05000482/FIN-2009005-10
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Obtain Vendor Data Necessary for Plant Modification |
| Description | On December 16, 2009, inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving failure to obtain vendor design data for a modification. In August 2009, a component cooling water modification was made to the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier heat exchangers flow rates as a corrective action to VIO 05000482/2009002 07 (EA-09-110). A flow rate above the previous design value was justified by an internal memo of a vendor opinion from a telephone conversation in 1992. The inspectors found this to be contrary to Procedure AP 05-005, for obtaining data from vendors. The notice of violation will remain open until full compliance has been restored. Wolf Creek consulted with Westinghouse, confirmed the acceptability of the increased flow rate, and requested a formal calculation. This issue is captured in Condition Report 22824. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because this issue aligned with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, example 2.f, in that the modification relied on verbal statements to raise the allowable flow through the heat exchanger. This is a significant deficiency in the modification package. The inspectors determined this finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04 and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because assuming worst case degradation, the finding would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage and would not have likely affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function because seal injection was available. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work practices in that management was unsuccessful in communicating expectations on procedure use and adherence in engineering H.4.b] (Section 1R18) |
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2009005 Section 1R18 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.18 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Vasquez J Drake P Jayroe R Kopriva S Alferink A Fairbanks C Alldredge C Cauffman C Long C Peabody D Graves D Loveless G Miller |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Wolf Creek - IR 05000482/2009005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Wolf Creek) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Wolf Creek)
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