IR 05000498/1991016
| ML20217D331 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1991 |
| From: | Gwynn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217D295 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-91-16, 50-499-91-16, NUDOCS 9107220128 | |
| Download: ML20217D331 (28) | |
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APPENDIX A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/91-16 Operating Licenses: NPF-76 50-499/91-16 NPF-80 Dockets: 50-498 50-499 Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Tcxas 77251 Facility Name: South .exas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: STP. Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted: May 2-10 and 28-31, 1991 Inspectors: A. T. Howell, Chief, Prvject Section D. Division of Reactor Projects M. F. Runyan, Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety G. F. Dick, Project Manager, Project Directorate IV-2, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved * h 7 !/ I/
1. P. Gwfnn, Deppty Ugector, Utvision of Uate Reactor Project $r Inspection Summary _
Inspection Conducteu May 2-10 and 28-31, 1991 (Report 50-498/91-16; 50-499/91-16)
Areas Inspected: Special, announced inspection of the implementation of the STP Operational Improvement Plan (0IP).
Results: The OIP represents a proactive effort to improve station performance and work environment. On the basis of employee interviews, the OIP has been generally successful to date in making STP a better place to work. The OIP has not been in effect long enough to assess whether its implementation will result in improved station availability ano reliabilit Two open items pertaining to the resolution of control room control board deficiencies (paragraph 4.2.1.2) and operator and maintenance technician overtime during outages (paragraphs 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.3.2) were identifie e 910715 0 DR ADOCK 0500
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i-2-DETAILS
- PERSONS CONTACTED
- tt Wisenberg, Plant Manager J. Sharpe, Manager, Maintenance
- A. McIntyre, Manager, Design Engineering
- W. Jump, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- A. Harrison, Supervising Engineer W. Blair, Manager, Maintenance Support D. McCallum, Manager, Plant Systems V. Albert, Manager, Plant Systems R. Hernandez, Acting Manager, Design Engineering j K. Christian, Manager, Unit 1 Operations
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L. Giles, Manager, Unit 2 Operations R. Dally, Engineer Specialist, Licensing R. DeLong, Manager, Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) Maintenance l K. Richards, Manager, Electrical Maintenance i W. Sieben. Manager, Mechanical Maintenance i
I In addition to the above, the inspectors also held discussions with various engineering, maintenance, and operations personnel during this inspectio !
- Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on May 31, 199 NRC personnel present at the May 31, 1991, exit interview were:
A. T. Howell, Chief, Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects J. I. Tapia, Senior Resident Inspector R. J. Evans, Resident Inspector C. J. Paulk, Resident Inspector BACKGROUND The licensee developed the OIP in late 1990 in response to the findings and recomnendations derived from several activities, events, and assessnents that occurred in 1989 and 199 Examples included:
Management consultant reviews
Work activity review program
1989 INPO based maintenance self-assessment
INP0 assistance visits NRC inspections reports Station problem report event investigations
Direct feedback From 1989 through the fall of 1990, several plant events occurred as the result of equipnent failures (primarily balance-of-plant [ BOP] equipment) and personnel errors. The licensee initiated a Procedure Compliance Task Force
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-3-in 1989 to address those plant events that were causea by inadequate procedures or noncompliance with procedures. In addition, the licensee also implemented I several design w difications to imprw e station availability and reliabilit '
Station events continued to occur, however, throughout 1990. In addition, during the Sunmer of 1990, operator and maintenance technician personnel errors resulted in Technical Specification violations as well as plant events. At an enforcement conference held in the Region IV office in August 1990, the licensee attributed e number of recent STP events to inadequate self-verificatio !
Corrective actions included the implementation of a seven-step I self-verification program. During an August 1990 BOP Team Inspection conducted by NRC Region IV, however, the team noted a number of other insights that may have had an impact on human perfonnance. These included the inaccessibility of sone plant equipment, thereby creating potential personnel safety hazards; and i low maintenance technician morale which was caused, in part, by work process inefficiencies, excessive work load, and fatigue resulting from overt 1ne. In general, the licensee was aware of these issues and had ongoing actions to address them. For example, the licensee implemented a Material Condition Improvement Plan in October 1990 to imprcve, in part, the work control proces The OIP was subsequently developed in the fall of 1990 to integrate previously existing and newly identified actions in the areas of organizational performance and station reliability and availabilit . OIP COMPOSITION The goals of the OIP are to improve STP availability and reliability ano to make STP a better place to work. These goals are expected to be accomplished on a continuing basis over time. It is applicable to all STP departments, and the goals of the OIP are intended to be accomplished by focusing on Organizational Performance and Perfonnance Tool Four issues are identified in the area of Organizational Performance. The issues include standards, teamwork, communications, and ownership. In each of these areas, actions have been established to address identified weaknesse In the Perfonnance Tonis area, eight issues are identified. These issues include procedures, drawings, corrective action process, work processes, material condition, work scheduling, generating experience, and the monthly report. Three previously existing licensee initiatives, which include the results of the Procedure Compliance Task Force, the action plan for drawing issues, and the actions associated with the Material Condition Improvement Plan Task Force, have been incorporated into the OIP to address the corresponding issues in the Performance Tools area of the OI An integrated schedule has been developed to allow proper sequencing, priority establishment, additions to scope because of new mquirements and feedback, and '
accountability tracking. The responsible managers have reviewed and approved the integrated schedules for those actions that are within their areas of
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l-4-responsibility. Implementation progress is tracked on a monthly basis by senior management review of the Station Repor OETAILED INSPECTION FINDINGS 4.1 Scope In order to assess the implementation effectiveness of the OIP, the inspectors conducted approximately 50 interviews of licensed and nonlicensed operators; maintenance technicians from the mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation and control ~ (l&C) disciplines; system engineers; design engineers; and various supervisors and managers. The team also reviewed records and toured selected areas of the plan ." Detailed Findings 4.2.1 Operations 4.2. Personnel Interviews The team conducted a number of interviews with reactor plant operators (RP0s),
reactor operators (R0s), senior reactor operators (SR0s),
unit superviso. < (USs), shift supervisors (SSs), and operations department supervisors and manager In general, morale in the operations department was good. Although most operators were not aware of the OIP, they were cognizant of recent management .
initiatives that were intended to address identified concerns. It appears that cperator morale has improved because of the following:
Management's responsiveness to personnel safety concerns;
Implementation of the operator pipeline;
Improved quality of training;
Management's responsiveness to improve the material condition of the plant; Recent management change in the operations department;
Increased confidence gained by additional operating experience; and
- A reduction in the amount of hours worked following the completion of two consecutive refueling outage The inspectors attributed the improvement in morale to specific actions in the 4 OIP and other initiatives. The inspectors also found that operators strongly supported the seven-step self-verification process and that they generally believed that this process has prevented plant transients and event ~
5 While morale was generally good and operators generally believed that continued improvement in-working conditions and job (perfonnance) tools could be expected, they did identify a number of concerns, in which (in their view) not much improvement was eviden Some of these observations included the following:
Inefficiencies in work control and work scheduling; Lack of management visibility in the plant; Lack of operational experience in other departments; Lack of career opportunities; Human factors problems with procedures because of an excessive number of temporary changes (tield change requests [FCRs]);
Insufficient amount of nonlicensed operator training; Excessive control room control board deficiencies and other longstanding equipnent problems; Lack of communication of management expectations with respect to opera tor duties and responsibilities; and Uneven distribution of resources in departments that support operations [
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4.2.1.2 Material Condition A review of licensee records revealed that the corrective maintenance backlog had been significantly reduced (approximately 11 percent) during the past several months. The inspectors noted during a tour of the turbine building that the amount of steam and hydraulic leaks had been significantly reduce At the time of the inspection, the material condition of the secondary plant was good and housekeeping was superior. Discussions with operators revealed that management was responsive in correcting many of these secondary plant problems during the last Units 1 and 2 refueling outages. The operators noted, however, that there were still many equipnent problems that had not been resolved. Examples given by the operators included:
Nunerous control room control board oeficiencies;
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Numerous secondary temperature centrol valve deficiencies; Several secondary air operated valve deficiencies; and
" Feedwater isolation valve (FWIV) and toxic gas monitor reliability problem _ . _
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-6-NRC has also documented some longstanding equipment problems in recent inspection reports. At the time of this inspection, there was an ongoing special inspection pertaining to reliability problems, identified by the resident inspectors, associated with the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) mitigation system actuation circuitrv (AMSAC) for both units (see NRC Inspection Report 50-498/91-18; 50-499/91-18). NRC Inspectior. Report 50-498/91-15; 50-499/91-15 identifiea reliability problems with the control room toxic gas monitors and NRC Inspection Report 50-498/91-11; 50-499/91-11 docunented ongoing problems associated with the FWIV A review of th i May 1991 Station Report revealed that there were 95 Unit 1 and 123 Unit 2 control room control board deficiencies. Some of these deficiencies were over two years old. For example, the Unit 2 "EHC Pump Filter D/P High" annunciator has not functioneo as intended for approximately 26 months and was still out of service at the end of the inspection. The effect of these control board deficiencies on operator performance as well as the licensee's processes for correcting them will be reviewed during future inspections. These issues will be tracked by Open Item 498/9116-01; 499/9116-0 .2.1.3 Operator Overtime A review of licensee records revealed that Units 1 and 2 aggregate average operator overtime rate from September 1990 through March 1991 was approximately 30 percent. During this 7 month period there was a Unit 2 refueling outage, a Unit 1 forced outage, and a Unit I refueling outage. The inspector noted that
+he sggregate average overtime rate declined to 13 percent in April 1991
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following the completion of the Unit 1 outag Discussions with operators revealed that some considered the amount of time worked during the outages to be excessive. Some also believed that fatigue experienced during this 7-month period may have had an adverse impact on the perforTnance of their assigned duties. This view is consistent with concerns noted in NRC Information Notice No. 91-36, " Nuclear Plant Staff Working Hours."
Similar concerns were expressed by station personnel during an NRC balance of plant (B0P) team inspection that was conducted in August 1990 (see NRC Inspection Report 50-498/90-29; 50-499/90-29). NRC inspectors subsequently identified a violation of NRC requirements pertaining to a lack of management control of senior licensed operator hours of work during the last Unit I refuelingoutage(seeNRCInspectionReport 50-498/91-11; 50-499/91-11).
While increased hours of work is required during extended outages, discussinns with licensee management personnel revealed that the amount of time that operators have worked during past outages, particularly non-licensed operators, was undesirable. Licensee management attributed a significant portion of the overtime rate to a lack of nonlicensed operators, whose numbers had decreased over the past 2 years (primarily due to attrition). The inspectors also noted ,
that there were only five shift technical advisers (STAS) at the time of the inspection, and that one had resigned just prior to the inspectio _ - _ _ __
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l-7-Discussions with licensee management revealed that they had taken steps to reduce the amount of operator overtirr.e during future outages by establishing an operator pipeline, which included the recent hiring of several nonlicensed operator candidates. The licensee also has a certification program in place to increase STA staffing. At the time of the inspection, however, it was not clear what effect these additional personnel would have on reducing the outage overtime rate. As a result, operator overtime rate during outages will be tracked as an open item (498/9116-02; 499/9116-02) and will be reviewed during future inspection .2.1.4 Control Room Fomality Several control room operators indicated that there was sorie need for improving control room formality. Recent NRC inspection reports (e.g., NRC Inspection Report 50-498/91-11; 50-499/91-11) documented a slight declining trend in the area of conduct of operations and control room formality. Discussions with licensee management personnel revealed that they identified differences in the level of control room formality between the two units, and that they were taking action to implement uniform standards and expectations for both unit This effort was confinned during interviews with the operators. The inspectors noted, however, that while operators generally believed that improvement in the area of formality was needed, operators also generally believed that such formality had little direct effect on unit performance. A review of NRC inspection reports and licensee event reports (LERs) revealed, however, that some plant events were caused, for example, by a lack of command and control by operators or coninunication weaknesses (e.g., see NRC Special lespection Report 50-498/90-31;50-499/90-31).
A review of LERs that were submitted in 1990 and 1991 revealed that there were almost tWiCe as many Unit 1 events as there were Unit 2 events. Although some of this difference can be attributed to more Unit 1 BOP equipment problems, the inspectors noted that there were significantly more personnel error-related events associated with Unit 1. These personnel errors resulted in unnecessary equipnent challenges and Technical Specification violations. While many were attributable to personnel errors during maintenance and surveillance activities, several others were attributable to personnel errors during operational activities. There was insufficient information to conclude that the differences in the amount of events were directly related to differences in control room fomality between the units; however, the ava11aale data indicated that some events were caused by weaknesses in the area of concut of operations (which includes control room fonnality and professionalism).
The inspectors discussed operator views about fonnality with senior licensee management personnel. Licensee management indicated that they view formality of operations to be significant in tems of operating the plant safely and reliably. They indicated that they will continue to reinforce their ,
expectations in this area. Fonnality of operations and its relationship to plant performance will be monitored by the resident inspectors on a continuel basi ____ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
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4.2.2 Engineering 4.2.2.1 Personnel Interviews The inspectors interviewed several system and design engineers. On the basis of these interviews, morale within the engineering department appeared hig In general, engineers viewed STP as a good place to work, and consnunications within their department and with other departments was viewed as goo .2.2.2 System Engineers in 1990, the licensee formalized its System Engineer Guidelines, which define the duties and responsibilities of system engineers. At the end of the inspection period, there were 54 system engineers assigned to all of the systems at STP and each system had a designated primary and backup enginee The inspectors found that the experience level of system engineers was high, and that the system engineers were effective in maintaining system operating experienc On the basis of interviews and discussions with licensee management personnel, however, the inspectors found that many system engineers have received little f ormal classroom training for their systems and system components. Such courses are available; however, system engineer participation appears to have been limited because of consecutive refueling outages in late 1990 and early 1991. The inspectors also found that the system engineers were not performing all the duties that are defined in the System Engineer Guidelines (e.g., performance monitoring). Discussions with licensee management personnel revealed that they were aware of these issues, but definitive actions to address them were still being evaluated at the end of the inspectio .2.2.3 Design Engineering Initiatives The inspectors noted that the OIP contained several proactive design engineering initiatives. Examples included developing control wiring diagrams, load lists, relay and fuse lists; streamlining the environmental qualification documentation system; and improving the master equipment database. Other actions included developing a single plant setpoint database and piping and instrumentation diagrams for critical skid mountr/ equipnent; and streamlining the modification processes. These and other act. ns are intended to result in gradual improvement in plant performanc .2.3 Maintenance 4.2. Personnel Interviews The inspectors interviewed a number of maintenance department craf t, '
supervisory, and management pcrsonnel from the eb.ctrical, mechanical, and I&C disciplines. On the basis of these interviews, morale within the maintenance department appeared low. The inspectors attributed the low morale to primarily d single issue that pertained to the desire by HL&P management to realign the maintenance department shift schedules. One purpose of this realignment is to
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-9-have the maintenance departnent, operations department, and technical services departirent personnel working on the same shif t schedule in order to foster team building. Mai5tenance of Electrical Workers (personnel, who were members of International BrotherhoodIBEW), rec of work, in accordance with a proposal offered by HL&P management and their own union representatives. This proposal was not passed; therefore, the current shif t structure remained in effect. This appears to have lowered morale because many maintenance departrrent personnel work on pennanent back shif ts (i.e., swing-shift and mid-shift). The inspectors noted, however, that licensee management was still working with representatives of the IBEW to resolve this issu Other employee perceptions obtaineo f rom interviews included:
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Foreman, supervisors, and managers cannot get out to the job sites as much as they desire because they are excessively burdened with administrative dutie Spare parts problems are widesprea *
Procedure quality was perceived as good, but there is some trustration with the continual need to process field change requests when errors are discovered in the fiel *
Work request backlog was perceived to be rising slowly. The inspectors found the perception to be inconsistent with available data that indicated that the backlog has actually been reduced by approxinutely 11 percent over the last several month Sone policy decisions are implemented without consultation with lower managemen j Interface with operations, engineering, and health physics wa: perceived as very goo *
Apprentice training was viewed as excellent; however, some expressed the desire for more journeyman trainin *
Interdepartmental conrnunications were perceived as having improved over the past several month Notwithstanding the issue of shift realignment, most maintenance department personnel viewed STP as a good place to wor The inspectors noted that the OIP and other licensee initiatives contained actions to address the negative perceptions that were voiced by maintenance department personne I
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4.2.4 Operational Improvement Plan (0IP)
On the basis of interviews with personnel and a review of licensee records, the intpectors made the following observations pertaining to the OIP:
- First level supervisors and below were generally unaware of the existence of the OIP, but were aware of specific OIP actions that pertained to the Discussions with licensee management personnel revealed that they intended to broadly disseminate the purposes of the OIP to all STP personne To the extent that licensee personnel were aware of the OIP, they believeo ,
that it had been effective to date in bringing about improvement at ST Generally, supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel have not provided 0IP implementation effectiveness feedback. The inspectors noted, however, that some specific elenents of the OIP were developed on the basis of 1 input from nonmanagement personne )
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'0IP action items were being effectively tracked and monthly status was being proyided to senior management personne *
Although intended to be a living plan, the inspectors noted that few additional action items had been added to the OlP. Discussions with licensee management personnel revealed, however, that several other licensee initiatives were being considered for inclusion in the 0! Licensee management personnel also indicated that it is their intent to integrate the OIP into the Master Operating Plan (business plan) at the end of 199 *
Discussions with licensee quality assurance (QA) personnel revealed that there were no specific audits, surveillances, or other activities to assess the overall implementation effectiveness of the OlP. The inspectors noted, however, that specific OIP action items do fall under the scope of other routine QA audits and surveillances. The licensee's primary metheds for assessing the overall effectiveness of the OIP included a monthly review of the data found in the-Station Report and periodic employee surveys. The inspectors considered these methods to be generally effectiv . CONCLUSIONS The inspectors concluded the following:
l The OIP represents a proactive effort to improve station perfonaance and
! work environmen On the basis of employee perceptions obtained through interviews, the OIP has iaeen generally effective to date in improving the work environment at STP.
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The OIP has not been in effect long enough to detennine whether its-implenentation will result in improved station reliability and availabilit *
Most perceived problem areas and areas perceived to require enhancement
! were either addressed in the OIP or were known by licensee senior management.
I Licensee personnel were generally unaware of the existence of the OIP, but were aware of specific actions in the OIP that pertained to them,
OIP~ action items were being effectively tracked. Several ongoing and recently completed activities and initiatives were being evaluated for inclusion in the OI l l
The seven step self-verification process was perceived as a positive l
initiative and was also believed to be an effective tool in improving human performanc *
OIP implementation effectiveness was being assessed on a continual basis.
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At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspectors considered housekeeping in the Units 1 and 2 turbine buildings to be superior and material condition to be good,
The corrective work request backlog was reduced by approximately 11 percent in the past several months. However, several longstanding equipment problems were noted. One example included the unavailability of !
the Units 1 and 2 AMSAC systems. AMSAC reliability was the subject of a !
special inspection (NRC Inspection Report 50-498/91-18; 50-499/91-18). l l
Maintenance department morale was low because of the issue of shift i schedule realignment. Hl&P management was working with IBEW to resolve it, j
Excessive administrative responsibilities appeared to reduce the time l l- available to managers and supervisors to observe work in the plan Interviews with nonsupervisory personnel appeared to confirm thi j
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Excessive procedure FCRs detract from procedure quality and appear to have l contributed to some human performance problems, t
- Spare parts unavailability and other inefficiencies in the work control process were viewed as a continuing problem. However, several ongoing !
actions were intended to address these concern * Maintenance department craft overtime and nonlicensed operator overtime during outages appeared excessive and may have been a contributor to human permnance problems. The licensee established an operator pipeline whic shock reduce nonlicensed operator overtime during future outage Many operators believed that formality during the conduct of operations i needed some improvement, but such formality had little effect on overall operational perfomance. Further, operators believed that there were differences between the two units in tems of fomality in the control rooms and that management was taking steps to make control room formality more unifor *
System engineers, although experienced, generally believed that they needed additional training to enhance their job performanc System engineers appeared to spend the majority of their time in helping to resolve operational problems, thereby preventing them from accomplishing other responsibilities that were defined in the System Engineer Guideline . EX1T INTERVIEW The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on May 31, 1991. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector .
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, APPENDIX B MEETING SUMMARY
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Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
Facility: South Texas Project (STP)
License Nos.: NPF-76 and NPF-80 Docket Nos.: 50-498 and 50-499 Subject: PLANT STATUS AND OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN (0IP)
IMPLEMENTATION STATUS On May 10, 1991, representatives of STP met with Region IV and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) personnel in Arlington, Texas, to discuss plant status, including the implementation of the OIP. The meeting was held at the request of HL&P. The issues discussed included station performance, recent plant events, automatic reactor trip history, recently completed refueling outages, and the OlP. The OIP discussion included the purpose, scope, approach, completion status of OIP action items, and future actions. The licensee also discussed major equipment improvement Attachments: Attendance List Licensee Presentation (NRC distribution only)
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ATTENDANCE LIST Attendance at the meeting between HL&P and NRC on May 10, 1991, in the Region IV office:
HL&P W. Kinsey, Vice President, Nuclear Generation M. Wisenberg, Plant Manager W. Jump, Manager, Nuclear Licensing A. Harrison, Supervising Engineer, Licensing CPSB - San Antonio M. Hardt Director, Nuclear Division NRC L. J. Callan, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
T. P. Gwynn, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
M. Virgilio, Assistant Director for Region IV and V Reactors, Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
J. P. Jaudon, Deputy Director, DRS ,
A. T. Howell, Chief, Project Section D, DRP G. F. Dick, Project Manager, NRR W. B. Jones, Senior Project Engineer, Project Section D, DRP M. F. Runyan, Reactor Inspector, Plant Systems Section, DRS R. J. Evans, Resident Inspector, DRP
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l MEETING WITH NRC ,
MAY 10,1991
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION ,
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION .
HL&P/NRC MEETING MAY.10, 1991
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AGENDA 1 0PENING REMARKS W. H. KINSEY PLANT STATUS REPORT M. R. WISENBURG CLOSING REMARKS W. H. KINSEY
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION .
STATION PERFORMANCE (APRIL 30) .
YTD 1989 1990 '1991 L'IFETIME*
UNIT l' 5 .8 1 CAPACITY FACTOR % 5 UNI .3 5 . .1
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STATION AVERAGE 5 .8 -5 FORCED OUTAGE RATE UNIT 1 .8 4 !'
UNIT 2 2 .0 '
SAFETY SYSTEM UNIT 1 1 3 5 ACTUATIONS UNIT 2 1 1 0 ;
i NOTICES OF VIOLATION- 24 14 3 LERS 53 45 14 OPEN MAINTENANCE WORK REQUESTS 4,977- 4,654
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- LATEST UDI DATA (1989) HAS USPWRS LIFETIME CAPACITY FACTOR AT 59.7%. l
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SOUTH TEXAS' PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION ..
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AUTOMATIC SCRAMS
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MAINTENANCE O O O OTHER 2 5 1 TOTAL 2- 6 1
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STATION PERFORMANCE (APRIL 30)
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1989 1990 1991 l COST PER KWH 1 .9 18.28*
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RADIATION EXPOSURE 17 .0 8 (PERSON / REM)
LOST TIME ACCIDENT RATE .5 .28 .16 HL&P TURNOVER % .34 1.93 l * YEAR END PROJECTION 17.25 LATEST UDI DATA (1989) HAS INDUSTRY AVERAGE COST PER KWH (MILLS /KWH) AT 22.6 ~
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION .
STATION PERFORMANCE REFUELING OUTAGES
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i f,i 1UNITH1FipBl?Ei31 L T jUNITs2; _ O!f"' i Planned 75 days- Actual 78 Planned 75 days- Actual 73 Completed 95.2% of baseline work Completed 95.8% baseline work r
86.6 Person-Rem 123 Person-Rem
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3 Lost Time Accidents 4 Lost Time Accidents 3 Notices of Violation 2 Notices of Violation
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION .
OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN
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PURPOSE ,
o ENHANCE PLANT AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY I
o IMPROVE THE DESIRABILITY OF WORKING AT STPEGS SCOPE o ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
_ STANDARDS
! _ TEAMWORK
_ COMMUNICATION
_ 0WNERSHIP o PERFORMANCE TOOLS
_ PLANT MATERIAL CONDITION
_ PROCEDURES AND ORAWINGS
_ CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESS
_ WORK PROCESSES AND SCHEDULING
_ OPERATING EXPERIENCE
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APPROACH o EXPECTED TO PROMOTE STEADY PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT o INTENDED TO REMOVE BARRIERS INHIBITING PERFORMANCE o APPLICABLE TO ALL STPEGS ORGANIZATIONS o INCORPORATE RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FROM ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES o $PECIFIC ACTION ITEMS SUPPLEMENTED, REVISED OR DELETED BASED ON LESSONS LEARNED i
o A CONTINUING PROCESS
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC G2NERATING STATION .
OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMEhT PLAN
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ITEMS COMPLETED A. ORGANIZATIONAL o ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT o MANAGEMENT, OPERATOR, TECHNICIAN AND CRAFTSMAN PIDcLINES o SHIFT REALIGNMENTS o HEAD OPERATOR AND HEAD JOURNEYMAN POSITIONS ESTABLISHED o MAINTENANCE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND DIRECTOR, MAINTENANCE POSITIONS ESTABLISHED o LICENSED OPERATOR, STA, AND BARGAINING UNIT INCENTIVE PAY o MANAGEMENT ROTATION o DIRECTOR, PLANT PROJECTS POSITION ESTABLISHED o REVISED OVERTIME POLICY o ADDED ADDITIONAL OUTSIDER ON NSRB o MONTHLY STATION REPORT o GROUP VICE PRESIDENT /VICE PRESIDENT MONTHLY MEETING WITH SUPERVISORS
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION -
OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN
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ITEMS COMPLETED o PLANT MANAGER OUARTERLY EMPLOYEE MEETINGS o SITE NEWSPAPER
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o STRUCTURED PLANNING AND BUDGETING PROCESS IMPLEMENTED o SITE WIDE PRIORITY SYSTEM IMPLEMENTED
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o EMPLOYEE APPRECIATION LUNCHES o POLICY ON STANDARDS AND PROFESSIONALISM o INCREASED INDUSTRY INVOLVEMENT
- INP0 IRG
. INP0 PEER EVALUATORS
. DIESEL GENERATOR OWNERS GROUP
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. RIV MAINTENANCE MANAGERS
. INP0 LOANEE PROGRAM o SELF VERIFICATION TRAINING o TEAM BUILDING
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION l OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN ITEMS COMPLETED i
B. PROCESSES o IMPROVED CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM o STREAMLINED WORK REQUEST PROGRAM l
o STREAMLINED MODIFICATION AND TEMPORARY MODIFICATION PROGRAM o EVALUATION OF SPARE PARTS ACQUISITION PROCESS o MAINTENANCE PROCESSES ASSESSMENT
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN
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FUTURE ACTIONS o FURTHER PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS IN MAINTENANCE, MODIFICATIONS, SPARE PARTS, WORK PLANNING AND SCHEDULING o SHIFTWORK o CAREER DEVELOPMENT o NEw FACILITIES
. NUCLEAR SUPPORT CENTER
. SPARE PARTS STAGING AREA MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS FACILITY
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o PROCEDURES o STANDARDS o DRAWINGS o INFORMATION SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
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L SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION i
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l MAJOR EQUIPMENT IMPROVEMENTS
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COMPLETED .
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! o TURBINE STATIONARY BLADES
o Low PRESSURE TURBINE ROTOR REPLACEMENT o low PRESSURE TURBINE MOISTURE REMOVAL MODIFICATIONS l
o TURBINE THROTTLE VALVES / GOVERNOR VALVES i o FLEX HOSES INSTALLED IN TURBINE HYDRAULIC OIL SYSTEM o UNIT 1 GENERATOR STATOR END MINDING SUPPORT
- o UNIT 2 STEAM GENERATOR HOT LEG SHOT. PEENING l o DUAL TOWER HYDROGEN DRYER l o CIRCULATING WATER PUMP MOTOR REWINDING i o QDPS AND ERFDADS DISPLAY UPGRADES
- o PUMP ON VAPOR EXTRACTOR l o GENERATOR MONITORING UPGRADE
! o UNIT 1 DEAERATING FEED TANK MANWAY CLOSURE
! o LOOSE PARTS MONITORING SYSTEM REPLACEMENT '
l o FREEZE PROTECTION SYSTEM UPGRADES I
- o rotor CLAMPING RING ASSEMBLY UPGRADE (UNIT 1)
! o ACCESS PLATFORMS'(CONTINUING)
i o EXTRACTION STEAM LINE BELLOWS AND SUPPORTS UPGRADE -
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i SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION :
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l MAJOR EQUIPMENT IMPROVEMENTS
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, i o UNIT 1 GENERATOR STATOR END WINDING SUPPORT o GENERATOR CONDITION MONITORING i
o ROTOR RETAINING RING CHANGE Our (UNIT 2)
o FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE _ HYDRAULIC CLEAN UP SKIDS
. o FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE SOLENOID RELOCATION o
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! UNIT 2 DEAERATING FEED TANK MANWAY CLOSURE
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