IR 05000400/1995001

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Insp Rept 50-400/95-01 on 950123-27.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Dam Safety Audit & Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings
ML18011A810
Person / Time
Site: Harris 
Issue date: 02/21/1995
From: Blake J, Lenahan J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18011A809 List:
References
50-400-95-01, 50-400-95-1, NUDOCS 9503080237
Download: ML18011A810 (9)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 Report Nos.:

50-400/95-01 Licensee:

Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.

Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos.:

50-400 Facility Name:

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit

Inspection Conducted:

January 23 -27, 1995 License Nos.:

NPF-63 Inspector:

J. J.

Lenahan Z/I//f~

Date Signed Accompanying Personnel:

R.

Shewmaker, Senior Structural Engineer, NNSS R. Pichumani, Geotechnical Engineer, NRR R. Bryant, Civil Engineer, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Atlanta Approved by:

J. J.,

Chief Mater'a and Processes Section Engi ee ing Branch Division of Reactor Safety Zci P5 Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:

This special announced inspection was conducted in the areas of a dam safety audit of the West Auxiliary Dam (Ultimate Heat Sink) performed by the NRC staff and its technical advisor, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

The inspector also examined the main dam and the separating dike, and licensee action on previous inspection findings.

Results:

In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

A weakness was identified in the licensee's followup actions to address recommendations of their consultants specified in the reports of periodic dam inspections performed under Regulatory Guide 1. 127.

Enclosure 9S0308023T 9S0224 PDR ADOCK OS000400 PQR

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Persons Contacted REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees

    • P. Chrisloe, Civil Subunit Supervisor, Harris -Engineering Support Service (HESS)
    • B. Christiansen, Manager, Maintenance
    • J. Dobbs, Manager, Outages
    • R. Duncan, Manager, Technical Support
      • B. Manlar, Civil Engineer, HESS
    • J. Nevill, Design Engineering Manager, HESS
  • W. Robinson, Vice-President, Harris Plant
    • G. Rolfson, Manager, HESS
      • V. Stephenson, Civil Unit Manager, HESS Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel.

NRC Resident Inspector

      • S. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector
  • Attended January 24, 1995 dam safety audit exit interview
    • Attended January 27, 1995 exit interview
      • Attended both exit interviews 2.

2.1 NRC Staff/FERC Audit of the West Auxiliary Dam and Associated Structures (37550)

Audit Criteria The audit/inspection evaluated conformance of the West Auxiliary dam (Ultimate Heat Sink) to the Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety, June 1979); the proposed NRC Dam Safety Program (April 1991);

and NRC Regulatory Guide 1. 127, Inspection of Water-Control Structures Associated with Nuclear Power Plants.

The licensee's commitment to inspect the dam is specified in Section 1.8 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

Details regarding construction of the dam are shown in FSAR Section 2.5.

2.2 Structural Review Prior to performing the walkdown inspection of the dam, the NRC staff and FERC consultant met with licensee engineers and reviewed the following topics:

Design criteria, construction specifications and procedures, geologic data, embankment construction data, stability analysis data, and predicted seepage and settlement data.

Hydrologic data Pertinent structural and design features of the discharge structure.

Instrumentation The discussions disclosed that no modifications, major repairs or maintenance have been implemented on the dam and associated structures since original construction.

2.3 Previous Dam Inspections and Findings The audit team reviewed the data and results from inspections of the West Auxiliary Dam completed in 1986, 1988, and 1990.

The team reviewed instrumentation data, and recommendations and conclusions from the inspection reports.

2.4 Inspection of West Auxiliary Dam The audit team examined the West Auxiliary Dam and associated structures by performing a thorough walkdown and visual inspection.

The following features were examined during the inspection.

Upstream and downstream embankment slopes, crest, and slope protection (rip-rap).

There was no evidence of cracking, slope instability, displacement of slope protection, settlement, or embankment erosion.

The audit team noted some vegation growth on the embankment, especially along the downstream toe of the embankment.

Concrete spillway, stilling basin, and retaining walls.

Some minor cracking was noted on the spillway apron, but this is a normal service condition.

An area of spalled concrete at the top of the west spillway wall, which was noted in the licensee's 1990 dam inspection, had been repaired.

The concrete spalling was cosmetic, not structural.

The concrete repair (patch)

may need to be re-repaired in the future.

The downstream toe of the dam was examined.

The audit team noted that rainfall runoff is ponding along the toe in some area, and that runoff is actually directed into the dam embarkment along portions of the embankment toe.

The audit team also noted that several trees were growing adjacent to the dam embankment in the toe area.

Also some of the toe areas showed signs of erosio.5 Audit Conclusions/Findings FERC will prepare the dam safety audit report for the NRC Dam Safety Officer.

The report will list the audit findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

After review and approval by NRC, a copy of the report will be provided to the licensee.

Audit observations and findings discussed at the dam safety audit exit interview were as follows:

The deflection/settlement data for monument AH-5 is erratic.

The team recommended that this data be reviewed in detail to determine the reason for the erratic readings.

The team recommended that better drainage be established along the toe of the embankment in areas where rainfall is ponding or draining into the embankment.

The team recommended that piezometer and deflection data be expanded when it is plotted to included a longer time period (up to 5 years).

This will result in the data being presented in a format which will be more meaningful to evaluate.

The team recommended that the licensee consider installing some additional piezometers in the embankment.

The existing piezometers are installed in the dam foundation and do not give a

good indication of the phreatic surface in the embankment.

The team recommended that vegetation be cleaned from the embankment (riprap)

and from proximity of the downstream toe of the dam.

The as-built drawings for the dam need to be updated.

Overall, the team concluded that the dam was in good conditions.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

3.0 Inspection of Hain Dam and Separating Dike (37550)

Subsequent to the conclusion of the safety audit of the West Auxiliary Dam, the inspector performed a visual inspection of the main dam and the separating dike.

Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector was Regulatory Guide 1. 127, as stipulated by FSAR Section 1.8.

The inspector examined the main dam concrete structures (spillway) and the separating dike and main dam embankments'ome minor cracking was observed in the main dam spillway, but this is a normal service condition and is unchanged since the last NRC inspection of the spillway in 1990.

There was no evidence of slope instability, embankment settlement, deflection or cracking, or displacement of slope protection (riprap).

The inspector noted the presence of some vegetation growing on the embankments, and ponding of rainfall runoff along portions of the downstream toe.

The inspector noted that trees were growing adjacent to the main dam toe, and some areas along the main dam toe where erosion had occurred.

The inspector also noted that some small trees were

growing in the main dam embankment and that the embankment fill had settled or eroded for a depth of approximately three feet around 270 degrees of the circumference of main dam monument H-6.

Licensee engineers stated that work requests will be initiated to clear vegation off the slopes of all three dams (Separating Dike, West Auxiliary Dam, and Hain Dam)

and remove trees along downstream toes of the West Auxiliary and Main Dams.

A work request will also be initiated to investigate the cause and repair the settlement/erosion around Monument H-6.

4.0 The inspector performed a review of piezometer data, survey settlement and deflection data for the West Auxiliary and Hain Dams.

The inspector performed a detailed review of the settlement and deflection data for West Auxiliary Dam Monument, AM-5.

(As stated in paragraph 2, above, the data for AM-5 has been erratic.)

A recommendation in the licensee's 1990 dam inspection report was to attempt to resolve the reasons for the erratic data.

This recommendation was not followed.

The inspector also noted that the licensee's actions to address the other recommendations in the report were not well documented, although followup action was completed on most of them.

The licensee failed to address a few of the other recommendations, and did not document their justification for not taking any corrective actions.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

The failure to resolve the erratic data for monument AN-5, and the lack of documentation of corrective actions to resolve other recommendations in the licensee's dam inspection report was identified as a weakness.

The inspector concluded that overall, the Separating Dike and Hain Dam were in good condition.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 70370)

(open) Violation (400/94-22-03):

Failure to Identify/Correct Several Design Deviations for Small-Bore Pipe Supports.

This violation was identified by the NRC Resident Inspector during walkdown inspections of small bore pipe supports on various systems.

The licensee's corrective actions for this violation are stated in their December 30, 1994, letter to NRC, Subject; Reply to Notice of Violation (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/94-22).

During walkdown inspection's, the Senior Resident Inspector examined approximately 350 small bore supports and identified deficiencies on 35 supports.

The licensee issued Adverse Condition Feedback Reports (ACFR)

Number 94-3199 and 94-3212, to document and disposition the problems.

Since the violation was identified, licensee engineers have examined approximately 500 additional small bore supports and identified an additional 25 deficiencies.

During the current. inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's planned corrective actions to address the large number of deficiencies being identified with the small bore pipe supports.

These supports are

not included in the licensee's In-Service Inspection program.

The corrective actions include training of operations,and maintenance personnel to identify small-bore pipe support deficiencies; revisions to plant procedures to strengthen requirements for post-maintenance inspection of supports; and inspections during normal plant walkdowns to identify and prevent realignment of pipe hanger components during plant operations.

These corrective actions are in progress.

The inspector also reviewed the various ACFRs which have been written to document the support deficiencies, and Engineering Service Reports Number ESR 94-00333,

-00345,

-00364, and-00387 which were issued to evaluate the operability of the supports.

The pipe supports were found to be acceptable as-is, or acceptable for short term operability.

The inspector, accompanied by licensee engineers, also performed a

walkdown inspection and examined approximately 200 small-bore pipe supports in the auxiliary building on elevations 190, 216, and 236.

The inspector used CP&L procedure number MMP-004, Installation of Pipe Supports, as acceptance criteria during the walkdown.

The inspector identified 21 support which had deficiencies.

Two had bent paddies on struts, and the other 19 had excessive angles (greater than the 3'pecified in MMP-004) between the strut paddle and the pipe clamp/welded beam attachment.

These deficiencies will be evaluated for operability and repaired as required.

The licensee's design engineers will continue to perform walkdowns on a

weekly basis to identify deficiencies on the small bore supports.

This is being done as an informal program meant to gather information to determine the long term corrective actions to correct small bore pipe support deficiencies.

The walkdowns are conducted on a plant area basis (e.g.,

by elevation, or building).

Licensee engineers are not documenting the identification of each support examined, and are not conducting a rigorous inspection of each support.

The purpose of the program is to identify the types of service related problems (misalignment, bent members)

identified by NRC inspectors..

Violation item 400/94-22-03 will remain open pending completion of the licensee's corrective actions and further review by NRC.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on January 27, 1995, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.

The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.

Proprietary information is not contained in this report.

Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.