IR 05000528/1996012
| ML17312A960 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1996 |
| From: | Dyer J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Stewart W ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9609170604 | |
| Download: ML17312A960 (22) | |
Text
CATEGORY
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
.-'CCESSION NBR:960 ACIL:STN-50-528 STN-50-529 STN-50-530 AUTH.NAME DYER,J.E.
RECIP.NAME STEWARTgW.L.
9170604 DOC.DATE: 96/09/10 NOTARIZED:
NO Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi'UTHOR AFFILIATION Region 4 (Post 820201)
RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Alabama Public Service Co.
DOCKET 05000528 05000529 05000530 SUBJECT: Discusses insp repts 50-528/96-12,50-529/96-12
&
50-530/96-12 on 960714-0824.No violations identified.
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SUBJECT:
4C INSPECTION REPORT 50-528/9612; 50-529/9612:
50-530/9612
Dear Hr. Stewart:
An NRC inspection was conducted July 14 through August 24, 1996't your Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 reactor facilities.
The enclosed report presents the scope and results of that inspection.
During the 6-week period covered by this inspection period. your conduct of activities at the Palo Verde facilities was generally characterized by safety-conscious operations, sound engineering and maintenance, and careful radiological work controls.
During this inspection period, several weaknesses regarding material conditions housekeeping, and operator attention to detail were identified by your staff and NRC.
While we are aware of your comprehensive plans to improve performance in these areas, we urge your continued attention to assure that your plans effect the necessary improvement.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's
"Rules of Practice."
a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we wi 11 be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, Docket Nos.:
50-528 50-529 50-530 License Nos.:
E. Dyer, Director Division of Reactor Projects 9609i70604 960910 PDR ADDCK 05000528
l c
e Arizona Public Service Company Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 50-528/9612:
50-529/9612:
50-530/9612 cc w/enclosure:
Mr. Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department.
Generation Resources P.O.
Box 800 Rosemead
~ Cali forni a 91770 Chairman Mar;copa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Angela K. Krainik, Manager Nuclear Licensing Arizona Public Service Company P.O.
Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 John C. Horne.
Vice President Power Supply Palo Verde Services 2025 N. Third Street, Suite 220
- Phoenix, Arizona 85004
e
-3-E-Mail report to D. Nelson (DJN)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System ( IPAS)
bcc to DMB ( IE01)
bcc distrib.
by RIV:
L. J.
Ca 1 1 an DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/F, WCFO)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/F, WCFO)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Leah Tremper (OC/LFDCB, MS:
TWFN 9E10)
Resident Inspector DRS-PSB MIS System RIV File M.
Hammond (PAO, WCFO)
DOCUMENT NAME:
R: t PV'~PV612RP. KEJ To receive copy of document, indicate in box: "C" = Copy without enclosures
"E" = Copy with enclosures
"N" = No copy SRI:DRP/F KEJohnson yf-09/ /96 C'.DRP/F DFKirsch~y 09/
D:DRP JEDyer
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
Units 1, 2, and
NRC Inspection Report 50-528/9612:
50-529/9612; 50-530/9612 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance.
and plant support.
The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspections.
~Qerati ons
~
Operations responded quickly and appropriately to the turbine building inverter failure.
The licensee's investigation was well planned and thorough (Section 01.1).
~
The operators performed well in stabilizing Unit 2 at power and Units
and 3 after thei r trips following the western states grid disturbance.
The management response team appropriately addressed pertinent issues relevant to the unit startups.
(Section 01.2).
~
The inspectors continued to identify material condition and housekeeping weakness examples which had not been previously identified by the licensee.
The licensee's Zone Improvement Program appears not to be fully effective in achieving management's expectations.
At the end of the inspection period, the licensee initiated a housekeeping improvement program that established appropriate but achievable standards.
established accountability, and assured the application of necessary resources (Section 02. 1).
~
Operations personnel continued to experience events due to weakness in attention to detail:
however
. these events were appropriately captured by the corrective action program and had minimal safety consequence.
The strategic plan initiated by operations management to address attention to detail weaknesses was well developed.and appeared to be comprehensive (Section 04. 1).
Maintenance
~
Maintenance and surveillance activities, observed by the inspectors, were performed as specified by procedure requirements (Sections Ml. 1 and M1. 2).
~
A routine reactor switchgear breaker maintenance activity was used as an excellent
"hands on" training opportunity for electrical maintenance trainees (Section M5. 1).
En ineerin Nuclear fuels department displayed good engineering rigor to pursue departure from nucleate boi ling ratio (ONBR) uncertainty factor issues (Section E2.1).
The licensee's procedures and management's expectations did not prevent incorrect and nonconservative addressable constants from being entered
-2-into the core operating limits supervisory system (COLSS) (Section E2.1).
Plant Su ort
~
Fire protection responded quickly and appropriately to the turbine building inverter failure.
Security officers demonstrated proper support for fire protection activities (Sections Sl. 1 and Fl. 1).
e Summar of Plant Status Re ort Details Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power.
On August 4. the unit reduced power to 89 percent to perform maintenance on a main turbine control valve.
On August 5
~ the unit returned to 100 percent power.
On August 10. the unit experienced a reactor trip due to a western states electrical grid disturbance.
On August 13. the unit returned to 100 percent power and remained at essentially 100 percent power for the duration of the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at essentially 100 percent power for the duration of the inspection period.
Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent power.
On August 10. the unit experienced a reactor trip due to a western states electrical grid disturbance.
On August 12. the unit returned to 100 percent power and remained at essentially 100 percent power for the duration of the inspection peI 1 od.
I.
0 erations Ol Conduct of Oper ations 01.1 Turbine Buildin Inverter Failure Unit 2 a.
Ins ection Sco e
71707 93702 On July 25, a Unit 2 nonsafety related inverter overheated.
The inspector responded to a control room announcement of a fire and observed licensee response to the event on the 110 foot elevation of the turbine building.
The inspector discussed response activities with fire protection, security, and operations personnel.
b. Observations and Findin s Fire protection personnel responded quickly to the event.
The inspector observed fire protection personnel check for the possible spread of the fire to adjacent areas.
An Auxiliary Operator (AO) and a Reactor Operator (RO) at the scene exhibited considerable knowledge of affected equipment.
The operators acted to de-energize the smoking transformers which terminated the fire.
The inverter was part of uninterruptible power Supply 2E-NON-N02, which provided power to nonsafety.
balance of plant equipment.
The loss of the power supply did not have an immediate impact on plant operations.
Fire protection supervisors demonstrated good leadership throughout the event.
Self-contained breathing apparatus were initially worn, then removed when conditions allowed.
Environmental monitoring personnel sampled the air quality in the room immediately after the event.
Turbine building and local area doors were opened to increase ventilation to the affected area.
Security officers ensured unnecessary personnel remained clear of the fire scene and properly accompanied the
-2-fire trucks to the scene and escorted fire fighters as they entered the building.
The licensee evacuated and quarantined the area until. the damaged transformer could be tagged out.
The licensee initiated an incident investigation team, led by the Director of Site Training.
As an immediate action, operators de-energized the same transformers in Units 1 and 3 until a cause of the failure could be established.
Subsequently.
the investigation team determined that the overheated transformer had been rewound approximately three years ago by a local vendor.
The team concluded that poor workmanship had contributed to the failure.
The licensee determined that the vendor had only been used for nonsafety related work.
c.
Conclusions Operations'ire protection, and security personnel responded quickly and appropriately to the turbine building inverter failure.
The licensee's investigation was well planned and thorough.
01.2 Reactor Tri Units 1 and
71707 93702 On August 10, Units 1 and 3 experienced reactor trips due to a core protection calculator (CPC) variable overpower trip.
At the same time.
Unit 2 experienced load osci llations.
These events were caused by an electrical grid disturbance which affected the western United States.
The inspector responded to the site and monitored the activities in all three control rooms.
The inspector observed that the operators responded appropriately to the unit trips and stabilized Units 1 and
in Mode 3.
The Unit 2 operators stabilized the unit at full power.
The inspector attended the management response team meeting and concluded that the licensee addressed pertinent issues relevant to restarting the units.
The licensee planned to submit, an LER describing both plant trips.
The LER will be reviewed in a future inspection.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02. 1 Material Condition and Housekee in a.
Ins ection Sco e
71707 71750 The inspectors performed routine inspections of the facility and assessed plant material condition and housekeeping.
b.
Observations and Findin s During the inspection period.
the inspectors identified the following material condition and housekeeping deficiencies:
-3-
~
On August 6
~ the inspector observed that insulation was removed and heat tracing was loose on the hydrogen monitor inlet isolation valve in Unit 3.
The inspector informed the shift supervisor of the discrepancy.
The shift supervisor determined that the system was operable and issued a work request to have the valve repaired.
~
The inspector observed numerous valves in the Unit 1 auxiliary building mechanical penetration rooms with excessive boron on the valve stems.
Several of these valves had dried boron beneath them wn insulation and on the floor.
One valve had boron running down into its piping insulation.
The licensee surveyed all identified areas.
All smears were less than the contaminated area limit of 1000 disintegrations per minute (dpm) per smear.
The licensee wrote work requests on valves with excessive leakage and all valve problems were turned over to the utilities foreman for action.
On July 22, 1996, the inspector found that painters, who were in the process of coating the stairwell leading the Unit 3 auxiliary feedwater pump rooms, had placed masking material over a water tight door in a manner which would have interfered with the mating of the doors elastomer seal and the cowling.
The licensee removed the masking material, determined that this interference would not have impacted the sealing capability of the door, and initiated a
condition report/disposition request (CRDR).
On July 23. the inspector identified boric acid buildup on top of a floor drain cover in the Unit 3 auxiliary building.
Subsequently.
radiation protection determined that the boric acid exceeded the limit for a contamination area and cleaned the buildup.
In addition, they took action to improve the draining of the drip catch hoses which were routed to the floor drain and had been the source of the contamination.
~
On July 24. the inspector found a minor steam leak in a drain line fitting downstream of a steam generator blowdown isolation valve in Unit 3.
The shift supervisor subsequently initiated a work request to address the steam leak.
The inspector discussed these material condition and housekeeping issues with the Director of Operations and noted that the number of discrepancies was high in relationship with the amount of inspection activity in this area.
Additionally, the inspector pointed out that these findings were consistent with the issues discussed during the presentation of the systematic assessment of,licensee performance (SALP)
report.
The Director discussed the licensee's plans to improve plant material condition and housekeeping.
On August 20. the licensee issued a
housekeeping guideline which identified 111 areas of the site and assigned responsibility for these areas among the Directors of
Operations'aintenance and Radiation protection.
In addition. the guideline established standards of housekeeping for both 1996 and the future.
The inspector found that these standards appeared appropriate and achievable.
The Director also emphasized that the resources and accountability had been established to ensure that the housekeeping guidelines would be achieved.
At end of this inspection period. the licensee had inspected all 111 areas and determined that none of the areas met their standards.
The Director planned to review the status of these areas on a weekly basis during the Director's morning planning meeting.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors continued to identify material condition and housekeeping issues which had not been previously identified by the licensee.
The licensee, at the end of the inspection periods initiated a housekeeping improvement program that established appropriate but achievable, standards, developed accountability, and assured the application of necessary resources.
In light of the discussions during the recent SALP meeting that efforts were underway to reemphasize the 2one Improvement Program and problems have continued to occur, management will need to provide adequate oversight to assure recent initiatives are implemented consistent with expectations.
Operator Knowledge and Performance 04. 1 0 erator Attention to Detail a.
Ins ection Sco e
71707 During the inspection period
~ the inspectors reviewed events associated with weaknesses in operations performance, and discussed the events and planned corrective actions with operations management.
b.
Observations and Findin s The licensee self-identified and documented several short duration operational events in the CRDR that indicated a decreased attention to detail by the operations staff.
While these events had minimal safety consequence to plant operations.
they demonstrated a need for continued licensee action to improve operator performance.
The inspector noted that these issues did not appear different in nature from those events discussed in recent inspection reports and in the SALP report.
The inspector discussed operator performance and planned corrective actions with the Director of Operations.
The Director discussed a strategic plan that operations had developed to address areas of procedure use and compliance. self and peer verifications and control board monitoring.
The plan established clear expectations for auxiliary and reactor operators in each of these areas.
Additionally.
08.1 Ml. 1 the plan included actions for the training department and nuclear assurance.
The inspector concluded that the planned actions appeared to be comprehensive.
Conclusion Operations personnel continued to experience events due to a lack of attention to detail:
however.
these events were appropriately captured by the corrective action program and had minimal safety consequence.
The strategic plan initiated by operations management to address attention to detail weaknesses appeared to be comprehensive.
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
Closed LER 50-530/94003:
TS violation due to missed channel check.
On May 7.
1994, the Unit 3 control room staff identified that previous shifts had not performed the TS surveillance'equirement (SR) 4.9.2.a
.
the channel check of the startup neutron flux monitor.
The licensee
.
determined the cause of the event was a procedure error and corrected the procedure deficiency.
The inspector reviewed the Procedure 40ST-9ZZ19, Revision 6, "Routine Surveillance Mode 5-6 Logs," and noted that the procedure actions that the operators were required to perform, to satisfy TS SR 4. 1.2.7.a, included a channel check of the startup neutron flux monitor.
The inspector reviewed completed copies of Procedure 40ST-9ZZ19, for the period that the licensee indicated that the channel checks were missed.
and concluded that the channel checks for SR 4.9.2.a were performed under TS SR 4. 1.2.7.a.
The inspector concluded, contrary to the LER, that a
TS violation had not occurred.
The inspector reviewed Procedure 40ST-9ZZ19, Revision 14. (the revision in place at the time of the inspection)
and noted minor administrative discrepancies with the procedure.
The. procedure requirements and the appendices used to record data were not 'consistent in referencing the TS SRs.
The inspector discussed the discrepancies with operations support personnel.
Operations revised the procedure to correct the discrepancies.
The inspector concluded that the discrepancies would not have caused a procedure user to miss a
TS SR and that the corrective actions were appropriate.
II.
Maintenance Conduct of Maintenance General Comments on Maintenance Activities Ins ection Sco e
62707 The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work
-6-activities:
~
WO 762110:
Diesel Generator B Lube Oil Pressure Switch Preventative Maintenance (Unit 1)
~
WO 737816:
Diesel Generator B Generator Outboard Bearing Oil Sample and Change (Unit 1)
~
WO 764029:
Diesel Generator B Local Annunciator Panel Power Supply Replacement (Unit 2)
~
WO 760877:
Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Speed Oscillation Troubleshooting (Unit 2)
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors found these work activities were performed in accordance with procedures.
In addition.
see the specific discussion of maintenance observed under Section H5. 1.
M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities a.
Ins ection Sco e
61726 The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
~
32FT-9QD02, Revision 4:
Exide Emergency Lighting System, 8 Hour Verification Test (Unit 1)
~
'6ST-9SB22, Revision 5:
Plant Protection System Loop Calibration For Steam Generator 1 Low Level (Unit 1)
~ Revision 1:
-Calibration of Diverse Auxiliary
=
Feedwater Activation System Analog Input Hodules (Unit 3)
b. Observations and Findin s The inspectors found these surveillance tests were performed as specified by applicable procedures.
H5 Maintenance Staff Training and Qualification H5. 1 Reactor Tri Switch ear Circuit Breaker Maintenance Unit 3 a.
Ins ection Sco e
62707 On August 21. the inspector observed electrical maintenance technicians perform portions of a preventive maintenance task on the reactor switchgear circuit Breaker D utilizing Procedure 32MT-9SB03.
-7-
"Maintenance of Westinghouse Type DS-416 Reactor Trip Switchgear."
b.
Observations and Findin s The technicians performed the reactor switchgear breaker maintenance in the electrical maintenance shop.
A qualified electrical maintenance technician performed the activity and used this opportunity to train other technicians who were in the process of obtaining qualification.
A training instructor was also present and performed an independent evaluation.
The inspector reviewed Work Order 759951 and noted that the procedure was adequate as written and the work authorization was properly approved.
The technicians used certified replacement parts and tools and the area was free of clutter and properly zoned for work.
The ci rcuit breaker did not contain evidence of debris.
The trainees had a
good questioning attitude and the electrical technician performed the maintenance activity in an appropriate manner.
Conclusions The routine reactor switchgear breaker maintenance activity was used as an excellent
"hands on" training opportunity for the electrical maintenance trainees.
El Conduct of Engineering III.
En ineerin Venti 1 ati on Boundar Not Control led Ins ection Sco e
37551 On July 7. the inspector observed that a penetration in a Unit
auxiliary building wall. which served as both a fire barrier and a
ventilation boundary, was not sealed.
The inspector discussed this issue with engineering and reviewed their response.
Observations and Findin s The licensee determined that the penetration through the plant 77 foot level in the auxiliary building east end stairwell had recently been opened to allow the routing of a cable associated with a security communication modification.
The licensee determined that the communications modification was in process at the time of discovery and that.
although compensatory actions had been taken to address the fire barrier issue.
engineering had not evaluated this interim condition for its impact on auxiliary building ventilation.
On July 9. plant operators initiated CRDR 9-6-0691 and performed
-8-walkdowns to inspect for open penetrations in the auxiliary building ventilation boundary.
During these walkdowns. the licensee discovered other open penetrations to the auxiliary building ventilation boundary that had not been previously addressed.
Engineering subsequently performed a calculation that concluded that the auxiliary building could have been maintained at a negative pressure with the added penetrations.
However. engineering management concluded that they had not established appropriate controls of the auxiliary building ventilation boundary and stated that this issue would be addressed in the CRDR.
The licensee had identified a number of instances in the past three months where doors to the auxiliary building have been opened without appropriate controls.
For each of the events'he licensee initiated a
CRDR and performed an engineering evaluation.
During this inspection period. the licensee developed a plan to improve the control of doors.
The inspectors will review the control of the auxiliary building ventilation boundary during a future inspection.
( Inspection Followup Item 528/96012-01)
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2. 1 DNBR Uncertainties Unit 3 a.
Ins ection Sco e
37551 The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of DNBR uncertainties and discussed personnel performance weaknesses with nuclear fuels management.
b.
Observations and Findin s Backcaround The CPC monitors pertinent reactor core conditions and provides an accurate, reliable means of initiating a reactor trip.
Trip signals are provided to the reactor protection system whenever the minimum DNBR or fuel design limit local power density is approached.
The COLSS is a
digital computer monitoring program which assists the operators in complying with TS operating limits on total core power, peak linear heat rate. axial shape index. azimuthal power tilt. and DNBR.
In June, 1996.
the licensee identified potential thermal hydraulic analysis problems specific to the upcoming Unit 1. Cycle 7 reload analysis.
Throughout the months of June and July. the licensee and vendor further evaluated the potential problem.
On July 26. the licensee requested that the vendor evaluate the potential for nonconservatism in the DNBR limits for the current analyses in all three units.
On July 29. the vendor indicated that Unit 3 could be adversely affected and that Units 1 and 2 were not affected.
On August 1, the licensee determined that the required minimum DNBR margin in the COLSS and the CPC contained nonconservative thermal hydraulic uncertainties equivalent to approximately one percent power.
The licensee performed an operability determination and determined that they currently have a 3.7 percent power conservatism since the installed radial peeking factor was greater than the measured radial peaking factor.
The licensee concluded that the CPC and COLSS remained operable.
The inspector reviewed the operability determination and found that it appropriately addressed this issue.
Addressable Constant Chan e
On August 9, the licensee adjusted the CPC and the COLSS addressable constants to account for the uncertainties.
Reactor engineering performed a
CFR 50:59 screening and determined that an evaluation was not requi red.
The revised calculations indicated that the installed radial geaking data in COLSS and CPC provided a 4. 1 percent power conservatism and the nonconservative uncertainties were approximately 2.5 percent.
A nuclear analysis supervisor calculated the required addressable constant changes and issued a
memo for reactor engineering to change the constants.
Reactor engineering performed the constant changes in the CPC and the COLSS.
Reactor engineering verified the changes for the CPC.
by using a
licensee developed CPC simulator, achieved the expected results in the simulator, and changed the constants in the unit.
Reactor engineering subsequently performed constant changes to COLSS in the operating unit.
The licensee does not possess a
COLSS simulator
.
The reactor engineer correctly entered the constants provided by nuclear analysis, but noted that the expected results for the constant changes were not received.
The reactor engineer did not inform supervision or nuclear analysis of the discrepancy until the next working day (four days later).
On August 13, when informed of the COLSS discrepancy, nuclear analysis identified that one of the calculations was performed incorrectly and an additional COLSS constant should have been changed.
The overall effect on COLSS was a three percent nonconservatiye error in the DNBR operating limit alarm.
Subsequently.
nuclear analysis re-calculated the constant changes for COLSS.
Reactor engineering entered the values and achieved expected results.
A nuclear analysis review of the event concluded that the CPC changes were properly calculated and entered.
On August 19. the licensee received a letter from the vendor recommending that the uncertainties in DNBR be;applied through adjustments in the addressable constants in the CPC and the COLSS.
Safet Conse uence The nonconservative entry of the constants in the COLSS resulted in raising the departure from nucleate boiling power operating limit alarm
-10-from approximately 103 percent to 106 percent power.
The licensee determined that an anticipated operational occurrence would not have challenged the specified acceptable fuel design limits with the nonconservative COLSS alarm setpoint.
The inspector compared the departure from nucleate boiling power operating limit to the actual core power for the four days the alarm was nonconservative and noted that the core power was always below the value of the alarm even when accounting for the three percent error
.
Therefore.
the inspector concluded that the event had minimal safety impact on the unit.
Corrective Actions The licensee initiated a
CRDR to evaluate the personnel performance weaknesses.
The licensee planned to evaluate the addressable constant change process, clarify management's expectations to perform reviews of calculations, and perform personnel training.
The inspector will review the licensee's conclusions, corrective actions, and the reportabi lity during future inspection ( Inspector Followup Item 530/96012-02).
c.
Conclusions The licensee's procedures and management's expectations did not prevent incorrect and nonconservative addressable constants from being entered into the COLSS.
Nuclear fuels department displayed good engineering rigor to pursue the DNBR uncertainty factor issues.
E8 Hiscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
E8. 1 Closed Ins ector Followu Item 529/95014-03:
battery specific gravity variations.
This item was opened pending the licensee's evaluation of the cause and correction of the battery cell specific gravity variations
'n Battery D.
The licensee performed battery discharge tests during the Unit 2 outage and obtained lower than expected results.
Therefore, the licensee reconfigured the cells in all.four batteries which included placing new cells from another utility in Battery D.
The change in cell composition in Battery D minimized the concern for the specific gravity variation.
The licensee's preliminary root cause investigation identified positive plate destruction of the cells.
In addition. the licensee determined that the vendor had increased the amount of platinum in the negative plate of cells produced after mid-1994.
The vendor added additional platinum to the negative plate to improve the float behavior of the cells.
The platinum decreased the charging efficiency of the negative plates to more closely match the charging efficiency of the positive plates.
Subsequent testing of batteries in all three units showed corresponding lower negative half-cell voltage readings in the Unit 2 batteries.
when compared to the readings from the Units I and
batteries.
which contained the lower amount of platinum.
e E8.2 R2 R2.1 The licensee planned to evaluate the effect of the increase in platinum in the negative plate on the long term capacity of the Unit 2 batteries.
In addition, the licensee planned to continue to monitor the positive and negative plate performance of the Unit 2 batteries by taking half-cell voltage readings.
The licensee informed the NRC of potential generic issues concerning round cell batteries through several meetings and conference calls.
The inspector concluded the Unit 2 reconfigured Class 1E batteries were operable and met the TS requirements.
Closed Violation 50-528/95016-01:
improper CRDR classification.
This violation concerned the failure to appropriately classify a repeat problem with the drain system for the charging pumps as a significant condition adverse to quality.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's immediate corrective actions and root cause evaluation and agreed with the conclusions.
The. root cause of the event described a practice by the CRDR review committee, that classified equipment fai lures, resulting in TS action statement entry, as an adverse condition without referencing the significant classification criteria as detailed in the procedure 90DP-OIP03.
"Condition Report Screening and Processing."
The event met the significant classification criteria'n accordance with the procedure.
The corrective actions to prevent recurrence included the following:
~
The CRDR review committee was briefed on results of, investigation.
~
The CROR review committee policy statement was revised to address this issue.
~
Significant classification criteria have been conspicuously displayed in the CRDR review committee meeting room.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's corrective actions were appropriate.
IV.
Plant Su ort Status of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Facilities and Equipment Material Condition Discre ancies 71750 During routine tours of the three units. the inspectors identified a number of material condition and housekeeping issues.
Two of the problems, discussed in more detai l in Section 02. 1, were associated with boric acid from safety injection system components that had not been previously identified.
Further aspects of material condition weaknesses are discussed in Section 02. 1.
-12-S1 S1.1 F1 F1.1 X1 X2 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities Turbine Bui ldin Inverter Failure Unit 2 93702 92904 The inspectors observed security personnel response to the inverter fai lure.
Security personnel proper ly accompanied the fire trucks and fire fighters to the inverter location.
Security ensured that unnecessary personnel remained clear of the fire scene.
The inspector concluded that security's response to the fire was prompt, demonstrated proper support for fire protection activities'nd promoted safety.
Further aspects of this event are discussed in Section 01. 1.
Control of Fire Protection Activities Turbine Buildin Inverter Failure Unit 2 93702 92904 The inspectors observed the fire department response to the inverter failure.
The fire department supervision appropriately controlled the event.
The inspector concluded that the fire department response was generally good.
Further aspects of this event are discussed in Section Ol.l.
V.
Hang ement Heetin s
Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 28, 1996.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
SALP Open Heeting Summary On July 24 '996. the NRC conducted an open meeting at the Palo Verde Energy Information Center to discuss the SALP report with licensee management.
The Region IV Deputy Regional Administrators supported by the SALP board chairman and one board member, presented the report, conclusions to licensee executives.
Members of the television media were also in attendance.
The licensee has responded in writing to the SALP report.
-13-ATTACHMENT 1 Licensee PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED J. Bailey, Vice Presidents Nuclear Engineering P. Crawley, Directors'uclear Fuel R. Fullmer, Director, Nuclear Assurance J. Gaffney, Department Leader.
Radiation Protection R. Hazelwood, Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs W. Ide, Director, Operations A. Krainik. Department Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs J. Levine, Vice President, Nuclear Production D. Mauldin, Director, Maintenance G. Overbeck.
Vice President, Nuclear Support W. Stewart, Executive Vice President J. Velotta, Director. Training IP 37551:
IP 61726:
IP 62707:
IP 71707:
IP 71750:
IP 92901:
IP 92903:
IP 92904:
IP 93702:
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Onsite Engineering Surveillance Observations Maintenance Observations Plant, Operations Plant Support Activities Followup - Operations Followup - Engineering Followup - Plant Support Prompt Onsite Response to Events
~Den ed 50-528/96012-01 50-530/96012-02 Closed 50-530/94003 50-529/95014-03 50-528/95016-01 ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED IFI ventilation boundary control (Section E1.1)
IFI DNBR addressable constant change Section E2. 1)
LER TS violation due to missed channel check IFI battery specific gravity variations VIO improper CRDR classification
-14-AO COLSS CPC CRDR DNBR LER RO SALP.
SR TS LIST OF ACRONYNS USED Auxiliary Operator Core Operating Limits Supervisory System Core Protection Calculator Condition Report/Disposition Request Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio Licensee Event Report Reactor Operator Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Surveillance Requirement Technical Specifications