IR 05000482/1980004
| ML19309F809 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1980 |
| From: | Crossman W, Oberg C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309F808 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-80-04, 50-482-80-4, NUDOCS 8005010318 | |
| Download: ML19309F809 (6) | |
Text
8005010)l8
,
d,,
U. S. NUCLEAR FIGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No. STN 50-482/80-04 Docket No. STN 50-482 Category A2 Licensee:
Kansas Gas & Electric Company Post Office Box 208 Wichita, Kansas 67201 Facility Name: Wolf Creek, Unit No. 1 Inspection at: Wolf Creek Site, Burlington, Coffey County. Kansas Inspection conducted: February 25-29, 1960 Inspector:
(
'+M -
MJ/[T C.R.Oberg,ReactopfInspector, Projects Section
' Date Approved:
.
8.f/
3//J/h
- W. A. Crossman, Ohief, Projects Section
'Date Inspection Summary Inspection on February 25-29, 1980 (Report No. STN 50-482/80-04)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection concerned with setting of the reactor vessel; review of procedures and observation of work; review of potential construction deficiency reports; and previous inspection findings.
The inspection involved forty-four inspector-hours by one NRC inspector on site.
Results:
No items of noncompliance of deviations were disclosed.
,
I e
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Personnel M. E. Clark, Manager, Quality Assurance, Site
- D. W. Prigel, Assistant QA Manager, Site G. W. Reeves, QA Engineer J. L. Stokes, Assistant Construction Manager S. L. Walmsley, QA Technician Daniel International Corporation L. R. Smith, Regional Manager W. E. Hitt, Project Manager R. Scott, Construction Manager D. L. Jones, Quality Control Manager B. Ernst, Project Safety Engineer R. Holby, Lead Q.C. Engineer D. Bondurant, Mechanical Engineer The IE inspector also talked with and interviewed other licensee employees and contractor personnel including members of the QA/QC and engineering staffs.
- Exit interview conducted with Assistant QA Manager only.
This was due to a non work day on Friday and non availability for most site personnel.
2.
Site Constructor Organization (Daniel Internation Corporation-Daniel)
The IE inspector reviewed the status of Daniel management recommenda-tions implemented at the Wolf Creek site.
Daniel management, with the assistance of an outside consultant, identified specific steps to beimplementedforimprovementofeffectivenessofsitecgpstruction operations and improvement of managerial Quality Control.- These items have been included in a " Management Action Plan" dated 6/19/79.
The action items which affect quality of work include:
a, construction department reorganization b.
personnel section review inspection report c.
warehouse inventory management 2/
d.
security coordinator established 1 1 j#' See Inspection Report No. STN 50-482/79-10
,
- Effective September 15, 1979, site security become a district function of KG&E management.
-
.
e.
site commanications improvement f.
enhancement of QA functions on site g.
improvement of communication between field engineers and field supervisors h.
enhancement of team approach of client and constructor for problem solving This is an ongoing program with periodic meetings and status reports made to KG&E.
3.
Project Housekeeping During the inspection, the IE inspector examined the Reactor Building area for housekeeping requirements. Daniel International Construction Procedure AP-XIII-05 (Rev. 1), " Project Housekeeping," (6/20/78) imple-ments the requirements of ANSI N45.2.3, " Housekeeping During the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants." During the inspection, two men were observed eating lunch within a designated " Zone 4."
AP-XIII-05, paragraph 3.7 and Appendix II, state that within " Zone 4" the use of tobacco and eating will not be allowed.
However, during the discussion and review of records of this item with the Project Safety Engineer, it was determined that Zone 4 was designated (for in area inside the shield walls) on February 22, 1980.
The Construction Manager was informed officially on February 25, 1980, and thus the required training of personnel has not yet been done by the area Construction Superintendent.
This item is considered unresolved and will be examined during a subsequent NRC inspection.
4.
Reactor Vessel Installation - Review of QA Implementing Procedures The IE inspector reviewed various procedures (indicated below) in order to determine their adequacy for implementing and controlling the installation of the reactor vessel. The following documents were reviewed:
Work Procedure WP-IV-110, Rev. 2, 4/14/78, " Rigging" a.
b.
Quality Control Procedure QCP-IV-110, Rev. 1, 12/29/78, " Rigging" c.
Special Rigging Report for Reactor Vessel Installation, Approved 2/13/80, Rev. O, with:
At.achment 1 - Special Lift-Authorized Approval Personnel List Attachment 2 - Certification for Shackles and Chokers
,
l l
..
,
Attachment 3 - Prelift Rigging Che'ckoff Procedure Attachment 4 - P&H Polar Crane Load Test Report d.
Work Procedure WP-VI-201, Rev. 1, 11/30/79, " Installation of Tanks, Vessels, Heat Exchangers & Miscellaneous Equipment" e.
Quality Control Procedures, QCP VI-201, Rev. 2, 11/22/79, "Installa-tion of Tanks, Vessels, Heat Exchangers and Miscellaneous Equip-ment" The IE inspector determined that the following are provided for in the procedures.
a.
polar crane and rigging testing b.
vessel lifting sequence c.
breaking and holding tests d.
reactor pressure vessel installation activities e.
use of special technical personnel f.
adequate records of installation g.
QC inspection of installation activities and records h.
post installation physical protection and cleanliness These procedures meet the requirements of ANSI N45.2.2, Paragraph 7,
" Handling," (of items for nuclear power plants).
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
5.
Reactor Vessel Installation - Observation of Work and Work Activities The IE inspector determined, through record review, that reactor vessel QC inspection requirements were met for pre-installation storage of the reactor vessel.
The vessel and vessel head were both designated level C and D storage.
Seals and devices for monitoring internal conditions were observed to be intact and condition of the protective coatings and coverings were monitored.
When necessary, action to correct minor dis-:
crepancies was taken.
Upon installation of the reactor vessel, QC inspection will continue.
- _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
The IE inspector observed preparations for and the installation of the reactor vessel.
The observations were conducted at various times during the inspection.
Two separate events caused a delay in the scheduled setting time.
The first was a galled leveling bolt. The bolt was removed, the embedment hole was tapped, and a new bolt installed.
The second related to the verification of placement of hardened washers in the attachment of support structures under the vessel nozzel supports.
These items were properly documented on an NCR, reviewed by engineering, including Westinghouse, and controlled as required by the applicable QA program.
The IE inspector verified the following:
a.
Lifting and handling of the reactor vessel was done in accordance with the established procedures.
b.
The lifting equipment used was as specified in the procedures.
c.
Placement was accomplished as specified in the procedures.
d.
QC coverage was adequate.
e.
A rigging consultant was utilized in the preparations for and actual lifting operations.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Reactor Containment Building Walls The IE inspector reviewed a summary of cylinder compressive tests for concrete used in the walls of the Containment Building. The concrete class 661AN has a required strength of 6000 psi in 90 days.
The indicated average value of 90 day cylinders is 8012 psi.
(standard deviation 416.6 and coefficient of variation 5.2).
This exceeds the requirements of the specification and indicates good uniformity of concrete production.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Construction Deficiency (Potential) Containment Building Polar Crane Broken Rail On January 5,1980, KG&E reported a potential construction deficiency l
involving a broken polar crane rail section.
On January 31, 1980, KG&E advised RIV that, if the broken rail had remained undetected and uncorrected, nuclear safety would not have been affected.
The IE inspector.eviewed Nonconformance Reports (NCR) No. ISN1306C l
(10/3/79) and ISN 1592M (1/5/80) and the engineering technical evaluation
!
on the broken rail made by Bechtel Power Corporation, dated January 24, 1980, BLKE 570.
Upon conclusion of the review and after discussion of
L
__
o
..
this event with licensee representatives, the IE inspector concluded that the event was not reportable as a construction deficiency.
8.
Reactor Building Fuel Pool Liner - Pctential Construction Deficiency Report NCR ISN 1423C, dated 11/8/79, reported the bowing of the stainless steel fuel pool liner plates.
During the time of pressure testing of the upper sections of the fuel pool, construction personnel inadvertently pressurized (approximately 35 psi) the collector trench piping in the south end of the fuel pool floor. After removal of five floor plates, damage to a portion of the embedded beams and approximately the upper i
five inches of concrete was observed.
Concrete directly under the 4" beams was not damaged, and safety-related embeds had not been damaged.
After evaluation of the damage, the A/E, Bechtel, specified repairs in the disposition of the NCR.
The NCR disposition also contained an evaluation of the noncon'ormance to determine if a significant construction
j deficiency report was required under 10 CFR 50.55(e). Bechtel concluded
'
that, if the bulge had not been detected, the health and safety of the public would not have been adversely affected.
This was based on:
'
(1) that the liner plate is not safety related (a leak would be collected in the containment pump) and (2) only the top five inches of the nine foot thick slab of concrete was affected.
The IE inspector had previously r
examined the damage reported (STN 50-482/79-18).
No safety-related embed-ments were damaged.
On January 25, 1980, KG&E concurred with the evalua-tion of the A/E and reported this fact to RIV.
'
Af ter consideration of the above, the IE inspector concluded that the event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e).
9.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 3.
10.
Exit Interview
'
The IE inspector met with a licensee representative (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 29, 1980.
The IE inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
6
,
s -
-
-
-
-