IR 05000454/2023012
| ML23292A356 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/2023 |
| From: | Hironori Peterson NRC/RGN-III/DORS/ERPB |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2023012 | |
| Download: ML23292A356 (18) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
BYRON STATION - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000454/2023012 AND 05000455/2023012
Dear David Rhoades:
On September 8, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Byron Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Harris Welt, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for problem identification and resolution programs.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
October 19, 2023 If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Byron Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Byron Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Hironori Peterson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000454 and 05000455 License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000454 and 05000455
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000454/2023012 and 05000455/2023012
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-012-0009
Licensee:
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
Facility:
Byron Station
Location:
Byron, IL
Inspection Dates:
August 21, 2023 to September 08, 2023
Inspectors:
J. Bozga, Senior Reactor Inspector
R. Elliott, Senior Project Engineer
T. McGowan, Senior Resident Inspector
M. Siddiqui, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Hironori Peterson, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Byron Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Perform ASME Relief Valve Scope Expansion Testing as Required by Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000454,05000455/2023012-01 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71152B The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,
Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the licensees failure to follow Procedure BMP 3100-23, and test additional containment sump isolation relief valves within the time frame allowed by procedure. Specifically, when the 2SI121B failed to meet the as-found set-pressure testing acceptance criteria, the licensee was required to expand testing scope and test two additional valves within 3 months. Subsequently, 1SI121B was tested 9 months later, and 1SI121A was tested 13 months later, and both failed to meet the as-found testing acceptance criteria. Due to the additional relief valve failures, the licensee was required to further expand scope to the 2SI121A, which was tested 19 months later, and failed as-found testing.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
- Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a 5-year review of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
- Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.
- Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
- Safety-Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B Review of Safety-Conscious Work Environment Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment The team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, workers at the station expressed freedom to raise and enter safety concerns through any one of the various avenues available to them, and the team encountered no indications of chilling or retaliation.
Workers expressed favorable opinions of the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) during interviews, most workers were familiar with how to raise issues through the ECP, specifically, they knew who to contact on-site. There were several signs posted with the name and contact info of the ECP representative; this information was apparently well-known by the interviewees. The inspectors noted that issues were still being identified by the ECP and that most workers stated they felt no need to approach the ECP. The inspectors reviewed those issues documented in the ECP over the previous 2 years and identified no adverse trends.
Overall, inspectors found no evidence of challenges to the licensee's safety-conscious work environment, as licensee employees were willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of several means available.
No violations or findings were identified Assessment 71152B Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of the following areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
No violations or findings were identified.
Effectiveness of Problem Identification Overall, the station was effective at identifying issues at a low threshold and was properly entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) as required by station procedures.
During interviews, workers were familiar with how to enter issues into the CAP and stated that they were encouraged to use it to document issues. During plant walkdowns, the team observed numerous action tags, indicating that workers were identifying issues in the field.
The team determined that the station was generally effective at identifying negative trends that could potentially impact nuclear safety. For the areas reviewed, the team did not identify any issues in problem identification.
Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues In-depth reviews of a risk-informed sampling of issue reports (IRs), work orders (WOs), and root and apparent cause and condition evaluations were completed. The team determined that the licensee had established a low threshold for entering deficiencies into the CAP, that the issues were generally being appropriately prioritized and evaluated for resolution, and that corrective actions (CAs) were implemented to mitigate the future risk of issues occurring that could affect overall system operability and/or reliability.
The inspectors noted that issues were properly screened with most either classified as Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ) or Non-Corrective Action Program (NCAP) items.
Through a selective review of CAP and NCAP items, the inspectors found no issues either with the assigned level of evaluation or the proposed corrective actions. Issues having potential operability concerns were properly addressed through the screening process and during control room observations and accompaniment of non-licensed operators during daily rounds; the inspectors did not identify any significant operator workarounds or similar deficiencies.
The inspectors also did a selective review of issues identified by the NRC either documented as observations, or for which findings or other enforcement was issued. These issues were properly documented and screened in the CAP.
Issue evaluations were generally sound and of good quality. Most issues were screened as low significance and were assigned a work group evaluation (the lowest level of review);more significant issues were assigned a Corrective Action Program Evaluation, or if highly significant, a root cause evaluation. The inspectors verified that the assigned evaluations were consistent with the significance of the issue as defined in the licensees process.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The team concluded that the licensee was generally effective in developing CAs that were appropriately focused to correct the identified problem, and to address the root and contributing causes for significant conditions adverse to quality to preclude repetition. The licensee generally completed CAs in a timely manner and in accordance with procedural requirements commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. For NRC-identified issues, the team determined that the licensee generally assigned CAs that were effective and timely. The inspectors also did a selective review of CAs that were still open at least 2 years after the issue was identified to verify that it was reasonable for these items to remain open and that the licensee was managing them correctly; no issues were identified.
The inspectors noted that while issue evaluations were generally sound, there were several examples where additional research was needed to verify that the appropriate corrective actions were taken, primarily due to a lack of clear documentation. This theme had previously been identified in earlier licensee self-assessments and CAP audits and several recent CAP items had been written to address this issue. These CAPs were still open; however, the inspector determined the proposed corrective actions were adequate.
Assessment 71152B Review of Operating Experience, Self-Assessment and Audits Assessment of Operating Experience and Self-Assessment and Audits Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance in the use of Operating Experience (OE) and Self-Assessments and Audits adequately supported nuclear safety.
No violations or findings were identified.
Use of Operating Experience The licensee routinely screened industry and NRC OE information for station applicability.
Based on these initial screenings, the licensee-initiated actions in the CAP to fully evaluate the impact, if any, to the station. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented in a timely manner to prevent similar issues from occurring. During interviews, licensee staff stated that operating experience lessons-learned were communicated during work briefings and department meetings and incorporated into plant operations.
Self-Assessments and Audits The inspectors reviewed several audits and self-assessments and deemed those sampled as thorough and intrusive with regards to following up with the issues that were identified through previous NRC inspections and in the self-assessments and fleet oversight audits.
Reviewed corrective actions for the identified issues were deemed reasonable and completed commensurate with their safety significance. The inspectors regarded licensee performance as adequately self-critical of their own performance and that performance-related issues were being identified through their self-assessment process.
Assessment 71152B Five Year Review of Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The inspectors performed an expanded 5-year review of the Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System; specifically, by performing system walk-downs, evaluating condition reports and work orders. The inspectors also interviewed a craft personnel responsible for working on the system. Overall, the inspectors determined that the licensee was effectively managing issues associated with this system.
Recently, the licensee has observed challenges in the maintenance of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. Specifically, the licensee's root cause investigation of the failure of the 1B Auxiliary Feed system did not definitively determine the root cause that introduced foreign material in the system that caused the pump to fail to start on demand during a scheduled surveillance. This issue was documented in the CAP and the NRC resident inspectors have been reviewing it through the baseline inspection program. The inspectors identified no operability or other immediate safety concerns with this issue and concluded that the licensee had taken adequate actions to find and correct the cause of this issue.
No violations or findings were identified.
Failure to Perform ASME Relief Valve Scope Expansion Testing as Required by Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000454,05000455/2023012-01 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71152B The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the licensees failure to follow Procedure BMP 3100-23 and test additional containment sump isolation relief valves within the time frame allowed by procedure. Specifically, when the 2SI121B failed to meet the as-found set-pressure testing acceptance criteria, the licensee was required to expand testing scope and test two additional valves within 3 months. Subsequently, 1SI121B was tested 9 months later and 1SI121A was tested 13 months later, and both failed to meet the as-found testing acceptance criteria. Due to the additional relief valve failures, the licensee was required to further expand scope to the 2SI121A, which was tested 19 months later, and failed as-found testing.
Description:
The containment sump isolation relief valves (SI121A/B) at Byron Station are normally closed valves and have a safety function to open to ensure the continued reliability of the containment recirculation sump isolation valves in the event of an overpressure condition resulting from pressure locking and thermal expansion. The failure of the SI121A/B valves reduces the redundancy of providing inventory from the containment sump to the reactor coolant system during recirculation.
The licensees American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code of Record for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM) is the 2004 Edition, with Addenda though 2006. In accordance with the OM code, the licensee categorized the containment sump isolation relief valves as Category C relief valves. The relief valves are accessible at full power and are replaced at least every 8 years during the in-service test.
Subsection ISTC-5240, Safety and Relief Valves, states, safety and relief valves shall meet the in-service test requirements of Mandatory Appendix I-1350.
Mandatory Appendix I-1350(c)(1) requires, for each valve tested for which the as-found set-pressure (first test actuation) exceeds the greater of either +/- tolerance limit of the Owner-established set-pressure acceptance criteria of I-1310(e) or +/- 3% of valve nameplate set-pressure, two additional valves shall be tested from the same valve group. Furthermore, I-1350 (c)(2) states if the as-found set-pressure of any additional valves tested in accordance with I-1350 (c)(1) exceeds the criteria noted therein, then all the remaining valves of that same valve group shall be tested.
On February 17, 2021, the Unit 2 containment sump isolation relief valve, 2SI121B, failed to meet the as-found set pressure testing acceptance criteria under Work Order (WO)04727979, Bench Test Previously Removed Relief Valve and Repair. The licensee replaced the valve with a pre-tested relief valve and entered the issue into their corrective action program as AR 04403027. As a result of the set-pressure failure, the licensee was required to expand testing scope and test two additional valves within the same valve group, as required by Mandatory Appendix I. On February 17, 2021, the licensee-initiated AR 04403055 and AR 04403056, to create WOs to expand testing scope to the 1SI121A and 1SI121B relief valves, respectively.
On November 10, 2021, the Unit 1 containment sump isolation relief valve, 1SI121B, failed to meet the as-found set-pressure testing acceptance criteria under WO 05043687, Replace Relief Valve 1SI121B. The licensee replaced the 1SI121B with a pre-tested relief valve, and initiated AR 04459919. As a result of the additional relief valve failure, the licensee was required to expand scope to all the remaining valves in the valve group, as required by I-1350(c)(2). On November 11, 2021, the licensee initiated AR 04460086 to create a WO to test the 2SI121A, the final valve in the valve group.
On March 07, 2022, the Unit 1 containment sump isolation relief valve, 1SI121A, failed the as-found set-pressure test under WO 04989712, Bench Test Previously Removed Relief Valve. The licensee replaced the valve with a pretested valve.
On September 09, 2022, the Unit 2 containment sump isolation relief valve, 2SI121A, failed the as-found set-pressure test under WO 05237431, Bench Test Previously Removed Relief Valve. The licensee replaced the valve with a pretested valve, and initiated AR 04521501 to perform repairs and additional testing on the valve.
The inspectors reviewed WOs 04727979, 05043687, and 05043687, and noted Section 4.4.3 of Procedure BMP 3100-23, which performed the as-found set-pressure bench testing, stated, in part, if an IST valve fails first as found set-pressure testassociated valves within same IST group may need to be tested. Specifically, Step 4.4.3.14 required, in part, this information shall be completed before this work order is closed out: determine if additional valves need testingensure additional relief valves are tested within 3 months of test date of valve failing as found testing. However, the inspectors noted Step 4.4.3.14 had not been performed as required in the associated work orders, and subsequently was not completed prior to WO closeout.
The inspectors determined the licensee failed to take the prompt and effective actions as a result of the relief valve failures. The licensee had several opportunities to schedule and perform additional relief valve testing, within the scheduling requirements of BMP 3100-23, but failed to perform the testing as required, causing a delay in the identification of additional relief valve testing failures.
Corrective Actions: The licensees corrective actions are to disassemble and inspect the valves to determine the cause of the relief valve testing failures.
Corrective Action References: AR 04700973, Procedure Enhancement for BMP 3100-23
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to ensure additional relief valves were tested within 3 months of a valve failing as-found testing, as a result of the as-found set pressure testing failure of the 2SI121B valve was contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, and was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to take prompt and effective actions to perform relief valve scope expansion testing to other valves within the group, as a result of the 2SI121B relief valve failure. When a relief valve fails the set-pressure testing acceptance criteria, the procedure required the testing scope be expanded to additional valves from the same group, to identify any potential generic concerns that could apply to valves in the same valve group or other valve groups. The licensees failure to expand scope testing within the scheduling requirements of BMP 3100-23 caused a delay in the identification of additional set-pressure testing failures of the 1SI121A, 1SI121B, and 2SI121A valves.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2.
Specifically, the inspectors determined that this finding screened as Green or very low safety significance because the performance deficiency did not result in the loss of operability or probabilistic risk assessment functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, work groups and supervision across several departments had multiple opportunities to communicate and coordinate activities to ensure additional relief valve testing was scheduled and performed as required, prior to work order closeout.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10, CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Licensee-established Procedure BMP 3100-23, IST Crosby Safety/Relief Valve Bench Testing, Rev 35, as the implanting procedure for IST relief valve testing. Section 4.4.3 of the procedure stated, in part, if an IST valve fails first as found set pressure testvalves within the same IST group may need to be tested. Step 4.4.3.14 required, in part this information shall be completed before this work order is closed out: determine if additional relief valves need testingensure additional relief valves are tested within 3 months of test date of valve failing as found testing.
Contrary to the above, from February 17, 2021, to September 09, 2022, the licensee failed to accomplish relief valve testing, an activity affecting quality, in accordance with written procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow Step 4.4.3.14 of BMP 3100-23 and failed to ensure additional relief valves were tested within 3 months of the 2SI121B valve failing as-found set-pressure testing acceptance criteria.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Clear and concise documentation with respect to following American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code of Record for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM).
71152B Clear PI&R documentation is crucial for several reasons. Firstly, it serves as a historical record of issues that have arisen, providing valuable insights into recurring problems and their causes. Secondly, such documentation ensures clear communication among team members, allowing for the effective sharing of knowledge and solutions. This, in turn, promotes collaboration and minimizes the chances of the same problems reoccurring due to misunderstandings or lack of information. Additionally, clear and concise documentation supports accountability by tracking the responsible parties and their actions toward resolution.
The team noted the follow:
- In the IR 04447391, Unit 1 Pressurizer safety valve (1RY8010B) failed as found test, the IR did not state how the licensee planned to satisfy the ASME OM code, nor did it specify in the two Licensee Event Report (LER) submitted how they are adhering to the ASME OM code. At a later date there was a CAP evaluation that stated the corresponding valves on Unit 2 will be tested, but did not clearly state how the specific ASME OM code would be met.
- In the IR 04447342 on September 19, 2021, Safety Injection (SI) valve 1SI8856B failed its as found test and there were no plans documented for meeting ASME OM code. On November 30, 2021, IR 04463772 was generated during the 2021 PI&R, in response to the inspectors asking how the licensee planned to meet the ASME OM code for the failure of SI valve in IR 04447342.
These are examples of licensee's lack of clear and concise documentation of how they are satisfying the requirements of the ASME OM code. Upon further discussion with the licensee, they are considering being more explicit in their CAP process and documentation on how they are satisfying ASME OM code requirements.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On September 8, 2023, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Harris Welt, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
00594046
Demin Resin Volume Inconsistent with UFSAR & Calcs
2/21/2007
04079285
Lack of Resin/Filter Control Impacts UFSAR Assumptions
11/30/2017
233520
Vendor Observation on MSSV MSA at Vendor Facility
03/27/2019
04331822
Generator Voltage Regulator Common Alarm
04/01/2020
04447342
1SI8856B Failed As-Found Testing
09/19/2021
04447391
1RY8010B Failed As-Found Testing at Vendor
09/19/2021
04450104
1RY8010A Failed As-Found Testing at Vendor
10/01/2021
04450108
1RY8010C Failed As-Found Testing at Vendor
10/01/2021
04463772
Spare Relief Valve Removed from Plant 1SI8856B
11/30/2021
04464358
NRC ID: PI&R Inspection - IR 04279156 - NCAP v. CAP
2/02/2021
04464412
NRC ID: PI&R Inspection - IR 04277073 - NCAP v. CAP
2/02/2021
04464431
NRC ID: Application of Buried Pipe and Sys Hlth on
0SX138A
2/02/2021
04464531
NRC IDed PI&R Concerns with Current NFPA 20
Noncompliance
2/03/2021
04467164
CO2 Storage Tank Trouble
2/16/2021
04470954
Byron NSRB Meetings Held on December 1 & 2, 2021
01/10/2022
04490983
Cyber Security Self-Assessment
04/07/2022
04497981
NRC ID - Lack of Design Basis Analysis for Tornado Impacts
05/05/2022
04499079
1Q22 NRC Integrated Insp Rpt: Green NCV for CO2
Actuation
05/11/2022
04499097
Security Equipment - Door 551 Nuisance Taper Alarms
05/11/2022
04506137
A Potential Trend in WO and Surveillance Paperwork
Closeouts
06/17/2022
04510682
Byron NSRB Meetings Held on June 21 & 22, 2022
07/13/2022
04518855
Unexpected Alarm
08/25/2022
04535496
22 M&T Training Objective 2 & 3 Self-Assessment
11/08/2022
04542707
NRC ID - Inadequate Past Operability Review for 1SX168
2/14/2022
04542707
NRC ID-Inadequate Past Operability Review for 1SX168
Failure
2/14/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
04546760
Byron NSRB Meetings Held on December 14-15, 2022
01/05/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
04551946
Chemical Addition Issue
2/01/2023
04561699
NRC ID; Disconnect in Selective Leaching Procedure
03/13/2023
04690437
07/13/2023
294984
NRC IN 19-09: Spent Fuel Cask Movement Issues
11/06/2019
4333276
Leak On AF Pumps Recirc Return to SX Piping
04/07/2020
4392079
Possible Through-Wall SX Leak - 1B AF Pp
2/25/2020
4403027
2SI121B Failed its As Found Lift Pressure Test
2/17/2021
4403055
Create WO to Test 1SI121A (Scope Expansion for 2SI121B)
2/17/2021
4403056
Create a WO to Test 1SI121B (Scope Expansion for
2SI121B)
2/17/2021
4418541
Through-wall SX Leak - 1B AF Pp Oil Cooler
04/23/2021
4447901
B1R24 FAC; Component SNM1MS116AA-E2 Low Wall
Thickness
09/22/2021
4448574
ASME Code Paperwork not Processed for 1VA08S and
2VA08S
09/25/2021
4448686
ASME Code Paperwork not Processed for 2VA08S Repairs
09/26/2021
4460086
Create a WO to Test 2SI121A (Scope Expansion for
1SI121B)
11/11/2021
4471596
Action to Review OPEX Industry Event Trend in Operator
Fundamentals
01/13/2022
4472994
Min Wall Piping Thickness Below 87.5% of Nominal
01/20/2022
4482044
1VA01SA Min Wall Piping Thickness Below 87.5% of
Nominal
03/02/2022
4482307
B1R25 FAC Piping Replacement WO Request for
1FW001/2C
03/03/2022
4494261
2VP01AD Min Wall Piping Thickness Below 87.5% of
Nominal
04/20/2022
4495057
2VP01AC Min Wall Piping Thickness Below 87.5% of
Nominal
04/23/2022
4499079
1Q22 NRC Integrated Insp Rpt: Green NCV for C02
Actuation
05/11/2022
21501
Relief Valve Failed As-Found Test
09/09/2022
4535936
B2R24 FAC Min-Wall Calc Evaluation Due Date Extension
Needed
11/09/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
4536886
NRC RIS 2022-02 Op Leakage Inconsistent w/Op Eval Proc
11/12/2022
4540550
NRC ID: PZR PORV IST Test Requirements
2/02/2022
4560499
B1R25 FAC-1FW03CB-16" Evaluation Required
03/08/2023
4564310
B1R25 FAC/EPC Component Wall Thickness >120% Tnom
03/23/2023
4669118
Diver Required for VT-3 Exam of 0A SX M/U Pump Support
04/11/2023
4671174
Wall Loss Between 30&50% on 0SX32AB
04/19/2023
4671176
Wall Loss Between 30&50% on 0SX33AB
04/19/2023
4672502
NRC NCV 05000454/2023010-01, Selective Leaching
Examinations
04/24/2023
4675797
0D SXCT Structures Monitoring Inspection Observations
05/05/2023
4676538
Potential DIER OPEX Applicability to Byron Station
05/08/2023
4678277
0E SXCT Structures Monitoring - Concrete Degradation
05/15/2023
4679889
SXCT Structures Monitoring Inspection Observations
05/22/2023
4682694
NOS ID: Revise Exam Coversheets for NDE Testings
06/05/2023
4682694
NOS ID: Revise Exam Coversheets for NDE Testings
06/05/2023
4682700
NOS ID: Have NDE Level III Complete a MT Fluorescent
Demo
06/05/2023
4683251
NOS ID: Ensure License Extension Assignments are
Accepted
06/07/2023
4683573
NOS ID: Tendon Nonconformance Eval has Not Been
Approved
06/08/2023
4683576
NOS ID: Discrepancies Btwn Vendor Report and Exam
Datasheets
06/08/2023
4683580
NOS ID: Nonconformance Evals Not Archived W/ Vendor
Report
06/08/2023
4683658
NOS ID: Underground Ground Cable Water Contact
Documentation
06/09/2023
4683660
NOS ID: An Aging Management (AMP) Inspection Not
Retrievable
06/09/2023
4689036
FAC WO Request for Tee Replacement
(1FW03CB-16" 1FW03EB-6")
07/06/2023
FLEX Readiness Fleet Review
04/07/2017
CA 4549945-08
Revise EQ Binder as a Result of NRC POV Inspection
08/02/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
(Root Cause
Investigation
Report)
1B AF Pump Failed to Start (RCI)
08/18/2023
4699955
Procedure Enhancement for Causal Evaluation
09/01/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4700973
Procedure Enhancement for BMP 3100-23
09/06/2023
Drawings
M-136
Diagram of Safety Injection
AZ
Engineering
Changes
0000338067
Replacement of AF Diesel Driven, Shutdown Safety Valve
(SSV)
09/06/2002
MRC Package
(8.22.23)
Management Review Committee (MRC) Package
08/22/2023
N56964-00-0049
2-17
Form NVR-1 Report of Repair/Replacement Activities for
Nuclear Pressure Relief Devices
01/17/2023
NES-EIC-30.00
EQ-BB-HE-10A
Environmental Qualification Engineering
NES-EIC-30.0
EG-BB-HE-10A
Environmental Qualification Engineering
6B
Issue Report Generation (Issue Identification and Screening
Process)
PI-AA-126-1001-
F-01
(2023) Byron Station Preparation for NRC Problem and
Resolution (PI&R) Inspection
Miscellaneous
Project BYR-
59609 (AT
4679424-02)
Failure Analysis of Valve, Solenoid, 1/4" NPT, 2-Way
Normally Open
06/08/2023
0BMSR 3.10.B.14
Diesel Fire Pump Engine 18-Month/1500 Hour Maintenance
BMP 3100-23
IST Crosby Safety/Relief Valve Bench Testing
CC-BY-118
Site Implementation of Diverse and Flexible Coping
Strategies (FLEX) and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
Program
Inservice Testing (IST) Program Corporate Technical
Positions
Procedures
Procedure Use and Adherence
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Maintenance Planning
OP-BY-101-0001
Byron Operations Standard Philosophy Handbook
Processing of Level 3 OPEX Evaluations
Issue Identification and Screening Process
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure
NOS-BYR-22-01
Maintenance Functional Area Audit Report
2/09/2022
NOSA-BYR-22-
Operations Functional Area Audit
08/31/2022
Self-Assessments
NOSA-BYR-23-
Engineering Programs Audit Report Byron Nuclear Station
06/14/2023
05157042
Replacement of the Fuel Shutoff Solenoid
03/17/2023
05187937
1SI8856A Relief Valve Test
09/19/2021
237710
Diesel Driven AF Pump Inspection per BMP 3203-1
03/23/2023
Work Orders
27979-03
EWP/MM Bench Test Previously Removed Relief Valve and
Repair
2/17/2021