IR 05000454/1997009
| ML20211B212 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1997 |
| From: | Grant G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Graesser K COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| 50-454-97-09, 50-454-97-9, 50-455-97-09, 50-455-97-9, 50-456-97-09, 50-456-97-9, 50-457-97-09, 50-457-97-9, EA-97-264, NUDOCS 9709250113 | |
| Download: ML20211B212 (30) | |
Text
.
p* *a,I4 Puk&c
.
'
We
SUBJECT:
NRC PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE REPORT
Dear Mr. Graesser:
,
This refers to the combined Byron /Braidwood Predecisional Enforcement Conference conducted by Mr. James L. Caldwell, Deputy Regiunal Administiator, and other members of the NRC Region ill and headquarters staff on September 11,1997, The subject of this conference was the apparent violations at Byron and Braidwood Stations, identified in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 454/97009(DRP); 50-455/97009(DRP); and 50 456/97009(DRP); 50-457/97009(DRP), concerning emergency core cooling system venting. We have enclosed a partiallist of attendees (Enclosure 1), a copy of the draf t proposed violations related to Byron that were provided to you at the conference (Enclosure 2), and a copy of the handout provided during the conferenco (Enclosure 3).
You will be notified by separate correspondence of our Jocision re0arding the enforcement action based on the information presented and discussed at the predecisional enforcement conference. No response is required until you are notified of the proposed enforcement action.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of tnis letter and the enclosed report will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room, 9709250113 970917 PDR ADOCK 05000454 G
-
h
,
,
. _. _ _
- - -
. -. -
- -..
- -.
. - - -. - -
.
- ~
..
.
- ~.
...
'k
$ GrCDssef?
' 2 ~-
.-
- . ny
-
<,
.
.
..
.
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this Predecisional Enforcement Conference.
,
,
-
Sincerely,
,
/s/ M.
I,. Dapas for=
Geoffrey E. Granti Directoi
.
.
.
Division of Reactor Projects
. Docket Nos. - 50-454; 50-455'
' Licenses Nos. NPF-37; NPF-66
-
,
Enclosures:
As Stated.
'
' cc w/o encis:
R. J. Manning, Executive c
,
Vice President, Generation.
.
l.
M. Wallace, Senior Vice i
President, Corporate Services H. G. Stanley, Vice President -
.
'
PWR Operations
, Liaison Officer, NOC-BOD D. A. Sager, Vice President,
.
Generation Support D. Farrar, Nuclear Regulatory Services Manager 1. Johnson, Licensing
-
Operations Manager
,
l K. Kofron, Station Manager
'
D. Brindle, Regulatory Assurance l
Supervisor.
!
cc w/encis:
Document Control Desk-Licensing l
Richard Hubbard Nathan Schloss, Economist p
Office of the Attorney General State Liairon Officer-State Uaison Officer, Wisconsin Chairman, Illinois Commerce
!
Commission Distribution:
Docket File w/encls SRI Brcidwood w/encls DRP w/encls g
OC/LFDCB w/encls Project Mgr., NRR w/ enc!s -
TSS w/encls
'
- PUBLIC IE-01 w/encis '
J. Lieberman, OE w/encls DRS (2) w/encls A. Beach w/encls J. Goldberg, OGC w/encls Rlll PRR w/encls Deputy RA w/encis..
R. Zimmerman, NRR w/encls RAC1 (E-Mail)
Rill Enf. Coord, w/encls CAA1 (E-Mail)
DOCDESK (E-Mail)
i.
.
.
.
'
I DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\BYRO\\BYR97009.ENF SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES J
_- T.
w...m.e em 4 m. we m o. n c. cm wem.m.a u e r - em wen.n a.,
u m
n.
OFFICE Rill ()
Alli
/J Rill Rllla ;p Rlli l
L NAME-TTongue:d@.RLanksburyttd HClayton -
BBMcV GGrantM
-
DATE Oi! /97 P 09/n/97 09/ -/97 09/"/97 0 @ 97 L
l OFFICIAL. RECORD COPY
L
-
-.
..
- -. -.-
-
..
-.
.
--
-
.-
,
.
..
.
- _. -.
-. -
.-
~
- - -. -
- --.-- -. - _. -
- /
"
.. i
,..
3V KiGraesser:
-2-l
"
i'
,
1We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this Predecisional Enforcement
-
Conference;
'
Sincerely,
-
.
,
. Geoffrey E. Granti Director--
Division of Reactor Projects LDocket Nos. - 50 454: 50-455
Licenses Nos. NPF 37: NPF-66
>
Enclosures: ^As Stated
'
' cc w/o encls:.
R. J. Menning, Executive Vice President, Generation M. Wallace, Senior Vice
'
President, Corporate Services-H. G. Stanley, Vice President
.
PWR Operations
,
Liaison Officer,' NOC-BOD D. A. Sager, Vice President, Generation Support
D. Farrar, Nuclear Regulatory Services Manager 1. Johnson, Licensing Operations Manager
.
K. Kofron, Station Manager
D. Brindle, Regulatory Ascurance l
Supervisor
,
(See attached continued distribution)'
.
,
i.
2 DOCUMENT NAMEi G:\\BYRO lR\\BYR97009.ENF 2T. m. n.e m.
.we.
m m. w c. c.n nom.m s i==..v r. c.n.em.m
.v ci
]
' n. m...n - -
-
OFFICE Rl!I O
Rill -
a Rlli.
Rill 7 y Rlli
~~
NAME TTongue:dg2:4@Lanksbur#l HClayton (4 Blppgs( W GGrant DATE 09/t&/97 -
09/ lb/97.
09//7/97 09/" /97-09/ /97
-
- OFFICIAL. RECORD COPY (
.
N 1 -.,_
.
-.
._
_
..
,-
_ _.. _
_ _.
_
_ _ _.
, _ _..
.
.
_
... _
_
.__
_
_
N
j
+
a ENCLOSURE 1 Partial List of Pgfsons Present at Confiranca
,
Commonyysalth Edison Comoany (ComEdi-'
-
E. St'anley, Vice President - PWR D. Sager, Vice_ President Generation Support
,
K. Graesser, Site Vice President - Byron Station T. Tulon, Site Vice President Braldwood Station
_
l
-
W. Subalusky, Site Vice President LaSalle Station K. Kofton, Plant Manager _- Byron Station
.
2 R. Wegner, Operations Manager Byron Station
-
T. Gierich, Operations Manager _ Braidwood Station
,
-
D. Wozniak, Engineering Manager - Byron Station D. Brindle, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor - Byron Station -
T. Sirnpkin, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor Braidwood Station -
1. Johnson, LicensinD Operations Manager
~ U; S. Nurdpar Reaulatory CommissiOD J. Caldwell, Deputy Regional Administrator, Rill
.-
M. Dapas, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Rlli R. Capra, Director, Project Directorate 1112, NRR R. Lanksbury, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3
-
B. Berson, Regional Counsel H.- Clayton, Enforcement Officer
,
S. Burgess, Senior Resident inspectori Byron Station C. Phillips, Senior Resident inspector, Braidwood Station T. Tongue, Project Engineer N. Hilton. Resident inspector, Byron Station R. Burrows Reactor Engineer
,
d
%-
a F
,
--
,
e a,
-
-,,
,,
---~-p
_ _ _ _ _
)
DRAFT
~
The apparent violations discussed in this predecisional enforcement conference are subject
to further review and are subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.
ENCLOSURE 2 BYRON NUCLEAR POWER STATION PROPOSED VIOLATIONS -INSPECTION REPORT 97009 1.
Technical Specification 3.5.2 requires that two independent emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) subsystems be operable with each subsystem comprised of a) one operable centrifuga* r.harging pump, b) one aperable safety injection pump, c) one operable residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger, d) one operable RHR pump,
.
and, e) an operable flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and automatic opening of the containment sump suction valves.
Technical Specification Surveillance 4.5.2.b(1) requires that each ECCS subsystem be demonstrated operable at least once per 31 days by venting the ECCS pump casings and discharge piping high points outside of containment.
Contrary to the above:
a.
The inspectors identified that since commercial operation began in 1985 and 1986, respectively for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and continuing until May 1997, the EUCS subsystem consisting of a centrifugal charging (CV) system had not been demonstrated operable at least once per 31 days by venting the pump caring and the CV high points outside containment when the units were in Modes 1, 2, and 3.
b.
The inspectors identified that a Unit 1 high point vent,1RH027, on the b
discharge piping of the RHR heat exchanger outside of containment was not vented at least once per 31 days in Modes 1,2, and 3 to demonstrate operability from 1985 through June 2,1997.
2.
Technical Specification 3.3.2 requires that the engineered safety featutes actuation s
system (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be operable with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the trip setpoint column of Table 3.3-4.
Technical Specification Surveillance 4.3.2.1 requires that each ESFAC instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic actuation logic and relays shall be demonstrated operable by the performance of the ESFAS instrument; tion surveillance requirements specified in Table 4.3-2.
Technical Specification Table 4.3 2, Functional Unit 3.a.(2). " Containment isolation.
Phase A isolation" requires that automatic actuation logic and actuation relays receive a slave relay test on e quarterly basis.
The apparent violations discussed in this predecisional enforcement conference are subject to further review and are subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.
_
..__
-
~
.
!
DRAFT l
.
The apparent violations discussed in this predecisional enforcement conference are subject
to further review and are subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.
Technical Specification Definition 1.31 states,in part, that a slave relay test shall include a continuity check, as a minimum, of associated testable actuation devices.
Contrary to the above:
The licensee identified that the continuity test for the slave relay contacts a.
that actuate the CV letdown orifice isolation valves 1CV8149A/B/C and
'
2CV8149A/B/C, (Containment Phase A lsolation Valves) were not being performed on a quarterly basis since April 29,1991.
a b.
The licensee identified that the continuity test for the slave relay contacts that actuate the CV letdown isolation valves 1CV8152,1CV8160, 2CV8152, and 2CV8160, (Cantainment Phase A isolation Valves) was not being performed on a quarterly basis since June 13,1991, 3,
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings "
requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. The procedures shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Contrary to the above as of June 2,1997, procedures 1BOS 5.2.b-1, " Unit 1 ECCS Venting and Valve Alignment Monthly Surveillance," Revision 5 and 2BOS 5.2.b-1,
" Unit 2 ECCS Venting and Valve Alignment Monthly Surveillance," Revision 4, f ailed to have appropri6te steps specified to vent the safety injection pumps.
The apparent violations discussed in this predecisional enforcement conference are subject to further review and are subject to change prior to any resulting enforceinent action.
__ _ __ _ __ _ __ - _ - _-___-_ __-_-_- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-_
ENCLOSURE 3
,
BYRON /BRAIDWOOD NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS
-
ECCS VENTING and SLAVE RELAY TESTING PRE-DECISIONAL ENFORCE ENT CONFERENCE September 11,1997 NRC Region III
.
.....
-
.
.
AGKNDA
+ OPE NIN G RE MARKS + CV VE:NTING R. Wegner
+ RH VENTING, D. Wozniac
'
SI PEMP SURVEILLANCE, SLAVE RELAY TESTING
+ CLOSING RE MARKS G. Stan ey
..,,..
.
- - _
.
_
__
_
_ _ _
_ _ _
!
!
-
i
!
j OPKNIN'G REMARKS
'
>
!
i
!
!
+ Agree with the inspection findings supporting the l
apparent violations
,
!
-
i
+ XRC's message is clear - literal compliance with l
Technical Specifications
-
!
{
+ Byron and Braidwood strive to comply with a!!
l regulatory requirements i
!
!
...
...
..
i
- ___ _,_. _
..
._.__
-
....
.
.
.-.-.-
..
-
-.
,,
,
-
__
_
i
ECCS VENTING
'
,
!
i
.
i i
ISSUES
'
+
i
!
POSITION
+
i ROOT CAUSE
!
+
i
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE l
+
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
+
!
,
.
}
}
!
!
,
i i
i I
-
'
....
.~
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,.. _. _,,.. -.,, -,..
.... _. _. -,., _.. _ _ _. _. _ _. _ _ _
, _ _, _
,,, _ _.... _, _..
. _... _ _,,,.,,,..... -,.. ~,
-
.
.
...
,.,
i
$l
!
ECCS VENTING ISSUES
-
l Failure to be in compliance with the Tec anical
+
,
j Speci5 cations Byron and Braidwood
+ CV Venting i
- Pump casings
- CV High points Byron
,
+ RH Venting
+ SI Pump Sunreillance Procedure
.
!
'
,.
.,,
,
- - -.
-
c
- -
-.e
-
,.
-
.
,
CV VENTING
'
,
.
- 1 Issue:
Failure to vent CV system accorc.ing
+
to Tecanical Specification requirements Position
+
i Compliance issue was evaluated previously
l Determination of compliance
+ Self-venting pump
+ System always under pressure
.
-
,
..,
.
.
ROOT CAUSE
~
-
+ Faulty evaluation that the continuous venting feature met the Technical Specification requirements
.
.
-
....
..
i i
l SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
)
Minimal safety significance
+
{
Weekly / Monthly UT surveillance has revealed no voids
,
Minima: impact on CV system function ca3 ability
!
+
l Fully capable of performing its intended design function, including design basis accident mitigation l
j
,
n
5
..
-
..,
.
-
- - - - -
-
.-.
..
l
)
>
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
,
!
Actions to prevent recurrence
+
l Ultrasonic testing inspection of vulnerable areas in CV I
system
,
+ Unit 1 and Unit 2 - monthly testing Revised procedure / schedule as appropriate (By - 06/97, Bw - 7/97Y
n Review of selected Technical Specification surveillances to verify literal compliance (08/29/97)
,
n Distributed Station Manager letters (09/10/97)
'
Plant Operational Review Committee (PORC) involvement
'
(11/07/97)
'
,
Effectiveness Reviews (09/11/98)
,
-
.
..
..
.
.
.
- -- - - - -
!
I f
[
I
,
I i
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS - cunt.
j
.
,
s
j Actions to achieve compliance (08/13/97)
+
j Appropriate Licensing submittals were made
.
f i
!
,
i i
!
i i
!
!
!
,
3 i
s i
!
"
i
i
!
.:.
..
,
!
.---- -
.
.
-.
...
_
..
.
..
i
i
!
,
I i
i i
RH DISCHARGE VENT'
!
Issue:
Failure to vent Unit 1 RH c ischarge piping
+
j vent 1RH027 per Technica Saecifications l
Root Cause
-
+
.
l Deficient surveillance procedure
.
i
!
f
'
!
[
l l
'
l
i l
I1
.., z;.
,
,
l SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
- -
Minimal safety significance
+
Minimal impact on RH system function capabi;.ity
+
Fully capable of performing its intended design function, i
l
including design basis accident mitigation
>
h i
'
!
!
,
i
.
4
-..... :.
,
.
-
. - -
_
__
_
.
,
l
!
-
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
!
)
+ Revised Unit 1 Monthly Venting Survei. lance
!
procedure to incorporate 1RH027 (06/03/97)
+ Reviewed ECCS isometric drawings, verifying a.
aig a point vent valves are included in surveillance l
procedure (06/08/97)
)
l i
-
,
..,.., _.
.
.
.
.
_
.
l
.
j
!
i l
SI PUNIP SURVEILLANCE
\\
i
'
l Issue:
Inadequate SI pump venting
+
l surveillance procedure (1/2 BOS 5.2.3-1)
!
Root Cause
+
!
!
Procedure was inadequate in that all potential vent paths were i
not identified
!
.
,
>
!
.
....:, s
.
_ _.,
_
_ _ _.
.
,_
.
_ _.
_
.
.
i
.
!
i
!
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
!
!
!
!
..
M, inimal.
+
Pump venting capability was maintained i
i i
t
!
i
!
t r
!
I
!
I i
!
!
,
is l
-,..,.
.,
l
-
-
--
-
- -
-
-
.
- -
_ --
.
i
,
!
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS I
'
Revised 1/2 BOS 5.2.>1, "ECCS Venting anc i
+
Valve Alignment Monthly Surveillance," to provic e
guidelines to perform venting by alternate means l
(06/03/97)
,
,
Reviewed other ECCS pump configurations for i
+
j pump venting capabilities (06/08/97)
i
%..,, %
.
- -
- -
-.
.
--- ---- - -- :
__
!
i
!
!
!
l l
SLAVE RELAY TESTING
!
!
-
,
l ISSUES
+
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
!
+
i
!
ROOT CAUSE
+
.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
+
!
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
+
-
,
i
!
I
!
.,..,.s
.
_ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _,.. _... _. - -..
..,
- _,,
. _. _. - _., _..... _, _ _., _, _,.., _.,
.
. -..
..
..
_ _. ~ _.,,,.,.....
. -.
_.
,
..,
,
,
._
_
.
-
ISSUES
'
Failure to perform CV letc own isolation va..ve s. ave
+
'
relay test per Technical Specifications Failure to perform CV letc own orifice iso..ation
+
,
valve slave relay test per Tec inical Specifications
.
%
n.. i,.
.
.
.
.
.
-.
..
,
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
,
Pre-1990 - Valves stroked per Tecanical Specifications
+
.
1990 - Westingaouse.etter recommenc.ec. not to stroxe
+
valves due to thermal transient issue Jumper temporarily used to prevent stroking valves Permanent options to correct t:ae issue considerec :
+
Modification to prevent stroking valves Technical Specification change to extend the surveillance frequency i
Technical Specification change chosen
+
s.. s,.
.
.
.
.
..
.
,
,
SEQUENCE OF EVKSTS - cont.
-
-
In March 1996, ajumper fell off causing a letc own l
+
j isolation (LER 96-001)
Safety Review Committee review questioned the use cf i
+
!
thejumper
-
Technical Specification Slave Relay Test definition
+
review determinec.:
Jumper installation and fuse removal did not meet the Technical Specification surveillance requirements
'
Slave relays were declared inoperable Slave relay surveillances changec. to stroke valves and
+
then performed to meet the Technical Specification
,
.s....
.
_
F
.i
I
'
ROOT CAUSE
'
l Inac equate Technical Specification surveil;.ance
+
.
!
Inadequate on-site reviews i
+
>
l i
)
)
,
.
!
,
.:
-
s.. i,
.
-.
- -.
- - -
l l
-
t
I SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
,
!
i I
l Minimal safety significance l
+
i j
Slave relays / additional equipment tested on quarterly i
basis i
Functioned on demand
.
i
-
i i
l
%.c.t.
s
.
'
i i
!
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
l Performing reviews of all slave relay survei; ance
+
procedures (11/07/97)
Eva uating modification to test components
+
quarterly (12/05/97)
'
Review of selected Technical Specification
+
surveillances for literal compliance (08/29/97)
Plant Operational Review Committee (PORC) is in
+
place (11/07/97)
'
i
'
i
%
r1.
_
_
_
,.
--
-
- - -
-
-
--
-
h i
-
t
.i
i
!
i i
!
e,
!
CLOSING RKMARKS
'
-
-
.
l
+ FocHS on Improving
!
i i
i
!
'
,
.
I i
i
!
!
+ Ensure compliance
,
.
'
i i
!
!
!
!
+ Common approach i
.
i i
i
!
i i
!
l l
Yb t
.
-
-
- - - -
-
- -
- - - - -
- - - -.
-
- -- - - --
-