IR 05000400/1995007
| ML18011A930 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1995 |
| From: | Barr K, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18011A929 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-95-07, 50-400-95-7, NUDOCS 9505310028 | |
| Download: ML18011A930 (17) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETI'ASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 May 24, 1995 Report Nos.:
50-400/95-07 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos1 50-400 License No.:
NPF-63 Facility Name:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit
Inspection Conducted:
April 17-21, 1995 Inspector:~~ A M.
M. Sartor, Jr.
Accompanying Personnel:
A. Gooden, RII
. Byron, Resident Inspector Clark, RII
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D te igned Approved by:
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te igned Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
This NRC/FEMA evaluated exercise was conducted from 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> to 2235 hours0.0259 days <br />0.621 hours <br />0.0037 weeks <br />8.504175e-4 months <br /> on April 18, 1995.
The scope of the onsite inspection focused on the adequacy of the licensee's emergency response program, the implementation of the Emergency Plan and procedures in response to the simulated emergency conditions, and the effectiveness of the emergency response training program as reflected by the players'erformance during the exercise.
Results:
The performance of the emergency response organization was considered satisfactory because the exercise progressed according to the scenario timeline and permitted both onsite and offsite objectives to be demonstrated.
However, the delayed accomplishment of prioritized repair missions due to the inability to approve emergency actions outside of the normal procedural requirement was a concern.
This concern was discussed in the critique process by the licensee as a deficiency requiring corrective action.
A similar issue had been addressed in one of the drill rehearsals as well.
Corrective action 95053l0028 950524 PDR ADOCK 05000400
to this concern was the most substantive challenge observed during the exercise.
Exercise strengths included the high state of training demonstrated by the ERO in performing most tasks and an excellent critique process.
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie,
Persons Contacted REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees
- R. Bassett, Emergency Preparedness
- S. Chaplin, Regulatory Affairs/Licensing Unit
- W. Christiansen, Manager, Maintenance
- T. Causey, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- J. Dobbs, Manager, Outages
- J. Donahue, Plant General Manager
- R. Duncan, Manager, Technical Support
- W. Gilbert, Nuclear Assessment
- H. Hill, Manager, Nuclear Assessment
- R. Indelicato, Emergency Preparedness
- E. Kellogg, Emergency Preparedness
- D. HcCarthy, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- B. HcFeaters, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- C. Hoss, Emergency Preparedness
- K. Neuschaefer, Manager, Radiation Control
- H. Palmer, Acting Manager, Work Control
- R. Prunty, Manager, Licensing/Regulatory Program
- L. Rowell, Project Engineer
- T. Toler, Instructor, Training Section
- M. Warren, Site Communications Specialist
- A. Williams, Manager, Operations Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- S. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview An index of abbreviations used throughout this report will be found in the last paragraph.
2.
Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine whether provisions had been made for (I) a test of the licensee's integrated capabilities for timely response to a radiological accident, (2)
a test of the content of selected implementing procedures and methods, (3) test emergency equipment, (4) test communications networks, and to (5) determine whether the licensee's emergency response personnel were familiar with their emergency response duties.
The recent training for the emergency response team that responded to the simulated accident was also reviewe The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and was discussed with licensee representatives prior to the exercise.
The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to demonstrate the capabilities of the onsite and offsite emergency organizations to accomplish the above tasks.
The"scenario also provided the necessary emergency information to the State and local government agencies for their participation in the exercise.
V No problems with the scenario data were identified during the review process, and only minor inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise.
The licensee's controller staff was effective in handling these inconsistencies and they did not detract'rom the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization, The training program for the evaluated exercise was fairly intense and well formulated.
Team D of the emergency response organization schedule was the duty roster team of the week and therefore participated in the exercise.
Three rehearsals had been conducted in the five weeks prior to the exercise with Team D.
The training appeared to have been effective in assuring good player performance but was not effective in securing corrective action to a deficiency identified in the critique package for the second rehearsal conducted on Harch 30, 1995.
Specifically, a comment indicated much time was spent deciding how to handle a procedure
"deviation" during an emergency situation.
A similar finding by the licensee during the critique for this exercise was the most substantive issue of the exercise.
The licensee's further evaluation of this issue and concomitant corrective action should lead to an improved emergency response program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by Section 2.4 of the SHNPP EP.
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives and the capability for long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was discussed and planning for relief was initiated.
Several changes had been made to staffing responsibilities since the October 1993 decision to assemble and activate the EOF at the Alert classification or higher.
This decision had allowed the elimination of redundant support functions which had been done in both the TSC and EOF.
The staffing responsibilities for this exercise also included the elimination of the TSC Logistics Support Director, the OSC Leader, and the EOF Environmental Supervisor
position.
The functions of these positions had been reassigned to others in the ERO and were incorporated into the necessary emergency procedures changes.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response were defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as referenced in Paragraph 2.2 and Annex G of the SHNPP EP.
'he inspectors determined that the licensee's onsite emergency organization was well defined and was effective in dealing with the simulated emergency.
Adequate staffing of the emergency response facilities was provided for the initial accident response and the interfaces between the onsite organization and offsite support agencies were adequate to ensure prompt notification and support from offsite agencies as required.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made, whether arrangements to accommodate State and local personnel in the EOF were adequate, and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified in Annex G of the SHNPP EP.
The licensee's EP provided information for additional support and resources that may be called upon to assist in an emergency.
Representatives of the North Carolina Division of Emergency Nanagement and the Nort'h Carolina Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources, Division of Radiation Protection were accommodated at the near-site EOF.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as documented in Section 4. 1 of the SHNPP EP.
The inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the EP.
The emergency action levels were based upon the fission product barrier concept.
The concept had its basis in NUREG-0654, Appendix 1 where emergency events are found that correspond to failures or jeopardy of the three basic fission product barriers.
The categorization of events according to one of the four emergency
classes was implemented through the EAL system.
The system was composed of two subsystems:
The Unusual Event Action Level Natrix and the EAL Network/Flowpath.
Senior Reactor Operators were present in the TSC and the EOF to provide assistance to the Site Emergency Coordinator and the Emergency Response Nanager respectively in maintaining an awareness of where the plant conditions were reflected on the EAL Network/Flowpath.
-The system worked effectively during the exercise as timely and proper emergency classifications were made.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel and the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations had been established; and a
means to provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway had been established as documented in SHNPP EP Sections 4.2 and 4.5.3.
The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizations.
The first Emergency Notification Form for the exercise was transmitted at 1612 hours0.0187 days <br />0.448 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.13366e-4 months <br /> and informed the State and local response organizations of the Alert declaration.
During the remainder of the exercise a total of 10 more notifications were made prior to the termination at 2235 hours0.0259 days <br />0.621 hours <br />0.0037 weeks <br />8.504175e-4 months <br />.
Two of the notifications were initial notifications for the, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency declarations, whereas the remaining eight notifications were follow-up notifications providing periodic status updates or dose projection estimates.
The management of notifications was well coordinated in the EOF and resulted in timely and accurate information being provided to the offsite response agencies.
Alerting, warning, and early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway would be provided by sounding sirens, activation of tone activated radios within five miles of the plant, and supplemented by announcements made through radio and television (EBS),
sound trucks, bullhorns, and knocking on doors.
Patrol boats would be used in alerting people on Lake Jordan and Harris Lake in accordance with the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in support of the SHNPP.
Siren activations and EBS messages were simulated for this exercise.
These offsite areas of interest were evaluated by FEHA.
No violations or deviations were identifie Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6)
and described in Section 3.8 of the SHNPP EP.
Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organization and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities were good.
During the exercise it was observed that the Selective Signaling System to the Chatham County EOC did not work.
The communicator in the EOF was very effective in making the notifications via an alternative system.
This provided an excellent unplanned demonstration of back-up communications system use as a result of a well trained communicator.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as described in Section 5.2.5 of the SHNPP EP.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise.
The information included details on how the public would be notified and what initial actions they should take in an emergency.
A rumor control program was in place.
During the exercise, provisions were established through the Joint Information Center to make available and distribute information to the news media about the simulated emergency.
The JIC was activated at 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br /> and the first press conference was at 1740 hours0.0201 days <br />0.483 hours <br />0.00288 weeks <br />6.6207e-4 months <br />.
The licensee prepared and issued 11 press releases about the simulated emergency conditions.
The inspector noted that the information provided was timely and accurate, and that the facility was well organized with security properly prohibiting media representatives from interfering with the emergency response.
The personnel doing the press briefings were well qualified and provided answers to media questions in a timely manner in most instances.
No'iolations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as described in Section 3.0 of the SHNPP EP.
Emergency response facilities were provided at centralized locations for organized command and control of onsite activities, and offsite activities performed by the licensee such as environmental monitorin The inspectors observed the activation, staffing and operation of selected emergency response facilities and evaluated equipment provided for emergency use during the exercise.
The facilities observed were the same facilities that would be used in an actual emergency with the exception of the Drill Control Room which was used in lieu of the actual Control Room to minimize distractions to the operating shift.
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Drill Control Room - This facility was located on the 4th floor of the K-Building in room K-011.
Communications equipment and procedures were located in this room to allow the drill participants to play the role of control room personnel without impacting actual operations.
- The TSC was located on the fourth floor of the K-Building in room K-08.
The TSC provided the assembly location for technical personnel who provided engineering and management support of plant activities following the simulated emergency along with direction and coordination of overall plant emergency activities.
The TSC was promptly staffed and operational following the Alert declaration.
Emergency equipment supported the emergency response in most cases.
An exception was the TSC ventilation which had a malfunctioning automatic damper controller.
Although the system could be manually aligned, this was not demonstrated during the exercise.
The inspector also noted that although the PA system was available for providing emergency information of onsite personnel, the PA announcement for the SAE declaration was not made until approximately 50 minutes after the declaration.
This oversight would have been significant had accountability of personnel been included as an exercise objective.
However, had emergency personnel been required to conduct such accountability, the need to sound the alarm for the SAE and direct personnel to assemble would have been procedurally directed.
The licensee identified this issue for correction in their critique.
Operations Support Center
- The OSC was located in the Waste Processing Building and provided an area for assembly and briefing of on-shift and other support personnel.
The inspector observed that the facility was organized to provide effective command and control of repair missions; however, enhancements would include more frequent status reports to the OSC staff personnel to include those dispatched on repair missions.
The inspector also noted some excessive delay in obtaining needed supplies for repair missions.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility - The EOF was located in the Harris Energy and Environmental Center.
The EOF was promptly activated and managed by the Emergency Response Manager who with his staff provided support in:
technical analysis, administration and logistics, radiological control, and emergency communications.
The emergency equipment in the EOF facilitated the emergency response with two exceptions.
These were the aforementioned
problem with the Selective Signaling System as well as a problem with the FAX machine.
In both cases, back-up machines or systems provided an effective alternate.
e.
- The JIC was located in the Raleigh Civic Center on the south side of Raleigh, N.C.
It functioned effectively as previously mentioned in Paragraph 9.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency conditions were in use as described in Section 4.4 of the SHNPP EP.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the simulated accident.
During the exercise, the Technical Analysis Director and the Accident Assessment Team in the TSC functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Site Emergency Coordinator concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials, and to terminate the emergency condition.
Onsite and offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the simulated plume.
The Radiological Control Manager in the EOF was effective in making assessments of the offsite radiological consequences and keeping the Emergency Response Hanager informed of the assessment.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel were implemented promptly as described in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 of the SHNPP EP.
Following the declaration of a General Emergency, the licensee made offsite protective action recommendations that were consistent with those in the Emergency Plan.
Protective actions for emergency workers were evaluated on several occasions and habitability was periodically assessed throughout the exercise through radiological surveys.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Exercise Critique (82301)
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The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether the deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise, and the weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization, were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as described in Section 5.3.2 of the SHNPP EP.
The licensee conducted facility critiques with exercise players immediately following the exercise termination.
Licensee controllers and observers conducted additional critiques prior to the formal critique to management on April 21, 1995.
Issues identified by the licensee's staff during the exercise were discussed by licensee representatives during the critique.
The critique process first discussed the objectives and the status of the objectives being met during the exercise.
Specific statements that addressed the strengths, deficiencies (if applicable),
and comments were then presented for each of the ERFs.
The critique process was thorough and well presented.
Exit Interview 15.
16.
The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 21, 1995, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and emphasized the opportunities to improve the emergency preparedness program by evaluating problem areas that surfaced during the exercise and then securing corrective action to same.
A specific challenge in this regard was the need to determine the process to authorize deviations from normal work practices to secure actions that are determined necessary to expeditiously mitigate accident conditions.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (RAC and FERA) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
Index of Abbreviations Used in This Report CFR EAL EBS EOC EOF EP ERF FEMA JIC NRC OSC PA Code of Federal Regulations Emergency Action Limit Emergency Broadcast System Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Plan Emergency Response Facility Federal Emergency Hanagement Agency Joint Information Center Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operational Support Center Public Address
PAR RAC SAE SEC SHNPP TSC Protective Action Recommendation Regional Assistance Committee Site Area Emergency Site Emergency Coordinator Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Technical Support Center Attachment:
Exercise Objectives and Exercise Narrative
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Demonstrate the ability to detect accident conditions, assess and project radiological consequences, and formulate near term mitigating actions.
Demonstrate the ability to identify and classify the emergency in accordance with the Emergency Plan.
Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to perform accident assessment and implement those appropriate mitigating actions necessary to place the plant in a safe and stable condition.
5.
10.
12.
Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for alerting, notifying, and mobilizing on-site and off-site emergency response organization personnel.
Demonstrate the timeliness and adequacy of the information provided in the initial notifications to state and county agencies.
Demonstrate the ability to provide follow-up notifications to the state and county agencies.
Demonstrate the capability to make timely and accurate notifications to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Demonstrate the ability to augment the on-shift emergency organization within the time limits specified within the emergency plan and implementing procedures (during normal working hours).
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center in providing accident assessment and mitigation, and communication/notification activities.
Demonstrate the adequacy, of the Operations Support Center in providing additional manpower support and coordination.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency Operations Facility in providing off-site dose assessment, environmental monitoring, protective action recommendations, and evaluation/coordination of off-site activities.
13.
14.
15.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate between emergency response facilities, as well as environmental monitoring teams.
Demonstrate that the transmittal of radiological, meteorological, and process data al to the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility is adequate.
Demonstrate the adequacy of emergency kits and equipment in emergency response facilities.
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Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the preparation, review, and release of information to the public prior to the activation of the Joint Information Center.
Demonstrate the ability to perform rumor control activities.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the equipment utilized for off-site radiological monitoring.
" HNP April 18, 1995 EP Oraded Exercise Scenario, Rev.
Page 8 of 22
5:18 20:48 A significant water hammer (pressure surge) is heard in the steam piping.
T+5:23 20:53 T+5: 26 20:56 A massive rupture of the steam header within the steam tunnel occurs.
When this condition is identified, the last of the fission product barriers (Containment) will be classified as breached.
With all three fission product barriers breached, a GENERAL EMERGENCY is required to be declared.
The steam break will be unisolable.
All Main Steam Isolation valves (MSIV) were closed prior to this event, which isolates the
"A" and "8" Steam Generators from the break.
The Control Board shut indicator light for the "C" MSIV is lost as a result of steam impingement.
The "C" Steam Generator pressure rapidly decreases.
The decreased pressure in the Steam Generator causes a significant increase in the leak rate from the RCS to that Steam Generator.
The increased flow rate results in increased damage to the Steam Generator U-Tubes, further increasing the flow rate from the RCS.
The increased leak rate from the RCS along with the cooldown and resultant depressurization of the RCS willrequire that the plant staff to re-initiate Safety Injection flow to protect the reactor core.
Some additional fuel damage occurs as a result of this evolution.
T+5:38 21:08 T+5:45 21:15 T+6:25 21:55 T+6:30+ =22:00 A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared by this time with Protective Action Recommendations being provided to the State and 10-mile EPZ counties.
The expected initial Protective Action Recommendations will be based on the measured wind direction at the plants meteorological tower (from 290') are expected to be an evacuation of the "A" sub-zone (2 mile radius around the plant) and "C" & "D" (downwind subzones 2 to 5 miles from the plant). Allother subzones will receive the recommendation to shelter in place.
The actual off-site prevailing winds will be from 280'esulting in a plume centerline leaving the plant at 100'.
The "C" steam break leak rate has been artiflcially increased by a factor of 2 to 3 to enhance the radiological release aspects of the scenario.
The Steam Generator U-tubes remain covered and significant removal of Iodines and Particulates from the release does occur.
The primary plant cooldown has proceeded as far is it can until Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cooling can be established.
The repair efforts associated with the "C" CCW Pump discharge valve to the "B" train of CCW will have been completed successfully.
Restoration of CCW cooling will be initiated followed by preparations to initiate Residual Heat Removal (RHR) to further cooldown the reactor coolant system and thereby terminate the radioactive release from the faulted and ruptured "C" Steam Generator.
T+7:30+ =23:00 The exercise will'erminate near this time, dependent on when State, County, and utilitypersonnel have had ample opportunity to demonstrate objectives selected for this exercise.
)ÃP April 18, 1995 EP Graded Exercise Scenario, Rev.
Page 12 of 22
2:05 17:35 T+2:25+ =17:55 T+3: 01 18:31 Operations personnel will discover that boration flow is no longer making it the Reactor Coolant System.
Investigation will identify a blocked boric acid filter. The filter will be bypassed to permit the boration to continue.
In response to the blocked boric acid filter, a backwashing of the filter will be initiated.
A inalfunction of the backwash control valves prevents performance of this task from the Rad Waste Control Room.
Investigation and repair activities should be initiated.
This malfunction will be repairable and will not affect the staffs ability to borate the reactor coolant system.
The Reactor Head Venting, which has been periodically occurring, will last occur at this time.
T+3: 07 18:37 T+3:18 18:48 T+3: 40 19:10 T+4: 00+ =19:30 T+4:45 20:15
A malfunction in the steam dump electronic control circuit willresult in all Steam Generator Condenser steam dump valves failing full open.
Both trains of safety injection automatically initiate on low Steam Generator pressure, rate compensated, and inject water into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS).
The Main Steam Isolation valves will shut in response to low steam line pressure and isolate the steam flow to the Condenser.
Steam Generator Blowdown and Containment Phase "A" Isolation valves will also close automatically.
The pressure transient from the steam generator pressure drop and RCS pressure increase from Safety Injection results in a primary to secondary leak in the "C" Steam Generator.
The leak willinitially be 80 gpm.
The Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors will go into alarm and will read high enough to result in declaration of the Fuel and RCS fission product barriers (FPBs) as breached.
With the RCS and the Fuel FPBs breached, a SITE EMERGENCY will be declared.
The plant operations staff will initiate a cooldown of the RCS in accordance with their procedure for response a
Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
A SITE EMERGENCY should be declared by this time based on a breach of two of the three fission product barriers.
A Chemistry Technician, who has sampled the contents of the "C" Steam Generator from the sample panel in the Turbine Building, is in the process of carrying the sample back to the laboratory when he trips and falls. As he falls he knocks the sample container to the floor and its contents spill on the floor and over his/her clothing. A small area of the floor willbecome contaminated to approximately 100,000 cpm/100 cm. The technician receives a minor injury to the hip during the fall. The First Aid team will be dispatched to assist the technician.
No offsite assistance nor further medical attention will be required.
The technician willbe assisted to the Waste Processing building where personnel decontamination willcommence with initial skin contamination as high as 30,000 cpm/100 cm. Another sample of the "C" Steam Generator will be required.
With the loss of the CCW system, there is no cooling available to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT).
The level and pressure in the PRT, inside Containment, has been increasing due to the periodic operation of the Pressurizer PORVs to maintain RCS pressure while on natural circulation cooling.
With the latest cycling of the PORV, the pressure in the tank exceeds the rupture disc relief pressure and the tank contents are release to the containment atmosphere.
As the steam is condensed, it drains to the Containment sump.
The contents of the sump are periodically pumped to the Waste Holdup Tank in the Waste Process Building.
HNP April 18, 1995 EP Graded Exercise Scenario, Rev.
Page 11 of 22
e 0:15 15:15 T= 0 15:30 T+0:19 15:49 T+0:22 15:52 The Harris Plant activities willbegin in the Drill Control Room.
The exercise crew will be manned and receive a turnover on simulated plant conditions.
The plant will be operating normally at full power, approximately middle of life, with no abnormal conditions existing and no major evolutions planned for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The nB" train of safety related equipment is in service.
Drill activities are initiated with a trip of the "Bn Component Cooling Water pump.
Per design the "An CCW pump will auto-start when the nBn CCW pump trips.
The plant staff will be involved in determining the cause of the pump trip, the verification of proper system alignments for "An train CCW cooling, and responding to the Technical Specification associated with the loss of one train of CCW.
A large tube rupture occurs in the nAn CCW to Service Water heat exchanger.
The water from the CCW system willbe lost to the service water system.
The level in the CCW Surge Tank willhave dropped to 4% which procedurally
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requires the Reactor Coolant Pumps to be shut down as they are cooled by CCW.
The reactor can not be operated at power with all 3 Reactor Coolant Pumps out of service and the plant staff willtrip the reactor.
RCS letdown and sampling capabilities will be lost due to the loss of CCW cooling.
The loss of all CCW meets the criteria for declaration of an ALERT. This transient on the primary plant results in a slight release of some fission product gases from the fuel. The primary coolant DE-I131 activity remains well below the EAL threshold for declaring the Fuel as breached (300 pCi/cc).
The RCS activity slowly increases over the next few hours.
+0:36 >16:06 When operations personnel attempt to restart the "A" CCW Pump, damage to the pump will be detected.
The pump willnot be capable of providing any cooling flow.
T+0:37 16:07 T+0:42 16:12 T+1:00+ =16:30
>T+0:45 >16:15 T+1:10 16:40 T+1:30 =17:00 1:49 17:19 The ALERT is expected to be declared by this point in time as a result of a loss of the CCW function which is a function required for Mode 4/5 (Hot or Cold Shutdown).
Primary plant temperature control will be established using natural circulation cooling with steam being dumped to the condenser.
A Pressurizer PORV begins to automatically cycle to maintain RCS pressure.
This valve discharges RCS fluid to the Pressurizer Relief Tank.
Efforts to restore CCW by placing the nC", swing, CCW Pump in service will fail due to finding the pump discharge cross-connect valves to both the nA train and nB" train, 1CC-68 and 1CC-70, stuck shut.
The lack of CCW prevents the use of the primary sampling system.
The Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) is still available.
A boration of the RCS will be initiated in preparation for a cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System.
Staffing and activation of the Joint Information Center (JIC) is expected to occur at approximately this time.
In order to maintain Pressurizer level below 90%, as required by procedure, the Reactor Head Vent valves will be periodically opened.
The normal path to the Pressurizer Relief Tank willnot function as a result of valve 1RC-905 failing to open.
As a result venting directly to Containment atmosphere will be required.
Containment radiation levels will rise as a result of this venting.
'HNP April 18, 1995 EP Graded Exercise Scenario, Rev.
Page 10 of 22
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Demonstrate the ability to formulate appropriate off-site protective action recommendations.
22.
Demonstrate that emergency exposure control procedures have been established and utilized in the protection of emergency workers.
23.
Demonstrate the capability to monitor personnel and equipment for contamination.
26.
Demonstrate that adequate control measures have been established for plant access control.
30.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate off-site radiological monitoring activities.
33.
Demonstrate the proper procedures and use of protective measures for entering a Radiologically Controlled Area under abnormal radiological conditions.
34.
Demonstrate the capability to coordinate the preparation, review, and release of information for the news media.
35.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate news releases with the state and county personnel.
HNP April 18, 1995 EP Graded Exercise Scenario, Rev.
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