IR 05000443/1981006
| ML20037D437 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1981 |
| From: | Sanders W, Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20037D436 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-81-06, 50-443-81-6, NUDOCS 8107100232 | |
| Download: ML20037D437 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-443/81-06 Report No.
Docket No.
50-443 License No.
CPPR-135 Priority Category A
Licensee:
Public Service Company of New Hampshire 1000 Elm Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Facility Name:
Seabrook Station Unit 1 Inspection at:
Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection conducted:
May 11-15,1981 M/ / Cd,Mw'
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Inspectors:
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W. F. Sanders, Reactor Inspector Q
date signed J'
date signed date signed date signed Approved by:
[.jh 8'2h/
- L. E. Tripp, Chief, Materials & Processes dpte signed
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Section, DETI Inscection S rn.ry.
Inspection on May 11-15,1981 (Report No. 50-443/81-06)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of activities relative to weld metal repairs and nondestructive examinations by the pipe fabricator, storage of material and moving of No. 3 steam generator.
The inspection involved 27 inspector-hours onsite by one regional based inspector.
Resul ts:
110 items of noncompliance were identified.
8107100232 810624 PDR ADOCK 05000443 G
pop Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Public Service Company of New Hampshire
- J. H. Herrin, Site Manager
- J. W. Singleton, Field Quality Assurance Manager
- W. J. Gagnon, Field Quality Assurance Supervisor
- W. T. Middleton, Field Quality Assurance Specialist W. J. Millen, Quality Assurance Manager F. X. Bellini, Geologist United Eagineers & Constructors
- B. E. O' Conner, Administrative Assistant D. E. Lambert, Field Superintendent of Quality Assurance Bullman - Higgins R. G. Davis, Field Quality Assurance Manager D. R. Geske, Quality Control Supervisor R. R. Donald, Field Quality Assurance Supervisor
- denotes those present at exit interviews.
2.
Scope This inspection was made to review the actions taken to resolve the problem of inadequate N.D.E. performed by a piping fabricator inspector and to review the planned program and actions taken for the inspection and resolution of N.D.E. coverage for weld metal repairs on pipe.
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3.
Site Tours The inspector made a general site tour each day of the inspection period to perform walk through inspections of the construction site and observe work l
activities in progress, completed work and construction status in several l
areas of the plant. The items were examined for any obvious defects or non-
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compliance with regulatory requirements, nonconforming material identifi-l cation, housekeeping, preservation of material and equipment.
Particular l
note was taken of the presence of Quality Control Inspectors and quality
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control evidence such as inspection records.
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Specific observations were made of the transporting of the No. 3 steam generator from the storage area to the equipment hatch of the primary containment building.
Inspections were made in the containment of the two installed steam generators and the steel supporting structures.
It was noted that the primary hot legs were previnusly placed in position prior to the installation of the steam generators.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Pipe Fabricator N.D.E. Deviations On December 30, 1980 the Vendor Surveillance Representative observed the performance of a Magnetic Particle (MP) weld examination by a vendor inspector, when it was discovered that the contact prod placemas* was in one direction only. This is contrary to the standards and procedure requirements which requires the area of interest to be covered by placement of the prods in two directions 90 degrees apart. When the problem became known, actions were taken to re-examine all of the work performed by the inspector on that day.
Further work consisted of approximately 59 operations on 19 fabricated assemblies. Approximately half of these were Dye Penetrant (DP) examinations and were conducted by other members of the vendor's inspection department.
There were no rejectable indications reported in any of the re-examination.
There was no evidence that the inspector was performing the Dye Penetrant Examinations in an improper manner.
In addition 3 assemblies representing work done by this inspector several weeks.or months prior to the incident were examined.
One indication was found in the base mat.*ial and was evaluated by the examiner as not rejectable to the code requirements. How-ever, a decision was made by the fabricator that additional examination of assemblies was warranted. A program was then instituted to re-examine any work performea.by this inspector, which was available in the shop or in the shipping yard to the extent that 76 fabricated assemblies were re-examined involving 197 operations.
In the group were three (3) class 1 assemblies,
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thirteen (13) class 2, thirty-eight (38) class 3 assemblies and twenty-two (22) B31.1 assemblies.
Results of Investigation Performed As Reported Below by the Pipe Fabricator a.
Indications in Welds:
The only indications found in welds occurred in the split type backing rings that were welded across the ring to make a solid ring.
Linear indications were found in seven (7) of the rings tested.
Since the pipe fabricator indicated that it is not a Code requirement that these rings be welded and since the backing ring is not a pressure retaining part, they have concluded that the indications in these backing ring welds are not Code violations.
Note that the construction was B31.1 Critical and not ASME II.
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b.
Indications in Base Material:
There were four (4) linear indications (2", 3/4", 3/4" and 1/4" long)
in four (4) carbon steel Class 3 fabrications.
They stated that the Code does not require examination of base material adjacent to welds.
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Thus, these were not considered rejectable indications.
The 2" long indication has since been removed by grinding approximately.005" from the surface of the pipe.
From the appearance of the other surface imperfections, they were also not considered material defects as defined in the applicable material specification.
There were three (3) linear indications in three (3) stainless Class 1 and Class 2 fabrications, with length of 1/16" or less.
They indicated that tha Code of record considers all linear indications as rejectable.
Howev since 1977, ASME III considers only indications with a major dimension greater than 1/16" to be relevant.
Thus, in 1974 these indications were rejectabie but today they would be accepted.
C.
The pipe fabricator held the shipment of an order of stainless fabrication l
since the first week in January 1981, until they were able to determine
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the magnitude of their inspection problem.
Because of an urgent delivery requirement and in order to provide some assurance that the inspections made by their inspector of these assemblies were acceptable, they elected to re-examine one (1) assembly.
This re-examination showed several unacceptable linear indications on the surface of full penetration welds attaching 1" thick plate supports to the pressure boundary.
Additional penetrant examinations of these structural welds in other assemblies revealed some rejectable indications.
They proposed to re-examine all of the welds previously examined by their inspector on this order prior to shipment and eliminate rejectable indications.
There were no indications in the girth welds in these assemblies.
This program was not complete as of the date of the correspondence I
reviewed by the inspector, d.
Also, on January 21, 1981, because of their urgent shipment requirement, they re-examined their inspector's work in three (3) Class 1 carbon
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steel assemblies.
Some unacceptable indications were found in base
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material on two (2) of these assemblies where fitting lugs had been removed.
Conclusions of the pipe Fabricator I
a.
Some examinations performed by their inspector have not been done in
strict accordance with their procedures and/or the results of these examinations have not been properly evaluated over an unknown period
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of time.
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b.
Although some indications found were greater than the acceptance standards would permit, none of the indications were the result of serious defects in the welds or base material and it was their opinion that, if the defects had not been removed, they would not have affected the safety or reliability of the fabrication, This problem did not occur as a result of lack of knowledge of the c.
procedure or acceptance standards as their inspector has been observed by their customer inspectors, their ANI and their Chief Inspector performing both dye penetrant and magnetic particle in a proper manner.
d.
There is no reason to suspect that the Dravo training program, qualifi-cation program or supervision was deficient or in any way contributed to this problem.
Although the AE/ Constructor generally agreed with the pipe fabricator's initial conclusions above, it was decided that these findings warranted further investigation at the Seabrook site to refute or reinforce the fabricator conclusion based on their own re-examination program.
UE&C proceeded with their own re-examination program, which was performed by Pullman-Higgins certified NDE personnel during the period February 9,1981 through February 23, 1981, under the auspices of UE&C NDE examiners D. Reinert and J. Werner.
Results of this re-examination program revealed a total of sixteen (16) indications of which fifteen (15) were surface base metal linear indications and one (1) weld crater.
These defects are identified on UE&C NCR-960.
Re-examination and removal of reported indications was then performed during the period March 12, 1981 to March 17, 1931.
The reported results substantiates that the indications were shallow in depth and considered to be nonrelevant indications.
Concurrent with this re examination program at the site, the fabricator expanded their re-examination program to a larger population.
The results of the AE/ Constructor and the pipe fabricator's re-examication are mutually reinforcing in their respective conclusions.
Based on the results of these investigations, the licensee has concluded that the improper N.D.E. has not caused a deficiency in the design or installation at Seabrook Station.
No item of noncompliance was identified.
5.
N.D.E. of Weld Metal Buildup on Pipe Weld Preo Inside Surfaces The pipe fabricator interpretation of the ASME Code, that weld metal buildups alongside a weld were an extension of the weld and are documented aiong with the weld, was not accepted by the NRC.
The weld metal buildups are considered to be base metal repairs which require the applicable N.D.E. relative to a repair.
The piping fabricator has been requested by the licensee to treat all weld buildups as base metal repairs and perform the necessary inspection and provide documentation.
This interpretation has prompted the AE/ Constructor to develop the following program:
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Have pipe installer reinspect all ASME Piping for Weld Butid-Ups.
They a.
will inspect the OD and the ID at the field weld ends for weld buildups.
This reinspection will be complete prior to the installation of each piping spool.
b.
The Pipe Installer shall check the Dravo documentation on the piping spools in question by referencing the list supplied by Oravo or review the site records supplied by Dravo.
The shop radiographs shall be reviewed to assure adequate coverage of the buildup area.
If the reinspection or Dravo documentation shows that the weld buildup c.
was done for reasons other than maintaining minimum wall, this buildup will be treated as minor repairs requiring only surface NDE.
d.
Buildups for minimum wall shall be treated as major base metal repairs unless defined otherwise by Dravo documentation.
Major repairs require both radiography and surface examination.
However, they are considering
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invoking the 1980 ASME Code Paragraph ND 4130 which does not require radiographs for Class 3 piping with repair welds less than 10 sq. inches.
In addition to the above steps, Pullman-Higgins was requested to check the placement of the ASME name plates, remove and relocate as required to comply with the 2T+4 or 6 inch minimum requirement of 9763-15-1 " Design Guidelines for Inservice Inspection of Piping Systems."
No item of noncompliance was identified.
6.
Material Receiving and Storage An inspection was made of the pipe laydown storage area to inspect for material preservation, protection for contaminants, readable identification, weld preparation protection, off ground storage, material segregation, visual examination of welds for undercuts, blending and general surface conditions i
indicative of good handling practices.
The inspector noted that all of the above attributes were acceptable with the exception that a number of surface cuts, spalling and abrasions were visible apparently caused by handling.
The licensee representative stated that these conditions were caused by the fabricator and actions had been taken as documented on norconformance report 7035-300 dated September 8, 1980, Material Thickness Inspection Record (UT), Dimensional Inspection Record, and corrective action specified in "Non Cor.formance Review Board Response Form." The surface conditioning and rework listed on the above NCR and corrective action procedure was inspected at a temporary work station setup at the site.
Surface conditioning was underway during this inspection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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7.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on May 15, 1981 at the conclusion of the inspection.
The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
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