IR 05000482/2009002

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000482-09-002 Errata

ML091610439
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	06/09/2009
From:	Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B
To:	Muench R Wolf Creek
References
IR-09-002
Download: ML091610439 (5)

Text

UNITED STATES NUC LE AR RE G UL AT O RY C O M M I S S I O N une 9, 2009

SUBJECT:

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2009002 ERRATA

Dear Muench:

Please replace pages 2 and 8 of the Report Details in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2009002, dated May 13, 2009, with the enclosed revised pages. These changes are needed to properly annotate the alphanumeric code for the cross-cutting aspect for Finding FIN 05000482/2009002-01, associated with the boric acid system.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-482 License: NPF-42 Enclosure: As stated

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation -2-cc w/Enclosure:

Vice President Operations/Plant Manager Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839 Jay Silberg, Esq.

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 2300 N Street, NW Washington, DC 20037 Supervisor Licensing Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839 Chief Engineer Utilities Division Kansas Corporation Commission 1500 SW Arrowhead Road Topeka, KS 66604-4027 Office of the Governor State of Kansas Topeka, KS 66612 Attorney General 120 S.W. 10th Avenue, 2nd Floor Topeka, KS 66612-1597 County Clerk Coffey County Courthouse 110 South 6th Street Burlington, KS 66839 Chief, Radiation and Asbestos Control Section Kansas Department of Health and Environment Bureau of Air and Radiation 1000 SW Jackson, Suite 310 Topeka, KS 66612-1366 Ronald L. McCabe, Chief Technological Hazards Branch National Preparedness Division DHS/FEMA 9221 Ward Parkway, Suite 300 Kansas City, MO 64114-3372

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation -3-Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)

DRP Director (Dwight.Chamberlain@nrc.gov)

DRP Deputy Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Roy.Caniano@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Chris.Long@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP/B (Vincent.Gaddy@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/B (Rick.Deese@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

Team Leader, DRP/TSS (Chuck.Paulk@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

SUNSI Review Completed: __VGG__ ADAMS: ; Yes No Initials: __VGG__

Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive ; Non-Sensitive R

\_REACTORS\_WC\2009\WC 2009-002 RP CML-vgg Errata adams.doc ML091610439 SRI:DRP/B BC:DRP/B CMLong VGGaddy

/RA/Vgg for /RA/

6/9/09 6/9/09 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

noncited violation, Wolf Creek downgraded the condition report. Using nonconservative assumptions, the licensee consistently viewed this issue as not having a risk impact because seal injection was not simultaneously lost [H.1 ( b)]

(Section 4OA2).

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

• Green. The inspectors identified a finding for allowing low room temperature to cause a boric acid flow path to be inoperable. The inspectors reviewed a Performance Improvement Request from 2005, which identified that boric acid could decrease below its limits if the room cooler was started while lake temperature was low which would render the system inoperable. The inspectors reviewed operator logs of safety injection Room A temperature data and found an instance where room temperature had decreased below the solubility limit for boric acid which had not been noted by operators. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action programs as Condition Reports 2009-00516 and 2009-0145.

The failure to implement the heat tracing corrective action within 3 years to maintain the boric acid injection piping operable during the winter is a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because this issue aligned with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 2.f because the heat tracing was required by Condition Reports 2005-3461 and 2007-2472 but was not installed and the room temperature dropped below the boron solubility limit. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 3, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because Wolf Creek maintained shutdown margin in compliance with its Technical Specifications. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred. The inspectors determined that this finding has a cross cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek did not maintain long term plant safety by not correcting this long term (3 years) equipment issue and its compensatory measure with the boric acid system H.2.a] (Section 1R01).

• Green. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of License Condition 2.C(5)(a) for a degraded fire seal that separated redundant safe shutdown equipment. Specifically, a silicone foam seal and ceramic fiber board separating redundant motor-driven auxiliary feedwater trains was degraded so that it no longer provided a 3-hour rated fire barrier. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-001087.

The finding was more than minor because it was similar to example 2.e. of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that, the performance deficiency impacted the ability of the seal to perform its function. In addition, the performance deficiency was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to Initiating Events to prevent undesirable consequences. Under NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements the-2- Enclosure

has a cross cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because Wolf Creek did not maintain long-term plant safety by not correcting this long-term (3 years) equipment issue and its compensatory measure with the boric acid system H.2.a].

Enforcement. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred because Wolf Creek still had one boron injection subsystem available and complied with its Technical Specifications on March 26, 2008. This finding was of very low safety significance and the issue was addressed in Wolf Creeks corrective action program as Condition Reports 2009-000516 and 2009-001495. FIN 05000482/2009002-01, untimely corrective actions result in room temperature below boric acid solubility limit.

.2 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions a. Inspection Scope Since thunderstorms with potential tornados and high winds were forecast in the vicinity of the facility for March 23, 2009, the inspectors reviewed the licensees overall preparations and protection for the expected weather conditions. On March 23, 2009, the inspectors walked down the emergency diesel generators and the transformer yard because their safety-related functions could be affected or required as a result of high winds or tornado-generated missiles or the loss of offsite power. The inspectors evaluated the licensee staffs preparations against the sites procedures and determined that the staffs actions were adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant-specific design features and the licensees procedures used to respond to specified adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also toured the plant grounds to look for any loose debris that could become missiles during a tornado. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report and performance requirements for systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant-specific procedures. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective action program items to verify that the licensee identified adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and dispositioned them through the corrective action program in accordance with station corrective action procedures. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of one readiness for impending adverse weather condition sample as defined in IP 71111.01-05.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04)

.1 Partial Walk downs a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed partial equipment walkdowns of the following risk significant systems:

-8- Enclosure