IR 05000423/1990004
| ML20034A807 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1990 |
| From: | Haverkamp D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034A806 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-423-90-04, 50-423-90-4, IEB-83-05, IEB-83-5, IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, NUDOCS 9004240356 | |
| Download: ML20034A807 (17) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION I
Report No.:
50-423/90-04 Docket No.:
50-423 License No.
NpF-49 Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 Inspection at: Waterford, Connecticut
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Inspection Conducted:
February 6 - March 19,1990
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Reporting
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Inspector:
Kenneth S. Kolatzyk, Resident Inspector, Millstone 3 i
Inspectors:
William J. Raymond, Millstone Senior Resident Inspector
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Kenneth S. Kolaczyk, Resident Inspector, Millstone 3 David H. Jaffe, Project Manager, NRR Approved by:
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Donald R. HaverkaMp, Chief Date Reactor Projects Section 4A Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Summary:
Inspection on February 6 - March 19,1990
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(Inspection Report No. 50-423/90-04)
Areas Inspected:
Routine onsite inspection by resident inspectors and head-quarter personnel of plant operations; maintenance and surveillance; security; l
i engineering and technical support; and safety assessment and quality verifi-cation.
L Results:
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1.
General Conclusions on Adequacy, Strength or Weakness in Licensee Programs Plant Operations - The licensee has taken meaningful steps to improve worker safety in the emergency diesel generator rooms by the installation of guard rails, platforms, and ladders where operator access is required.
9004240356 900413 PDR ADOCK 05000423 Q
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Engineerino Technical Support'- The licensee has taken proper action to
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correct a deficiency in the testing of the main steam isolation valves.
2.
Unresolved Items One item (89-21-05) was closed and one item opened during this report period. The closed item concerned the submittal of inaccurate information in Licensee Event Report (LER) 89-09.
(Section 7.3)- The opened item (90-04-01) regarded inspector concerns over the adequacy of the low flow alarm setpoint for the "B" hydrogen recombiner and apparent acceptance of operating the recombiner with the low flow annunciator illuminated.
(Section4.3)
3.
Violations A non-cited violation was identified concerning the failure to ensure that armed guards are medically cleared prior to their participation in the annual physical fitness test.
(Section 6.1)
A previously identified deviation, concerning the testing of. main steam isolation valves, was closed.
(Section 5.1)
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. TABLE OF CONTENTS
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1.0 Persons Contacted...........................................
2.0 S umma ry of Fa cil i ty Act i vi ti e s..............................
3.0 Plant Operations (IP 71707/93702)*..........................
3.1 Control Room Observations..............................
3.2 Plant Tours............................................
i 3.3 Reactor Trip due to Loss of Generator i
Stator Coo 11ng.........................................
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3.4 PIR 3-90-045 Isolation of Failed Fuel Monitor
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CHS RE69...............................................
3.5 Review of Plant Incidents Reports......................
t 3.6 Safety System Wa1kdown.................................
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4.0 Maintenance / Surveillance (IP 62703/61726/93702).............
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4.1 Observation of Maintenance Activities.................. 6
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4.2 Follow-up of March 9 Plant Trip........................ 6 4.3 Adequacy of Hydrogen Recombiner Low Flow Alarm Setpoint 7
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4.4 Observation of Surveillance Activities.................
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5.0 Engineering / Technical Support (IP 37701/93702/92701)........ 9 5.1 Licensee Response to Notice of
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Deviation 89-16-07.,...................................
5.2 IE Bulletin No. 84-02, " Failure of General Electric Type HFA Relays in Class IE Safety Systems.............
5.3 Response to IEB 83-05 (80-423/83-21-01)...............
5.4 (0 pen) TI 25000/19, Low Temperature Overpressure P ro t e c t i o n ( LT0P ).....................................
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6.0 Security (IP 717107)........................................12 6.1 Security Requalification Deficiencies Identified......
7.0 Safety Assessment / Quality Verification (90712/71707)..........................................
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7.1 Committee Activities..................................
7.2 Licen see Event Report Revi ew..........................
7.3 (Closed) 50-423/89-21-05:
Submittal of Corrected
Licensee Event Report 89-09...........................
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8.0 Ma n a g eme n t Me e ti n g s........................................
- The NRC inspection manual inspection procedure (IP) or temporary instructions (TI) that was used as inspection guidance is listed for
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each applicable report section.
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DETAILS
1.0 Persons Contacted Interviews and discussions were conducted with Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECo or the licensee) staff and management during the report period to obtain information pertinent to the areas inspected.
Inspection findings were discussed periodically with the supervisory and management personnel identified below.
R. Rothgeb, Maintenance Manager J. Barile, Engineer
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M. Hess, Engineering Supervisor, Millstone Unit 3
- S. Scace, Nuclear Station Director, Millstone Station
- C. Clement, Nuclear Unit Director, Millstone Unit 3
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- M. Gentry, Operations Manager, Millstone Unit 3
- J. Harris, Engineering Manager, Millstone Unit 3 l
D. McDaniel, Engineering Supervisor, Millstone Unit 3 R. Sachatello, Radiation Protection Supervisor, Millstone Unit 3 M. Pearson, Operations Assistant
- B. Enoch, Instrument and Controls Manager, Millstone Unit 3
- P. Weekley, Security Manager, Millstone Station
- H. Haynes, Station Services Director
- Attendee at post-inspection exit meeting on April 4, 1990.
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2.0 Summary of Facility Activities During this report period, balance of plant (BOP) failures caused rapid power reductions and a plant trip.
On February 14 the outboard mechan-ical seal on the motor-driven feedwater pump failed due to thermal fatigue which necessitated a 51% power reduction.
The feedwater_ pump mechanical
seal which failed was a tungsten-based design, which has had a history of-problems at Millstone Unit 3.
The most recent failure occurred in August 1989 as reported in Inspection Report 50-423/89-16. When repairs to the B turbine-driven feedwater pump, which had been out of service since the January 18 coupling failure, were completed,-the plant was returned to full power (100% of rated thermal power) on February 15.
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From February 28 to March 1, reactor plant power w;s reduced to 95% to allow work on the "A" main steam reheator pump.
On March 3, plant power was decreased to 84% when the 4A heater drain pump tripped due to a fail-
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ure of the 2A feedwater heater level control valve.
Repairs _to the valve were completed, and the plant was returned to full power on the same day.
A turbine trip / reactor trip occurred on March 9 when a stator cooling
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water temperature control valve malfunctioned.
The resulting feedwater hydraulic transient which occurred caused two feedwater heater relief
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valve inlet pipes to fail.
The temperature control valve was fixed, the
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joints were rewelded and the plant was restarted on March 11. The turbine was synchronized to the grid and full power was reached on March 13.
The inspection activities during the report period included 124 total hours of inspection during normal activity working hou s.
In addition, the review of plant operations was routinely conducted during periods of
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backshifts (evening shifts) and deep backshifts (weekends and midnight shifts).
Inspection coverage was provided for 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> of backshifts and 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of deep backshifts.
j 3.0 Plant Operations 3.1 Control Room Observations The inspector reviewed plant operations from the control room and
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reviewed the operational status of plant safety systems to verify safe operation of the plant in accordance with the requirements of technical specifications and plant operating procedures. Actions
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taken to meet technical specification requirements when equipment was inoperable were reviewed to verify that the limiting conditions for operations were met.
Plant logs and control room indicators were reviewed to identify changes in plant operational status since the last review and to verify the changes in the status of plant equip-ment was properly communicated in the logs and records.
Control room instruments were observed for correlation between
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channels, proper functioning and conformance with technical specifi-
cations. Alarm conditions in effect were reviewed with control room operators to verify proper response to off-normal conditions and to verify operators were knowledgeable of plant status. Trainees who were manipulating reactor controls were under instruction by licensed operators. Operators were found to be cognizant of control room indications and plant status during normal working hours and back-l shift observations.
Control room manning and shift staffing was
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reviewed and compared to technical-specification requirements. No t
inadequacies were identified.
3.2 Plant Tours The inspector observed plant operations during regular and backshift tours of the following areas:
Control Room Vital Switchgear Rooms Diesel Generator Rooms Turbine Building Intake Structure Auxiliary Building ESF Building i
During plant tours, logs and records were reviewed to ensure compli-ance with station procedures, to determine if entries were correctly made, and to verify correct communication and equipment status'. The conclusions following the plant-tours were that (1) the licensee is
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generally maintaining equipment areas in a clean and orderly fashion, (2) equipment appears to be well maintained with minimum valve and
pump seal leakage, and (3) contaminated areas have decreased in size.
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The following deficiencies were noted:
Excessive lube oil had collected on the charging pumos. The lube i
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oil was subsequently cleaned up by the licensee.
The A emergency diesel generator jacket cooling heat exchanger
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appeared to have a leak on the service water side.
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request of the inspector, the licensee removed the insulation in i
the vicinity of the leakage and found that a deficiency tag had
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been hung inside the insulation. The inspector noted that removal of the insulation to examine the pipe would not have been required if the deficiency tag was placed in clear view, i
making it obvious that the unsatisfactory condition had already been identified.
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A wrench was found on top of a safety injection pump (3SIH-PIB)
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inside a contaminated area.
No work was in progress on the pump. When informed of the condition, the licensee subsequently removed the wrench.
The licensee should continue to emphasize cleanup of the job site when work is complete, l
Also, the inspector noted the installation of new guard rails, l
ladders, and platforms inside the emergency diesel. generator rooms.
These new installations improve worker safety, improve access to the equipment, and reduce the need for climbing on safety-related or important-to-safety equipment.
3.3 Reactor Trip on Loss of Generator Stator Cooling i
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The reactor tripped from 100% of full power at 4:53 p.m. on March 9,
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1990 due to an automatic trip of the main turbine.
The turbine trip
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was caused when cooling was lost to the generator stator. The resident inspector responded to the control room upon notification of the event and reviewed plant status, operator actions to stabilize the reactor after shutdown and actions taken to recover from the
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event and to perform a followup evaluation of the plant response.
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Inspector review included observations of control board recorders and indications, a review of the event soquence of events printout, and discussions with operations, maintenance, engineering and instrument and controls (I&C) personnel. The following event sequence was noted by the inspector:
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+ 4:47:32 - hydrogen & stator cooling trouble alarm
+ 4:48:56 - hydrogen & stator cooling alarm reset
+ 4:49:51 - hydrogen & stator cooling trouble alarm
+ 4:50:02 stator cooling water inlet temperature high
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+ 4:51:03 - stator cooling pump 'B' breaker closed
+ 4:51:11 - stator cooling pump ' A' breaker open
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+ 4:52:37 - stator cooling pump breaker 'A' closed
+ 4:52:37 - hydrogen & stator cooling trouble alarm
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+ 4:53:30 - loss of stator cooling alarm
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+ 4: 53:30 - turbine-generator trip
+ 4:53:30 - reactor trip i
+ 5:02
- steam leak on FW Heater 1A reported to control room
+ 5:30
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The first indication of a problem was the receipt in the control room (
of main generator stator cooling trouble alarms. Operators responded by starting a backup stator coolant pump, and dispatching a plant equipment operator (PEO) to the stator cooling skid in the turbine
building. The PE0 found that the temperature indicating controller (TIC 3GMC-V5) for throttle valve TV36 had malfunctioned due to a failure of a mechanical linkage internal to the Fisher controller.
The PE0 attempted to correct the problem, but was not able to
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complete the action in time to preclude the turbine generator trip.
Failure of TIC 3GMC-V5 caused TV36 to open, which caused stator cooling water to bypass the heat exchanger and the stator coolant temperature to increase to the trip setpoint.
A feedwater system isolation occurred following the reactor shutdown as expected, which caused vibrations within the feedwater system.
During this transient, the piping for the'3/4-inch relief valve 3FWS-RV29A on the 1A feedwater heater failed.
The failure occurred at the pipe-to-nozzle interface in the heater head.
Feedwater to the heater was isolated by 5:30 p.m.
Subsequent licensee inspection identified a crack on the similar relief valve for the IB heater.
The relief valves for all three heaters were inspected and repaired as necessary.
See section 4.2 for inspection review of the repair l
activity on the controller and heater.
The inspector reviewed the control room operators actions to stabilize the plant following the scram, and in response to the alarms received prior to the turbine trip.
Operator actions were reviewed specifically in regard to procedures OP 3206, A0p 3550, OP 3322 and OP 3324E Section 8.1.
The inspector concluded that opera-tors actions were proper and that the crew could not b:ve prevented the trip. No inadequacies were identified.
The resident inspector reviewed the licensee's event investigation,
root cause determination, testing and corrective actions, and identi-i fied no inadequacies. The licensee repaired the affected equipment prior to reactor restart on March 10.
The licensee's conclusions regarding equipment repair and operability were proper.
Licensee actions to review the event and to verify
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proper plant response were thorough and conservative.
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operations management were actively involved in event followup and were effective in coordinating the resources needed to resolve
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identified issues.
Licensee maintenance and I&C personnel provided
excellent support to plant operations to identify and correct the root cause of the event.
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The licensee notified the NRC operations officer of the partial ESF actuation at 5:15 p.m. as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii).
NRC
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review of the licensee event report required per 10 CFR
50.73 (a)(2)(iv) will be completed on a subsequent routine inspection.
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3.4 PIR 3-90-045 Isolation of Failed Fuel Monitor CHS RE69 On March 7, 1990, at 2:30 p.m., the process line containing the let-down "f ailed fuel" radiation monitor (CHS RE69) was found by coera-r tions personnel in the isolated condition in that'the inlet and
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outlet isolation valves 3CHS $0V390A and B were closed. The inspector was concerned that this was another occurrence of valves not being returned to their proper position after a planned evolution as had been reported in LER 89-026 on October 23, 1989.
Inspector review of this PIR indicated that inadequate restoration due to operator inattention was not the case and that valves $0V390A and B may have been closed accidentally. An inspection of the valve push-button switch location indicated that the switch (both valves are opened or closed by a single open/close push-button combination)
is located next to an anti-contamination clothing change area.
It is possible that a licensee employee could have accidentally hit the closed push-button for the subject valves during removal of enti-
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contamination clothing.
The inspector noted that the licensee, as a result of the incident, had installed protective plastic enclosures over the push-buttons for the subject valves and over push-buttons for push-buttons for the subject valves and over push-buttons for related valves on the same local panel. The licensee is currently evaluating whether an alarm should be installed to indicate that the subject valves have been closed. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
3.5 Review of Plant Incident Reports (PIRs)
The plant incident reports (PIRs) listed below were reviewed during the inspection period to (i) determine the significance of the events; (ii) review the licensee's evaluation of the events; (iii)
verify that the licensee's response and corrective actions were
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proper; and, (iv) verify that the licensee reported the events in accordance with applicable requirements, if required. The PIRs t
reviewed were:
number's 3-89-159, 3-90-024, 3-90-25, 3-90-26, 3-90-27, 3-90-28, 3-90-29, 3-90-30, 3-90-31, 3-90-32, 3-90-33, 3-90-34, 3-90-35, 3-90-36, 3-90-37, 3-90-38, 3-90-39, 3-90-40, 3-90-41, 3-90-42, 3-90-43, 3-90-44, 3-90-45, 3-90-46, 3-90-47 and 3-90-4.
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The incidents described in PIRs 3-90-45, 3-90-46, and 3-90-47 were selected for inspector followup as discussed in Sections 3.4, 3.3 and 4.2 respectively.
3.6 Safety System Walkdown Two safety-related systems were reviewed to verify system operability.
The two systems reviewed, which support control room habitability, were the control room pressurization system and the control room normal and emergency ventilation system.
The inspection included verifying proper positioning of flowpath valves, comparison of as-built construction to reference drawings and review of equipment tagout controls, work orders, and trouble reports to assess the effects on system operability.
References used were:
Final Safety Analyses Report, tag-out log, and plant instrumentation and piping diagram 26951 sheets 1 through 3.
No inadequacies were identified.
4.0 Maintenance / Surveillance 4.1 Observation of Maintenance Activities The inspector observed and reviewed selected portions of preventive and corrective maintenance to verify compliance with regulations, use of administrative and maintenance procedures, complianct with codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, use of bypass jumpers and safety tags, personnel protection, and equipment alignment and retest.
The following activities were included:
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AWO M39001538 Steam Generator Feed Stop Valve, dated February 15, 1990 AWD M38916192 Radiant Heater 3HCS-E-1B and Reaction Chamber, Temper-ature Control and Indicating Circuit, dated February 15, 1990.
AWO M39003613 Radiant Heater Differential Pressure and Low Flow Alarm, dated February 15, 1990.
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No inadequacies were noted.
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4.2 Follow-up on March 9 Plant Trip Stator Cooling Failure Millstone Unit 3 experienced a turbine trip / reactor trip on March 9, 1990 as a result of a " generator stator coolant temperature
- high" signal. The turbine trip signal was generated when a Fisher-Porter temperature indicator / controller (TIC), model number 511451T, failed.
The failed controller caused valve TV-36 to open, resulting in the bypass of the stator cooling heat exchangers, a subsequent
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increase in stator coolant temperature, and the generation of a
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turbine trip signal.
The turbine trip caused a reactor trip.
Post-trip inspection indicated that an internal linkage failure had
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caused the controller to fail in the " low" condition.
The failed
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controller was repaired and returned to service.
No definitive
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reasons for the failure were determined, however, the most likely
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I cause, according to I&C personnel, was vibration. The inspector viewed the reinstalled controller and noted that the unit was being subjected to strong vibration. The licensee is considering the relocation of the controller from its present location, on the valve,
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to an adjacent concrete wall.
Licensee experience at Millstone Unit 2, with similar controller problems, indicates that relocation of the controller to a vibration-damped location will lessen the failure
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rate, No schedule was provided for relocation of the subject controller and the inspector has no further questions in this area,
FW Heater Relief Valve Failure i
Post-trip plant inspection by the licensee identified the failure of
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two.750-inch relief valve inlet lines on feedwater heaters EIA and
ElB. On the 61A heat exchanger, the failure had resulted in the
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complete severance of the line while on the ElB heat exchanger, a
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through-wall crack in the relief valve inlet line was noted.
Non-destructive testing (NDT) on the E1C feedwater heat exchanger relief valve inlet line resulted in the discovery of an " indication." All
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three relief valve inlet lines were subsequently repaired by replace-ment of the flawed sections of pipe, Similar repairs of the relief valve inlet lines for feedwater heaters EIA, B and C were completed during May 1987,
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A preliminary evaluation by the licensee indicates that the feedwater heater relief valve inlet lines failed due to a combination of
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hydraulic shock and thermal fatigue, The hydraulic shock resulted from a post-trip isolation of the feedwater system.
Definitive analysis of the failure mode has been inconclusive to date.
The licensee has tentatively proposed post-trip NDT of the. subject lines.
The inspector ncted the licensee's planned course of action was
proper, The inspector had no further questiens in this area.
4,3 Adequacy of Hydrogen Recombiner Low Air Flow Alarm Setpoint While observing instrumentation and controls (I&C) personnel perform troubleshooting operations on the "B" hydrogen recomoiner, the
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inspector noted that the low air flow annunciator remained constantly illuminated during recombiner operation, Proper air flow'to the recombiners is required to ensure adequate cooling of the heaters in the recombiners which cause the hydrogen-oxygen recombination to occur.
The inspector considered the illumination of the annunciator to be unusual since air flow to the recombiner, as sensed across a reference venturi meter, indicated 14 inches of water or 6.5 inches above the alarm setpoint as specified in operating procedure 3313A
" Hydrogen Recombiner, Hydrogen Monitors and Recombiner Building Ventilation,"
The illuminated alarm was identified by. operators who then submitted
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a trouble report on the problem.
A check of the low flow alarm by I&C personnel revealed that the meter was functioning properly and L
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the low flow alarm was properly calibrated per the I&C procedure.
Therefore, the inspector concluded that the alarm setpoint contained i
in the operating procedure 3313A was incorrect. The inspector reviewed the alarm setpoint calculation to determine the bases for the setting since it is apparent that an annunciator which indicates low flow should not be illuminated when a normal airflow exists.
Review of the alarm setpoint by the inspector revealed that the setpoint may be too conservative.
Specifically, the alarm setpoint of 14 inches
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differential pressure is calculated based upon a containment pressure
of 12 psia, however, normal containment operating and accident pressure is 9.0 to 10.6 psia.
Therefore, the setpoint is calculated using pressures which would not exist either during routine
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surveillance or when the recombiner is placed into operation during
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accident conditions.
The inspector discussed his observation that the recombiner low flow annunciator may be set too conservative with an assistant operations
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supervisor. Additionally, the inspector questioned why there was a discrepancy between the setpoint stated in the system operations procedure OP 3313A and the setpoint calculation._ Finally the inspector noted that operators may be desensitized to alarms since personnel who performed the surveillance previously had only trouble reported that the alarm was illuminated in August of 1988 and November 1987 even though the surveillance is performed every six months. Additionally, although it was determined in' August of 1988 that the I&C alarm setpoint differed from the operating procedure setpoint, no apparent effort was made to resolve the discrepancy.
This suggests an inadequate followup of a known problem.
This item is open pending an explanation of: (1) why the operating procedure setpoint differs from the I&C setpoint calculation, (2) why the annunciator was not reported during other routine surveillances,
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(3) what is the correct air flow alarm setpoint, and (4) why the discrepancy was not noted earlier.
(UNR 90-04-01)
4.4 Observation of Surveillance Activities The inspector observed portions of and reviewed completed surveill-ance tests to assess performance in accordance with approved proce-
dures and Limiting Conditions of Operation, removal and restoration
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of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution.
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tests were reviewed:
SP 37120 Trip Actuating Device Operational Check for LIKV Undervoltage Test FC, dated February 26, 1990.
SP 3447C11 Hydrogen Monitor Operational Analog Channel Operational Test and Channel Check.
No inadequacies were noted.
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a 5.0 Engineerino/ Technical Support
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5.1 Licensee Response to Notice of Deviation (89-16-07)
Inspection Report 50-423/89-16 documented that the licensee was'not testing the main e team isolation valves (MSIVs) in accordance with the Institute of Flectrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 338 " Standard Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power
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Generating Station Safety Systems" which is a requirement that the
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facility is committed to follow.
Specifically, the licensee was not verifying that each redundant MSIV closing circuit would shut the
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MSIV within the five-second technical specification required time period.
In response to the notice of deviation, the licensee developed inservice test (IST) 3-89-020 "MSIV Single Train Full Stroke Test in Mode 3" and tested each individual MSIV closing i
circuit during an unscheduled shutdown in December. The test results verified that each individual train could close the MSIV in five seconds. Additionally, the licensee modified the main steam valve surveillance procedure 3616A.1 to require hot individual train full stroke testing of the valves during refuel periods.
These actions were outlined in a February 8, 1990 response to the Notice of Deviation.
The inspector reviewed IST 3-89-020 and SP 3616A.1 and determined that the licensee's corrective actions were appropriate and will meet the intent of IEEE Standard 338.
Therefore, the inspector has no further comment on this issue.
5.2 IE Bulletin No. 84-02, " Failure of General Electric Type HFA
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helays in Class IE Safety Systems"Bulletin 84-02 was issued on March 12, 1984 for the purpose of alerting licensees and applicants of failures associated with GE HFA relays.
The failures associated with the HFA resulted from the use of Lexan as the coil spool material.
Experience and testing have revealed that as the HFA relay heats up, the elevated temperatures caused coil wire insulation failure and subsequent melting of the Lexan core.
Bulletin No. 84-02 endorses the replacement of the subject HFA relays with GE " Century Series" relays. The replacement relays use a high temperature coil spool material and improved high temperature wiring.
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The licensee responded to Bulletin 84-02 by letter dated July 10, 1984. The licensee identified four relays in each of two emergency diesel generator (EDG) auxiliary panels that required replacement.
The licensee had scheduled replacement of the subject HFA-relays prior to issuance of the Facility Operating License.
The inspector reviewed the automated work orders, produced by the licensee's PMMS System, which were used to control replacement of the subject relays.
The inspector also viewed the inside of the EDG f
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auxiliary panels.
From inspection of the EDG auxiliary panels, it i
was determined that the model number on the four subject relays correctly matched the model numbers associated with the GE " Century
Series" relays described in the replacement work orders.
The inspector had no additional questions in this area.
5.3 Response to IEB 83-05 (50-423/83-21-01)
Bulletin 83-05 addressed various concerns related to pumps and spare parts fabricated by Hayward Tyler Pump Company.
Inspection Report
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50-423/85-20 presents the details of the remaining outstanding items
(3009 and 3011) which were documented as unsatisfactory items (UNS)
associated with Bulletin 83-05. The issues result from service water
pump horsepower, based upon motor amperage, not being within 10% of
the pump test curve.
In addition, the 48-hour pump endurance and
inservice test procedures must be completed.
Regarding the
outstanding issues associated with Bulletin 83-05:
The November 1985 Supplement No. 4 to NUREG-1031, the Facility
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Operating License Safety Evaluation Report, Page 3-29, states
that the pump horsepower issue has been resolved with review of
the licensee's October 10, 1985 letter.
With regard to the 48-hour pump endurance test and the inservice
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test procedures for the Service Water Pumps, these tests were
completed during July and August 1985 under " Phase II Test
Procedure T3326-P, Rev. 0".
All issues associated with Bulletin 83-05 have now been resolved.
5.4 (0 pen) TI 2500/19 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)
Inspection Report 50-423/88-18, dated December 16, 1989, provided
details of an inspection of the Millstone Unit 3 LTOP system.
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results of that inspection indicated that additional information
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should be provided by the licensee to resolve our concerns regarding
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LTOP for Millstone Unit 3.
The results of our reinspection of the
LTOP are as follows:
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Seismic Qualifications
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The licensee provided additional information regarding the
seismic qualifications of equipment, identified as inadequate,.
in the previous inspection.
In each case, the information
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provided demonstrated that the subject equipment was properly
qualified.
Procedural Measures
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The previous inspection indicated that certain procedural
measures, identified in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
had not been implemented as part of the Millstone Unit 3 LTOP
program.
Specifically, the FSAR stated that, during plant cool-
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down, all steam generators would remain connected to the steam
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header. The licensee subsequently made a change to the plant
cool-down procedure, OP 3208 Step 4.14, to implement the subject-
requirement.
Heat-up and Cool-down Procedures
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The previous inspection had noted that the hect-up and cool-down
procedures, OP 3201 and OP 3208, respectively.-did not appear to
be consistent regarding LTOP provisions.
Further discussions
with the licensee resulted in resolution of this concern.
Cold Overpressure System (COPS) Alarm
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Description in Training Material. The previous inspection noted
that the COPS alarms were incorrectly described in training
material. The licensee has resolved this item by the use of a.
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new procedure OP 3301 1, " Arming the Cold Overpressure Protec-
tion System," in the training material.
In aadition, the
licensee has revised the associated lesson pian, PPL-01-C to
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correctly describe the subject alarms.
COPS Cabinet Indicating Lights
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Through conversations with an instrumentation and controls
supervisor, the inspector was informed that the 7300 power
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supply cabinet lights are flickering because they are loosing
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neon gas.
Replacement of the lights would require deenergiza-
tion and disassembly of the power supply cabinets, which is a
high risk condition which could subject the plant to a transient.
There are alternate means of determining that the cabinets are
energized through use of power modems located adjacent to the
lights. The inspector viewed the cabinets and noted that all
indicating lights were of the " screw-in" type design.
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fore, disassembly could conceivably involve extensive disassembly
of the cabinets. The inspector also noted that he power supply
meters were located adjacent to the flickering indicating lights;
therefore, an individual should be able to tell if the cabinet
is energized by observing the meter. The inspector concluded
that the licensee's decision to forego maintenance on the power
supply lights until a cabinet is disassembled for other reasons
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is prudent.
Positive Indication of COPS Status
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The licensee is in the process of studying the need to provide
positive indication of COPS status.
With the exception of the final item, " positive indication of COPS status",
all outstanding LTOP issues are resolved for Millstone Unit,
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6.0 Security
Selected aspects of site security were verified to be proper during
inspection tours, including site access controls, personnel searches,
personnel monitoring, placement of physical barriers, compensatory
measures, guard force staffing, and response to alarms and degraded
conditions. The following item warranted inspector followup:
6.1 Security Requalification Deficiencies Identified
The inspector reviewed the medical and physical training records of
11 armed contractor guards assigned to the Millstone site. This
review was prompted in response to an allegation that a contractor
security guard had been allowed to perform the annual practical
physical exercise test prior to receiving medical clearance.
Inspector review of the security medical a W training records
revealed that the allegation was substantiated. Additionally, three
other instances were identified where an individual had participated
in the physical exercise test prior to receiving medical clearance.
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The Millstone Station Suitability Training and Qualification Plan
(STQP) for members of the security organization states in part, that
subject to a medical examination with an appropriate written state-
ment by the examining physician, armed security personnel shall demon-
strate physical fitness through testing.
Through conversations with the security supervisor, the inspector was
informed that the discrepancy involving the alleger was caused when
the physician's office gave verbal. clearance to a security officer
that the individual was cleared to perform the physical test, when in
fact all blood test results were not received by the office.
How-
ever, no definite explanation was provided to identify the reason for
the violations involving einer individuals other than administrative
breakdown.
The inspector noted that when the security manager was informed of
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the inspector's findings, she immediately directed a complete 100%
audit of the remaining security records be performed by the security
contractor.
Results of the audit identified five additional discrep-
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ancies where individuals had taken the physical test prior to being
medically cleared or had performed security functions with lapsed
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qualifications.
In accordance with the criteria of Section V.A of 10 CFR Part 2,
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Appendix C (Enforcement Policy), the failure to obtain written
medical clearance prior to administering the annual physical
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exercise test is considered a non-cited violation.
(443/90-04-02)
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To prevent recurrence of the finding, the security manager indicated
that a new metnod of record keeping would be devised that would
simplify the :nethod of tracking security guard qualifications.
In
the interim, additional supervisory oversight will be used as a means
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to ensure only physically qualified personnel take the physical test.
The inspector noted the manager's comments and will review the
effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions in future resident
inspections.
7.0 Safety Assessment / Quality Verification
7.1 Committee Activities
The inspector attended meetings of the plant operations review comm-
ittee (PORC). The inspector noted by observation that committee admin-
1strative requirements were met for the meetings, and that the comm-
ittees discharged their functions in accordance with regulatory
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requirements.
The inspector observed a thorough discussion of matters
before the PORC and a good regard for safety in the issues under
consideration by the committee. Ne inadequacies were identified.
7.2 Licensee Event Report Review
Licensee event reports (LERS) submitted during the report period were
reviewed to assess LER activity adequately of corrective activity
compliance with 10 CFR 50.73 reporting requirements, and to determine
if there were generic implications or further information was
required.
Selected corrective actions were reviewed for implementa-
tion and thoroughness.
The LERs reviewed were 89-31-01, 89-35-00,
90-01-00, 90-04-00, 90-05-00, 90-06-00, and 90-07-00.
No inadequa-
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cies were identified.
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7.3 (Closed) UNR 89-21-05:
Submittal of Corrected Licensee Event
Report 89-09
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Unresolved item 89-21-05 documented an NRC finding that a procedure
change that was reported in a licensee event report (LER) as having
been accomplished had in fact not been completed.
Specifically, LER
89-09 which was issued in June 12, 1989, reported that surveillance
procedure SP3451N21 had been updated to prevent a repeat of the
sequence of events which caused the May 11 reactor scram.
However,
when the inspector reviewed this report, he noted that surveillance
procedure SP 3451N21 had not been updated until November 17, 1989.
Through discussions with licensee personnel, it appears that the
cause for the discrepancy between the reported data and the actual
procedure change date was personnel error. The engineer who prepared
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the LER did not personally verify that the procedure had been changed.
Rather he assumed that the procedure had already been revised during
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a.May 23, 1989 discussion of the event by the plant operations review
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committee (PORC). He acknowledged that assumption.was a poor way of
verifying a completed action and only through personal verification
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can he be sure an action is completed.
The inspector informed the engineer of the importance of ensuring
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information submitted to the commission is accurate. The inspector
noted that a revised LER which reflected the actual procedure revision
date was submitted to the commission on December 29, 1989. The
inspector considers this item to be closed.
8.0 Management Meetings
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Periodic meetings were held with station management to discuss inspection
findings during the inspection period. A summary of findings was also
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discussed at the conclusion of the inspection. No proprietary information
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was covered within the scope of the inspection. No written material.was
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given to the licensee during the inspection period.
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