IR 05000483/2001006
| ML020160176 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 01/16/2002 |
| From: | Johnson W NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | Randolph G Union Electric Co |
| References | |
| IR-01-006 | |
| Download: ML020160176 (36) | |
Text
January 16, 2002
SUBJECT:
CALLAWAY--NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-483/01-06
Dear Mr. Randolph:
On December 29, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Callaway Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed with Mr. Warren Witt and other members of your staff on December 28, 2001.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified two issues that were evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that violations are associated with these issues.
These violations are being treated as noncited violations (NCVs), consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. These NCVs are described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Callaway Plant facility.
Immediately following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the NRC issued an advisory recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. With continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants remain at the highest level of security and the NRC continues to monitor the situation. This advisory was followed by additional advisories and, although the specific actions are not releasable to the public, they generally include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and more limited access of personnel and vehicles to the sites. The NRC has conducted various audits of
Union Electric Company-2-your responses to these advisories and your ability to respond to terrorist attacks with the capabilities of the current design basis threat. From these audits, the NRC has concluded that your security program is adequate at this time.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
/RA/
William D. Johnson, Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-483 License: NPF-30
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 50-483/01-06
REGION IV==
Docket:
50-483 License:
NPF-30 Report:
50-483/01-06 Licensee:
Union Electric Company Facility:
Callaway Plant Location:
Junction Highway CC and Highway O Fulton, Missouri Dates:
September 30 through December 29, 2001 Inspectors:
V. G. Gaddy, Senior Resident Inspector J. D. Hanna, Resident Inspector R. V. Azua, Project Engineer J. B. Nicholas, Ph.D., Senior Health Physicist R. P. Mullikin, Senior Reactor Inspector M. E. Murphy, Senior Reactor Engineer T. F. Stetka, Senior Reactor Engineer P. A. Goldberg, Reactor Inspector W. A. Maier, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector C. J. Paulk, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By:
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Callaway Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-483/01-06 IR 05000483-01-06; on 09/30-12/29/2001; Union Electric Co; Callaway Plant. Integrated Resident & Regional Report; Postmaintenance Testing; Identification and Resolution of Problems The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, region based emergency preparedness inspectors, health physics inspectors, reactor inspectors, and reactor engineers. The inspection identified two Green findings, both of which were noncited violations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.
A. Inspector Identified Findings Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green. A noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 occurred when inadequate maintenance instructions resulted in maintenance personnel not adding enough lubricating oil to the driving bearing of component cooling water Pump C. The instructions failed to include guidance on how much oil to add to the pump bearing following maintenance.
Insufficient lubricating oil caused the pump bearing to fail.
This finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety in that, if the other component cooling water pump that supplied the train had failed, the train would not have been available to perform its safety function. This finding affects the mitigating system cornerstone. This finding was found to be of very low safety significance because no other risk significant equipment was rendered inoperable due to the inadequate maintenance instructions and the safety function was still maintained. Because this finding is of very low safety significance, and the finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 200107296, it is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy (Section 1R19.2).
- Green. A noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, occurred when the licensee failed to take corrective action to ensure flood doors leading into the emergency core cooling system pump rooms were properly controlled. On October 7, 2001, the inspectors identified that the flood door leading to emergency core cooling system Train A equipment was open and unmonitored. With the door open a continuous flood watch was required. In June 2001 the inspectors identified that the flood door leading to emergency core cooling system Train B equipment was open and unmonitored. In response to the June 2001 incident, the licensee did not take corrective action to prevent the doors from being unmonitored while open. The corrective action for this incident had been closed with no immediate corrective action taken.
-2-This finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety in that, if a fire water pipe break had occurred while the flood door was open and unmonitored, fire water could affect the operation of emergency core cooling system equipment. This finding affects the mitigating system cornerstone. This finding was found to be of very low safety significance because of the low likelihood of a fire water pipe break while the door was open and unmonitored and because of the availability of Train B equipment. Because the finding is of very low safety significance, and the finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 200106307, it is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy (Section 40A2).
B. Licensee Identified Findings Violations of very low safety significance which were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. These violations are listed in Section 4OA7.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status: The plant began the inspection period operating at full power. On December 3, the unit was shut down to repair a stator cooling water leak into the main generator. The unit was restarted on December 6 and reached full power on December 8. The unit remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
a.
Inspection Scope During October 2001 the inspectors reviewed the licensees cold weather preparations to verify that design features and implementation of the cold weather procedure were adequate to protect from the effects of adverse weather. The inspectors walked down heat tracing and other cold weather preparations the licensee had implemented. The inspectors verified the licensee had completed Operating Procedure OTS-ZZ-0007, Plant Cold Weather, Revision 6.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments (71111.02)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a selected sample of nine licensing impact reviews to verify that the licensee had appropriately considered the conditions under which the licensee may make changes to the facility or procedures or conduct tests or experiments without prior NRC approval.
The inspectors reviewed an additional 11 licensing impact evaluation screenings in which the licensee determined that evaluations were not required, to ensure that the licensees exclusion of a full evaluation was consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensees corrective action process to identify and correct problems concerning their performance associated with 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. The inspectors reviewed four corrective action requests and the subsequent corrective actions pertaining to licensee identified problems and errors in the performance of licensing impact evaluations to ensure that problems and deficiencies were being identified and that appropriate corrective actions were being taken.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
-2-1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1 Partial Walkdowns a.
Inspection Scope On October 11, 2001, the inspectors performed a partial walkdown of essential service water Train A while Train B was out of service for maintenance. The inspectors compared the as-found condition of the essential service water system with the requirements of the Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifications, and Drawing M22-EF01, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water, Revision 38.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete Walkdown a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a complete review of equipment alignment in the auxiliary feedwater system from November 19-30, 2001. This system was selected due to its importance in providing decay heat removal capability through the steam generators.
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the condition of the system using the criteria documented in Operations Procedure OTN-AL-00001, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Revision 7; Drawing M-22AL01(Q), Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System, Revision 17; and Section 10.4.9 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. Specifically the inspectors verified that the system was aligned properly and that any outstanding maintenance work request or design issue did not challenge the ability of the system to function properly.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1 Routine Fire Protection Walkdowns a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following areas to determine if the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capabilities, and maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition.
The following areas were reviewed:
-3-
Fuel building air handling equipment room on October 19, 2001
Emergency core cooling system Train B equipment on October 22, 2001
Emergency Diesel Generator B on October 23, 2001
North mechanical piping penetration room on November 1, 2001
Essential service water pipe chase room (Auxiliary Building 1974' elevation) on November 1, 2001
Alternate shutdown panels on November 26, 2001
Component cooling water heat exchanger rooms on November 27, 2001 The inspectors assessed these areas and verified combustibles that were noted were being controlled in accordance with the following:
Final Safety Analysis Report, Appendix 9.5B, Fire Hazards Analysis
Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ-00741, Control of Combustibles Material, Revision 15
Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ-00701, Control of Fire Protection Impairments, Revision 8
Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ-00742, Control of Ignition Sources, Revision 14 b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Annual Fire Drill a.
Inspection Scope On November 15, 2001, the inspectors observed an unannounced fire drill. The purpose of the drill was to evaluate the readiness and effectiveness of fire brigade personnel in responding to a fire inside the lower cable spreading room (Room 3501).
The inspectors observed fire brigade members donning protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus, entering the fire area, and utilizing fire preplan strategies. Sufficient firefighting equipment was available to fight the fire. The inspectors also evaluated communications between the fire brigade and control room.
The fire drill was conducted using fire drill Scenario 01U06. General drill objectives and acceptance criteria were outlined in the scenario.
-4-b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
a.
Inspection Scope On November 14, 2001, the inspectors performed a periodic flood protection walkdown of the residual heat removal and containment spray pump rooms. The inspectors verified that water-tight doors designed to mitigate flooding were closed and door seals were in good condition. The inspectors also evaluated other flood protection features (e.g., holes or unsealed penetrations in floors and walls, sump pumps and level detection systems) designed to protect risk significant systems, structures, and components from flooding due to internal causes.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)
.1 Performance of Testing, Maintenance, and Inspection Activities a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's test methodology for the component cooling water system, standby diesel generator jacket water heat exchangers, and safety injection pump room coolers. In addition, the inspectors reviewed test data for the heat exchangers and design and vendor-supplied information to ensure that the heat exchangers were performing within their design basis. The inspectors also reviewed the heat exchanger inspection and test results. Specifically, the inspectors verified proper extrapolation of test conditions to design conditions, appropriate use of test instrumentation, and appropriate accounting for instrument inaccuracies. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately trended inspection and test results, assessed the causes of the trends, and took necessary action to address any significant changes in these trends.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Verification of Conditions and Operations Consistent with Design Bases a.
Inspection Scope For the selected heat exchangers, the inspectors verified that the licensee established heat sink and heat exchanger condition, operation, and test criteria were consistent with
-5-the design assumptions. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the applicable calculations to ensure that the thermal performance test acceptance criteria for the heat exchangers were being applied consistently throughout the calculations. The inspectors also verified that the appropriate acceptance values for fouling and tube plugging for the component cooling water heat exchanger remained consistent with the values used in the design-bases calculations. Finally, the inspectors verified that the parameters measured during the thermal performance and flow balance tests for the essential service water and component cooling water systems were consistent with those assumed in the design bases.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors examined the corrective action program for significant problems with the selected components over the past 3 years. The inspectors selected a sample of eight Callaway Action Request System items for review. The Callaway Action Request System Numbers reviewed are identified in the attachment to this report.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors: (1) evaluated examination security measures and procedures for compliance with 10 CFR 55.49, "Integrity of Examinations and Tests"; (2) evaluated the licensees sample plan for the written examinations for compliance with 10 CFR 55.59
"Requalification," and NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 8, Supplement 1, as referenced in the facility requalification program procedures; and (3) evaluated maintenance of license conditions for compliance with 10 CFR 55.53, "Conditions of Licenses," by review of facility records, procedures, and tracking systems for licensed operator training, qualification, and watchstanding. The inspectors also reviewed remedial training and examinations for examination failures for compliance with facility procedures and responsiveness to address areas failed.
In addition, the inspectors: (1) interviewed seven personnel (two operators, two instructors/evaluators, and three managers) regarding the policies and practices for administering examinations; initiating and incorporating feedback from in-house and industry events; developing and administering remedial training and retake examinations; (2) observed the administration of two dynamic simulator scenarios to two
-6-requalification crews by facility evaluators, including an operations department manager, who led the crew and individual evaluations, and (3) observed five facility evaluators administer six job performance measures. Each job performance measure was observed being performed by an average of two requalification candidates. The inspectors also reviewed the remediation process for this and the last training cycle.
The inspectors also reviewed the results of the annual and biennial requalification examinations to determine if these results reflected any findings.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)
.1 Routine Resident Inspection a.
Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed licensee implementation of the maintenance rule. The inspectors verified structure and component scoping, characterization, safety significance, performance criteria, and the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions. The inspectors compared the licensees implementation of the maintenance rule to the requirements outlined in 10 CFR 50.65; Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ-00303, Classification of Systems, Revision 5; Engineering Procedure EDP-ZZ-01128, Maintenance Rule and EPIX Programs, Revision 3; Regulatory Guide 1.160, Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2; and meeting minutes from various expert technical panel meetings.
The inspectors reviewed the following components:
Ultimate heat sink cooling tower Fan B
Nonsafety-related 125 Vdc system
Turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump
Reactor coolant system Loop 3 letdown to regenerative heat exchanger upstream level control Valve BGLCV0460
Residual heat removal Pump A room cooler
Safety injection Pump B b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
-7-
.2 Periodic Evaluation Reviews a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's reports documenting the performance of the last two maintenance rule periodic effectiveness assessments. These periodic evaluations covered the period from May 1998 through May 2001.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's program had monitored risk-significant functions associated with structures, systems, and components using reliability and unavailability. Additionally, the performance of nonrisk-significant functions were monitored using plant level criteria.
The inspectors reviewed the conclusions reached by the licensee with regard to the balance of reliability and unavailability for specific maintenance rule functions. This review was conducted by examining the licensee's evaluation of all risk-significant functions that had exceeded performance criteria during the evaluation periods.
The inspectors also examined the licensee's evaluation of program activities associated with the placement of maintenance rule program risk-significant functions in Categories (a)(1) and/or (a)(2). Also, the inspectors reviewed the periodic evaluation conclusions reached by the licensee for the following systems: essential service water; component cooling water; control building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning; 480 Vac electrical distribution; atmospheric steam dump; auxiliary feedwater; 125 Vdc battery; emergency diesel generator building ventilation; and security system emergency diesel generator.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the use of the corrective action system within the maintenance rule program. This review was accomplished by the examination of the corrective action requests and a sample of control room logs. The purpose of this review was to establish that the corrective action program was entered at the appropriate threshold for the purposes of:
Starting the evaluation and determination of corrective action process when performance criteria were exceeded;
Correction of performance-related issues or conditions identified during the periodic evaluation; and
-8-
Correction of generic issues or conditions identified during programmatic surveillances, audits, or assessments.
The inspectors verified that the identification and implementation of corrective action was acceptable.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees assessment and management of selected maintenance activities to assess the effectiveness of risk management for planned and emergent activities. The inspectors compared the licensees risk assessment and risk management activities against the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4), the recommendations of NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2, and Engineering Procedure EDP-ZZ-01129, Callaway Plant Risk Assessment, Revision 1. The inspectors evaluated the following risk assessments:
October 12, 2001 Risk assessment prior to removing Bus PN02 from service for maintenance November 12, 2001 Weekly risk assessment for scheduled maintenance and surveillance November 19, 2001 Risk assessment subsequent to unplanned inoperability of switchyard Breaker MDV-41 December 17. 2001 Weekly risk assessment for scheduled maintenance and surveillance b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions and Events (71111.14)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees actions in response to a stator cooling water leak inside the main generator. The inspectors also followed up on the circumstances surrounding the gas binding of motor-driven auxiliary feedwater Pump A that occurred during the plant shutdown to repair the stator cooling water leak.
-9-b.
Findings During a plant shut down to remove the main generator from service, the licensee noted that motor-driven auxiliary feedwater Pump A was gas bound. The gas binding prevented the pump from performing its safety function. At the conclusion of the inspection period, the licensee had not determined how gas had entered the auxiliary feedwater system and caused the pump to become inoperable. This issue will remain unresolved until a root cause is identified and the safety significance is determined.
During the night shift on December 2, 2001, the licensee received a high level alarm on the generator leakage detection system. System engineering and operations personnel evaluated the alarm and, on December 3, identified that there was a water leak inside the main generator. Based on the pressures in the main generator, the licensee suspected that the leak was from the generator bushing cooling system. The bushings were cooled by stator cooling water. At approximately 11a.m., the licensee decided to shut down to Mode 3 to remove the main generator from service and repair the leak.
At 1:15 p.m., the licensee began decreasing reactor power at approximately 10 percent an hour. At 10:39 p.m., with the main turbine at approximately 120 MWe (approximately 10 percent power) high vibrations were observed on Bearing 4. The vibrations reached 10.40 mils. Vibrations also increased on Bearings 3 and 8. The vibrations reached 10.04 mils and 8.55 mils, respectively. At 10:48 p.m., the turbine vibration trouble alarm was received.
The operators decided to break condenser vacuum and rapidly remove the main turbine from service to reduce turbine vibrations. Since breaking condenser vacuum would also cause a loss of the operating main feedwater pump and generate an auxiliary feedwater actuation signal, both motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were manually started at 10:56 p.m., prior to breaking condenser vacuum. Following start, motor-driven auxiliary feedwater Pump B delivered rated flow to steam Generators A and D. However, operators noted that although motor-driven auxiliary feedwater Pump A started it was not supplying steam Generators B and C. The pumps discharge pressure was erratic and lower than expected. Condenser vacuum was broken at 10:57 p.m. During main turbine coastdown, vibrations peaked at 17 mils. Since no flow was being supplied to steam Generators B and C, operators manually started the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump at 10:58 p.m., and supplied the steam generators. At 10:59 p.m., main turbine vibrations returned to normal.
Since a valid auxiliary feedwater actuation signal was generated following the breaking of condenser vacuum and the loss of the operating main feedwater pump, it was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A).
Since no flow was being supplied by motor-driven auxiliary feedwater Pump A, an equipment operator and the field supervisor were dispatched to inspect the pump. The field supervisor noted the pumps outboard bearing was hot and that there was no leak-off flow. The pump was secured at 11:07 p.m. and declared inoperable. Operations personnel then vented the pump casing. Gas vented for approximately 15 seconds from the pump. Since gas was vented, the licensee concluded that the pump was gas
-10-bound. Because the gas was not analyzed, the licensee could not determine what type of gas was inside the pump casing.
At the conclusion of the inspection period, the licensee had not determined how gas entered the auxiliary feedwater system and caused the pump to become inoperable. As a result, the safety significance of this incident could not be determined. This issue will remain unresolved until the licensee determines how gas entered the auxiliary feedwater system and how long the pump was inoperable (Unresolved Item 50-483/0106-01). This issue is in the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 20017423.
Since no cause had been determined, the licensee was venting the casing and recirculation line on each auxiliary feedwater pump on a shiftly basis. Venting was planned to continue at least until the root cause was determined.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of several evaluations to verify that they were sufficient to justify continued operation of a system or component. The inspectors verified that, although equipment was degraded, the operability evaluation provided adequate technical justification that the equipment could still meet its Technical Specification, Final Safety Analysis, and design bases requirements and that any potential risk increase attributed to the degraded equipment was thoroughly evaluated.
Operability evaluations for the following components were reviewed:
October 15, 2001 Residual heat removal Pump A room cooler November 28, 2001 Feeder breaker for component cooling water from reactor coolant pump thermal barriers bypass Valve EGHV0061 November 15, 2001 Emergency Diesel Generator B November 26, 2001 Auxiliary feedwater pumps (Refer to Section 4OA7 for a licensee identified violation associated with this operability evaluation)
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the fire protection aspects of Modification MP-1038, Replacement of existing GE Engineered Safety Features Transformers with Load Tap Changers Transformers. Since the load tap changers transformers were much larger
-11-and contained more oil, the inspectors evaluated the transformer deluge system to ensure it was adequate to mitigate any transformer fire. The inspectors also verified that the installed deluge system was consistent with the requirements of Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5.1.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)
.1 Routine Postmaintenance Test Inspections a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors verified that postmaintenance tests were adequate to verify system operability and functional capabilities. The inspectors verified that testing met design and licensing basis requirements, Technical Specifications, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Inservice Testing, and licensee administrative procedure. The inspectors verified testing results for the following components:
October 10, 2001 Containment spray Pump B discharge valve
December 5, 2001 Component cooling water Pump C
December 8, 2001 Main feedwater Pump A thrust bearing
December 12, 2001 Containment spray Pump A b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Maintenance of Component Cooling Water Pump C a.
Inspection Scope On November 27, 2001, during planned maintenance, component cooling water Pump C failed. The inspectors reviewed the previously performed postmaintenance tests and the associated maintenance procedures that specified the work to be performed for their adequacy to verify system operability.
b.
Findings The inspectors identified that the licensee failed to perform adequate maintenance on component cooling water Pump C leading to failure of the pump. This finding was of very low safety significance and was a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.
At 1:26 a.m. on November 27, 2001, component cooling water Pump C was started to support planned maintenance on component cooling water Train B. Two component
-12-cooling water pumps supply each train. At approximately 2:30 a.m. the driving bearing temperature for the pump exceeded the 90C alarm setpoint. Within 3 minutes the bearing temperature peaked at 130C. The licensee promptly started component cooling water Pump A and secured Pump C.
The licensee determined that the high bearing temperature and resultant bearing failure had been caused by a lack of lubricating oil. Preventative maintenance had been performed on this pump in accordance with Work Order P635486, Oil Change Pump and Motor, on November 15, 2001. The inspectors determined that the maintenance instructions had not included any directions as to the quantity of oil to be added to the pump. The only guidance specified in the procedure stated, Use caution to fill cavity middle of the sight glass and no more. The licensee determined that an oily sight glass had prevented maintenance personnel from adding the proper amount of oil.
This finding is more than minor due to having a credible impact on safety because, if the other component cooling water pump that supplied the train had failed, the train would not have been available to perform its safety function. This finding affects the mitigating system cornerstone. This finding was found to be only of very low safety significance (Green) using the reactor safety significance determination process because no other safety-related equipment was rendered inoperable due to the ineffective maintenance procedure and the safety function was still maintained.
Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9, requires, in part, that Maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written instructions appropriate to the circumstances. The licensees inadequate preventive maintenance document for the addition of lubricating oil resulted in damage to component cooling water Pump C. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-483/0106-02). This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 200107296.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed or reviewed the following surveillance tests to ensure the systems tested were capable of performing their safety function and to assess their operational readiness. Specifically, the inspectors verified that the following surveillance tests met Technical Specifications, ASME Section XI test requirements, the Final Safety Analysis Report, and licensee procedural requirements:
October 22, 2001 Operations Procedure OSP-AL-P001A, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A Inservice Test, Revision 26
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November 27, 2001 Surveillance Procedure ISF-EG-0F107, FCTNAL-FLOW;CMPNT COOLING WTR FLOW, Revision 7
December 6, 2001 Operations Procedure OSP-EF-P001B, ESW Train B Inservice Test, Revision 36
December 6, 2001 Operations Procedure OSP-NE-0001B, Standby Diesel Generator B Periodic Tests, Revision 10 b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)
a.
Inspection Scope Since April 1, 2001, the licensee has not installed any risk significant temporary modifications. As a result, none were available for review.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP1 Exercise Evaluation (71114.01)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the objectives and scenario for the 2001 exercise to determine if the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the emergency plan. The scenario included equipment and electrical power failures, a loss of reactor coolant, core damage, and a radiological release to demonstrate the licensee's capabilities to implement the emergency plan.
The inspectors evaluated exercise performance by focusing on the risk-significant activities of classification, notification, protective action recommendations, and assessment of offsite dose consequences in the following emergency response facilities:
Simulator Control Room
Operations Support Area
Emergency Operations Facility The inspectors also assessed personnel recognition of abnormal plant conditions, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, protection of
-14-emergency workers, emergency repair capabilities, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan to verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 50.47(b), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.
The inspectors reviewed drill reports, drill critiques, and corrective action requests to identify trends in licensee performance and to identify areas for which the licensee had completed corrective actions. The inspectors observed exercise performance in these areas to determine whether corrective actions were complete and effective. The inspectors attended the postexercise critiques in each of the above facilities to evaluate the initial licensee self-assessment of exercise performance. The inspectors also attended a subsequent presentation of critique items to plant management.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed the simulator exercise conducted on November 7, 2001. The purpose of these observations was to evaluate operator performance, licensee event classification, notification of state and local authorities, and adequacy of protective action recommendations. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees critiques of the exercises to determine if they were self-critical in the identification of strengths and performance issues.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2.
Radiation Safety Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety 2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors interviewed chemistry and radwaste personnel involved in radioactive material/waste processing and transportation activities, and walked down the liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems to verify that the current system configuration and operation agreed with the descriptions contained in the Final Safety Analysis Report and the Process Control Program. No shipments of radioactive materials were conducted during the inspection. The following items were reviewed and compared with regulatory requirements:
Radioactive material/waste processing and shipping procedures
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The status of radioactive waste processing systems that were not operational and/or abandoned in place
Changes made to the radioactive waste processing systems since the previous inspection in March 2000
Waste stream sampling procedures and radio-chemical sample analysis results for each of the licensee identified radioactive waste streams for the year 2000 and 2001
Scaling factors and calculations used to account for difficult-to-measure radionuclides
Changes in waste stream composition due to changing operational parameters and analysis updates
Conduct of the licensees quality assurance program per 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix G
Documentation for 11 nonexcepted package shipments that demonstrated shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checks, emergency instructions, waste disposal manifest, shipping papers provided to the driver, and licensee verification of shipment readiness (Shipments 00-0002, 00-0022, 00-0027, 00-0029, 00-0038, 00-0041, 01-0004, 01-0027, 01-0034, 01-0039, and 01-0058)
Applicable transport cask Certificates of Compliance and cask loading and closure procedures
Selected transferee licenses and state Department of Transportation permits
Training program and lesson plans for personnel responsible for the conduct of radioactive waste processing and radioactive material/waste shipment preparation activities
Quality assurance Audit AP00-004, Radiological and Non-Radiological Environmental Monitoring Plan and Process Control Program, May 29 through August 7, 2000, and Audit AP01-001, Assessed Plant Activities and Programs, January 1 through May 31, 2001
Radwaste Department Self-Assessment, Conduct of Radwaste Operations, September 17-21, 2001
Special Report Radioactive Waste submitted February 15, 2001
Nineteen Callaway Action Request System numbers related to the radioactive material/waste processing and shipping program (20000810, 20001002, 20001688, 20001706, 20001707, 20001880, 20001881, 20010166, 20010168, 20010182, 20010243, 20010345, 20010902, 20011189, 20013018, 20013076, 20013976, 20016198, and 20016391)
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Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1 Mitigating Systems Cornerstones a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees third quarter 2001 performance indicator data submittal to verify its accuracy and completeness. The inspectors reviewed control room logs, maintenance documents, surveillance tests, and corrective action reports to verify that the data was properly collected and reported in accordance with NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines, Revision 2. The following performance indicators were reviewed:
High pressure injection system unavailability
Heat removal system unavailability
Residual heat removal system unavailability b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Drill and Exercise Performance a. Inspection Scope The inspectors verified the licensees reported results for the drill and exercise performance indicator by reviewing all licensee records for exercises, site-wide emergency drills, and rapid responder drills conducted during the fourth quarter of 2000 through the second quarter of 2001 to verify the accuracy of the reported performance indicator data for that period. The inspectors evaluated licensee performance indicator collection and reporting practices against the standards of NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
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.3 Emergency Response Organization Readiness Performance Indicator Verification a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors verified the licensees reported results for the emergency response organization drill participation performance indicator for the fourth quarter of 2000 through the second quarter of 2001 by reviewing drill participation attendance records for a sample of eight key emergency responders. The inspectors evaluated licensee performance indicator collection and reporting practices against the standards of NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Alert and Notification System Reliability Performance Indicator Verification a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors verified the licensees reported results for the alert and notification system reliability performance indicator by reviewing test worksheets and data for all offsite siren test results performed during the fourth quarter of 2000 through the second quarter of 2001 to verify the accuracy of the reported performance indicator data for that period.
The inspectors evaluated licensee performance indicator collection and reporting practices against the standards of NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the circumstances that caused the flood door to Train A of the emergency core cooling system equipment to be open and unmonitored. The inspectors also evaluated a similar incident from June 2001 in which the flood door to Train B of the emergency core cooling system equipment was open and unmonitored to assess the effectiveness of prior corrective actions as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
b.
Findings The licensee failed to implement corrective action that could have prevented a significant condition adverse to quality. This finding was of very low safety significance and was a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
-18-On October 7, 2001, the licensee removed residual heat removal Pump A from service to perform maintenance on its room cooler. The residual heat removal pump, safety injection pump, containment spray pump, centrifugal charging pump, and associated room coolers were located in a common area. To support maintenance on the residual heat removal room cooler, maintenance personnel blocked open flood Door 11131 (centrifugal charging and safety injection pump room Train A) and ran a hose through the doorway.
The flood door was blocked open and no one was in the area to close the door if a fire water pipe rupture occurred. A placard on the door stated that per Request for Resolution 16409A, a continuous flood watch was required if the door was blocked open.
After maintenance personnel were located, they stated that a fire protection impairment permit had been activated for the flood door, an hourly fire watch had been implemented for the door, and the door was not required to be continuously monitored.
Request for Resolution 16409A allowed the flood door to be blocked open only if a continuous flood watch was established. Calculations in the request for resolution found that flooding from a fire water pipe break in the auxiliary building would begin to flow into the safety injection and centrifugal charging pump room in approximately 10 minutes, thus necessitating the continuous flood watch. The requirements for the continuous flood watch were outlined in Attachment 5 of Engineering Procedure EDP-ZZ-04107, HVAC Pressure Boundary and Watertight Door Control, Revision 11.
In June 2001, the inspectors identified that flood Door 11081 (Train B of the emergency core cooling system equipment) was left open and unmonitored. This door also required a continuous flood watch if it was open. The licensee documented this incident in Callaway Action Request 200104044. Refer to NRC Inspection Report 50-483/01-03.
The licensee assigned this corrective action document a significance of Level 2.
Significance Level 2 documents were considered significant conditions adverse to quality and required a thorough cause analysis, corrective actions to prevent recurrence, and management oversight review and approval. Actions to prevent recurrence were not scheduled to be implemented until Fall 2005. Had the licensee implemented corrective actions following the June 2001 occurrence, the October 7 incident may have been prevented. Since no immediate corrective action was taken, the licensee missed an opportunity to correct and possibly prevent a significant condition adverse to quality.
Failing to take corrective action to prevent a Significance Level 2 (significant condition adverse to quality) condition was a violation (50-483/0106-03).
This finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety in that, if a fire water pipe break occurred while the flood door was left open and unmonitored, fire water could affect operation of Train A of the emergency core cooling system equipment. In June 2001 the inspectors identified an instance in which the flood door leading to Train B of the emergency core cooling equipment was left open and unmonitored. Although the licensee considered this incident a significant condition adverse to quality, no corrective action to prevent recurrence was taken. This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone. This finding was found to be of very low safety significance (Green) using the reactor safety significance determination process because of the low likelihood of a
-19-fire water pipe break and because of the availability of Train B equipment. This finding included crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution.
Appendix B or 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion XVI, required, in part, that significant conditions adverse to quality be promptly identified and corrected and that measures be taken to assure that the cause of the condition is determined and that corrective action is taken to prevent repetition. On October 7, 2001, the inspectors identified that the flood door leading into the emergency core cooling system Train A equipment was open and unmonitored. In June 2001, the inspectors identified that the flood door leading into emergency core cooling system Train B equipment was open and unmonitored.
Although the licensee considered the June 2001 incident to be a significant condition adverse to quality, they failed to take corrective action to prevent recurrence. Had action been taken to prevent recurrence they could have possibly prevented the October 7 incident. This violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is documented in the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 200106307.
4OA6 Management Meetings Exit Meeting Summary The emergency preparedness inspectors presented inspection results to Mr. Garry Randolph, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 5, 2001.
The reactor inspectors presented inspection results to Mr. Ron Affolter, Vice President, Nuclear, and other members of licensee management on October 5, 2001.
The reactor engineers presented inspection results of the licensed operator requalification inspection to Mr. Ron Affolter and other members of the licensees management staff at an interim exit interview on August 31, 2001. The final exit was held by telephone with Mr. James Gloe, Superintendent, Training, on November 8, 2001, after receipt and review of the results of the annual and biennial requalification examinations.
The reactor inspectors presented inspection results to Mr. Garry Randolph and other members of the licensee staff on December 5, 2001.
The health physics inspector presented inspection results for the radioactive material processing and transportation inspection to Mr. Ronald Affolter and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on November 30, 2001.
The resident inspectors presented inspection results to Mr. Warren Witt, Plant Manager, on December 28, 2001.
The inspectors asked whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified by the licensee.
-20-4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations The following findings of very low safety significance were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements, which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as noncited violations.
NCV Tracking NumberRequirement Licensee Failed to Meet 50-483/200106-04 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. On November 26, 2001, the licensee recognized that a previously identified condition (associated with minimum discharge pressure and recirculation flow) had not been corrected on the auxiliary feedwater system. This event is described in the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 200107295. This finding is being treated as a noncited violation.
50-483/200106-05 10 CFR 71.12(c)(2) requires that a licensee who delivers to a carrier for transport licensed material in a package for which a Certificate of Compliance has been issued by the NRC shall comply with the terms and conditions of the Certificate of Compliance as applicable. On December 10, 1999 (Shipment 99-0075), and again on April 25, 2000 (Shipment 00-0022), dewatered bead resin was shipped to the Barnwell Waste Management Facility for disposal using Package USA/9208/B( )[NuPac Cask Model Number 10-142]. In each case, the leak test required by Section 9.b of the Certificate of Compliance was not performed. These events are described in the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Requests 200100166 and 200100168. This finding is being treated as a noncited violation.
50-483/200106-06 10 CFR 71.5(a) requires that each licensee who transports licensed material outside the site of usage, as specified in the NRC license, or where transport is on the public highways, or who delivers licensed material to a carrier for transport, shall comply with the applicable requirements of the Department of Transportation regulations in 49 CFR Parts 170 through 189 appropriate to the mode of transportation. 49 CFR 172.202(a)(1) and (a)(3) require that the shipping description of a hazardous material on the shipping papers must include the proper shipping name prescribed for the material in Column 2 of 49 CFR 172.101, Hazardous Materials Table, and the identification number prescribed for the material as shown
-21-in Column 4. On December 10, 1999, the proper shipping name for Shipment 99-0075 was incorrectly determined to be Radioactive Material, LSA, n.o.s., 7 - Radioactive Material UN2912 instead of Radioactive Material, n.o.s.,
7 - Radioactive Material UN2982. Therefore, the shipments hazardous material identification number was also incorrectly assigned as UN2912 instead of UN2982.
This event is described in the licensees corrective action program, as Callaway Action Request 200100168. This finding is being treated as a noncited violation.
ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee R. Affolter, Vice President Nuclear T. Antweiler, Maintenance Rule Administrator T. Arms, Supervisor, Radwaste Operations R. Barton, Shift Supervisor, Operations Training J. Blosser, Manager, Regulatory Affairs G. Bradley, Training Instructor/Evaluator D. Carstens, Systems Engineer D. Catlett, Training J. Cruickshank, Supervisor, Radwaste Operations P. Davis, Nurse M. Evans, Manager, Operations Support J. Gloe, Superintendent, Training L. Graessle, Superintendent, Protective Services S. Halverson, General Supervisor, Simulator Systems Management D. Heinlein, Supervisor, Engineering E. Henson, Supervisor, Instrumentation and Controls J. Hiller, Engineer, Regional Regulatory Affairs R. Howeth, Superintendent, Instrumentation and Controls M. Jennings, Training Instructor/Evaluator R. Lamb, Superintendent, Work Control J. Laux, Manager, Quality Assurance R. Miller, Supervisor, Chemistry and Radwaste W. Muskopf, Engineer, Licensing R. Myatt, Supervisor, Engineering R. Neil, Assistant Superintendent, Operations E. Olson, Superintendent, Chemistry and Radwaste S. Putthoff, Operating Supervisor G. Randolph, Senior Vice President M. Reidmeyer, Supervisor, Regional Regulatory Affairs R. Roselius, Superintendent, Health Physics S. Sandbothe, Superintendent, Operations K. Schoolcraft, Engineer, Regional Regulatory Affairs E. Stewart, Operating Supervisor M. Taylor, Manager, Nuclear Engineering R. Wink, Acting Supervisor, System Engineering W. Witt, Plant Manager Other T. East, Superintendent, Emergency Preparedness, Wolf Creek Generating Station
-2-NRC A. Sanchez, Operations Engineer ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-483/0106-01 URI Gas binding of auxiliary feedwater pump (Section 1R14)
50-483/0106-02 NCV Failure to perform adequate maintenance on component cooling water Pump C (Section 1R19.2)
50-483/0106-03 NCV Failure to take action to ensure emergency core cooling system flood doors are properly controlled (Section 4OA2)
50-483/0106-04 NCV Failure to correct potential degradation of motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (Section 4OA7)
50-483/0106-05 NCV Failure to perform shipping cask leak test requirement prior to shipment (Section 4OA7)
50-483/0106-06 NCV Failure to provide the correct proper shipping name and shipment identification number (Section 4OA7)
Closed 50-483/0106-02 NCV Failure to perform adequate maintenance on component cooling water Pump C (Section 1R19.2)
50-483/0106-03 NCV Failure to take action to ensure emergency core cooling system flood doors are properly controlled (Section 4OA2)
50-483/0106-04 NCV Failure to correct potential degradation of motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (Section 4OA7)
50-483/0106-05 NCV Failure to perform shipping cask leak test requirement prior to shipment (Section 4OA7)
50-483/0106-06 NCV Failure to provide the correct proper shipping name and shipment identification number (Section 4OA7)
-3-DOCUMENTS REVIEWED The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings:
Callaway Action Requests:
199800191 199801666 199803022 199803574 199803967 199900615 199900856 199901284 199901549 199901897 200000113 199901822 199903468 199101821 200102332 200000456 200102209 200101957 200002546 200101272 200105027 200105765 200107144 Procedures Revisions APA-ZZ-00101 Procedure Preparation, Review and Approval 33 and 34 APA-ZZ-00140 Environmental and Other Licensing Evaluations 28 and 29 TDP-ZZ-00010 Operational Evaluations
TDP-ZZ-00019 NRC License Examination Security and Integrity
TDP-ZZ-00021 Job Performance Measures
TDP-ZZ-00022 Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program
TDP-ZZ-00025 Emergency Operating Procedure Usage
TDP-IS-00002 Simulator Configuration Management
ODP-ZZ-00001 Operations Department - Code of Conduct N/A Callaway Radiological Emergency Response Plan
EIP-ZZ-00101 Classification of Emergencies
EIP-ZZ-00201 Notifications
EIP-ZZ-00212 Protective Action Recommendations
EIP-ZZ-00240 Technical Support Center Operations
EIP-ZZ-01211 Management Action Guides for Nuclear Emergencies
EIP-ZZ-C0010 Emergency Operations Facility Operations
HDP-ZZ-01300 Internal Dosimetry Program
HDP-ZZ-01450 Authorization to Exceed Federal Occupational Dose Limits
-4-HTP-ZZ-01201 Preparation and Maintenance of General and Specific Radiation Work Permits
HTP-ZZ-03300 Airborne Radioactivity Surveys
KDP-ZZ-2000 Performance Indicator Data Collection
ETP-KJ-00003 Diesel generator heat exchanger test
EDP-ZZ-01112 Heat exchanger predictive performance manual
ETP-ZZ-03001 GL89-13 heat exchanger inspection
EDP-ZZ-01121 Raw water systems predictive performance manual
ETP-EG-00001 Component cooling water heat exchanger test
ETP-GL-00001 Area room cooler coil test
ETP-EF-0002B Essential service water train B flow verification
Written Examinations Week one written exams Week two written exams Job Performance Measures URO-AEO15PA044J(A)
Local Isolate a MSIV, dated 9/18/2001 URO-AEO15PA054J Local Start NE02 [B Emergency Diesel Generator], dated 9/17/2001 URO-SAB05PBC57J Perform MSIV Accumulator Precharge Checks, dated 9/17/2001 URO-SGG01PDC10J Restoration of Fuel Handling Building after FBVIS, dated 9/17/2001 SRO-RER02PAC118J(TC)
Emergency Event Classification, dated 9/17/2001 URO-SSF02PDC31J Perform Recovery of a Misaligned Control Rod-High, dated 9/17/2001 URO-AEO07PC024J Emergency Boration Per FR-S.1, dated 7/24/2000 URO-SBB05PGC77J(F)
Perform BBHV8000A Stroke Test, dated 5/10/2000 URO-SEF02PCC03J Manually Operate an ESW Train, dated 5/23/2000 EOE-SAP02PA043J Emergency CST Fill From Firewater, dated 6/6/2000
-5-SRO-RER02PAC122J(TC)
Emergency Event Classification, dated 5/23/2000 URO-SSE03PCC32J Respond to a Failed Power Range Instrument, dated 12/15/1993 URO-SBG02PAC79J Swap From the NCP to B CCP, dated 9/26/2001 SRO-RER02PAC114J(TC)
Emergency Event Classification, dated 10/1/2001 Simulator Information Formal Tracking (SIFT)
1995-01-25 1998-07-12 1998-07-21 1998-10-12 1999-05-12 1999-05-13 1999-05-14 1999-05-15 1999-06-01 1999-10-02 2000-01-01 2000-01-03 2000-01-04 2000-01-06 2000-02-12 2000-02-13 2000-02-15 2000-02-25 2000-03-10 2000-03-13 2000-03-14 2000-03-15 2000-03-17 2000-03-21 2000-04-01 2000-04-02 2000-04-06 2000-05-10 2000-05-11 2001-02-25 2001-05-10 Scenarios DS-01 ATWAS [Anticipated Transient Without Scram] dated 6/30/2000 DS-22 SGTR with RCP Off-Normal (Seal Leak), dated 9/19/2001 DS-37 Station Blackout due to Seismic Event, dated 8/15/2000 DS-38 Loss of Heat Sink, dated 9/19/2001 Licensing Impact Reviews (Evaluations)
CMP 01-1013 CN 99-030 MP 98-1036 RFR 19717 RFR 20019 RFR 20207 RFR 20269 RFR 20473 RFR 21102 Licensing Impact Reviews (Screenings)
RFR 13440 RFR 15697 RFR 16311 RFR 20425 RFR 21119 RFR 21425 RFR 21507 RFR 21542 RFR 21582 RFR 21589 RFR 21643 Calculations EF-45, Add 2 Evaluation of as-found ESW flows for past Revision 4 operability EF-45, Add 3 Determine ESW flow rates to be used in flow Revision 4 balance procedures ETP-EF-0002A/B M-GF-01 Cooling load, motor-driven auxiliary feedwater Revision 0 pump room
-6-EG-14 Component cooling water system calculation Revision 0 M-YY-44, Add. 2 Addend calculation to reference Calculation M-EG-20, Addendum 1, which revises the maximum design basis operational temperatures in the CCW system Revision 0 P-33 Component cooling heat exchanger Revision 0 Requests for Resolution 19203 19513 7809 Suggestion Occurrence Solution 99-1822 99-3468 99-1821 Work Documents W207895 P653134 P610949 P560226 P643872 P593939 A643872A P610949 P589317 P621800 P623115 P631061 P651727 P550998 P648556 P573817 P629331 P596892 P618126 P636491 P592239 P644211 P592312 P549427 P568019 P572557 P627421 Other Documents Reviewed Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment for Cycle 10 (5/5/98 thru 11/5/99)
Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment for Cycle 11 (11/6/99 thru 5/21/01)
Sample Plan License Requal, April 1999 - April 2001 Callaway Plant Simulator 2000 Certification Annual Report, dated 11/30/2000 Callaway Plant Simulator Certification, dated 3/13/2000 Window 1B Priority Work List, 10/02/2001
-7-Window 1P Open Software Items, 10/02/2001 Callaway Plant Simulator 2000 and 2001 Configuration Control Status Summary, 10/02/2001 Callaway Action Request (CAR) 200106174, TDP-ZZ-0022 Expired License Upgrade Enhancement, 10/3/01 Differences Between this UNIT and the OTHER UNIT, for LOCT [Licensed Operator Continuing Training] Cycles 2001-01 Week 8, 2001-03 Week 8, 2001-04 Week 5 Callaway Plant Training Department Pilot Program Guide, Simulator Scenario, 3/15/00 UEND-Training-01, Training Guide, Systematic Approach to Training, 6/6/01 Desk Top Instruction - 016, Enhancements, 7/2/01 Policy: UEND-Communications-01, Guidelines for Verbal Communications, 1/14/98 ULNRC-2146, Response to Generic Letter 89-13 service water system problems affecting safety-related equipment, January 29, 1990 ULNRC-2344, Response to Generic Letter 89-13 service water system problems affecting safety-related equipment, November 14, 1990 SAE01-NE-007, Final report for the peer assessment of Ameren UEs Callaway program GL 89-13 (service water) site programmatic compliance, August 27, 2001