IR 05000456/1990009
| ML20034A656 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1990 |
| From: | Michael Kunowski, Schumacher M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034A653 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-90-09, 50-456-90-9, 50-457-90-09, 50-457-90-9, NUDOCS 9004240056 | |
| Download: ML20034A656 (4) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY: COMMISSION-REGION IIIs
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Rep _ortsNo.;50_-456/90009(DRSS);~50-457/90009(DRSS)--
Docket Nos. 50-456;.50-457-
- Licenses: No. HPF-72; NPF-77J Licensee:z~ Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690-Facility Name:
Braidwood Station, Units-1~and-2
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inspection At: -Braidwood: Site,:Braidwood, Illinois; Inspection Conducted: March 13-23, 1990 f1,/),1(
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Inspector _: -
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Kunowski'-
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Reviewed By:
.M.'C. Schumacher, Chief
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Radiological Controls and'
Date; Chemistry Section e
Inspection: Summary Inspection on March'13-23, 1990 (Report-Nos. 50-456/90009(DRSS):
-50-457/90009(DRSS))_
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Areas Inspected:
Special inspection to~ review the circumstances'of the failure of the Unit 1 containment atmosphere. sampling system to. operate:during -an.
emergency drill (Inspection Procedure (IP) 84724).
Results: The licensee reestablished the operability of: the system. However,-
one violation.was identified for failure to-test _ post-accident' sampling; equipment-at the required frequency (Section 3), and 'one open_: item.was identified regarding the adequacy of system shielding (Section :.3).
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DETAILS
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' Persons Contacted
+D. F. Ambler, Health Physics Supervisor J. Bowman, Emergency Planner, Corporate-0+J.. Burns,. Lead Chemist 0+E. W. Carroll,- Regulatory Assurance
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OT. Coomers, Tech Staff
-+P. E... Holland, Regulatory Assurance OSu Hunsader, Nuclear Licensing. Administrator
. L. Kim, Qual _ity Assurance (QA) -Inspector?
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0+R. 'D. Kyrouac, QA; Superintendent y
+P. A.. Lau,! Regulatory Assurance -
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i. A. Literski, Generating Station Energency Plan Coordinator.
0+R.~-James, Chemist.
+K. L. Kofron, Production Superintendent OD. E. O'Brien, Technical Superintendent-0+J.. R. Petro, ' Chemistry Supervisor GE.' Roche,1 Lead Health Physicist, Operations.
OT. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance
+J. ft.-Watson, QA' Inspector 0+J. F. Harold, NRC Intern 0+T. E. Taylor, NRC Resident Inspector T. M. Tongue, NRC Senior Resident Inspector G
The.-inspector also interviewed other licensee:perso'nnel.
+ Denotes those present at onsite exit meeting onLMarch;21,:1990.
0 Denotes those present at. telephone conference 'on March 23,fl990.
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General-This was a s ecial inspection of the Containrient Atmosphere Sampling System (CASS which is part of the licensee's Post Accident Sampling-System (PASS. The CASS-consists of a gas partitioner'(sampler) and-gasJ 3artitioner control unit (GPCU) in addition to the original system buil.t-ay Sentry Equipment Corporation. The inspection was undertaken as a
result of an inability of the system to provide a containment air sample L
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during a Unit 1 emergency-drill conducted by the licensee on' February 23,-'
1990.'
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3.
Containment Atmosphere Sampling System (IP 84724)
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'The failure appeared to result from a malfunction of a.keylock' reset switch; the switch was replaced the.same day and'the. drill rescheduled-for March 13, 1990. The licensee's investigation into the-problem n
revealed similar problems had been encountered.in March 1988 when an inoperable Unit 2 switch was apparently exchanged with 'an operable switch d
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on Unit 1 in order to complete a drill on Unit 2.
The investigation also indicated that the cause of the difficulty had been incorrectly attributed to a mixup of keys between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems and that the faulty keylock switch may have remained on the Unit I system until it was.
next tested during the February 23, 1990 drill.
The inspector observed the rescheduled Unit I drill on March 13, 1990.
The replaced keylock switch operated as intended but the automatic r
sampling feature of the GPCU did,not and a sample could not be obtained
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following the governing procedure, BwCP 703-18, " Post Accident Sampling of Containment Atmosphere." However, the chemist was able to obtain'a-sample with the GPCU in the manual mode and transport it'to the
. laboratory and analyzed it without problem. The licensee's post drill
. evaluation determined that the partitioner-GPCU lineup was, incorrect and-stated that.the units would be labelled to indicate the correct lineup.
When the inspector returned on March 21, 1990, he observed that the GPCU labels were incorrect; they were immediately corrected.
The inspector learned from discussions with licensee ~ representatives that a corporate audit of the PASS in June 1989 had identified failure of.the station to adhere to the surveillance requirements of Nuclear Operations Directive NOD-CY.5, " Post Accident Sampling Surveillance Frequency,"
which requires quarterly operation of the gas partitioner to ensure-operability of the CASS. The response to this finding.was a program to-
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track outstanding work requests. However,-the required surveillance to verify operability was not performed from March 1987 until February 1990.
In addition, the Unit 2 partitioner was only tested annually in 1988 and 1989. This is an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.8.4.d.3 which requires implementation of a program to ensure.verability)of the PASS (Violation No. 50-456/90009-01[DRSS);50-547/90009-01(DRSS).
Although the occurrence was licensee-identified, the corrective action-reqcired to achieve compliance was not timely.
The recurring problems with the PASS operability suggest. lack of familiarity of station personnel with its operation and with the surveillance requirements.
Inadequate training may be the root cause of the violation.
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The inspector also noted that the Updated Final Sefety Analysis Report (UFSAR) does not describe the shielded carts actually used to transport the sample vials to the laboratory nor the method used to count them.
The UFSAR also incorrutly indicates that the PASS is used for routine sampling and that the unshielded eight-inch connection between the gas partitioners and the Wtry sample panels was made of stainless steel whereas it is actually plastic. The inspector expressed concern that the absence of shielding might prohibit sampling under accident conditions.
A work request to shield the tubing was initiated immediately. The station subsequently obtained a study performed on an identical installation at the Byron station, which according to licensee representatives, indicated that shielding may not be necessary.
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licensee's resolution of these matters will be reviewed in subsequent-l inspections (0penitemNo. 456/90009-02(DRSS);457/90009-02(DRSS)).
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One violation of fiRC requirements was identified.
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Exit lieeting (IP 30703)
The inspector discussed the tentative findings of the inspection with the individuals denoted in Section 1.
Specifically, he discussed the violation, the UFSAR discrepancies, and the concern about the PASS shielding. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's findings, and stated that the station had developed and was implementing an action plan to correct problems and address concerns with the PASS (including the containment atmosphere sampling system) which were identified during the corporate audit in June 1989, and in a recent itRC inspection (Inspection Report llos. 50-456/90005(DRSS);50-457/90005(DRSS)),
The inspector acknowledged the existence of the action plan and stated that the focus of that f1RC inspection was the liquid sampling portion of the PASS, unlike the present inspection which addressed only the containment atmosphere sampling portion.
In addition, the licensee stated that the discrepancies identified by the inspector between the UFSAR and the current PASS configuration and practice >;ould be reviewed and the UFSAR would be revised accordingly.
Licensee representatives did not identify any documents or processes reviewed by the inspector as proprietary, i
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