IR 05000461/1986062
| ML20215M760 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1986 |
| From: | Knop R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215M749 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-86-62, NUDOCS 8611030265 | |
| Download: ML20215M760 (7) | |
Text
.
.
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIO!! III
'
Report No. 50-461/86062(DRP)
Docket No. 50-461 License No. CPPR-137 License No. NPF-55 Licensee:
Illinois Power Company 500 South 27th Street Decatur, IL 62525 Facility Name:
Clinton Power Station Inspection At: Clinton Site, Clinton, IL Inspection Conducted:
September 15 through October 14, 1986 l
Inspector:
D. E. Keating
'
gc4
Approved By:
R. C. Knop, Chief
/Od8blo Projects Section IB Date Inspection Summary Inspection on September 15 through October 14, 1986 (Report No. 50-461/86062(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine safety inspection by the resident inspector of construction completion activities including licensee action on 10 CFR 50.55(e),
and 10 CFR 21 reports; licensee action on open items; independent inspection effort; and functional or program areas including site surveillance tours.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
The licensee's activities and corrective actions were adequate except as noted i
in Paragraph 2b(2) regarding an unresolved item. This unresolved item concerns potential failure to adequately correct ventilation damper tension wire deficiencies.
,
kodIOjfjCK65 86102s 05000461 G
- -
- -
_
_ _ - - -
.
.
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Illinois Power Company (IP)
- D.
Hall, Vice President
- W. Connell, Manager, Nuclear Planning and Support
- R. Campbell, Manager, Quality Assurance
- F. Spangenberg, Manager, Licensing and Safety
- G. Bell, Assistant Manager, Scheduling & Outage Management
- J. Perry, Manager, Nuclear Program Coordination
- J. Wilson, Manager, Clinton Power Station l
- A. Ruwe, Director, Design Engineering i
- J. Weaver, Director, Licensing and Safety I
- W. Rives. Supervisor, General / Technical Training
- J. Brownell, Licensing Specialist
- Denotes those attending the monthly exit meeting. Other licensee personnel were routinely contacted during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR Part 21 Items (92700)
a.
Review of 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports (92700)
(Closed) 50.55(e) Item (461/86009-EE)(55-86-09): On September 5, 1986, Illinois Power (IP) notified Region III of a potential deficiency regarding the inability to rack out the 4160 volt breakers on the Division I diesel generator for Shutdown Service Water (SX) system.
The inspector reviewed the final report, letter Y-82050, condition report (CR) CR1-86-08-110, revision 0, identifying the condition, and the potential 10 CFR 50.55(e) deficiency referral No. 86RE40.
The inspector also reviewed procedure deviation for revision (PDR)
86-1072, procedure CPS. 3501.01, High Voltage Auxiliary Power System, revision 3, and High Voltage Auxiliary Power System l
Electrical Lineup Checklist, CPS 3501.01EE001. The licensee I
determined that to correct the problem the control fuses must be removed prior to racking the breaker out. The procedure was revised to include a precaution to remove the control power fuses prior to racking out either a 4160V or a 6.9KV breaker.
In addition to this precaution, the licensee has initiated a program to install self-adhesive stickers to breaker cabinets stating the same precaution regarding the control power fuses as appears in the revised procedure. This was performed under plant modification AP19.
The inspector used the High Voltage Auxiliary Power System Electrical Lineup Checklist to walkdown the breakers _ listed and verified that plant modification AP19 had been implemented and that the stickers had been affixed.
.
.
.
.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Review of 10 CFR Part 21 Reports (92700)
(1)
(Closed)Part 21 (461/86002-PP) (IP referral 86RE33):
Clow tricentric - 12 inch butterfly valves installed at Peach Bottom in the containment vacuum breaker line failed because of corrosion of the valve shaft and shaft bearings. This corrosion was due to high chloride content in the carbon steel bearings attacking the stainless steel shaft.
The inspector reviewed letter Y-82031 dated September 19, 1986, J. H. Greene to F. A. Spangenberg, which Nuclear Station Engineering Department's (NSED) presents basis for the conclusion that this item was not reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21 requirements.
Illinois Power (IP) has four valves of this type, IVR006A,B, IVR007A, and B.
These are containment isolation valves, there are two valves at each penetration so that any single failure will not. jeopardize plant safety. The valves in question have been stroked and timed at least twice during this year. The stroking times have met the Technical Specifications requirements.
These valves will be stroked and timed quarterly by procedure CPS No. 10P9061.03 as required by Technical Specification.
Letter Y-82031 contained actions taken by Clow (now C&S Valve Company of Westmont, Illinois) regarding this condition. Clow employed an independent engineering firm to do a study on the compatibility of carbon steel bearings and the particular grade of stainless steel shaft. The results of this study indicate that this material combination, although not ideal, is acceptable.
Clow has indicated that a letter of guidance will be sent to all customers concerning the outcome of this study and how it will impact these installations.
Clow has successfully used this material combination in many applications of these valves. The Peach Bottom failure was the first and only failure of this type reported of this valve. Because of this, Clow considers this an isolated case and, therefore, not reporta'le under the requirements of 10 CFR 21 since it is not considered a generic defect.
Based on these facts, NSED believes the valves at Clinton are satisfactory. Any degradation in stroke time will be cause for inspection of the valve and any necessary repair. The licensee will continue to follow Clow's evaluation and recommendations.
The inspector, in addition to reviewing letter Y-82031, reviewed the local leak rate test (LLRT) results, containment penetration valve lineup sheets, and valve data sheets. The
_.
- -_
-
.
.
.
.
test steps were initialed as required and the necessary data had been recorded in the proper places. Comments regarding test performance and data accumulation were legible.
Based on the reviews performed of the aforementioned data, the inspector concurs that this was not a reportable item.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(2)
(0 pen) Part 21(461/85001-PP)(21-85-01): On August 9, 1984, the Zack Company informed Baldwin Associates (BA) that Titus Products, a division of Phillips Industries, Inc., had notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under the provisions of 10 CFR 21 that a defect existed in their Model 272 grilles.
The defect concerned the tension wires used for adjustment of the blades on Grilles Model 272. These tension wires would not remain in place when the blades were completely closed. The blades could not be re-positioned during testing and balancing for proper flow direction because of the disengaged wires.
Corrective actions required use of pushon nuts to lock the wires in place.
The inspector reviewed the closure package presented. This review included but was not limited to the following documents:
(a) Titus Products letter dated August 7, 1984 to the Zack Company.
(b) The Zack Co. letter, K-2910-ZCB-643, dated August 10, 1984 to Baldwin Associates (BA).
(c) BA letter, AEK-966-84, dated December 12, 1984, to IP.
(d) S&L letter, SLMI-16286, dated June 6, 1985, to IP.
(e) Titus Products letter, dated June 6,1985 to IP.
(f) Zack Co. meeting minutes dated April 4, 1985 to Koppers Co., IP, S&L, and Zack.
(g) Titus Field Rework Procedure RW-07, dated October 10, 1984.
(h) Titus Products drawing XY-10295, Containment Supply Register (Field Rework Procedure).
(1) Titus letter dated June 13, 1986, to IP answering questions raised in IP letter F-1224 of March 19, 1985 to Koppers Company.
(j) Letter Y-76614 dated July 29, 1985, Final Report for the closure of 10 CFR 21 (461/85001-PP)(21-85-01).
-..-
._
.
.
.
-_
. -
_. _._-
_-
t'
.
.
- a
'
.
,
The inspector requested the licensee to identify any grilles
on site that were listed as spares in order to verify that the rework recomended by Titus had baan performed. The licensee identified 33 grilles of various sizes that are on site
,
designated as spares. The inspector accompanied by personnel
'
from Licensing & Safety inspected some of the grilles. The inspector identified the fact that there were no pushon nuts installed as required by the rework recommended and called for
by Titus Products. The licensee has since identified seven
!
grilles of the 33 that have been modified to meet the Titus recommendations.
'
Tita licensee is in the process of identifying the construction work requests (CWR) and maintenance work requests (MWR)
covering the grilles that have been installed in the plant to date. The inspector has requested that he be notified when
'
these _ inspections will take place in order to verify the as-installed condition.
Based on the reviews performed and the status of the spares, this 10 CFR 21 evaluation will remain open until it can be confirmed that the grilles were installed correctly during
a future inspection. This is considered to be an unresolved item (461/86062-01).
'
3.
Licensee Action on Open Items (92701)
a.
(Closed)OpenItem(461/86057-01): During a walkdown of the VX system, at the 781' level of the Auxiliary Building, it was noted that one side of a seismic support on a non-seismic ventilation duct, M14626, was not attached to its associated hanger. MR-C18552 was issued to cover rework of this duct support.
The inspector requested that the licensee verify that similar
,
conditior.s did not exist elsewhere in the plant. Walkdowns by IP were conducted in other areas of the Auxiliary Building and Control Building. No similar conditions were identified. The inspector-personally walked down the Auxiliary Building 781' level and verified that the seismic support had been reattached and that no other supports were identified with the condition.
In addition, during regular plant tours, the inspector was particularly sensitive
.
to this condition. No additional unattached supports were identified. This was apparently an isolated case. This itea is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
'
b.
(Closed)OpenItem(461/86057-02):
In the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) room a trapeze pipe hanger, IMC05026R, located approximately-10'-0" above the Suppression Pool Clean-Up (SPCU) pump 1A, was
i missing the nuts attaching the threaded hanger rod to the trapeze j
support.
.
.
__.m
,,_m...
,,.,-,,,,..-,m.
.,, - _. _,,,,.
, _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _, _ _ _ _ _ _ _, _ - _.
_ _ _ _ _. _
. _ _
,,
_
_. _, _ _,, _
_
_
,
-
.
,
.
The inspector reviewed Maintenance Request (MR) C-08312.
In accordance with this MR, the old trapeze hanger and threaded rod were removed and replaced by new items and painted. The inspector determined that Quality Assurance (QA) personnel had walked down other areas of the plant and had not identified any additional loose hangers. Additionally, the inspector walked down the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) room and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) rooms A and B.
No loose or unattached hangers were identified. Also during normal plant tours the inspector verified that electrical as well as piping hangers were attached and where possible, by hand, checked for tightness of nuts.
No additional items of this nature were identified. This was apparently an isolated case. This item 1s closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Independent Inspection (49063)
The inspector reviewed IP Quality Audit Report Q-09047, dated September 9, 1986, covering material discrepancies on items supplied by Capitol Pipe and Steel Products Company (CPSPC) to Baldwin Associates (BA) on purchase order No. C-50191.
Two heats of threaded tees failed tensile tests performed by CPSPC in August and September, 1985. Capitol Pipe had not notified either BA or IP of these test failures. The unacceptable test results were identified during an audit of CPSPC conducted on August 21-22, 1986, by Quality Systems, Inc. (QSI) for IP and Niagra Mohawk.
The audit by QSI determined that in the middle of 1985 Capitol Pipe performed required mechanical tests for TVA on material supplied by Bonney Forge heats that had originated from their Italian subsidiary.
Scme of these tests failed to meet requirements.
Two heats of this material had been supplied to BA on the above mentioned purchase order:
-
1 1/4", 3000# threaded tee, Ht.# W314
-
2",
3000# threaded tee, Ht.# W369 These two heats failed to meet the minimum ASME tensile strength requirements.
The inspector reviewed Q31 audit dated August 26, 1985. During this audit it was determined the nonconformance report (NCR) 4-N-86 had been issued, however as stated previously, neither IP or BA were notified of
'
this fact.
During the performance of this audit, QSI reviewed this open NCR and it became apparent that a significant breakdown in Capitol Pipe's QA program existed.
Subsequently, additional testing of the discrepant material from the i
two heats received by IP was performed at Lehigh Testing Laboratories i
'
$
i
._.
___
___ _
_
e
.
-
.
.
.
on August 29, 1986. These test results conformed to the material specification requirements of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) SA-105. The inspector determined that the results demonstruted that the material was acceptable.
IP, in discussions with Bonney Forge, determined that improper machining of the tensile specimens at Capitol Pipe may have caused an alteration of mechanical properties on the initial set of data.
IP identified 20 tees which had been received from the two heats.
Nineteen were located in the warehouse and placed on " hold". The one remaining was installed in the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System.
IP decided that the exact location would be determined only if the_ retest failed. Since the heats proved to be acceptable, t!e hold tags were removed.
Capitol Pipe and Steel Products Co. was removed from IP's Qualified Suppliers list and remains off this list.
Based on these reviews, the inspector concurs with the licensee's actions and no further inspection is warranted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Site Surveillance Tours (42051C)
The inspector toured selected areas of the site at periodic intervals during the report period. Those tours assessed the general cleanliness of the site; storage and maintenance conditions of equipment and material being used in site construction; and potential for fire or other hazards.
The licensee's response to items brought to its attention was prompt and adequate. The cleanliness of the plant remains very good.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. One unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 2.
7.
Exit Meetings (30703)
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on October 14, 1986. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings.
L