IR 05000454/1997006

Insp Repts 50-454/97-06 & 50-455/97-06 on 970415-17.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Evaluation of Performance During Plant Biennial Exercise of Emergency Plan & Review of Previous Emergency Preparedness Open Items

ML20141K104
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	05/19/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20141K089	List: IR 05000454/1997006 ML20141K088
References
50-454-97-06, 50-454-97-6, 50-455-97-06, 50-455-97-6, NUDOCS 9705280319
Download: ML20141K104 (11)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 i

Docket Nos: 50-454; 50-455  !

Licenses No: NPF-37: NPF 66

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Reports No: 50-454/97006(DRS); 50-455/97006(DRS)

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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)

Facility: Byron Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 Location: 4450 North German Church Road Byron, IL 61010 Dates: April 15-17,1997 Inspectors: James Foster, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Analyst 1

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Robert Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst l

Nicholas Hilton, Resident inspector Thomas Ploski, Emergency Response Coordinator Lawrence Cohen, Emergency Preparedness Specialist Approved by: James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety I

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9705280319 970519 PDR ADOCK 05000454 0 PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Byron Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 NRC inspection Reports 50-454/97006; 50-455/97006 This inspection included evaluation of performance during the plant's biennial exercise of the Emergency Plan and review of previous emergency preparedness open items by the plant resident staff and headquarters and regional emergency preparedness inspectors.

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Plant Sunoort

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Overall performance during the 1997 Emergency Preparedness exercise was goo Emergency offsite notifications and offsite protective action recommendations were correct and timely. Transfers of command and control of event response were orderly and i timely. Two Exercise Weaknesses were identified relative to classification and utilization l of the Acting Station Director's procedure and associated checklis *

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General ly, performance in the Control Room Simulator was very good as evidenced by strong operator communications. " Repeat back" communications and " peer checking" of controls to be manipulated were evident. Operator statements and actions indicated a detailed understanding of plant conditions. The Unit Supervisor displayed effective command and control of the operators. However, some specific weaknesses were observed as noted below. (Section P4.1.b.1)

The Shift Engineer reviewed the plant emergency action levels several times but focused on an explosion in the diesel generator crankcase and classified the event as an Unusual Event. The loss of all but one power supply to the Unit 1 Essential

Safety Feature buses warranted the classification of an Alert. This was an Exercise l Weakness. (Section P4.1.b.1)

! Once the Alert was declared, the Shift Supervisor did not utilize the Acting Station Director procedure nor associated checklist. This was an Exercise Weakness. One of the checklist items, initiation of the Emergency Response Data System, was

overlooked by the control room staff but was caught by Technical Support Center (TSC) personnel. (Section P4.1.b.1)

I Overall performance in the TSC was excellent. Personnel were professional, and teamwork and communications were very good. (Section P4.1.b.2)

The overall performances of Operational Support Center (OSC) management and staff were very good. Teams were quickly assembled and dispatched from the OSC. Teams were very well controlled and team exposure was monitored constantly. Team size was reduced when high radiation fields were encountere Communications between teams and OSC personnel were good. (Section P4.1.b.3)

• Overall performance in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was good. The

! EOF staff in the Dixon EOF adequately performed all required activities in a correct

and timely manner. (Section P4.1.b.4)

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Renort Details l IV. Plant Suncort

l P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation  !

! l P Review of Exernlem Objectives and Scenario (82302)

The inspectors reviewed the 1997 exercise objectives and scenario and determined that they were acceptable. The scenario provided an appropriate framework to support demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan. The scenario included a large radiological release and numerous equipment failures. Exercise realism was enhanced by use of a mock NRC Site Team.

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i P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P Evaluated Biennial Emeroency Prenaredness Exerel==

l l insoection Scone (82301)

l On April 16,1997, the licensee conducted a biennial exercise involving partial State ,

l participation and full county participation. The exercise was conducted to test j i major portions of the onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities. The j j licensee activated its emergency response organization and emergency response  !

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l The inspectors evaluated licensee performance in the following emergency response

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l e Control Room Simulator (CRS)

I e Technical Support Center (TSC) i e Operational Support Center (OSC)

e Dixon Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

l The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of abnormal plant conditions, l classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development

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of protective action recommendations, command and control, communications, and the over$ implementation of the emergency plan. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques in each of the facilities to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of exercise performanc Emeroenev Resoonse Facility Observations and Findinas Control Room Simulator (CRS)

l In the CRS an excellent pre-exercise briefing was provided to the players, including

! initial conditions and paperwork which would have been completed by the

preceding shift. " Repeat back" communications and " peer checking" of controls to i be manipulated were evident. Periodic briefings kept operations personnel aware of j current conditions and desired goals. Briefing initiations and conclusions were crisp i

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and formal. Operator statements and actions indicated a detailed understanding of plant conditions. Strong command and control of the operators was displayed by the Unit Superviso .

Exercise controllers properly delayed providing the first of the exercise's events

(explosion in the crankcase of the 18 Diesel Generator) until testing of the diesels was begun. Control room operators immediately suspected trouble when the

., individual doing the testing ceased radio communication with the control roo l Operators dispatched assistance to the individual injured in the explosion and

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learned that the explosion had not caused a fire. Shortly thereafter, operators observed that breaker 1414 had lost control power, and there had been a loss of all

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but one power supply to the Unit 1 Essential Safety Feature buse l Effective communication was noted. An operator brought various concerns to the attention of the Unit Supervisor, including the risks associated with ramping down

, power while electric supplies were degraded, and the possibility that one of the

steam generators was faulted. When the OSC was activated, operators already l performing tasks in the plant were advised by radio that they were under the !

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control of the OS I i The Shift Engineer reviewed the plant Emergency Action Levels (EALs) several l times but apparently focused on the diesel generator crankcase explosion and thus classified the event as an Unusual Event. Operators were aware of the degraded 1 condition of the plant power supplies and had begun to analyze the extent of the j degradation. A pro-active precautionary staffing of Technical Support Center (TSC)

J positions was requasted to assist in evaluating the overall condition of the plant.

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The loss of all but one power supply to the Unit 1 Essential Safety Feature buses warranted the classification of an Alert per EAL MA1, " Power to ESF buses reduced l to a single power. source for 2: 15 minutes". When this classification was not j made within a reasonable period of time (15 minutes), a controyer prompted the participants to make the classification to preserve the scenario time line. The

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failure to properly classify the accident scenario at the highest appropriate classification level was an Exercise Weakness that will be tracked as inspection

. Followup Item 50-454/97006-01; 50-455/97006-0 Once the Alert was declared, the Shift Engineer failed to utilize the Acting Station Director checklist included as an attachment to Emergency Plan implementing Procedure (EPIP) BZP 310-5, " Acting Station Director or Station Director", Rev. 23, and associated checklist, BZP 310-5T1, " Acting Station Director Checklist", Rev. The Acting Station Director Checklist indicated that it is to be used as a guide by the Acting Station Director to assist in the completion of emergency responsibilities and duties <,

One of the BZP 310-5T1 checklist items (Step 5), initiation of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) as soon as possible but no later than one hour following an Alert classification or higher, was overlooked by the control room staff but was caught during checklist verification in the TS .

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The failure to utilize the Acting Station Director procedure and associated checklist was an Exercise Weakness that will be tracked as inspection Followup item 50-454/g7006-C2; 50-455/g7006-0 An additional communicator and clerical support were called to the CRS to assist with notifications and other communications. Event notification message forms and verbal messages to State and simulated NRC officials were completed in an detailed and timely manne Communications between responders in the CRS and TSC were good. Transfer of command and control of event response activities from the Acting Station Director

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to the TSC's Station Director was orderly. The Shift Engineer properly advised the Station Director that EAL review indicated that the latter should declare a Site Area

. Emergenc b.2 Technical Suonort Center (TSC)

Overall, performance in the TSC was excellent. Personnel were professional, and teamwork and communications were very good. The TSC staff rapidly activated their equipment and established their communications links with the CRS and OS Status boards were well-utilized and continuously update No public address announcements were made regarding the Unusual Event declaration. Public address announcements of plant conditions with appropriate instructions could prevent unnecessary phone calls to the control room during an actual emergenc Transfers of command and control to and from the TSC were well-coordinated and implemented. The Station Director ensured the staff was aware of the current status of communications and forthcoming notification The Operation, and Technical Directors were pro-active 'in tracking plant conditions and comparing emergency action levels for possible event paths leading to potential i event classification upgrades. Tasks and priorities were effectively identified for i OSC repair teams by the Maintenance, Operations, Technical, and Radiation l Protection Directors and quickly communicated to the OSC. The Tasks and  ;

Priorities status board effectively tracked the OSC repair teams' priorities and i statu !

Individuals assigned to participate as the " mock NRC" site team arrived at the TSC, 1 were appropriately briefed by an individual appointed as the NRC team liaison, and were provided with binders containing plant information and telephone number The Environs and Radiation Protection Directors maintained appropriate awareness of the plant and offsite radiological conditions. Dose assessment calculations !

conservatively projected offsite doses during the radiological release. The Radiation !

Protection Director provided excellent technicalinsight when a significant difference between TSC and EOF dose projections was identified. The dose assessor quickly identified the cause of the differences and reported the reason to the directo Offsite survey teams were effectively positioned to locate and monitor the

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radiological release. Communications with the offaite teams were clear and 4 j~ ' efficien j

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Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) to the State were efficiently made 4_ according to the procedures'. PARS and protective actions issued by the State of lilinois were effectively communicated and displayed on a status boar '

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An excellent discussion was conducted among the TSC directors for sending a

response team into high radiation areas to look for the radiological release path out

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of containment. The directors demonstrated awareness of radiological and safety z concern l i

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Habitability monitoring of the TSC was conducted periodically when increasing radiation levels in the plant were identified. A radiation protection technician (RPT) l was observed on two' occasions, dragging the frisker's probe on the carpet, a poor j demonstration of health physics technique l

Communications in the TSC were excellent. Personnel provided very good f teamwork by correcting and following up on communications. The Station Director provided frequent, comprehensive briefings. A cordless microphone was circulated s among the directors, facilitating comments and questions during facility briefing l The Corporate Emergency Operations Facility (CEOF) staff was unable to maintain radio communications with the offsite survey teams. The TSC retained control and communications with the offsite field teams after command and control was transferred to the CEO : Ooerational suonort center (Osci and innlant Teams '

The overall performance of OSC management and staff was very good. Teams were quickly assembled and dispatched from the OSC. Team radiological exposure was monitored constantly by the escorting RPT. Appropriately qualified, experienced personnel were utilized for the team The OSC was fully staffed and operationalin a timely manner following the Alert i

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declaration. Status boards were effectively used to track personnelin each technical discipline who were available for assignment to an inplant team as well as the teams themselves. Provisions for reviewing radiation work permits, issuing dosimetry and establishing dose limits were efficient and effective. Simulated !

exposures received by inplant team members were effectively tracke ;

The priority assigned to each inplant team's mission by the TSC's decision makers was clearly understood by OSC management and communicated to OSC personne i Inplant team briefings were clear, concise, and included current information on relevant, simulated radiological conditions. Team leaders were designated and RPTs were assigned to inplant teams when appropriate, inplant teams were issued ;

hand-held radios and were advised to transmit progress reports to OSC '

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Inplant teams were dispatched within about 10 minutes of TSC management's requests. All teams were adequately debriefed and were asked to report any unexpected conditions that they encountered. Briefings and debriefings were documented per procedures. _ OSC management remained well aware of inplant - j teams' progress and result The OSC Manager and OSC Supervisor provided very good periodic briefings to available staff on changing plant conditions, results reported by inplant teams, major event response decisions and simulated onsite radiological condition '

Communications with the CRS and TSC were well-maintained with the exception

~ that OSC management was not informed of the General Emergency declaration for approximately 45 minute After the simulated release began, abnormally high simulated radiation levels were reported in various inplant areas. The existence of these abnormal conditions was not adequately incorporated into plans for staffing two relatively large, multi-disciplinary inplant teams to assess and restore one or both trains of the containment spray system. Members of these multi-disciplinary teams were advised to remain near their RPT escort, although each team member was carrying an alarming dosimeter, and remaining near the RPT would result in team members having less freedom to attempt assessment and coractive action j Teams were pre-determined and included a mix of all disciplines. This created logistic difficulties that could have been avoided. The concept of As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) was not achieved because superflucus individuals

. were allowed to enter the simulated high radiation area. Specifically, a containment spray breaker inspection required only operations and electrical maintenance personnel. However, a team that included instrument and mechanical maintenance personnel was dispatched. The RPT sent all but one operator and one electrician :

back to OS OSC management demonstrated good concern for limiting the simulated radiological exposures received by personnel within the OSC. OSC management coordinated l with TSC managers and prudently decided to relocate the OSC (simulated) to its i pre-planned alternate location (the Shift Manager's office). The OSC Director noted j that ventilation in the Shift Manager's office would probably be tripped off due to l high radiation levels. Therefore, habitability by a large number of people could be a ;

proble l Dixon Emeroency Operations Facility (EOF)

Overall performance in the EOF was good. Staff in the Dixon EOF perivimed required activities in a correct and timely manner. Command and control in the EOF ,

was very good throughout the exercise. Status boards were generally well- i maintained. The noise level was kept low, and security personnel effectively controlled access to the EOF and the adjacent Joint Public information Cente I

The EOF staff promptly assumed their required functions as they entered the EO It took 39 minutes to achieve minimum staffing and for the Manager of Emergency

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Operations (MEO) to take over command and control from the CEOF. Transfer of command and control was effective and smoot j j Communications and information flow within the EOF and between other facilities

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and the State of lilinois were good. Notifications to offsite authorities were timel The licensee utilized a " mock NRC" cell to support simulated communications with

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the NRC. The MEO communicated with TSC and CEOF managers frequently and periodically discussed events with the mock NRC site team and lilinois Department

. of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) representative The Technical Support Manager briefed the EOF staff approximately every 30 minutes. The EOF staff conducted knowledgeable technical discussions.

i~ EOF personnel maintained good communications with the offsite survey teams.

l The location and findings were kept current. However, the offsite survey team's j l data was not displayed prominently.

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a l Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) were well-coordinated with State '

L decision makers. The status board showing the licensee's PARS and the State's I

actions was slow to be posted with information on the State's action The licensee was proactive in dose assessment and dose projection, including back-calculating and verifying plant release rates from actual field measurements.

l Recovery Discussions  !

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Recovery discussions observed in the TSC and EOF were adequate. The lead controller provided the EOF and TSC staffs with scenario data and sets of questions ,

to initiate the recovery phase of the exercise. This approach (answering questions !

l rather than following the recovery procedure) to the recovery discussions caused l confusion and recovery efforts were terminated earl Scenario and Exercise Control The inspectors made observations during the exercise to assess the challenge and l realism of the scenario and to evaluate the control of the exercise.

p The inspectors determined that the scenario was appropriate to test emergency l capabilities and demonstrate onsite exercise objectives. Control of the exercise was good. No controller prompting or other problems were identifie Licensee Self-Critinue i

The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's post-exercise facility critiques immediately following the exercise. Participants and controllers participated in the ;

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discussions and completed formal critique forms Site Quality Verification personnel also observed and evaluated the exercise for audit purposes.

j Participants and controllers were self-critical, and numerous issues, both positive i and negative, were discussed. Participating personnel had an opportunity to speak.

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l Controllers requested wr;tten comments from the participants to augment the

controllers' document

Prior to the exit meeting, the licensee exercise evaluation organization provided a ,

summary of its overall assessment of the exercise, which mirrored the NRC evaluation team's conclusions. The licensee's overall self-assessment was very '

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! Overall Conclusions  ;

The exercise was a good comonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement  !

its emergency plans and procedures. Event classifications, with the exception of

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the initial Unusual Event, were correct and timely. Offsite notifications and offsite i protective action recommendations were correct and timely. Inplant activities were '

well-thought-out and well-coordinated. Transfers of command and control were -

appropriately coordinate The licensee's overall self-assessment was very goo (

P8 Miscellaneous EP lasues

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(Closed) Inspection Followup item (454/455/9501106): Tracking of inplant teams  !

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in the OSC. During this exercise,inplant teams were coordinated and tracked very  !

well, and there was no lack of understanding of the status of the various inplant {

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teams. This item is close :

V. Management Meetings 1

' Exit Meetina Summary i l

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the i conclusion of the inspection on April 17,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings )

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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection l should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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Licensee l l

J. Bauer, Health Physics Supervisor i

E. Bendis, Operations 1 D. Brindle, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor l l T. Burns, Scenario Development Supervisor E. Campbell, Maintenance Manager

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} R. Colglazier, NRC Coordinator {

D. Drawbough, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator P. Elkmann, Corporate EP, Lead Onsite Controller T. Gierich, Operations Management P. Johnson, Engiaeering Superintendent {

W. Kouba, LRWC Superintendent H. Lange, Services R. Linboom, Site Quality Verification Senior inspector

, W. McNeill, ALARA/ Operations Radiation Protection l S. Morrell, Emergency Preparedness Trainer M. Rasmussen, Operations Engineer T. Schmidt, Training M. Snow, Work Control Superintendent D. Stobaugh, Operations & Onsite Programs

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l M. Vonk, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Director  !

l D. Wozniak, Engineering Manager i

L lilinois Deoartment of Nuclear Safety l

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C. Thompson, Resident Engineer

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HEC N. Hilton, Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors

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ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED i Opened 50-454;455/97006-01 IFl Exercise Weakness, failure to classify to the highest applicable EAL

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L 50-454:455/97006-02 IFl Exercise Weakness, failure to utilize the Acting Station 1 Director procedure and checklist )

Closed 50-454:455/95011-06 lFI Team tracking in the OSC l

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

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i ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable

CEOF Corporate Emergency Operations Facility

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CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRS Control Room Simulator

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[ DRS Division of Reactor Safety j EAL Emergency Action Level l j ENS Emergency Notification System l

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EOF Emergency Operations Facility I

EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure l l ERDS Emergency Response Data System i

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ERO Emergency Response Organization IFl inspection Followup item l MEO Manager of Emergency Operations )

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NPF Nuclear Power Facility '

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSC Operational Support Center i PAR Protective Action Recommendation

! PDR NRC Public Document Room

RPT Radiation Protection Technician l

TS Technical Specification TSC Technical Support Center i

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