basis event.
These compensatory actions were sufficient to restore adequate inventory margin.
The licensee reviewed source documents related to the original construction error and determined that the improper orifice installation was an isolated event.
The inspectors considered the licensee's determination to be adequate.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had satisfactorily resolved the specific concern and had adequately addressed the generic implications associated with the original construction Closed Licensee Event Re ort 94-10: Misalignment of Limit Switch Contact Bar The licensee identified a potential generic concern for misalignment of the electrical contact bar of the torque switch in Limitorque actuators for motor-operated valves.
The licensee reported three incidents between April 1993 and June 1994 in which the root cause of failure of a motor-operated'valve to close on demand was determined to be misalignment of the contact bar of the torque switch. The failures occurred on different valves (2SI-655, 1SI-672; and 3SI-655). The licensee attributed the misalignment to result during violent unseating of the valve which caused the contact bar of the closing torque switch to misalign and lose electrical
-1 2-continuity. This problem was not detected until the next close demand at which time the valves failed to respond due to the flipped contact bar.
The licensee replaced the compression spring of the contact bar with a stiffer spring to prevent recurrence of the misalignment.
The licensee modified all similar vaJves which they" determined to be susceptible to potential contact bar flipping. According to the licensee, no additional operational failures due to contact bar flipping have been experienced following the corrective action to replace the compression spring.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions and found them to be thorough and complete.
E8.4 Closed Licensee Event Re ort 95-06:
Inadequate Carbon Steel Key Material for Motor-Operated Valves On May 25, 1995, the licensee reported that a common deficiency caused at least one independent train in multiple safety systems to become inoperable.
After reviewing all of the data for motor pinion key failures which the licensee had acquired during the its motor key replacement program, the licensee determined that the common mode deficiency was reportable due to its generic implications.
The licensee reported five instances between April 1993 and April 1994 in which the motor pinion key of safety-related motor-operated valves had been sheared.
On September 19, 1996, the licensee revised the original licensee event report to change the designated reporting criteria under which the condition was being reported and to provide additional information supporting the past operability of the affected systems.
The licensee determined that the key material (AISI 1018 carbon steel) was inadequate to withstand the shock loading which resulted from normal operation and testing of the valve.
Re ortabilit Evaluation The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Report 95-06, Revision 0, and noted several inconsistencies in the licensee's evaluation of the past operability of the affected valves.
The operational failure and the discovery of the sheared motor keys occurred while the valves were out of service for testing.
Since the keys were replaced prio< to returning the'valves to service, the inspectors considered that the weak key material did not appear to have completely sheared during a period of plant operation in which the valves were required to be operable.
However, the licensee had reported the condition as a common mode failure which had caused the safety-related equipment to be inoperable.
The inspectors discussed the inconsistencies with the licensee in telephone conversations subsequent to the onsite inspection.
As a result of the inspector's observations, the licensee revised the original licensee event report to clarify the past operability of the affected systems.
The licensee also changed the reporting criteria under which the report
-1 3-had been submitted to identify a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, rather than an event where a single cause resulted in an inoperable condition.
Subsequent to the onsite inspection, the inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Report 95-06-1 during the week of September 23-25, 1996, and found that the inconsistencies in the original Licensee Event Report 95-06 had been clarified and that the condition had been adequately reported.
The revised licensee event report identified that all instances of sheared keys had been discovered during maintenance and testing activities when the affected valves were out of service.
The licensee concluded that all affected valves had been operable (in the past)
before the time of discovery of the sheared keys.
Corrective Actions The licensee initiated corrective actions to replace the motor shaft keys on valves which the licensee had determined to be susceptible to shearing of the motor pinion keys.
The licensee replaced the keys on a total of 227 valves in all three units with higher strength keys (AISI 4140 alloy steel).
The motor pinion keys of four additional valves were found sheared during the scheduled maintenance.
The licensee found the following valves with sheared motor shaft keys:
05/25/93 2-SI-672 10/1 8/93 1-SI-671 03/23/94 3-SI-671 04/02/94 3-SI-61 5
"A" Train Containment Spray Header Isolation Valve
"B" Train Containment Spray Header Isolation Valve
"B" Train Containment Spray Header Isolation Valve
"B" Low-Pressure Safety Injection Header Isolation Valve 04/1 3/94 3-SI-321
"A" High-Pressure Safety Injection Long-Term Recirculation Isolation Valve After metallurgical analysis of the sheared keys, the licensee concluded that the failures occurred progressively over time and were not the result of a single catastrophic loading.
The inspectors reviewed the following condition report/disposition requests which documented the licensee's identification and corrective actions for the sheared key problem:
CRDR 94Q199, 340154, 340194, 340186, 340177, 230234, 130593, and 920177.
The inspectors found that the licensee had initiated corrective actions based on its review of Information Notice 94-10, "Failure of Motor-Operated Valve Electric Power Train Due to Sheared or Dislodged Motor Pinion Gear Key," and Limitorque
f l
-1 4-Maintenance Update 92-02.
In Limitorque Maintenance Update 92-02, the actuator manufacturer recommended the use of higher strength motor keys in actuator models SMB-000 through -2. The manufacturers also recommended the replacement of motor keys in models SMB-3, -4, and -5 with the higher strength keys (AISI 4140) if not already done.
The manufacturer stated that the original key material (AISI 1018) had been changed for cost reasons.
The licensee had initiated its effort to replace existing motor keys with the higher strength keys as a reliability improvement activity.
The licensee found sheared keys on the following actuators and valves:
Valve No.
Actuator Model Valve Type 1-SI-671 2-SI-672 3-SI-671 3-SI-615 3-SI-321 SB-0-25-3600-AC 8" Borg Warner Flex-Wedge Gate Valve SB-0-25-3600-AC 8" Borg Warner Flex-Wedge Gate Valve SB-0-25-3600-AC 8" Borg Warner Flex-Wedge Gate Valve SB-3-150-3600-AC 12" Borg Warner Flex-Wedge Gate Valve SB-0-25-1900-DC 3" Borg Warner Globe Valve The inspectors noted that all the key shearing occurred on Limitorque actuator model SB actuators which were not specifically identified as susceptible in the previous industry notices.
This model actuator has an additional design feature which cushions the impact loads during valve closing and reduces the resulting inertia loads, resulting in lower total seating thrust.
However, despite this reduction in closing force, the inspectors considered that the licensee's failure experience indicated a particular susceptibility of SB-0-25 motors in high speed applications within only 50 cycles of valve operation.
The inspectors found that the licensee was also aware of emerging industry concerns for motor-shaft cracking and dislodging of motor-shaft keys which have been reported following replacement of the motor keys with higher strength material.
According to the licensee, no subsequent instances of sheared keys have occurred with the higher strength AISI 4140 motor key installed.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions were thorough and complet V. Mana ement Meetin s
X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 16 and September 25, 1996. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
Following the exit meeting the results of this inspection were discussed with the licensee on September 12, 1996.
In response to several questions, a revised Licensee Event Report 95-06-01 was submitted on September 19, 1996, and reviewed during the week of September 23-29, 1996.
A final'exit meeting was held on Sept~inber 26, 199 ATTACHMENT PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee S. Bauer, Licensing Section Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs M. Hooshmand, Section Leader, Valve Services Engineering J. Levine, Vice President, Nuclear Production A. Krainik, Department Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs D. Maudlin, Director, Maintenance J. Minnicks, Department Leader, Valve Services M. Renfroe, Section Leader, Valve Design Engineering R. Rogalski, Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs M. Salazar, Section Leader, Valve Services S. Scow, Engineer, Nuclear Assurance
- Maintenance G. Shanker, Department Leader, Nuclear Assurance
- Maintenance E. Smith Jr., Consulting Engineer, Valve Services Engineering OTHERS F. Gowers, Site Representative, El Paso Electric J. Kramer, Resident Inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Tl 2515/109,R.2 Inspection Requirements for Generic Letter 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance" IP 92903 Followup-Engineering LIST OF ITEMS CLOSED Closed IFI 9412-02 Apparent Conflict Between Safety Evaluation Report Supplements LER 94-06/94-06-1 Spray Pond Pump Flow Greater Than Design Calc LER 94-10 Misalignment of Limit Switch Contact Bar LER 95-06/94-06-1 Inadequate Carbon Steel Key Material for Motor-Operated Valves
% It e