IR 05000416/1993003
| ML20035D259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1993 |
| From: | Bernhard R, Cantrell F, Hughey C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035D257 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-93-03, 50-416-93-3, NUDOCS 9304130003 | |
| Download: ML20035D259 (7) | |
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ECO UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-416/93-03 I
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Jackson, MS 39205
Docket No.:
50-416 License No.: NPF-29
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Facility Name:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted:
February 14 through March 13, 1993 Inspectors:
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3/23b 3 R. 41. Bernhard, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed
L h2tL ad du/n
C. M. Hughey, Resident inspector Date Signed Approved by:
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F.'S. Cantrell,
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Reactor Projects Section IB Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
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The resident inspectors conducted a routine inspection in the following areas:
operational safety verification; maintenance observation; surveillance observation; action on previous inspection findings; and reportable occurrences The inspectors conducted backshift inspections on
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February 16, 18, and 22, and March 1, 2, 8, and 11, 1993.
Results:
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One inspector followup item (IFI) was identified involving broken U-bolts in the standby service water cooling towers (Paragraph 3a).
One non-cited violation was identified for reactor water cleanup isolation circuit logic test deficiencies (Paragraph 3b).
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Weaknesses associated with work control practices on radiation monitors were observed (Paragraph 4).
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9304130003 930323
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. Cottle, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- L. Daughtery, Superintendent, Plant Licensing M. Dietrich, Manager, Training
- J. Dimmette, Manager, Performance and System Engineering C. Dugger, Manager, Plant Operations
- C. Ellsaesser, Assistant Operations Manager
- C. Hayes, Director, Quality Assurance C. Hicks, Operations Superintendent
- C. Hutchinson, General Manager, Plant Operations F. Mangan, Director, Plant Projects and Support M. Meisner, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs D. Pace, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering
- J. Roberts, Manager, Plant Maintenance R. Ruffin, Plant Licensing Specialist Other licensee employees contacted included superintendents, supervisors, technicians, operators, security force members, and administrative personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status The plant operated in Mode 1, power operations, at or near 100% power during the entire reporting period. At the end of the reporting period, the unit had been on-line for 219 consecutive days. This exceeded their previous record run of 204 days.
3.
Operational Safety (71707 and 93702)
l Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the i
control room to review the status of equipment, alarms, effective LCOs, temporary alterations, instrument readings, and staffing.
Discussions
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were held as appropriate to understand the significance of conditions observed.
Plant tours were routinely conducted and included portions of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building, radwaste building and outside areas. These observations included safety related I
tagout verifications, shift turnovers, sampling programs, housekeeping
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and general plant conditions. Additionally, the inspectors observed the l
status of fire protection equipment, the control of activities in progress, the problem identification systems, and the readiness of the onsite emergency response facilities. No deficiencies were identified.
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The inspectors reviewed the activities associated with the events listed f
below.
a.
On February 4, 1993, the licensee found U-bolts that provide
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restraint to the Standby Service Water cooling tower drift
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eliminators were broken.
Examination of the Division II basins j
revealed 21 of 24 U-bolts in the northwest quadrant and 18 of 24 U-bolts in tie southwest quadrant to be broken.
The licensee l
performed an initial operability call, followed up later by an j
engineering analysis confirming the results of the initial j
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operability call. The broken U-bolts functionally acted as J-i hooks.
The evaluation showed that for seismic and lift forces
generated by the fans or a tornado, the weight of the drift
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eliminators alone was enough to restrain their movement in the vertical direction.
Later examination of the Division I tower t
basin found 20 of 24 U-bolts broken in the southwest quadrant and
15 of 24 broken in the northwest quadrant. The Division III tower i
has not yet been inspected.
The unused quadrants of the tower (unit 2) were not found to have the problem with broken U-bolts.
The root cause of the broken U-bolt problem has not yet been
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determined. The licensee has plans to remove several of the broken bolts for analysis and to conduct inspections of the
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Division III portion of the tower in April.
The inspectors have been evaluating the licensee actions since the
time of discovery. lhis review of the operability evaluations of-j the towers found them to be adequate.
Since the root cause of
this common mode failure has not yet been discovered, and due to the high importance of the Ultimate Heat Sink to plant safety,
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this item will be tracked to resolution by IFI 93-03-02, standby service water basin U-bolt failures.
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I b.
On March 4, 1993, a maintenance planner raised questions concerning the adequacy of a surveillance test to perform a complete retest after replacement of a temperature switch.
The temperature switch was part of the RWCU leak detection isolation logic.
The questions resulted in a review of the sis used to
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determine operability of the isolation logic for Tech Spec 3.3.2.
Fourteen out of sixteen of the isolation temperature switches were i
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i found to be inadequately tested.
The surveillance had been
written in a manner that checked the circuits full logic using one
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temperature switch in each channel, then verified the remaining l
tempera ure switches by verifying each actuated an alarm. The
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al arm i s actuated when a relay changes state upon high temperature
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at the sensor. Another set of contacts on the same relay open to i
cause the isolation. The SI verified the relay changed state, but
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did not verify the isolation contacts on the relay were actually
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open. The SI did not provide adequate electrical overlap to i
verify the logic. The plant entered an LCO, made a temporary i
change to the surveillance procedure to verify operability of the
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affected temperature switches, and after performance of the SI, i
exited the LCO.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions,
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the circuit diagrams, and the changes to 06-IC-lE31-Q-1001, RWCU
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High Room and High Differential Room Temperature (RWCU Isolation)
i Functional Test, and to 06-IC-lE31-A-0001, RWCU High Room Temperature High Room Differential Temperature (RWCU Isolation)
Calibration.
The actions performed by the licensee were timely-
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and adequate.
This licensee identified violation is not being
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cited because the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the NRC
Enforcement Policy were satisfied, and is identified as NCV 93-03-l
01, RWCU isolation circuit logic test deficiencies.
The
inspectors recognized this discovery by the planning department as an example of the benefits gained through the use of planners with a high level of experience in the areas they are tasked to plan.
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This is a strength, c.
The inspectors conducted an inspection of the protected area perimeter and reviewed the station security plan and contingency plans for licensee planned response for various events. The inspectors observed several pre-staged trailers with minor
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maintenance problems of a nature that would not impact response.
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The licensee was informed and corrective actions were taken.
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After the inspector's review, interviews were conducted.
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those areas reviewed the licensee was aware of the required
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responses, and personnel and equipment were available to provide l
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the response.
One non-cited violation and one inspector followup item were identified.
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Maintenance Observation (62703)
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During the report period, the inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below. The observations included a review J
of the MW0s and other related documents for adequacy; adherence to
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procedure, proper tagouts, technical specifications, quality controls,
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and radiological controls; observation of work and/or retesting; and l
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specified retest requirements.
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MWO DESCRIPTION 89549 Clean, inspect and lubricate HPCS jockey pump motor.
89550 Sample upper and lower HPCS motor bearing oil and add oil.
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91391 Change oil on HPCS jockey pump.
Since December 1992, the inspectors have noticed several related incidents involving maintenance on various radiation monitoring instrumentation and the post accident sampling system.
Some of these incidents involved inadvertently rendering the monitors inoperable
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during maintenance activities.
Individually, these incidents were relatively safety insignificant.
Collectively, they possibly indicated
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deficient work control practices specific to radiation monitors and the
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post accident sampling system, and poor communications between the
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involved plant departments during these activities.
Plant management
indicated they were also aware of these weaknesses and that individuals had been tasked to investigate further and recommend corrective actions.
- The resident inspectors will continue to follow this issue to
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J resolution.
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e Violations or deviations were not identified.
The results of 'he observations in this area indicated that maintenance activities were
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effective.
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5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
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The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillances
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listed below.
The observations included a review of the procedures for
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technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications and LCOs; verification of test instrument calibration; observation of all or part of the actual surveillance; removal and return to service of the system or component; and review of the data for acceptability based upon the
acceptance criteria.
06-IC-lE31-A-1002, Rev. 27 RCIC Steam Pipe Tunnel High Differential.
Temperature Calibration.
07-S-13-7, Rev. 7 Calibration / Calibration Check of the (General Maintenance Drywell Purge Compressor 'B'
Auxiliary Instruction)
Lube Oil Pressure Switch.
07-S-53-142, Rev. 4 Calibration of The Drywell Purge
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(Maintenance Calibration Compressor 'B' dP Pressure Switch.
Instruction)
i Violations or deviations were not identified. The observed surveillance tests were performed in a satisfactory manner and met the requirements
of the Technical Specifications.
6.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700)
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The events listed below were reviewed to determine if the information r
provided met the NRC reporting requirements.
The determinations included adequacy of the event description, the corrective actions taken
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or planned, the existence of potential generic problems and the relative
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safety significance of each event. The inspectors used the NRC enforcement guidance to determine if the event met the criterion for
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licensee identified violations.
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a.
On February 17, 1993, at 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />, the liquid sampling portion of the post accident sampling system was declared to be inoperable
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after a monthly chemistry test revealed a failed flow element that monitored liquid sample flow rate. This flow monitor is required l
to ensure representative sampling.
Further investigations by the r
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licensee revealed that the monitor had be inoperable since February 11, 1993, after scheduled maintenance work.
Repairs were completed and the system was declared operable on February 20, 1993, at 0230 hours0.00266 days <br />0.0639 hours <br />3.80291e-4 weeks <br />8.7515e-5 months <br />.
The resident inspector was notified and a one hour notification was made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(v).
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On March 4,1993, at 1021 hours0.0118 days <br />0.284 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.884905e-4 months <br />, the liquid and gaseous sampling portions of the post accident sampling system were declared inoperable to complete the scheduled replacement of an air purge regulator. This required securing air to all air operated valves in the system. Work was completed and the system declared operable the same day at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />.
The resident inspector was notified and a one hour notification was made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(v).
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7.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)
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(Closed) Violation 92-09-02, Multiple examples of failure to follow procedures.
The inspectors reviewed and verified the following
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corrective actions specified in the licensee's response to this
violation dated June 5, 1992:
Example 1) Operator tripped the wrong
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breaker causing an Engineered Safety Feature actuation.
Following this event discussions were held between shift supervision and the operating shifts emphasizing management expectations and self verification.
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addition, all LCC feeder breakers that supply MCCs were labeled to identify them as feeder breakers.
Example 2) Operator misplotted offgas
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pretreatment radiation monitor reading which resulted in a Technical Specification surveillance not being performed.
The operator involved j
and all other operators were briefed on this incident to emphasize
following procedures and the self verification process.
Procedure 06-
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OP-1000-D-0001, Daily Operating Logs, was revised to eliminate comparison errors thereby reducing the chance of plotting errors.
Additional guidance was developed by the Chemistry department to determine nominal offgas activities during plant operations.
Example 3)
Chemist failed to recommend to the operations shift supervisor that an
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effluent radiation monitor be declared inoperable af ter determining that
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a setpoint change was required.
The chemistry procedures associated with effluent radiation monitor alarm setpoint determination and control were revised to place greater emphasis and clarification on control room notification when a setpoint change was required.
Training sessions
were given by the Chemistry Superintendent emphasizing attention to
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detail, procedural compliance and prompt control room notification when required.
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In response to all the above incidents, plant management incorporated i
"self verification" guidelines into the appropriate plant administrative procedures.
The inspectors determined that the above corrective actions l
were adequate. This item is closed.
l (Closed) Unresolved Item 91-18-02. A licensee contracted consultant I
firm completed a safety system functional assessment during May 1991 (
which included a review of the HPCS system. A concern that the HPCS i
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header pressure change (dP) alarm instrument setpoint was not set in t
accordance with Technical Specifications was identified. This setpoint
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is dependent on core dP which changes with varying reactor power, core i
flow and core geometry. The inspectors 1) reviewed General Electric
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service information letters and correspondence to ensure that their
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recommendations were incorporated in the applicable plant procedures, 2) discussed alarm setpoint determination methodology with-the
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responsible system engineer and 3) reviewed the current setpoint i
determination made following the last refueling outage. Current
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practices ensured that the setpoint was conservatively determined based on varying core flow and power conditions. This item is closed.
8.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 12, 1993,
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with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results
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listed below.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
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Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
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Item Number Description and Reference 50-416/93-03-01 NCV, RWCU isolation circuit logic
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test deficiencies.
i 50-416/93-03-02 IFI, standby service water basin U-bolt failures 9.
Acronyms and Initialisms
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CFR
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Code Federal Regulations i
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Load Control Center LC0
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Limiting Condition for Operation MCC
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Motor Control Center i
MWO
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Maintenance Work Order NRC
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission RCIC -
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RWCU -
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Surveillance Instruction
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