IR 05000416/1993007
| ML20045E501 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1993 |
| From: | Bernhard R, Cantrell F, Hughey C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045E494 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-93-07, 50-416-93-7, NUDOCS 9307020149 | |
| Download: ML20045E501 (7) | |
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Report No.: 50-416/93-07
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Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.: 50-416 License No.: NPF-29 Facility Name: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted: April 18, through May 15, 1993 Inspectors:
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8 7[ kb N5 4/v d'S R. H. Bernhard, Senior fesident Inspector-Date Signed-69 M 2E;u-cNea C. A. Hughey, Resident 0 Inspector Date Signed ([///7 3 Approved by:
+1 F.'S. Cantrell, ChieY(/
Dsts ' Signed Reactor Projects Sect 1on IB Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY-Scope:
The resident inspectors conducted a routine inspection in.the following areas:
operational safety verification, maintenance observation, surveillance-observation, action on previous inspection findings, and reportable occurrences. The inspectors conducted backshift inspections on April 19, 20, 21, 22 and 25, and May 11, 1993.
Results:
Two non-cited violations were identified.
One for failure to follow procedure to reposition two residual heat removal system valves when the system was taken out of the suppression cooling mode is an example of a mistake made while accomplishing a frequently performed action-(Paragraph 3 ).
The second is for a violation of ASME requirements during the plant's construction (Paragraph 7). Observation of a Safety Review Committee meeting and Quality Audit Exit meetings.-show-strengths in the plant's self assessment process (Paragraph 3).
Inspection in the areas of maintenance and surveillance concluded these activities were being effectively implemented (Paragraphs 4 and 5).
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9307020149 930604 PDR ADOCK 0500041.
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- L. Daughtery, Superintendent, Plant Licensing
- M. Dietrich,. Manager, Training
- J. Dimmette, Manager, Performance and System Engineering
'C Durger, Manager, Plant Operations C. Eii;ac
?r, Assistant Operations Manager
- C. Hay.3, uirector, Quality Assurance C. Hicks, Operations Superintendent
- C. Hutchinson, Vice President, Nuclear Operations F. Mangan, Director, Plant Projects and Support M. Meisner, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs D. Pace, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering
- J. Roberts, Manager, Plant Maintenance R. Ruffin, Plant Licensing Specialist Other licensee employees contacted included superintendents, supervisors, technicians, operators, security force members, and administrative personnel.
NRC Personnel F. Cantrell, Chief, Reactor Projects Section IB, RII was on site April 19-21, 1993, to meet with the resident inspectors and observe facility operation.
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- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
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Plant Status The plant operated in Mode 1, power operations, during the entire reporting period. As of the end of the period, the unit had been on line for 282 consecutive days.
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During the week of April 19, 1993, a Radiation Specialist from Region II, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, conducted a review of Grand Gulf's radiological effluents and chemistry program. Results of this inspection are contained in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-416/93-06.
3.
Operational Safety (71707 and 93702)
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room to review the status of equipment, alarms, effective LCOs, temporary alterations, instrument readings, and staffing. Discussions
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were held as appropriate to und'erstand the significance of conditions observed.
Plant tours were routinely conducted and included portions of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building, radwaste building and outside areas. These observations included ' safety related tagout verifications, shift turnovers, sampling programs, housekeeping and general plant conditions. Additionally, the inspectors observed the status fire protection equipment, the control of activities in progress, the problem identification systems, and the readiness.of the onsite emergency response facilities.
The inspectors observed activities associated with a downpower conducted May 12, 1993, using Integrated Operating Instruction 03-1-01-2, Attachment III, Revision 33, Section 7.0, Power Decrease from Full Power to 60%.
Power was reduced from 100% to 80% as a lightning storm passed near the site to reduce the plant's susceptibility to lightning induced scrams.
No deficiencies were observed and the plant was returned to 100% power after.the storm passed.
The inspectors observed portions of a simulator exercise. Differences were noted between the consistent use of the ' repeat back' technique for verification of status or information during simulator activities, and inconsistent use of repeat backs during actual control room activities, especially in annunciator responses. The control room demeanor during this simulator exercise was more formal than that generally observed on-shift during routine activities.
The inspectors attended a quarterly Safety Review Committee meeting on April 28, 1993.
D. P. Galle, formerly of Commonwealth Edison, had replaced H. J. Greene as one of the outside members of the SRC in January.
The meeting covered the plant's past operational performance, significant planned activities, significant operating events and their causes, safety evaluations, QP audits and their findings, and NRC and INP0 findings. The meeting was well organized, and maintained its focus on safety and plant improvements.
The inspectors attended the monthly Quality Programs audit exit meeting on May 13, 1993. Audits were conducted in the areas of fitness for duty, and E0Ps and operations observation. The audits reported both positive and negative findings. The audits were conducted over several weeks and were broad in scope. The findings were indicative of a program review.
The inspectors consider these program reviews a strength-in the -licensee's corrective action programs.
The inspectors reviewed license'e activities associated with the ECCS strainer fouling issue..The inspectors reviewed video recordings of the ECCS pump strainers taken on May 6, 1993. A fine silt layer was observed on most of the strainers. The inspectors reviewed the faLrication drawings for the strainers. They show the mesh. size of the ECCS strainers to be the same as that of the suppression pool cleanup suction strainer. The suppression pool cleanup system stays in service
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'3 most of the time. There have not been signs of NPSH problems in the pump for the suppression pool cleanup system that would be indicative of gross fouling of the strainers. This would indicate to the inspector that the silt observed does not represent a gross fouling problem. The licensee has placed activities to inspect the drywell on their list for performance at the next forced outage. The licensee has performed an inspection of containment for materials of a nature that caused the problem with NPSH as addressed in Bulletin 93-02, Debris Plugging of -
Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers. The licensee is forming a task force to look into ways to insure continued operability of the ECCS strainers. The inspectors will continue to monitor licensee action in this area.
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On May 3,1993, while walking down the control boards, an operator found; valves IE12-F048B and IE12-F064B in the closed position'. The IE12-F048B is the RHR heat exchanger bypass valve, and the IE12-F064B is the minimum flow valve for RHR pump protection. Their required position is open.
It was determined that the valves were not repositioned properly when the RHR system was taken out of the suppression pool cooling mode of operation on May 1, 1993. This mode of operation is entered several times each week to remove the heat from several weeping safety relief valves.
501 04-1-01-E12-1, Revision 49, dated August 20, 1992, required the subject valves to be repositioned as part'of Section 5.2.2.b.
Shutdown of Suppression Pool Cooling. The operator failed to_ perform these steps. This is identified as non-cited violation 93-07-01, Failure to follow procedure while restoring RHR from suppression pool cooling.
This item was licensee identified and corrective actions were taken prior to the end of this report period. The safety significance of these valves being mispositioned is low because the valves automatically reposition themselves to perform their required functions.
Plant management is aware of the inspector's concerns with the recent mistakes made by operations while accomplishing frequently performed activities.
Interviews with the on-shift operations staff show that management is stressing self verification techniques and increased attention to detail in the performance of duties. This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because of the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy.
This item is closed.
One non-cited violation was identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation-(62703)
During the report period, the inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below. The observations included a review of the MW0s and other related documents for adequacy; adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, technical specifications, quality controls, and radiological controls; observation of work and/or retesting; and specified retest requirements.
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DESCRIPTION MWO
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94920 Clean HPCS diesel lube oil separator and eductor 89950 Change lube oil in generator. bearing 19891108 Division III 125 Vdc ground detector (partial installation)
No violations or deviations were identified. The results of the observations in this area indicated that maintenance activities were effective.
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5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillance listed below. The observation included a review of the procedures for
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technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications and LCOs; verification of test instrument calibration; observation of all or part of the actual surveillance; removal and return to service of the system
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or component; and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.
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06-0P-1E12-Q-0024, Rev. 28 LPCI/RHR Subsystem B Quarterly Functional'
Test Delays were numerous during the performance of this test.on May 6,1993, and were due to test equipment not being available or prestaged, equipment failures and poor communications between operations and instrumentation & control personnel. Test data.(pump suction pressures, dPs, etc.) had to be taken twice because of the long delays.
10-S-02-1, Rev. 1 Emergency Response Facility Inspections, Inventories, Operability Check.s and-Maintenance The inspector observed this first quarterly test of the ERDS between the licensee and NRC headquarters.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700)
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The event report listed below was reviewed to determine if the information provided met the NRC reporting requirements. The determination included adequacy of event description, the corrective action taken or planned, the existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of the event. The inspectors used the NRC enforcement guidance to determine if the event met the criterion for licensee identified violation !
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On April 30,1993, at 9:58 a.m., the liquid and gaseous portions of the post accident sampling system were declared inoperable to complete corrective maintenance associated with a plugged pressure reducing capillary tube. Repairs were completed and the system was ustored the
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same day at 2:40 p.m.
The resident inspector was notified and a one hour notification was made per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(v).
7.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)-
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-416/93-02-01, Spectacle flange installation in LPCS, RHR A, B and C pump discharges.
The existing piping design did not include the additional mass of the spectacle flange. The licensee also determined the flange was provided and installed without the ASME'
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required Code Data Reports. The inspector concluded that the spectacle flange was to be replaced after hydro with a spacer as indicated on the note on the system drawing. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's calculations and evaluations regarding spectacle flange effects on nozzle loading, seismic considerations, and material compatibility.
Calculations by the licensee concluded that the pipe nozzle loads are
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not significantly affected by the additional weight of the blank-fl anges.
Pipe stresses and support loads are also not significantly affected since most of the spectacle flange load goes onto the pump nozzle. Although the flanges were provided and installed without the required Code Data Reports, they were purchased as safety related material, and installed to the same standards as the system piping. The licensee evaluation dispositions the nonconformance as ' accept as is'.
Based upon the evaluation, the safety significance of the failure to replace the flanges with spacers is low from a system operability basis.
The existence of the flanges as a permanent part of the system piping without meeting the ASME requirements is a violation of 10 CFR50.55a.
This item is identified as NCV 50-416/93-07-02, Failure to follow ASME code requirements, during construction, for installation of ECCS pump discharge spacers. This NRC identified violation is not being cited
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because the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy were met. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 50/416/92-16-01, Two examples of failure to follow procedure. The inspectors reviewed some of the corrective actions by the licensee in response to this violation. Example 1) Operator mistakenly deenergized the Division II LSS panel. The operator involved and other personnel were counse. led concerning attention to detail and lack of self verification.
The maintenance technician involved was temporarily removed from safety related duties and the importance of equipment identification and tagging was re-emphasized to all maintenance personnel.
Example 2) Maintenance worker failed to follow procedure during EHC system maintenance resulting in a reactor scram.
The mechanics involved were formally reprimanded and discussions were held by management with all mechanical maintenance personnel stressing the importance of procedural compliance. Mechanical section shift turnover time has been increased to ensure a more thorough turnover.
Direct supervisory attention is now required on all work performed on trip critical systems.
In addition, the operations plant supervisors
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now review l building operators logs each shift. The inspectors determined that'the above corrective actions were. adequate'therefore-this item is closed.
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Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 14, 1993, with-those persons indicated.irt paragraph 1 above. 'The licensee did not l
i identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no comment.on
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the following inspection findings:
Item Number'
Description and Reference 50-416/93-07-01 NCV, Failure to-follow procedure
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t while restoring RHR from' suppression pool cooling.
50-416/93-07-02 NCV, Failure to follow ASME code
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requirements, during construction, for installation of ECCS pump
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discharge spacers si
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Acronyms and Initialisms I
APRM -
Average Power Range Monitor.
American -Society of Mechanical-Engineers ASME
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Emergency Core Cooling System ECCS
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Emergency Operating Procedure E0P
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ERDS -
Emergency Response _ Data System dP
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Differentia 1' Pressure
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LCO
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Limiting Condition for Operation LPCI
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Low Pressure Core. Injection LPCS -
Low Pressure Core Spray Maintenance Work Order MWO
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Load Sequence & Shedding LSS
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Non-Cited Violation Net Positive Suction Head NPSH
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NPE
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Nuclear Plant Engineering NRC
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission Residual Heat Removal'
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