IR 05000498/1993043
| ML20058M893 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1993 |
| From: | Constable L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058M834 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-93-43, 50-499-93-43, NUDOCS 9312210148 | |
| Download: ML20058M893 (16) | |
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i APPENDIX
d U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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i Inspection Report:
50-498/93-43
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50-499/93-43
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i Licenses: NPF-76 NPF-80
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Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company P.O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas
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Facility Name: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 j
Inspection At: Matagorda County, Texas l
Inspection Conducted: November 2-19, 1993
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Inspector: Howard F. Bundy, Reactor Inspector, Plant Support Section
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Division of Reactor Safety
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/2/v/97 Approved:
p-Les Constable, Chief, Plant Support Section Dat'e '
i Division of Reactor Safety Inspection Summary i
Areas Inspected (Units 1 and 2):
Routine, announced inspection of the j
licensee's self-assessment capability, information exchange with the industry, and followup on previous inspection findings.
Results (Units 1 and 2):
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The licensee was performing high quality audits, surveillances, and
special assessments.
However, it appeared that identifi'.1 deficiencies were not being addressed in a timely manner. (Section 2.
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The industry experience review program was acceptable. The backlog of l
open operating experience communications was high, but appeared manageable. The open operating experience review and vendor equipment technical information communications had been reviewed for plant restart impact. (Section 2.2.2)
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l The nuclear safety review board appeared'proactive iniidentifying safety -
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issues to management; however, the backlog of nuclear safety review board action items was unacceptably high. -An' action: plan existed for.
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resolving the backlogged action items. (Section 2.3.2)..
'Ia The plant operations review committee was performing.:all Technical'
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Specifications required activities and attempting:to become more'
proactive in identifying adverse performance. trends.
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(Section 2.3.2)~
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Administration of the. operating _ experience' review propas by thel
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ability.to. perform its other duties.' A minimal number of surveillances'.
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and assessments had been performed. However,"contractLpersonnel had'
recently been added to the staff to work on~ the. operating experience
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review effort. (Section 2.3.2)
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j TheISEGactionitemtrackingsystemhidinaccuracies; 'It indicated'
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that the final action for Report 93-04, which involved a printed circuit board configuration control issue,' was scheduled for completion in.
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February 1994. The final action was.actually scheduled for completion
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at the end of 1996. (Section 2.3.2)
i The operational readiness assessment program appeared comprehensive and i
l was effectively addressing safety issues. (Section 2.3.2)
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.i The licensee had demonstrated effective self-assessment capability. The'
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personnel interviewed exhibited a safety conscious attitude-and a desire to correct past errors.
Everyone appeared to be working toward.
optimizing safety performance. -Positive changes;had been made in-several site programs.. Howeveri several programs..were still in
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transition, including the~ responsibilities of the ISEG and the
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corrective action group. (Section'2.4)
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The licensee was an active participant in the appropriate industry;
groups. (Section 3.2)
i The licensee was active in information exchange with-other. utilities and j
e the information obtained was considered when making programmatic 1'
s changes. (Section 3.2)-
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Summary of Inspection Findinas:
Inspection Followup Item 498;499/9331-55 was reviewed;and remains open.
- pending-additional review of other independent assessments by the NRC.
(Section 4)
Inspec e n Followup Item 498;499/9331-82 was closed. _(Section 5).
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Attachments:
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I Attachment 1-- Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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Attachment 2'- Documents Reviewed
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.i DETAILS
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1 PLANT STATUS
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Atthebeginningofthisinspectionperiod,bothunitswereshutldown'and
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defueled. Refueling of Unit I began on November 17, 1993.-
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2 LICENSEE'S SELF-ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY (40500, 90700)
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This inspection was performed pursuant to an NRC: South: Texas Project Restart
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j Action Plan which was prepared to address issues contained,in a Diagnostic-
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i Evaluation Team (DET) Report issued on June 10,L1993, and a Confimatory;.
j Action Letter, issued on February 5,1993, together with supplements: issued 'on-
May 7, 1993, and October 15,.1993. The purpose was to. ascertain. existence of l
j an environment where problems _were readilyLidentified, prioritized,L and;.
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tracked. Also, the licensee's root cause determinations,~ proposed solutions-
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to the issues, and verification methods for. ensuring-the issues were resolved-
i were assessed. This inspection focused on the'following three areas::
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effectiveness of the. quality assurance (QA) program, adequacy of the-industry i
experienceLreview program, and adequacy of the licensee's; independent' review:
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group functions.
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q 2.1 Effectiveness of OA Proaram
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I 2.1.1 Discussion j
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The inspector reviewed selected audit reports, surveillance reports.: special
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L assessments, self-assessments, performance indicator reports,- and. independent ~
assessments performed by the licensee andrits contractors.1: Also,LselectedL
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individuals involved with the quality oversight. function.were interviewed to i
gain their insight on the effectiveness of_their effort and;the acceptance and..
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j responsiveness of licensee management.and staff to resolving issues..
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The inspector concluded that the scope of the QA program wasLappropriate:and,.
with the exception of the corrective action system,;the program.had been
effectively implemented. All audits required by Technical ~ Specifications were-
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being performed.. All major functional : areas were reviewed and additional:..
emphasis had been placed on identified problem areas..The reports were high.
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quality and had identified issues similar to most of those identified by; thel
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NRC.
In-depth evaluations of plant performance had been~ conducted... I t"
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i appeared that the findings had been communicated to.the. appropriate' management level. Suitable root cause determinations' had.beenL made,..and, appropriate
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corrective actions had been fomulated,~ prioritized, and were being tracked to-
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completion.
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l Implementation of the corrective action system had been noted as a problem'
area by both the NRC and the licensee's audits and assessments.- It was:an:
i item on the nuclear safety review board's " watch list." = Interview's with.
j licensee personnel indicated that this issue had existed for several years.
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l The inspector's independent review indicated that the timeliness of
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formulating and implementing corrective actions continued to be a critical issue. The licensee documented most problems requiring corrective actions with station problem reports (SPRs). There were 153 open QA initiated SPRs as
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of the first week in November 1993, of which 15 were more than a year old.
Overall numbers indicated that Category I to 4 (significant) SPRs had i
l increased from less than 300 in July to more than 500 in November.
It appeared that the licensee was identifying problems at a faster rate than they could be resolved. This was supported by a corrective action group trend i
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l report dated November 2, 1993, which showed 34 percent of the investigations i
for root cause and 16.5 percent of the assigned corrective actions related to SPRs for the 6 month period ending September 1993 were overdue.
2.1.2 Conclusions The licensee was performing high quality audits, surveillances, and assessments. However, it appeared that identified deficiencies were not
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addressed in a timely manner.
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l 2.2 Industry Experience Review Procram 2.2.1 Discussion The external operating experience review (OER) program was administered by the independent safety engineering group (ISEG) and the vendor equipment technical information program (VETIP) was administered by design engineering with input to ISEG. The in-house operating experience review program was administered by the corrective action group as a part of the station problem report program and was not pursued during this inspection.
It appeared that the appropriate entities were receiving the industry experience communications for technical analysis and resolution, and the required actions were being tracked to completion. The licensee had recently augmented the staffs for the OER program and VETIP to reduce what they viewed as unacceptably high backlogs of open communications.
As of November 17, 1993, there were 36 open VETIP items, which had been reviewed for restart issues. This did not appear to be an unreasonably high number of open items.
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As of October 31, there was a backlog of 59 open OER packages. The open OER
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packages had been reviewed for restart issues, and the ISEG director indicated
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that they were reviewing incoming OER reports for restart issues. The OER package backlog had been reduced from 140 in April, with 17 of the original l
140 remaining open. Although the number of open OER packages appeared
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somewhat high, it did not appear unreasonable.
The inspector reviewed selected industry experience communications. The licensee's responses appeared appropriate and of high quality. Suitable and timely corrective actions had been implemented.
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I 2.2.2 Conclusions
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The industry experience review program was acceptable. The backlog of open operating experience comunications was high, but appeared manageable. The open OER and VETIP comunications had been reviewed for plant restart impact.
2.3 Independent Review Groups i
2.3.1 Discussion The licensee employed standing independent review groups as follows:
Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB) - off-site safety review comittee j
Plant Operations Review Comittee (PORC) - on-site safety review
comittee Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG)
i Also, as a part of its restart plan, the licensee had initiated a Unit 1 i
Operational Readiness Independent Assessment program.
It consisted of self-assessments by the line organizations and independent assessments under the i
direction of the general manager of nuclear assurance,' which were reported directly to the nuclear group vice president.
Independent assessments were performed by the NSRB and an operational readiness oversight team, which
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constituted a third party senior level. review of overall readiness to resume operation. Quality assurance, the planning and assessmant group, and ISEG participated in other independent assessments.
The NSRB appeared proactive in identifying safety issues to management. The-NSRB had several outside members, including the chairman. The documented NSRB philosophy was to identify performance trends and significant safety issues.
i The inspector noted that there was discussion in a recent NSRB meeting regarding doing a better job in this area.
Recent NSRB meeting minutes reflected substantive discussion and reporting of significant issues. Many of these issues were highlighted to the nuclear group vice president. The NSRB watch list, which was attached to the minutes 'or each meeting, also appeared useful for highlighting ongoing NSRB concerns. There were 94 open NSRB action
items, which appeared unacceptably high. Many of the items were more than a year old and it was not clear why they were still open._ In response to the
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inspector's questions, the executive director stated that this issue had been l
recognized by the NSRB and resolution was in progress. The inspector reviewed an action plan dated October 19, 1993, which comitted to reducing the backlog.
to a reasonable number of action items by January 1994.
The PORC was performing all Technical Specifications required activities and attempting to become more proactive in identifying adverse performance trends.
The PORC secretary had visited other plants to obtain ideas for improving the PORC safety performance.
Recomendations from special assessments of PORC by~
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the NSRB and the planning and assessments group had been factored into a draft revision of the PORC administrative procedure.
The PORC chairman indicated that they would request more special presentations and try to establish meeting agenda further in advance of the meeting date. The PORC did not have a significant number of open action items.
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The ISEG had assumed responsibility for administration of the OER program without an increase in staff. This had adversely impacted the group's ability to perform surveillances and assessments. A]though surveillances and assessments were being performed, the number was not as high as expected, and most of them appeared to be reactionary rather than proactive. The ISEG had also been tardy in executing other duties. Their administrative procedure
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required an annual OER p ogram effectiveness assessment. The assessment for 1991 was dated April 21, 1993. The assessment for 1992 was still in draft.
The business planned reflected an augmentation of the ISEG staff beginning in 1994 to enable it to better perform its responsibilities.
In the meantime, contractors had been employed to reduce the OER backlog. The ISEG director stated that the responsibilities of ISEG at other utilities had been studied, and it had been proposed to transfer respons%ility for administration of the OER program to the corrective action group in 1994.
The inspector reviewed selected ISEG reports and observed that the findings were generally high quality. However, for Report 93-04, involving a configuration control issue for printed circuit boards, the tracking report showed the final action due in February 1994. The documentation in the file did not support this date. When questioned, the licensee produced further documentation which showed that design engineering had actions which extended
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to the enJ of 1996.
It was not clear that management was aware of the long delay time in completing the corrective actions.
The operational readiness assessment program appeared comprehensive and was effectively addressing safety issues. There was a core group of five individuals in the planning and assessments group who had been performing assessments prior to establishment of the operational readiness assessment program. The inspector reviewed checklists which were keyed to the business plan and included appropriate safety requirements. The assessments reviewed by the inspector contained safety significant findings and appropriate recommendations. The assessments were responsive to action plans which supported the business plan. A weekly assessment covered key restart issues and the results were given in a report card format which was highly visible.
In attempting to verify completion of some of the action plan initiatives, the inspector noted that the completion status in a report dated November 9, 1993, was not accurate.
Planning and assessments provided a marked up report with accu *3te completion dates.
2.3.2 Conclusions The NSRB appeared proactive in identifying safety issues to management; however, the backlog of NSRB action items was unacceptably high. An action
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Administration of the OER program by ISEG had detracted from perfomance of.
its other duties. A minimal number of surveillances and assessment's had been performed by ISEG. Contract personnel had recently been'added to.the ISEG staff to work on the OER effort. The ISEG action ites tracking system had-inaccuracies.
It indicated that the. final.' action for Report 93-04,. which i
involved a printed circuit board configuration control issue,:was scheduled-for completion in February 1994. The final-action was actually schtjuled for.
l completion at the end of 1996. The. operational readiness assessment program appeared comprehensive and was effectively addressing safety issues.-
2.4 Overall Conclusion
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The licensee had demonstrated effective self-assestment capability. The personnel interviewed exhibited a safety. conscious attitude and a desire to correct past arrors.
Everyone appeared to be working toward optimizing safety.
performance. Positive changes had been made in several site programs.
However, several programs were still in trar.sition, including the responsibilities of ISEG and'the corrective action group.
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3 INFORNATION EXCHANGE WITH THE IIBUSTRY
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l The purpose of this part of the inspection was to ascertain that licensee
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management had provided for exchange of operational safety information with
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other utilities and participation in industry groups which could contribute to
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the enhancement of operational safety.
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3.1 Discussion
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The following assessment is based primarily.on interviews ~with members of the
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licensee management team. The licensee's communications with other utilities and industry groups was spearheaded by the vice president, industry relations.-
l There was widespread licensee participation in industry and other utility j
counterpart groups. There were seven licensee representatives.in the
Westinghouse Owners Group, with a member on the executive advisory committee
and each subcommittee. The licensee was-also an active participant in Nuclear-l l
l Management and Resources Council (NUMARC), Institute for Nuclear. Power i
Operations (INPO), Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and Cooper i
Bessemer Owners Group. The licensee was heavily involved in the steam-
generator management program with EPRI and the maintenance rule implementation j
with NUMARC. The licensee had also nominated more employees for EPRI
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The licensee appeared to be actively exchanging information with other
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utilities.
It was a member of both Regions IV and V licensing counterpart groups. The licensee was also a member on the Region IV.QA managers counterpart group. The inspector was informed that they routinely ~ exchange; technical specialists with other utilities for audits.
In its effort to
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I-9-I upgrade PORC and ISEG, the licensee had sent representatives to study these groups at other utilities.
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3.2 Conclusions The licensee was an active participant in the appropriate industry groups.
These groups included INPO, EPRI, Westinghouse Owners Group, and Cooper i
Bessemer Owners Group. The licensee was active in information exchange with other utilities and the information was considered when making programmatic changes.
Information derived from visits to other utilities was considered in-i proposing changes to PORC and ISEG.
4 STATUS OF ITEM RELATED TO RESTART ISSUE The following item, relating to Restart Issue 9, was reviewed in conjunction i
with the inspection of the licensee's self-assessment capability discussed in paragraph 2.
This issue will remain open pending NRC review of additional data during subsequent inspections.
J (0 pen) Inspection Followup Item 498:499/9331-55: The Licensee Will Prepare an Independent Assessment Plan J
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The licensee had prepared and implemented an independent assessment plan as-i discussed in paragraph 2.3.
The initial assessments performed were high-quality. However, this item will remain open pending completion of ' additional i
independent assessments and review of them by the NRC.
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5 CLOSED ITEM RELATED TO RESTART ISSUE 9, MANAGEMENT'S RECEPTIVENESS TO IDENTIFYING AND CORRECTING PLANT PROBLEMS
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The inspector determined that licensee management had been proactive in improving self-assessment and independent assessment capability to achieve early identification of adverse performance trends. Management had also been proactive in expanding licensee participation in industry study groups and exchange of information with other utilities. The following item related to this issue will be closed.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item 498:499/9331-82: Management Did Not Respond Effectively to the Findinos. Concerns. and Recommendations of Their Principal Self-Assessment and Quality Oversicht Funr.tions Through interviews and review of corrective action documentation the inspector determined that management was aware and currently responding to issues raised by its principal self-assessment and quality oversight groups. New senior managers were added to the NSRB in September 1993. The inspector reviewed a
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matrix dated November 12, 1993, which cross-referenced NSRB watch list concerns, NRC DET observations, business plan action plan initiatives, and '
operational readiness plan items. The action plans reviewed by the inspector present viable solutions to the associated problems.
In most instances, the actions had not been completed. However, business plan initiatives were i
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subject to assessments and ' audits to ensure successful completion.
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QA concerns had been addressed in the operational. readiness plan. Recent QA'
concerns were being addressed in SPRs. Although the backlog of significant SPRs had been increasing since July 1993 (paragraph 2.1.1), management had recognized the problem and flagged its importance by placing the corrective.
j action program at the top of the NSRB watch list. The increase in the-
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significant SPR backlog appeared related to an increased rate of problem
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identification as result of larger number of assessments and audits.
Management was proactive in making ISEG more proactive by augmentation of the j
staff. Through interviews and review of procedures and memoranda, the j
inspector determined that management was encouraging the self-assessment and
oversight groups to identify significant safety issues. The effectiveness of i
management's response to these issues will be measurable upon completion of i
the action plans. However, this issue is being closed based on initiation of viable action plans by the licensee together with continual self-assessment of the success of these action plans.
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ATTACHMENT 1 l
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1 PERSONS CONTACTED 1.1 Licensee Personnel
+M. Berg, Manager, Engineering Support
- H. Bergendahl, Manager, Technical Services
- D. Bize, Licensing Engineer
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- H. Butterworth, Operations Manager, Unit 1
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+J. Calloway, Staff Consultant, P & A
- T. Cloninger, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering
+J. Conly, Licensing Engineer
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+W. Cottle, Group Vice President, Nuclear
- D. Daniels, Administrator, Corrective Action Group t
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- K. Doody, Assessor, Planning and Assessments (P & A)
R. Fisher, PORC Secretary
- R. Foote, Supervisor (Acting), QA i
- J. Groth, Vice President, Nuclear Generation
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+A. Harrison, Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Licensing.
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+C. Harvey, Staff Specialist, Corrective Action Group J. Hughes, Senior Consultant Specialist, Engineering Support
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+J. Johnson, Supervisor, QA
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- T. Jordan, General Manager, Nuclear Engineering
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- D. Keating, Director, ISEG l
- R. Kerr, Senior Engineer, ISEG._
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+D. Leazar, Manager, Plant Engineering
- M. Ludwig, Manager, Nuclear Training l
+F. Mallen, Manager, P & A
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- L. Martin, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance l
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+L. Myers, Plant Manager, Unit 1
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+M. Pacy, Manager, Design Engineering
- G. Parkey, Plant Manager, Unit 2 l
+P. Parrish, Senior Specialist, Licensing l
- S. Phillips, VETIP Coordinator
- R. Rehkugler, Manager, Quality Control and Material Testing-
- S. Rosen, Vice President, Industry Relations
+J. Sheppard, General Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- M. Smith, Senior Consultant, ? & A
- E. Stansel, Division Manager, Plant Engineering Department
- S. Thomas, Assistant to Vice President, Nuclear
+C. Walker,-Manager, Public Information, P & A 1.2 Other Attendees
+B. McLaughlin, Owners Representative, CPL l
+T. Puckett, Manager, Nuclear Department, CPL
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1.3 NRC Personnel-
- D. Garcia, Resident Inspector
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+W. Johnson, Chief, Project Section A, Division'of Reactor Projects
- J. Keeton, Resident Inspector
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- J. Pellet, Chief, Operations Section, Division of Reactor Safety.
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+T. Westerman, Chief, Engineering Section, Division of Reactor Safety-t In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspector contacted other-I personnel during this inspection period.
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- Denotes those personnel that attended both exit meetings.
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- Denotes those' personnel that attended the exit meeting =on. November 5,-1993.
+ Denotes those personnel that attended the exit meeting on November 19, 1993.
i 2 EXIT NEETING
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Exit meetings were conducted on November 5 and. November 19. 1993. During i
these meetings, the inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the report.-
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The licensee did'not identify as proprietary any information provided to,;or.
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ATTACHMENT 2 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED South Texas Project (STP) Technical Specification 6.2.3, "ISEG" STP Technical Specification 6.5, " Review and Audit" Report, "QA Audit Log," dated November 2, 1993 Report, "QA Surveillance Log," dated November 2,1993 Memorandum, "NSRB Meeting Minutes 93-01, March 11, 1993," dated March 19, 1993 QA Surveillance Report 93-006, " Technical Specifications Surveillance Test Conduct," dated February 16, 1993 Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0004, "PORC," Revision 15 Policy Docunent, "STP NSRB Operational Philosophy," Revision 11 Procedure NGP-170, "NSRB," Revision 2 Procedure NSRB-01, "NSRB Rules of Conduct," Revision 9 Procedure NSRB-03, "NSRB Review Procedure," Revision 4 Procedure NSRB-04, "NSRB Audit / Assessment Procedure," Revision 8 Procedure NSRB-05, "NSRB Training Program," Revision 5 Procedure NSRB-06, "NSRB Standing Committee Rules of Conduct," Revision 1 Procedure IP-2.2Q, " Operating Experience Review," Revision 9 Memorandum, L. E. Martin to Distribution, " Joint Utility Management Audit 93-11 (JU)," October 7, 1993 Memorandum, L. E. Martin to Site Management Team, " Operational Readiness Plan (ORP) - Independent Assessment Results for the Week of October 25, 1993,"
dated November 1, 1993
"STP 1994-1998.usiness Plan" Procedure IP-2.2Q, " Operating Evperience Review," Revision 9 Procedure ISEG-04, "ISEG Operating Experience Review," Revision 6 Action Plans El.1, El.2, El.4, E2.1, E3.1, E4.1, E4.2 i
"1994-1998 Business Plan Companion Book, Volume 4 - Program Elements for Baseline Programs"
"Index of ISEG Reports," dated November 12, 1993
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-2-Memorandum ST-HS-HS-24383, H. R. Hesidence to Distribution, "ISEG Report 92-05, 1991 Annual Operating Experience Review Program Effectiveness Assessment,"
dated April 21, 1993 Memorandum ST-HS-HS-17331, T. E. Underwood to Distribution, "ISEG Annual Work Plan," dated January 6,1992 Memorandum ST-HS-HS-23379, J. M. Gruber to Distribution, "ISEG Annual Work Plan - 1993," dated February 9,1993
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Memorandum ST-HS-HS-22534, J. M. Gruber to W. H. Kinsey, "ISEG Report 92-10 -
Observation of Chemical Controls," dated November 23, 1992 Memorandum ST-HS-HS-23808, H. R. Hesidence to Distribution, "ISEG Report 93-04
- Review of Plant Scaling Manual," dated March 11, 1993 Memorandum, J. Johnson to D. R. Keating, " Request for NSRB Review and Comment of Audit Scope CA - Corrective Action," dated November 5, 1993 Memorandum, F. H. Mallen to Distribution, " Assessment Report of Accredited j
Training Programs," dated March 19, 1993
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Memorandum, F. H. Hallen to Distribution, " Report of Assessment of Capabilities for Detecting and Mitigating an RCP Thermal Barrier Heat Exchanger Leak (ITN 93-068)," dated June 16, 1993 Memorandum, F. H. Hallen to Distribution, " Report of Assessment of Operation of Electrical Buses with Their Normal Grounding Systems Disconnected," dated
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August 5, 1993 i
Memorandum, F. H. Mallen to T. H. Cloninger, " Request for Review of Potential Restart Restraints Associated with RCP Seals," dated September 20, 1993 Memorandum, F. H. Mallen to Distribution, " Control of Radioactive Contamination Assessment," dated September 21, 1993 Procedure OPGPO4-ZA-0108, " Control of Vendor Documents," Revision 0 Report, "STP Commitment Tracking & Control Report Action Item Base Report, Sorted by ORIGNAME BY SOURCED0C FOR GROUP 939 - DESIGN ENGINEERING," dated November 3, 1993 Report, "STP Work Control Self-Assessneent for Unit 1 Mode 6 (Core Reload),"
dated October 25, 1993 Report, " Plant Operations Self-Assessment Corrective Action Status," dated November 16, 1993 Report VETIP DR 93-01, " Letter from Dresser-Rand on Governor Valves Corrosive Attack on Valve Stem," dated May 16, 1993
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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-3-Report VETIP C/B 770, " Advisory on KSV Engine Concerning Piston to Liner
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Clearance & Piston Ring Gap Measurements," dated July 7, 1993 Report VETIP C/B 765, "LSVB, LSV and KSV4 - Cycle Engines Power Cylinder Leak Down Test," dated April 5, 1993
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Report VETIP B93-01, " Potential Loss of RHR Cooling During Nozzle Dam Removal," April 5, 1993 Report VETIP WTB 93-01, " Revised Procedures for RCP Shutdown With No.1 Seal Leakage Outside Operating Limits," dated June 8, 1993 Report VETIP WIG 92-04, " Pressurizer Level Reference leg Design Change"
" Independent Assessment / Methodology to Support Operational Readiness,"
Revision 2
" Independent Assessment Plan to Support Operational Readiness," Revision 1 Report, "Open SPRs Generated by QA," dated November 4, 1993
"HL&P Operational Readiness Plan," Revision 0 Business Plan Initiatives A2, B1, B2, B3, and E2
" September 1993 Station Problem Report Trend Report," approved November 2, 1993 Procedure OPGP03-ZX-0002, " Corrective Action Program," effective May 26, 1993 Operating Experience Report (OER) OTH 92-03B, " Inoperable Switches Due to Use of Unsuitable Cleaner," dated January 4, 1993 OER SER 93-005, " Reactor Pressure Temperature Limits Exceeded," dated March 23, 1993 OER GNL 93-01, " Emergency Response Data System Test Program," dated March 30, 1993 OER IEB 93-03, " Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs," dated July 1, 1993 OER IEN 93-052, "NUREG-1477 - Voltage-Based Interim Plugging Criteria for Steam Generator Tubes," dated August 10, 1993 l
Memorandum ISEG 106.93, D. R. Keating to J. F. Grotn, "Old NSRB Standing l
Committee Items," dated October 19, 1993 Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0004, "PORC," Revision 16 (Draft)
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,
-4-Memorandum ST-HS-HS-26826, H. W. Bergendahl to L. W. Myers, "PORC Meeting 93-052," dated November 2, 1993 Memorandum ST-HS-HS-26805, H. W. Bergendahl to L. W. Myers, "PORC Meeting 93-051," dated November 1, 1993 Memorandum ST-HS-HS-26871, H. W. Bergenoahl to G. L. Parkey/L. W. Myers, "PORC Meetings93-049 and 93-050," dated November 5, 1993 Memorandum ST-HS-HS-24725, H. W. Bergendahl to G. L. Parkey, "PORC Meeting 93-023," dated May 18, 1993 Memorandum ST-HS-HS-24068, C. J. Christian to G. L. Parkey, "PORC Meeting 93-022," dated May 10, 1993 i
Memorandum (Draft), D. R. Keating to Distribution, " Transmittal of Minutes of NSRB Meeting 93-07, November 11, 1993" Memorandum ST-HS-HS-26273, D. R. Keating to Distribution, " Transmittal of Minutes of NSRB Meeting 93-05, September 9, 1993," dated September 22, 1993 Memorandum ST-HS-HS-25600, M. K. Chakravorty to Distribution, " Transmittal of Minutes of NSRB Meeting 93-04, July 15,1993," dated July 27, 1993 Memorandum, D. A. Liazar to T. H. Cloninger, " Review of Unit 1 RCP Seal Potential Restart Problems," dated October 18, 1993 Memorandum ST-HS-HS-26740, J. Johnson to Distribution, "QA Station Audit Schedule for Fourth Quarter 1993, Revision 2," dated October 28, 1993 Memorandum ST-HS-HS-22799, R. J. Rehkugler to Distribution, "QA Department 1993 Verification Plans," dated Cecember 22, 1992 Memorandum, R. J. Rehkugler to Distribution, "QA Audit Report 93-02 (PO),
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Plant Operations," dated July 6,1993 Memorandum, J. Johnson to Distribution, " Engineering Assurance Assessment Report EA 93-02, SIS Safety System Functional Assessment," dated October 28, 1993
" Station Report September 1993," approved October 19, 1993
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Station Problem Report (SPR) 930613, " Heat From Load Boxes Used for Transformer Load Test Actuated Halon System," dated February 24, 1993 SPR 920957, " Output Breaker Would Not Close Due to Lockout Relay in at Local Panel," dated October 22, 1992