IR 05000456/1990006
| ML20012F373 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1990 |
| From: | Beverly Clayton NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20012F372 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.B.4, TASK-TM 50-456-90-06, 50-456-90-6, 50-457-90-06, 50-457-90-6, NUDOCS 9004120065 | |
| Download: ML20012F373 (13) | |
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a U.S. NUCLEAR F.EGULATORY COMMIS$1CN REGION !!!
ReportsNo.504EC/90006(DRP);50-457/90006(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50 456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-72; NPT-77 Licent.se: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Draidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois inspection Conducted: February 1 through March 17, 1990 Inspectors:
T. M. Tongue T. E. Taylor D. R. Calhoun R. N. Sutphin A. M. Bongiovanni Approved By: Brent Cla
, Chief f/k//*
Reactor Projects Section IA Uat(
Inspection Surrnary inspection from February 1 through March 17, 1990 (Reports No.
I>0 456/90005(DRP): 50 457/90005(DRP))
Artes Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection by resident inspectors and one region-based inspector of licensee action on previously identified items; licensee event reports; regional request follow-up on TM1 action item; operational $6fety verification; response;to inspector inquiries; monthly maintenance observetion; monthly surveillance observation; preparation for refueling and initiation of a refuel outage; containment air sampling panel; training effectiveness; report review; and meetings and other activities.
Results: Operabilit raiseTas a concern.y of the containment atmospheric sampling panel was Excessive delay in the evaluation or resolution of issues is evidenced in the followup cn the mispositioned containment spray cheniical addition valve.
One non-cited violation (NCV) was reviewed concerning a missed surveillance for safety injection accumulator boron concentr6 tion analysis.
900412006G 900330
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PDR ADOCK 05000456
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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cormionnealth Edison company (Ceco)
l T. J. Mainian, Vice President, PWR Orcrations
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- R. E. Querio. Station Manager
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- 0. E. O'Brien, Technical Superintendent
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- K L. Kofron, Production Superintendent i
S. C. Hunsader, Nuclear Licensing Administrator l
- G. R. Masters, Assistant Superintendent - Operations
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'G. E. Groth, Braidwood Project Manager, PWR Projects Departe.ent
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- R. J. Legner, Services Director
- M. E. Lohman, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance
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P. Sniith, Operating Engineer - Unit 1 R. Yungk, Operating Engineer - Unit 2
- W. B. McCue Operating Engineer - Unit 0
- R. D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- D. J. Miller, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor D. E. Cooper, Technical Staff Supervisor
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A. D' Antonio, Quality Control Supervisor A. Che:ca, Security Administrator
- R. L. Byers, Assistant Superintendent - Work Planning and Startup
- L. W. Raney, Nuclear Safety Supervisor i
- C Vanderheyden, Training Supervisor l
- D F. Ambler, Health Physics Supervisor
- P. L. Barnes, Performance Improvement - Corporate
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- R. Carson, Emergency Preparedness - Corporate
- L. Literski, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- D. S. Huston, Acting Training Supervisor
- P. L. Maher, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- D. P. Overbeck, Training
- E. W. Carroll, Regulatory Assurance P. Holland, Regulatory Assurance J. Smith, Master, Electrical Naintenance
- V. D. Bean, Mechanical Maintenance Chief Steward
- A. Haeger, Operations Staff
- J. Burns, Chemistry
- C. R. Choven, 0)erations Staff
- R. Vignocchi, C 11ef Steward l
- S. D. Notter, Quality Programs Engineer l
- L. Rodriguez, Work Planning l
1111nois_ Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS)
D. Benz S B. Beasly,ection Head Remote Monitoring, Design and Installation Project Engineer, Liquid Effluent Monitoring Systems
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on March 16, 1S90, and at other times throughout the inspection period.
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The inspectors also ta16ed with and interviewed several other licensee j
ernployees, tacluding nenters of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and aux 111ery eperators, Shif t engireers and forenen, and electrical, mechenical and instrument maintenance personnel, and l
contract security personnel.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (92701_. 92702)
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Unresolved item
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(0 pen)457/89026-02(DRP): ContainmentSpray(CS)TrainBChemical
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Addition Throttb Valve Found Hispositioned. As part of the assessnent of the irrpact of this event th evaluation by Sargent & Lundy Engineering.e licensee requested an
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The concerns evaluated were if the systen: had been called upon under this condition, what l
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would the affect be on containment hydrogen generation and what
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would be the corrosive affect on the environrent qualification of l
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theequipment(EQ). The licensee contractor developed a CS flow l
model and calculated that the caustic concentration would have a i
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pH of 12.9 (confirned by NRR) for about 30 minutes or until dilution would occur from the refueling water storage tank by continued
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operation of the CS system.
The analysis also developed projected i
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hydrogen buildup under this ccodition based on the presence of aluminum and zine (most affected) in the containment. Although
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l the technique seemed appropriate, the evaluations were performed i
at 10% and 50f greater than the original data at pH of 11.0 rather
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l than at 100% greater which would correspond to the pH of 12.9.
j The results showed that the dangerous explosive concentration of
4% hydrogen would not be exceeded until in excess of 260 hours0.00301 days <br />0.0722 hours <br />4.298942e-4 weeks <br />9.893e-5 months <br /> after the LOCA, giving reasor.able time to make use of the hydrogen i
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l recontiners.
With respect to the EQ issue, the licensee noted that most equipnent
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operates instantaneously and prior to serious corrosive oegradation
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and that most EQ equipnent is shielded by other equipment and
structural materials, and that the duration of exposure to the i
high pH would be about 30 minutes. This confirmed the resident f
inspectors previous calculation and knowledge of the LOCA procedures.
The licensee representatives confided that the EQ equipment was
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t not qualified for a pH exposure of this ma In addition,
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the licensee acknowledges the inspectors' gnitude.
conscent that this matter is requiring an unacceptable amount of time to eyeluate. This was i
primarily due to the recognition that this should have had a
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priority consideration. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is assisting the resident staff in evaluating this isst.e.
This matter will remain open, b.
Violation
(Closed) 456/87029-01: Failure to maintain valve 1RH8716A open
during post maintenance testing of Train B of the residual heat
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removal system, in a letter, dated December 11, 1987, from the NRC staff to coninonwealth Edison, in response to the licensee's request
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for withdrawal of the violatien, the NRC staff stated that they i
confirmed their previous classification of the violation as a
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Severity Level IV in its entirety.
The staff further stated that I
the corrective actions described in the licensee's response was
considered adequate to prevent recurrence of the cited violation.
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The licensee's corrective actions for this violation included:
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counseling personnel involytd on the importance of procedural i
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compliance and the programmatic reouirements for temporarily l
ceviating from approved procedures; and placement of caution cards
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(to be replaced by permanent signs) on the control switches for
the RH8716 valves identifying taat manipulation of these valves l
while in Nodes 1 through 4 may result in a violation of the
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Technical Specifications. There has been no recurrence of this
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Based on satisfactory implementation of corrective actions
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and no recurrence of this event this item is considered closed.
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f No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Licenseo Event Report (LER) (92700)
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j Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and I
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that innediate corrective
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action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence had been or would be accomplished in accordance with Technical l
Specifications (TS):
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{ Closed) 456/89020.LL: Failure to verify safety injection accTnuletor (5IA) boron concentration within specified time interval due to programmatic deficiency. At 8:28 a.m., on December 23, 1989,
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two SIA levels were raised with addition of 105 gallons to one, and 189 gallons to the other. Boron concentration is required to be
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verified within six hours after each volume increase of 70 gallons.
l At8:36a.m.,theControlpoomSupervisor(SCRE)telephonedthe
Chemistry Supervisor (CS) and requested the samples.
The CS entered the request in the logbook intending to assign the task when personnel became available.
The CS was not aware of the six hour l
requirement. When the CS was relieved at 11:00 a.m. by the after-
noon shift CS, the tample was not mentioned. At 3:30 p.m., the i
l SCRE contacted the CS and after checking the logbook, the CS
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concluded that the samples had not been taken. A technician was
innediately dispatched to sample the SIAs, they were within I
acceptable limits.
The cause of this event was the failuro of the l
SCRE to assure timely com)letion of the required analysis and the l
i CS not being aware that t1ere was a six hour time limit on the l
samples. A contributing factor was that there was no program to monitor routine Technical Specifications samples being performed on a non-routine basis which do not require action statement entry.
Corrective actions included:
the CS issuing a memo to all chemistry
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department personnel regarding sample time requirements for SIAst Operating Procedure, Bw0P SI 5, will he revised to include an Action Requirenent sheet for sampling; a review of Chemistry Surveillance
cover sheets will be performed to insure that time requirements for
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non routine sempling requirements are identified; a formal turnover
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theet will be developed for the Duty Chemist / Supervisor; and a training * tailgate" session will be held to discuss the event with
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chemistry and operating Tersonnel, failure to perfom the required
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analysis for the safety injection accumulator boron concentration
is a violation of Technical specification 4.5.1.1 (NCV (456/90006 01)).
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The violation is not being cited because the criteria specified in
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Section V.G.1 of the enforcement policy were satisfied. This LER
is considered closed.
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_ Closed) 456/90002-LL: failure to verify three containntnt I
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penetrations as a Ffiult of progrannatic deficiency. On January 19, l
i 1990, in response to an NRC inspector's inquiry, a system technical
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engineer identified that there had been no surveillance performed i
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on three blind flanges on containment penetrations as required by l
l Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.1.1.a.
On November 21, 1989, a
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modification installing the three blind flanges on these containment
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penetrations was completed. As part of the modification process,
the procedures identified on the Station Checklist were revised.
The cause of this event was the omission of operating surveillance
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procedure,18w05, 6.1.1.a-1, Unit 1 primary Containment Integrity
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Verification of Outside containment Isolation Devices, from the Station Checklist.
A Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued for the
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TS 4.6.1.1.a violation. The licensee's corrective actions will be reviewed and evaluated during closcout of the NOV for NRC Inspection i
Report 456/90002 457/90002. This LER is considered closed.
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In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Deviation Reports (DYRs) generated during the inspection period. This
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was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or
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personnel perfonnance, potential trends, etc. DVRs here also reviewed for proper initiation and disposition as required by the applicable
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procedures and the QA manual.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Regional Request (92701)
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10 CFR 21 Notification
r By Region !!! memorandum, dated February 15, 1990, the inspectors were requested to determine if any Automatic Valve Company (AVC) valves possibly used as main steam isolation and main steam relief valves, were
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in use at Braidwood.
These valves were reported pursuant to 10 CFR 21
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to have incorrect installation instructions.
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A review was conducted by contacting the technical staff system engineer
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who conducted a coroputer search of maintenance and station stores systems
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and concluded that no AVC valves were used at Braidwood.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Follow-up on TM! Action Item (25565)
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_II.B.4.2 - Mitigating Core Damage Training NUREG-737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirernents, and NUREG-0060, l
"HRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the THI-2 Accident," outlines l
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requirements for licensee trainirg for mitigation of core damage.
The
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licensee developed and implemented a training pro
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Allreactoroperaturandseniorreactoroperator$ramonAugust 19}1985.
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1u nsed personne completed this training prior to Unit 1 and Unit 2 operational phases.
1he training consisted of 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> classroom instructions and several
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hours of simulator training. The majority of the training was performed I
as part of the Emergency Operating Procedures training.
Plant conditions
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covered were Class 9 events LOCAs natural circulation, non condensible
gases,andcorethermallimIts. All licensed operations personnel and
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several management people have con:pleted this training. This issue is
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considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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l During the inspection period, the ins)ectors verified that the facility l
was being operated in conformance wit) the licenses and regulatory i
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effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation.
l This was done on a sampling basis through routine direct observation
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l of activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and l
discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety
l system status and limiting conditions for operation action requirements (LC0ARs), corrective action, and review of facility records.
j On a sampling basis the inspectors verified proper control room
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staffing and access, operator behavior and coordination of plant
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ectivities with ongoing control room op,erations; verified operator adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities;
verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS),
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including compliance with LC0ARs with emphasis on engineered safety features (ESF)andE5Felectricalalignmentandvalvepositions;
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monitored instrumentation recorder traces and duplicate channels for abnormalities; verified status of various lit annunciators for operator
i understandin, off-normal condition and corrective actions being taken;
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l examined nuc ear instrumentation (Nl) and other protection channels for r
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proper operability; reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for
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abnornal conditions; verified that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station manager, superintendents, assistant operations superintendent, and other managers and observed the Safety Parameter Display System
(SPDS)foroperability.
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During tours of accessible areas of the lant the inspectors made note
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ofgeneralplant/equipmentconditions,iciudIngcontrolofactivitiesin
progress (maintenance / surveillance), observation of shift turnovers,
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general safety items, etc. The specific areas observed were:
Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems
l Accessible portions of ESF systens and components were inspected to verify: valve position for proper flow path; proper alignment of power supply breakers or fuses (if visible) for proper actuation on an initiating signal; proper removal of power from components if
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required by TS or FSAR: and the operability of support systems l
essential to system actuation or performance through observation
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of instrumentation and/or proper valve alignment.
The inspectors also visually inspected corponents for leakage, proper lubrication,
cooling water supply, etc.
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Pediation Protection Controls i
The inspectors verified that workers were following health physics
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procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting,
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etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation r
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for use, operebility, and calibration.
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Security
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The inspectors, by sampling, verified that persons in the protected
area (pA) displayed proper badges and had escorts if required vital areas were kept locked and alarned, or guards posted if required:
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and personnel and packages entering the PA received proper search l
and/or monitoring.
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Housekeeping and Plant Cleanliness The inspectors nionitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection, protection of safety-related t
equipnent from intrusion of foreign matter and general protection.
l The inspcctors also monitored various records, such as tagouts, jumpers, shiftly logs and surveillances, daily orders, maintenance items, various
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chemistry and radiological sampling and analysis, third party review results, overtime reccrds, QA and/or QC audit results and postings required per 10 CFR 19.11.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
ResponsetoinspectorInouiries(71707{
During the inspection period, the inspectors identified a number of
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issues requiring followup by the licensee.
These are referred to as
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- Blue Sheets" and the following is a summary of the issues and responses:
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Inquiry 90-004 - Unusual Oder in a Cable Spreading Room l
On about February 21, 1990, an ocor similar to ozone was noted in the Unit I lower cable spreading room.
This is an OSHA concern.
The licensee hazardous materials representative and the Industrial
Hygiene and Safety Advisor monitored the area with an ozone detector and none was detected. An odor was detected that may have been from
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t cable pulling compound, paint epoxy, or residual material from the fire protection system.
This was not considered to be a hazard.
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Inquiry 90 005 - ECCS Room Cooler Dirt on Fins and Fin Damace
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During a plant tour, on February 6,1990, the inspectors noted dirt accumulated on the fins (potential blockage) and some fin damage i
on several ECCS room coolers.
These were cleaned and the fins
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repaired.
It was noted that this was an inspection sattple and only
t. hose coolers identified were checked by the licensee.
This lack of
I follewup or narrow span of correction was discussed with station management during orie of the routine exit briefings, c.
Inquiry 90-006 - Unsecured Spare Circuit Breakers and Ground Test j
Device During a routine plant tour on February 6,1990, the inspectors noted spare circuit breakers outside of the switchgear cabinet damagingtheClass.e.freetorollabout,creatingapotentialfor were unsecured 1 2E power supplies. These were in the 4.1 and
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6.9 KV switchgear rooms. The licensee promptly placed the spare breakers in the spare switchgear cubicles.
However, about one week
later, ground test devices were found in the same condition. These were chained to stanchions to prevent riovement.
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Inquiry 90-009 - NWR Labels on control Room Annunciators and Ins tr.lments The inspectors noted what appeared to be on excessive number of control room annunciators and instruments with Nuclear Work Request (NWR) stickers indicating a problem or potential problem. The inspector inquired as to whether there was a mechanism to remove these when the NWR was completed. This was in the interest of the control room operators and their confidence in the validity of the alarms and instrument indications. An operating engineer conducted
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a study of backlog NWRs to verify the appropriateness of the NWR stickers and assure those present were valid.
In addition, the inspectors were provided a copy of Special Operating Order
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50-ST-0009, Rev.1, dated July 3,1989, giving instructions to
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assure that the NWR stickers are removed upon completion of the work. This response was found to be acceptable and the effectiveness will be monitored during future inspections.
Other issues raised were minor end responses were acceptable, i
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station naintenance activities affecting the safety-related systems and con.ponents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were' considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were i
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removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; ectivities were accornplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were perforined prior to returning components or systems to service; quelity control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implenented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to deterinine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may af fect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed end reviewed:
Unit 1 1A Diesel Generator Jacket Water pump repair.
CHC punip systen4 oil leak repair and filter change.
Unit 2 NWR #A39087 2B T-cold RTD troubleshoot and repair activities, replaced NRC card.
NWR #A36104 perform MOV preventive maintenance (PM)
inspection, diagnostic test, replacement of motor shaft key and signature trace on 2CC9473A.
During the periodic maintenance work, the licensee identified a problem with water intrusion in the motor grease compartment, which was evaluated and repaired.
2A RHR pump seal and bearing replacenent.
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The inspectors monitored the licensee's work in progress and verified thet it was being performed in accordance with proper procedures, and approved work packages, that 10 CFR 50.59 reviews and applicable drawing updates were made end/or planned, and that operator training was conducted in a reasonable period of time.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accompitsbed, that results conforrad with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the ir<dividual directing the test and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were proper,ly reviewed and resolved by appropriate m6nagement personnel.
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The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
l Unit 1
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Bw!S 3.2.1-302 Analog Operational Test and Channel Verification / Calibration for Loop IP 0516 Steam
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Generator IA Steam flow / feed flow Mismatch
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Channel!! Cabinet 2(IPA 02J)
l Bwls 3.2.1 013 Analog Operational Test and Channel l
Verification / Calibration for Loop 1P-0516 Steur
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Pressure Protection Loop 1A Channel 4 Cabinet 4
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(IPA 04J)
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Dwls 3.1.1 339 Analog Operational Test and Channel
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Verification / Calibration for Loop IP 0457 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel !!!
Cabinet 3(IPA 030)
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Bw!S 3.1.1-328 Analog Operational Test and Channel
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Verification / Calibration for Loop IL 0549 Steam
I Generator 10 Level Protection (Narrow Range)
Channel!! Cabinet 2(IPA 020)
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DwYS 5.2.f.2-1 ASME Pump Run Surveillance Requirerents for l
Safety injection Puaps Unit 2 l
Ew!S 3.1.1-302 Analog Operational Test and Channel i
Verification / Calibration for Loop 2T-0421 Delta
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T and Tavg Protection Loop 2B, Channel II, l
Cabinet 2(2PA02J)
Bw!S 6.4.1-200 Analog Operational Test / Surveillance Calibration of Containment Hydrogen Monitoring Analyzer
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Indicating Loop j
Bw05 3.2.1-800 ESTAS Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance (Train A Automatic Safety injection - K611)
Bw05 8.1.1.2a-1 2A Diesel Generator Operability Monthly (Staggered) Surveillance No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Preparation for Refueling and Initiation of a Refuel Outage (60705. 60710)
During the inspection period, the inspectors monitored the licensee's
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> reparation for the first refueling outage on Unit 2.
This involved.
l aut was not limited to, final receipt, opening, inspection, storage of I
new fuel as described in inspection report 456/89032(DRP);457/89030(DRP),
end inanagement and coordination of planned work group activities, i
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On March 16 1990 Unit 2 was shut down comencing its first refuel
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outt.ge. This cullnineted a first fuel cycle run of 168 days.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
I 11. Containinent Air Sampling Panel (CASP) (93702)
l Operability / Availability Challenged i
On March 9,1990, licensee staff members informed the resident inspectors l
of a problem identified with the portion of the Post Accident Sampling
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system where the Unit 1 CASP would not operate as designed.
The CASP is
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for sampling the contairment atniosphere to menitor radioactivity levels
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following an accident. During a drill on February 23, 1990, the key
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lock switch that initiates the sampling sequence would not operate.
Investigation revealed that the wires to the switch were not properly
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terminated to terminals in the back of the CASP. Evidence indicated that i
the wires were disconnected intentionally and there was no sign of
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maliciousness in that the wires showed no insulation damage and lugs for
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connection to terminal screws were undamaged and intact. A histor< cal
review revealed that both Unit I and 2 CASPs were proven operable during
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preoperational test in March 1987.
Subsequently, during a drill on Jnit 2, apparently in March 1988, a similar f611ure occurred. The prompt i
corrective action at the tine to meet the urgency of the drill was to i
swap the lock switches between units.
The inferior lock switch was
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placed in the Unit 1 panelt however, there was no record of this and no
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Nuclear Work Request was generated for final repair.
This is based on
recollection of chemistry department personnel.
However no one could
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recall or would confide specifically low or when the swap, occurred.
t At the tire of the discovery, the licensee was developing a surveillance for periodic testing of the CASP and is presently committed to have the surveillance implenented by November 1990.
The Unit 1 CASP lock switch was replaced and satisfactorily tested on
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March 13, 1990.
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This issue has been the subject of a review by Region III radiation I
specialist and is addressed in Inspection Report 50-450/90009(DRSS);
50-457/90009(DRSS).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. Training Effectiveness (41400. 41701)
The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed
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personnel was reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of the licensee's performance of routine surveillance maintenante, and operationelactivitiesandduringthereviewofthelicensee'sresponse l
to events which occurred during the intpection period.
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appeared to be knowledgeable of the tests being performed, and nothing was observed which indicated any ineffectiveness of training.
During the inspection, the inspectors attended the 00 Nuclear General Employee Training at the Production Training Center. This included i
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requalification on radiation protection and included specific trainin9 on Fitness for Duty, Nuclear Security, Industrial Safety, fire Protection, and Quality Assurance / Quality Control.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Report Review During the inspection period the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Reports for January and February 1990.
The inssector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Tucinical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
The inspector also reviewed the licenste's Monthly Plant Status Report for January 1990, the Braidwood Radioactive Effluents Report for July
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through December 1989, the 1989 Occupational Exposure Report for Braidwood, and the Regulatory Assurance Departnent's Trend / Concern Reports, dated February 8 and Perch 9,1990.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Meetings and Other Activities (30702)
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS)
Fembers of the IDNS were onsite on February 15, 1990 for a planning and informationmeetingwithCECopersonnelontheu>comInginstallationof the Liquid Effluent Monitoring System (LEMS). Tae LEMS is slated for delivery installation, and startup about mid 1990 and will be installed at the river screen house on the Kankakee River in Custer Park Illinois.
The unit is an online device to monitor for any release of radloactivity from processed (cleaned) plant effluents being returned to the Kankakee River.
The Senior Resident Inspector attended the meeting and also acconpanied the party)on a tour of the river screen house (proposed installation location.
Site Visits by NRC Staff On february 6.1990, Nr. B. Clayton, Chief Division of Reactor Projects section 1A, was onsite for a meeting with the resident inspectors, a tour of the plant, and meeting with the senior station management.
The subject matter covered present plant status and discussion on timely subjects, such as discretionary enforcement.
On February 14, 1990, Mr. W. D. Shafer, Chief. Division of Reactor Projects Branch 1, was onsite for a routine visit.
During that time, he n4:t with the resicent inspectors and made a tour of the plant.
In addition, he met with the station manager, station superintendents, end others to discuss the present plant status and other timely topics, such as waivers of compliance or discretionary enforcement and upcoming personnel changes.
In addition, he presented operator licenses to recently passed R0/SR0 candidates.
The licensee provided a brief presentation and a package of information on Braidwood's performance.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
!$. [xitInterview(30703)
The inspectors net with the licensee representatives cenoted in Paragraph I during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on March 16 1990. The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report.
The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature,
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