IR 05000445/1981001
| ML19347D536 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1981 |
| From: | Crossman W, Renee Taylor NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347D535 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-81-01, 50-445-81-1, 50-446-81-01, 50-446-81-1, NUDOCS 8103260495 | |
| Download: ML19347D536 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No. 50-445/81-01; 50-446/81-01 Docket No. 50-445; 50-446 Category A2 Licensee:
Texas Utilities Generating Company 2001 Bryan Tower Dallas, Texas 75201 Facility Name:
Comanche Peak, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Inspection conducted:
January 1981 Inspector:
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R. G. Taylor, Resident Reactor Inspector Date Projects Section Approved:
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m W.'A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section Date Inspection Summary:
Inspection During January 1981 (Recort 50-445/81-01; 50-446/81-01)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection by the Resident Reactor i
Inspector (RRI) including general site tours; piping installation; piping
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system supports and restraints; observation of protection of major installed l
equipment; and follow up on previous inspection findings.
The inspection involved eighty-eight inspector-hours by the RRI.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Personnel
- D. N. Chapman, TUGCO, Quality Assurance Manager.
- R. G. Tolson, TUGCO, Site Quality Assurance Supervisor
- J. R. Ainsworth, TUGCO, Quality Engineering Supervisor
- J. R. Merritt, TUSI, Engineering and Construction Manager
- J. B. George, TUSI, Vice-President and CPSES Project General Manager Other Persons J. V. Hawkins, Brown & Root, Project Quality Assurance Manager The RRI also interviewed other licensee and Brown & Root employees during the inspection period including both craft labor and QA/QC personnel.
- Denotes those persons with whom the RRI held on-site management meetings during the inspection period.
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2.
Action of Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-445/80-08; 50-446/80-08):
Clarification of Electrical Cable Repair Procedures.
This item originally involved
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a lack of clarity in an engineering procedure for cable repair; and
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whether a material utilized under the peacedure satisfied the require-ments of IEEE 383-74.
The procedure (EEI-13) was changed to provide explicit instructions to the craft engineering.
The RRI reviewed a test report of flame tests conducted by Okonite Company on site pre-pared samples typical of cable repairs which indicate that the question-able material utilized in repairs meets the flame retardance character-istics required by IEEE-383/74.
The RRI had no further questions on this matter.
l (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-445/80-15; 50-446/80-15):
Weld Configuration l
of Component Supports.
Several questions individually addressed under
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this item have been resolved as follows:
a.
The ASME official definition of a full fillet weld is one where the size of the weld is equal to the thickness of the thinner member and not necessarily appearing on both sides of the welded
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member.
The definition is contained in ASME Section IX-74 under QW-492.
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b.
The RRI was provided with a copy of a Commentary to the AWS Code for the Design of New Buildings which contains an explanation and illustrations relative to the requirement for weld end returns, more often referred to as " boxing." The verbage of ASME repeats that of AWS and the AWS Code and is clearly the original source of the requirement.
The explanation and the illustrations clearly indicate the weld end returns are desirable where the weld itself is subject to bending moment rather than subject to a shearing stress l
as a result of the bending moment.
The requirements for a " continuous weld" apply only to essentially c.
circular welds as defined by the American Welding Society which was the source of definitions and terms as stated by QW-492 of ASME Section IX.
Since square tubing cannot be defined as essentially circular, the apparent ASME requirement does not apply.
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The RRI had no further questions on this matter.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-445/80-18; 50-446/80-18):
Absence of l
Weld Returns.
As indicated in Inspection Report 50-445/80-18; 50-446/
80-18, this unresolved item was analogous to the requirement for weld end returns contained in ASME even though based upon the require-ments of AISC.
It appears that the American Welding Society Code and the Commentary discussed above antedate both the ASME and AISC Code, the Commentary therefore is equally germaine to all.
The AWS and AISC Code both state that where weld returns are to be utilized and are to be included in the weld stress calculations, the weld returns shall be shown in the engineers drawings.
Since the Commentary does not clearly depict weld end returns in the applications observed and since the engineer's drawings do not show the need for weld returns, this item is considered resolved and the RRI has no further questions.
3.
Site Tours The RRI toured the safety-related plant area several times during the l
inspection period to observe the general progress of construction and the practices involved.
All of the tours were confined to day shift operations since there is no longer a craft labor second shift.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Protection of Major Installed Ecuiement The RRI observed that the reactor vessel internals (core support structure)
continued to be partially installed within the Unit 1 reactor vessel.
The vessel head and the lifting rig assembly were found to be adequately covered with a heavy plastic to provide protection from construction dust
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and small debris.
The Unit 2 reactor vessel was observed to be well protected in its installed location with the internals remaining in their temporary storage enclosure.
The RRI observed that electric motors used as pump drivers and as actuators for piping system valves continued to have their space heaters energized and that each unit checked was hand warm in comparison to other metal objects in the area.
The RRI also observed that installed instrument sensing devices were well protected from damage by being covered with substantial wooden boxes wired in place.
Partially installed instrument impulse tubing was found to be plugged where open ends might have otherwise existed.
These actions are commensurate with good industry practices.
No violations or deviations were ident<?ied.
5.
Safety-Related Piping Installation and Welding The RRI made several observations of the handling practices relative to piping components during the inspection period, both in the on-site fabrication shop and within the main plant buildings.
The practices observed were consistent with the requirements outlined in Construction Procedure 35-1195-CPM 6.9, Project Specification MS-100, and good industry
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practice.
The RRI observed the following piping system welds being made during the inspection period:
Weld No.
Isometric No.
Filler Metal Ht.
Welder Procedure FW 1-1A SI-1-RB-059 762550 BTG 88021 l
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FW 6 SI-1-RB-039 762550 AIM 88021
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The first of the above w' elds is in the Reactor Coolant pressure boundry (Class 1) while the second weld was in the Class 2 Safety Injection System.
The RRI verified that the filler metal being utilized by the welders was certified by the supplier via a Certified Material Test Report as meeting the requirements of ASME Section II.
The weld procedure and the welders were verified to have been qualified as required by ASME Section IX.
The RRI examined the radiographs of the following welds for compliance to the requirements of ASME Section III for weld quality and Section V for the quality of the radiographs:
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Weld No.
Isometric No.
Line No.
FW-5, W-4, W-3 CS-2-RB-076 3-CS-2-052-2501R1 W-17, W-19, W-21 RC-2-RB-072 6-RC-2-100-2501R1 FW-2 RC-1-RB-005 6-RC-1-008-2501R1 W-2 RC-2-RB-072 6-RC-2-098-2501R1 FW-16 SI-1-RB-060 10-SI-1-181-2501R1 W-5, W-4, W-15, W-3, W-2 RC-2-RB-071 6-RC-2-108-2501R1 FW-15 RC-2-520-001 Loop 2, Cold Leg to Pump FW-24 RC-2-520-001 Loop 3, Cold Leg to R.V.
FW-7 RC-2-520-001 Loop 1, Cold Leg to Pump FW-1 RC-2-520-001 Loop 1, Hot Leg to R. V.
FW-3 RH-2-RB-002 12-RH-2-002-2501R1 FW-6 MS-1-SB-018 34-MS-1-017-1302G FW-1 MS-1-SB-017 32-MS-1-04-1303-2 FW-14 CS-2-AB-088 4-CS-2-110-2501R2 W-11 CH-2-SB-035 6-CH-2-002-152-2 i
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Installation of Pipe Supoorts a19eismic Restraints The RRI obtained and reviewed the " Computer Tracking / Pipe Support Flow Diagram"which depicts the management and engineering system for controlling the on-site engineering design process for small pipe hangers and for controlling design changes for large hangers that were initially engineered off-site, but for a variety of reasons must be changed. The RRI reviewed four of ten Engineering Instructions that provide procedural guidance on i
the implementation of the referenced flow diagram.
The procedures reviewed were:
a.
CP-EI-4.5-4, " Technical Services Engineering Instruction for Pipe Hanger Design Review."
(Revision 2)
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b.
CP-EI-4.6-1, " Field Design Change Control Instruction."
(Revision 5)
c.
CP-EI-6.1-2, " Mechanical Drafting Drawing Control for Field Modified Hanger Sketches." (Revision 0)
d.
CP-EI-4.6-8, " Field Design Change Control for Pipe Supports."
(Revision 0)
In addition to the above, the RRI also reviewed a top level procedural document intended to provide the basis for compliance with NRC IE Bulletin 73-14 which requires "as-built" verification that pipe system supports and restraints are of the correct configuration and in the location required by the design, all for the purpose of assuring that the final system stress analysis is performed on the "as-built" system.
The above procedures appear to satisfy the requirements of Appendix B as it pertains to design and design change control and at least the basic requirements of Bulletin 79-14.
The RRI selected, essentially at random, the below listed piping system supports and restraints for visual verification of correct fabrication and installation.
The selection was made from a computer tabulation of supports and restraints that had been inspected and accepted by the site QC department with supporting documentation on file in the permanent records vault.
The RRI biased the sample such that the sample would include supports and restraints in piping classes 2, 3 and 5 as defined in the FSAR, Section 3.2.
As an aid in understandi.1g the meaning of the below listed assembly numbers; the first six letter-digit combint-tions identify the piping line being supported and/or restrained.
These line numbers can be found on the many flow diagrams included in several sections of the FSAR.
The next three digits are a sequence number of each support / restraint on a given line.
The remaining combination of letters and digits give the approximate location; the third indicates the piping class code and the fourth gives the type as in "K" for snubber or "S" for spring type.
a.
FW-1-017-028-C72K, Revision 1, as modified by Component Modification Card 38130, Revision 1 b.
AF-1-035-035-Y33K, Revision 1
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AF-1-036-008-S33K, Revision 1 d.
AF-1-047-006-Y45S, Revision 0 e.
CS-1-015-001-542K, Revision 1 l
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CC-1-008-018-A33K, Revision 1, as modified by Component Modification Card 41665, Revision 3.
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l The RRI found that each of the above supports / restraints had been fabricated j
utilizing the type of materials specified on the drawing for the component I
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and that the welds, all fillets, were of the size required by the design.
The welds presented a visual appearance acceptable under the ASME Code, Subsection NF of Section III or the AISC Building Code as applicable to item d. above.
The RRI noted that the mechanical snubbers required on each of the "K" designated restraints above were not installed l
but rather had a drilled strap of the same end-to-end dimension installed
in place of the snubber.
i Item c. above was also found not to be grouted between the assembly base-plate and the building floor as indicated on the drawing.
Only one of the
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assemblies was painted, that also being item c.
l The RRI obtained and reviewed the QA record packages for each of the above identified assemblies.
The absence of the snubbers was properly noted on the records.
Presence of paint and/or grout was found not to be an
inspection characteristic for any of the assembifes.
Discussions with appropriate QA/QC management personnel indicated that it had been deter-mined sometime ago not to install the snubbers until near the time for the " Hot Functional Tests." This determination was made because the snubbers could easily become damaged if left installed in the on going construction areas.
The painting and grouting are treated as separate activities since they are accomplished by craft labor departments other than support / restraint erector / fabricators.
The licensee is understood to be depending on the final "as-built" inspection to identify any such work that has not been accomplished.
Since this program has not yet been fully defined or proceduralized and will not be implemented for a period of time, the RRI determined not to pursue the issue at this time.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Manacement Interviews The RRI met with one or more of the persons identified in paragraph 1 on January 6, 7, 9, 16, 19, 22, 24, 27, 29 and 30, 1981 to discuss inspection findings and the licensee's actions and positions.
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