IR 05000400/2016007
| ML17011A222 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/2017 |
| From: | Bradley Davis Reactor Projects Branch 7 |
| To: | Hamilton T Progress Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2016007 | |
| Download: ML17011A222 (15) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ary 11, 2017
SUBJECT:
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2016007
Dear Ms. Hamilton:
On December 16, 2016, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on December 16, 2016, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). Adams is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Bradley J. Davis, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63
Enclosure:
IR 05000400/2016007 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION II==
Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63 Report No.: 05000400/2016007 Licensee: Duke Energy Progress, Inc.
Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location: 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562 Dates: December 12 - 16, 2016 Inspectors: S. Freeman, Senior Reactor Analyst, RII (Team Leader)
R. Rodriguez, Senior Project Engineer, RII P. McKenna, Senior Resident Inspector, Surry R. Alexander, Senior Project Engineer, Region IV Approved by: Bradley J. Davis, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000400/2016007; 12/12/2016 - 12/16/2016; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1;
Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans issued December 23, 2015.
The inspection covered a one week inspection by one senior reactor analyst, one senior resident inspector, and two senior project engineers. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None
Licensee-Identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
4. Other Activities
4OA5 Other Activities (TI 2515/191)
The objective of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2015/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, is to verify that licensees have adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the licensees Final Integrated Plan, dated July 10, 2015 [non-public] as supplemented by letter dated June 29, 2016 [ADAMS Accession No. ML16182A047] and the NRCs plant safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML16217A449) and to verify that the licensees installed reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in their spent fuel pools. The purpose of this TI is also to verify the licensees have implemented Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements as described in their site-specific submittals and NRC safety assessments, including multi-unit dose assessment capability and enhancements to ensure that staffing is sufficient and communications can be maintained during such an event.
The inspection verifies that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verifies implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012 request for information letter and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).
The team discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed documentation, and where appropriate, performed plant walk downs to verify that the strategies could be implemented as stated in the licensees submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the teams inspection activities are described in the following sections.
1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events
a. Inspection Scope
The team examined the licensees established guidelines and implementing procedures for the beyond-design basis mitigation strategies. The team assessed how the licensee coordinated and documented the interface/transition between existing off-normal and emergency operating procedures with the newly developed mitigation strategies. The team selected a number of mitigation strategies and conducted plant walk downs with licensed operators and responsible plant staff to assess: the adequacy and completeness of the procedures; familiarity of operators with the procedure objectives and specific guidance; staging and compatibility of equipment; and the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the postulated scenarios.
The team verified that a preventive maintenance program had been established for the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) portable equipment and that periodic equipment inventories were in place and being conducted. Additionally, the team examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Operations and Security staff most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee was generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
- developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events.
- integrated the FSGs into existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures.
- protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards.
- developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure its availability and capability.
- trained the staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events.
- developed means to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.
The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
c. Findings
No findings identified.
2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
a. Inspection Scope
The team examined the licensees newly installed spent fuel pool instrumentation.
Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling for the power supplies and the indications for each channel are physically and electrically separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of the instruments were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that the licensee satisfactorily installed and established control of the spent fuel pool (SFP)instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
- installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation.
- installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals.
- trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation.
- developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.
The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
c. Findings
No findings identified.
3. Staffing and Communication Request for Information
a. Inspection Scope
Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walk downs, the team verified that the licensee had implemented required changes to staffing, communications equipment and facilities to support a multi-unit extended loss of offsite power scenario as described in the licensees staffing assessment and the NRC safety assessment. The team also verified that the licensee had implemented dose assessment (including releases from spent fuel pools) capability using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described in the licensees multi-unit dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Assessment The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensees multi-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRCs March 12, 2012, request for information letter and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all alternating current power (ELAP) to the site and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:
- Licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing change(s) to support an ELAP scenario.
- Implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools)using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach.
The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
c. Findings
No findings identified.
4OA6 Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On December 16, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Ms. Tanya Hamilton and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- T. Hamilton, Site Vice President
- P. Fisk, Plant Manager
- S. Scott, Operations Manager
- S. OConner, General Manager Engineering
- B. Jones, Director Organizational Effectiveness
- D. Corlett, Manager Procedures
- J. OKeefe, Assistant Operations Manager, Support
- M. Weber, Manager of Fukushima Response
- S. McDaniel, Regulatory Affairs Engineer
- P. Houseworth, Senior Reactor Operator
- T. Nietschmann, System Engineer
- J. Robertson, Manager Regulatory Affairs
- A. Goodman, Regulatory Affairs
- T. Byrne, Regulatory Affairs
- T. Toler, Manager Nuclear Oversight
- R. Garner, Manager Operations Training
- C. Simmons, Manager Emergency Preparedness
- R. Rishel, Director Probabilistic Risk Assessment Group
NRC personnel
- C. Jones, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
- M. Franovich, Acting Director, Japan Lessons Learned Division, NRR
LIST OF REPORT ITEMS
Opened and Closed
None
Discussed
None