IR 05000395/2008006
| ML081290374 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/2008 |
| From: | Vias S Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Archie J South Carolina Electric & Gas Co |
| References | |
| IR-08-006 | |
| Download: ML081290374 (18) | |
Text
May 8, 2008
SUBJECT:
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
AND RESOLUTION (PI&R) INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2008006
Dear Mr. Archie:
On March 28, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Plant. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed with you and other members of your staff on March 28, 2008.
This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
On the basis of the sample selected for review, there were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The team concluded that problems were being properly identified, documented, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution (PI&R)
programs. However, during the inspection, the team identified several isolated examples where corrective actions did not appear appropriate, were not accurately documented, or were not completely carried out. The team observed that the quality of Condition Report documentation has improved since the last NRC biennial PI&R inspection; however, the team did observe that there continues to be some lingering issues regarding implementation of corrective actions identified during self-assessments.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
SCE&G
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Steven J. Vias, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No.:
50-395 License No.: NPF-12
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000395/2008006 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos:
50-395
License Nos:
Report No:
Licensee:
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G)
Facility:
V.C. Summer Nuclear Plant
Location:
P.O. Box 88
Jenkinsville, SC 29065
Dates:
March 3, 2008 - March 28, 2008
Inspectors:
J. Baptist, Senior Project Engineer, Team Leader M. King, Senior Project Inspector S. Atwater, Senior Project Inspector J. Policoski, Resident Inspector, V.C. Summer
Approved by:
S. J. Vias, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
OF ISSUES
IR 05000395/2008006, 03/03/2008 - 03/28/2008; V.C. Summer Nuclear Plant, Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Problem Identification and Resolution.
The inspection was conducted by one Region II Senior Project Engineer, two Region II Senior Project Inspectors, and one Region II Resident Inspector. No findings of significance were identified during this inspection.
Identification and Resolution of Problems
The team determined that the licensee was identifying plant deficiencies at an appropriately low level, effectively entering them into their corrective action program (CAP), and performing corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The team determined that while the licensee was properly prioritizing and evaluating issues, several isolated examples were identified where corrective actions did not appear to be accurately documented, or were not completely carried out. The team also observed that the quality of Condition Report (CR) documentation has improved since the last NRC biennial PI&R inspection, but further improvements could be made. Additionally, there continue to be examples of difficulty in effectively integrating suggested improvements from self-assessments and audits; however, the licensee had shown progress over the inspection period. The team concluded that the licensee was generally providing an effective CAP.
The inspectors observed that the implementation of a new CR software system (Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS)) created a number of minor issues regarding the ability to effectively track and implement corrective actions. While no issues existed that warranted regulatory attention, the licensee was aware of the potential pitfalls that existed during the software familiarization period, and they have made numerous enhancements to CMMS to strengthen the software systems use. A review of the technical interface between personnel and the CMMS program identified that personnel were comfortable with the software and its functionality in creating and processing CRs.
On the basis of interviews conducted during this inspection, the inspectors determined that workers at the site felt free to put safety concerns into the corrective action program. The inspectors concluded that the Employee Concerns Program was functioning acceptably.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a.
Assessment of the Corrective Action Program
- (1) Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed items selected across the seven NRC cornerstones of safety to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program (CAP) for timely and complete evaluation and resolution. The inspectors reviewed the licensees CAP procedure, Station Administrative Procedure (SAP)-999, Corrective Action Program, Revision 3, which described the process for documenting and resolving issues via condition reports (CRs). The team reviewed CRs selected across the span of plant activities to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. Specifically, the inspectors selected and reviewed 93 of the approximately 8000 CRs initiated by the licensee from April 2006, to March 2008. When necessary, the inspectors reviews included CRs older than April 2006 that were referenced by the original CR sample set. The team examined CRs and work orders (WOs) associated with the service water system, the component cooling water system, and the chill water system. The team reviewed CRs associated with issues in the Operations, Maintenance, Engineering, Radiological Protection, Chemistry, and Emergency Preparedness departments. The team reviewed operating experience resolution documents, and Employee Concerns Program activities. The team also reviewed licensee corrective action trend reports, CR effectiveness reviews, as well as Quality Assurance (QA) department audits and assessments from the review period.
The team evaluated these items to determine the licensees threshold for identifying problems.
The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of and components associated with the service water system, the component cooling water system, and the chill water system to verify that problems had been properly identified and characterized in the CAP.
System performance was reviewed by discussion with system engineers and by review of work requests, completed maintenance work orders, maintenance rule data, and system health reports to verify that equipment deficiencies were being appropriately entered into the CAP. Control room operator logs were reviewed to verify that CRs were initiated for deficiencies described in the logs when appropriate. In addition, the inspectors attended plant morning status meetings and CAP initial review meetings to observe management oversight in the corrective action process. The inspectors reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments (SA), focusing primarily on problem identification and resolution, to verify that findings were entered into the CAP and to verify that these findings were consistent with the NRCs assessment of the licensees CAP.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- (2) Assessment
Identification of Issues.
The team determined that the licensee was effective at identifying problems at an appropriately low threshold and entering them into the CAP. No examples were found where personnel utilized a problem reporting system outside the CAP.
Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues.
The team determined that CR level classifications were consistent with established procedures and that licensee audits and self-assessments generally confirmed that conclusion. The team further determined that operability, reportability, degraded or non-conforming condition determinations and cause evaluations were also consistent with SAP-999; however, the team did identify one prioritization and seven evaluation deficiencies that were not appropriately dispositioned. At the time of the closure of the inspection, the licensee was evaluating the proper corrective actions, if any, for the issues described below.
- CR-06-04246 addressed a missed procedure step in STP-215.008 resulting in transfer of water from B safety injection system accumulator to the reactor water storage tank and subsequent Technical Specification 3.5.1 entry for 44 minutes. This CR was categorized as a Category 3 CR when it clearly satisfied the example requirements in SAP-999 to be Category 2. This was also identified in QA audit 2006012.
- CR-08-00267 regarding SA07-OD-03, Corrective Action Program Self Assessment, area for improvement stated that site personnel were not exhibiting the appropriate behavior of adhering to site procedure requirements had recommended actions that did not evolve into CR actions. The licensee created a new action item to evaluate dividing portions of SAP-999 into working procedures to address the identified weakness.
- CR-07-00278 was written in response to an observation from QA-AUD-2006012 Corrective Action Program that five of the sampled CRs were not properly categorized. CR-07-00278 was closed with no actions performed and with the evaluation that the CRs were unanimously determined by two review teams and were therefore correct. The licensee failed to evaluate the reasons behind this discrepancy to potentially strengthen the CAP. This appeared to be a missed opportunity to evaluate the CR for procedure adherence.
- CR-07-00276 was written in response to an observation from QA-AUD-2006012 Corrective Action Program regarding corrective action 5 from the apparent cause evaluation of CR-06-2214, Missed performance of STP-128.024 CO2 SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL REFUELING TEST. The licensee failed to properly evaluate why a pre-job brief was not held in an incident where electrical maintenance did not properly perform the procedure which resulted in closure of dampers in the relay room.
- CR-06-02093 was written in response to a series of relay room high temperature alarms that had been actuating. The licensee evaluation of the continuing issue included reviewing regulatory compliance, performing operability determinations, and verifying design basis operation of the systems required to maintain relay room temperature. However, the inspectors did identify that the licensee failed to evaluate what effects the volume of transient personnel through the area might have had on the ability of the systems to maintain proper room temperature.
- CR-05-03349 was written to document a reactor trip that occurred due to failures of both condensate pumps. Review by the inspectors identified that the root cause investigation failed to identify the running condensate pumps resistive thermal device (RTD) as a contributing cause to the plant trip. The scope of the root cause investigation was artificially limited to the standby condensate pumps discharge isolation valve which failed to open when the standby pump was started following the running condensate pumps RTD fire.
- CR-06-03572 was written to document the presence of foreign material found in the service water side of the heat exchanger on one train of the component cooling water system. The operability determination performed by the licensee did not consider the possible operability concern to other train of component cooling water or other safety related components. The operability determination procedure ES-120 was not utilized when an extent of condition was needed to support the current operability determination. The process for operations review of potential operability concerns has since been changed to force a consideration of extent of condition in the CR supervisor review process.
- CR-06-1091 was written to document discrepancies for thermal performance testing of the emergency diesel generators intercooler heat exchanger. Non-conservative assumptions were identified and remained inputs to the calculated acceptance criteria for the emergency diesel generators intercooler heat exchanger. As a course of inquiry during this inspection, the non-conservative inputs have been corrected and accurate inputs have been evaluated to verify emergency diesel generator operability.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions.
Based on a review of numerous corrective action plans and their implementation, the team found, for the most part, that the licensees corrective actions were effective.
Effectiveness reviews and audits were generally of good depth and correctly identified issues similar to those raised during previous NRC inspections. However, the team did identify five corrective action deficiencies. At the time of the closure of the inspection, the licensee was evaluating the proper corrective actions, if any, for the issues described below.
- CR-05-03349 was written to address Licensee Event Report (LER) 2005-003 in which a Reactor Trip resulted from the failure of A-train condensate pump discharge valve, XVB00614A-CO to open while starting A-train condensate pump following trip of B-train Condensate Pump. The action to revise the procedure used to time the condensate pump discharge valves was not agreed to by Operations department and the action was improperly closed without being taken. Additionally, the CR identified the need to improve insulation for RTD's, secure the RTDs, and short unconnected leads; however, no assignment of these actions was made. All pumps have since been replaced with improved RTD insulation, but it was not driven by action assignment from the CR.
- CR-07-02167 action 02 was created to evaluate the necessary changes to Reactor Building cooling unit flow switch design. This action was improperly closed by the system engineer based on assumptions that foreign material exclusion (FME)controls were already in place to ensure no foreign material in the system.
- CR-07-03332 identified that the conditions which existed in CR-07-02167 were reportable to the NRC under 10CFR50.73 as a violation of TS 3.4.6.1. The corrective actions to prevent recurrence were to revise the test method for STP-342.003 to ensure P-trap and flow switches were adequately tested. These actions had a due date of August 20, 2008 and were still open as of March 28, 2008. The action assignment stated that "This action should be completed in time for use in the Refueling (RF)-17 outage; however, RF-17 outage is in April 2008. The procedure change is expected to be completed in time for the RF-17, but the process allowed improper due date to be established.
- CR-07-00531 was written in response to NRC Generic Letter, GL 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients. Licensee response indicated that an additional off-site power supply with underground cables was added to the facility in the fall of 2006 and that an inspection and testing monitoring program for this off-site power supply will be evaluated for development in the future. No action assignment was made to track completion of this commitment. The licensee has changed this action to reflect that there is an implied commitment to evaluate preventative maintenance for offsite power cables. This commitment was already being tracked in CR-03-04066 with preventative maintenance generated for Aug. 2017, in accordance with licensee renewal commitment identified in SAP-0156 Enclosure 8.18.
- CR-07-0582 was written to document actions generated from Self Assessment SA07-MN-02 "Effectiveness Review of FME Program Improvements." Self Assessment SA07-MN-02 was performed in February of 2007 and identified that the actions taken as a result of a 2005 FME Self Assessment were ineffective.
Revisions to the FME training courses and FME procedures have been completed but observed weaknesses remain in the FME program. This has been evidenced by inadequate FME controls events on March 13, 2008, when a loss of FME integrity occurred in the area around the circulating water screens, and on March 25, 2008, when a loss of FME integrity occurred in the B emergency diesel generator room.
The licensee has since made FME controls a focal point of the RF-17 outage beginning April 2008.
The inspectors did not identify any more than minor equipment performance issues from the above described deficiencies.
b.
Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience
- (1) Inspection Scope
The inspectors examined licensee programs for reviewing industry operating experience, reviewed the licensees operating experience database, and interviewed personnel, to assess the effectiveness of how external and internal operating experience data was handled at the plant. In addition, the inspectors selected fourteen operating experience notification documents (NRC generic communications, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, and SCE&G plant internal operating experience items, etc.), which had been issued since April 2005, to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to the V.C. Summer plant.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- (2) Assessment
The team determined that the licensee was effective in screening operating experience for applicability to the plant. The inspectors verified that the licensee had entered those items determined to be applicable into the CAP and taken adequate corrective actions to address the issues. External and Internal operating experience was adequately utilized and considered as part of formal root cause evaluations for supporting the development of lessons learned and corrective actions for CAP issues. An example of a weakness in the Operation Experience assessment of information was observed in review of the disposition of CR-07-01851. NRC Information Notice (IN) 2007-11 regarding Reactor Operator Performance Issues had proposed actions to consider possible improvements in plant operations. The actual corrective actions focused on determining if the listed examples had previously existed at V.C. Summer and if appropriate actions had been taken. The corrective actions did not propose an evaluation of the V.C. Summer Operations programs to determine if the same generic weaknesses existed. At the time of the closure of the inspection, the licensee was evaluating the proper corrective actions, if any, for the issue described above.
c.
Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
- (1) Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed CAP trend reports, CAP backlogs, CR trend reports, department self-assessments, and QA audits to verify that the licensee appropriately prioritized and evaluated problems with the CAP in accordance with their risk significance. The inspectors compared the NRCs CAP assessment results against the licensees assessment of the CAP effectiveness.
- (2) Assessment
The team determined that the scope of self-assessments and audits were adequate.
Department self-assessments and QA audits were generally self-critical and effective in identifying issues that were entered in the CAP for resolution. Corrective actions developed as a result of these assessments and audits were generally effective. The team noted that these audits and assessments identified issues similar to those identified by the NRC.
The inspectors also reviewed the last QA assessments of the CAP program performance. The management organization is appropriately responding to QA by initiating CRs and taking corrective actions.
d.
Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment
- (1) Inspection Scope
The team reviewed numerous audits, assessments, CRs, WOs, and other corrective action documents and held discussions with numerous personnel at various levels in the organization to assess if a work environment existed that was conducive to the identification of nuclear safety issues. Inspectors also examined the licensees Employee Concerns Program records and discussed the program with the implementer to determine if issues affecting nuclear safety were being appropriately addressed.
- (2) Assessment
The team determined that workers at the site felt free to raise safety concerns.
Personnel stated that they do not hesitate to raise nuclear safety issues to their management without fear of retaliation by their management. The wide spectrum of CRs evaluated appears to support workers statements in this regard. The team had no indication during this inspection of individuals being inhibited from identifying problems using the corrective action process.
Inspectors concluded that the Employee Concerns Program was functioning acceptably and that there were no technical safety issues identified that were lingering without attention in the program.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Jeffrey Archie and other members of the licensee staff on March 28, 2008. The licensee acknowledged the results. The inspectors confirmed that inspection activities discussed in this report did not contain proprietary material.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee personnel
- J. Archie, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- S. Bailey, System Engineering Training Manager
- G. Baker, Supervisor, Plant Support Group
- J. Bonnette, System Engineer
- C. Boozer, System Engineer
- J. Brown, Plant Support Engineering
- A. Cribb, Licensing Supervisor
- C. Crowley, OD&P Specialist
- J. Galloway, System Engineer
- J. Garza, Plant Support Engineer
- R. Haselden, OD&P Manager
- J. Heilman, OD&P Supervisor
- E. Lynch, OD&P Specialist
- J. Nolting, Surveillance Specialist (Quality Assurance)
- V. Pearson, OD&P Specialist
- D. Perez, Supervisor, Health Physics (Dosimetry/Performance Improvement/Cal Lab)
- C. Rice, Design Engineer
- B. Schwartz, MR Supervisor
- R. Sloane, Plant Support Engineer
- J. Waters, Plant Support Engineer
- J. Weathersby, Nuclear Licensing
- K. Weir, Supervisor, Engineering (Modifications)
- B. Williamson, ES Supervisor
NRC personnel
- J. Zeiler, V.C. Summer Senior Resident Inspector
- J. Polickoski, V.C. Summer Resident Inspector
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None.
Closed
None.
Discussed
None.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Selected CRs for Review
00-00629, EDG intercooler Heat Exchanger
03-01449, CAL Procedure stpt values typo?
04-03026, Relay Room Cooling does not provide adequate flow
05-03323, NRC Information Notice IN 2005-23, Vibration-Induced Degradation of Butterfly
05-03349, LER 2005-003: Reactor Trip resulted from failure of A CO Pump Discharge Valve
05-03523, This CR is to document Self Assessment SA05-MN-02 "Effectiveness Review of
05-03527, Possible loose part internal to valve actuator
06-00488, RBCU drain flow switch
06-00770, This CER documents the results of the 2006 Mid-Cycle evaluation (SA06-OE-01)
06-01091, Inadequate acceptance criteria for EDG intercooler performance testing
06-01293, Why when SW temperature < 65 degrees is
06-01332, NRC Generic Letter GL 2006-03, Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc
06-01419, Relay Room high temperature alarm locked in
06-01449, Breaker for XFN0075B (A DG Room Fan) Tripped. Supply fan B
06-01556, FIELD LEADS FOUND LANDED INCORRECTLY.
06-01648, LER 2006-001: During the performance of STP0360.031, RMA1 Rad Monitor
06-01654, NRC Inspection Report IE 2006-007, Problem Identification and Resolution, March
06-01817, Relay Room high temperature alarm
06-01969, NRC Information Notice 2006-14 & PRIME Nuclear Industry Advisory
06-02034, NRC Identified Tracking Item. During the NRC Design Basis Review it was identified
06-02035, NRC Identified Tracking Item. During the NRC Design Basis Review it was identified
06-02041, Technical deficiencies noted in VCS evaluation for CER 05-3241 for OE20884 related
06-02093, Relay room high temperature alarm. Suspect problems with XAH0013A
06-02106, INITIAL PART 21 NOTIFICATION -PRIME MEASUREMENT PRODUCTS
06-02128, The implementation of the station's CA program
06-02143, "A" Chill Water Pp, XPP0048A has abnormal noise and elevated vibes
06-02214, During performance of STP-128.024 CO2 SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL
06-02243, Two spare transmitter connector assemblies were found to be defective
06-02279, AB Lower Operator noted frequent purges on "C" HVAC Mechanical Chiller
06-02315, SWPH flooding calc. DC03690-004 disagrees with as built plant
06-02645, NRC Inspection Report IE 2006-003, NRC Integrated Inspection Report, April 1,
06-02685, NRC Resident Inspector questioned the rigor with which Operations evaluates
06-03273, LER 2006-002: RMA-2 sample pump secured for STP144.001 while Alt. Purge
06-03273, LER 2006-002: RMA-2 sample pump secured for STP144.001 while Alt. Purge in
06-03401, Electronic Dosimeter did not record dose during an entry into an HRA.
06-03464, Indication of a possible crack discovered in Reactor Coolant System
06-03572, During Engineering Inspection of Safety Related Service Water Components
06-03579, 7.2 KV breaker XSW1DX 03 breaker to cubicle alignment cannot be obtained as spe
06-03720, Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-06-15, Unqualified Service Level 1 Coatings on
06-03985, NRC Inspection Report 2006-004 for the period of 7/1/06 to 9/30/06.
06-04109, Switch SS-SI86 on XCP6107 failed to operate during "A" train safeguards testing.
06-04127, VALVE XVR08864B-SI FAILED TO LIFT AT REQUIRED PRESSURE, LIFTED AT
06-04128, VALVE XVR08864A-SI FAILED TO LIFT AT REQUIRED PRESSURE, LIFTED AT 62
06-04129, VALVE XVR08865-SI FAILED TO LIFT AT REQUIRED PRESSURE, LIFTED AT 645
06-04246, Missed procedure step in STP-215.008 resulted in transfer of water from "B" SI
06-04275, LER 2006-004: During power escalation, the B SG experienced a high level resulting
06-04331, A Chilled Water Pump would not start
06-04336, HP Counting Instrument (BC4 #311) used for required sample analysis failed Quality
07-00274, Identified during QA audit QA-AUD-200612-0:"Corrective Action Program":
07-00275, Identified during QA audit QA-AUD-200612-0:"Corrective Action Program": Items
07-00276, Identified during QA audit QA-AUD-200612-0:"Corrective Action Program":The audit
07-00277, Identified during QA audit QA-AUD-200612-0:"Corrective Action Program":As a result
07-00278, Identified during QA audit QA-AUD-200612-0:"Corrective Action Program":The follow
07-00279, Identified during QA audit QA-AUD-200612-0:"Corrective Action Program":
07-00280, Identified during QA audit QA-AUD-200612-0:"Corrective Action Program": Issued for
07-00419, Regulatory Issue Summary, RIS 2007-01, Clarification of NRC Guidance for
07-00442, NRC Inspection Report IE 2006-005, NRC Integrated Inspection Report.
07-00531, NRC Generic Letter, GL 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable
07-00582, This CR is to document Self Assessment SA07-MN-02 "Effectiveness Review of
07-00629, XFN0075A Tripped on Autostart. DG area A vent fan supply fan A
07-00693, NRC Information Notice IN 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities
07-00696, NRC Information Notice IN 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling
07-01225, NRC Event No. : 43294-Part 21 Notification - Diesel Cam Roller Bushing Failures
07-01387, NRC Integrated Inspection Report 2007-002 for period of 01/01/2007 to 03/31/2007.
07-01424, This CR is being written to document the evaluation of NCV 2007-002-01 as
07-01425, This CR is being written to document the evaluation of NCV 2007-002-02 as
07-01440, SA07-PS-02: Self-Assessment of the Maintenance Rule Program
07-01698, OED 2007-09 - April 2007 - External Degradation of Buried Piping,
07-01705, NRC Emergency Preparedness Inspection Report 2007-502 addresses an
07-01783, Doc Training of SAP 1352 Change A
07-01851, IN 2007-11. Recent Operator Performance Issues at Nuclear Power Plants.
07-02167, The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has questioned the adequacy
07-02453, Expectations for taking Operator action to maintain eq functional for risk management
07-02522, Valve XVV03014A-SP failed acceptance criteria on vacuum at -1.0 psig lift (STP-401.
07-02596, High relay room temperature alarm
07-02705, During the removal and re-installation of heat tracing on WO 0702136-002, it was fou
07-02819, Shortfalls in strict procedure use and adherence.
07-02894, LER 2007-002-00__Inadequate Administrative Control Resulting
07-02894, LER 2007-002-00__Inadequate Administrative Control Resulting in LCO 3.6.4
07-02894, LER 2007-002-00__Inadequate Administrative Control Resulting in LCO 3.6.4 Violat
07-02937, Rosemount Nuclear - Notification under Part 21 for Certain Model 1152 Pressure
07-03149, Energized contact found while performing Live-Dead-Live check. An additional tag sh
07-03150, This CR is to document a timeliness issue in regards to the processing and
07-03215, IR 2007-004, NRC IIR
07-03332, The inoperability of RBCU Drain Flow high alarm switches discovered
07-03621, Document Self Assessment SA07-OE-01, Nuclear Safety Culture Self Assessment.
07-03678, NRC non-cited violation (NCV 2007-004-02) on inadequate implementation
08-00265, This CR documents Corrective Action Program Self Assessment (SA07-OD-03)
08-00266, Self-Assessment SA07-OD-03 "Corrective Action Program Self Assessment"
08-00267, Self-Assessment SA07-OD-03 "Corrective Action Program Self Assessment"
08-00268, Self-Assessment SA07-OD-03 "Corrective Action Program Self Assessment"
08-00487, A Green non-cited violation (NCV 2007-005-02) of TS LCO 3.4.6.1
08-01061, Inadequate acceptance criteria for EDG intercooler performance testing
Audits and Self-Assessments Reviewed
QA-AUD-200601, Chemistry
QA-AUD-200612-0, "Corrective Action Program"
SA05-MN-02, FME Program Self Assessment
SA06-OE-01, V.C. Summer Mid-Cycle Review
SA07-MN-02, FME Program Self Assessment
SA07-OD-03, "Corrective Action Program Self Assessment"
SA07-OE-01, Nuclear Safety Culture Self Assessment
SA07-PS-02, Maintenance Rule Self Assessment
CRs Reviewed For Operating Experience
05-03323, NRC Information Notice IN 2005-23, Vibration-Induced Degradation of Butterfly Valve
06-01332, NRC Generic Letter GL 2006-03, Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barr
06-01969, NRC Information Notice 2006-14 & PRIME Nuclear Industry Advisory - Barton Tran
06-02041, Technical deficiencies noted in VCS evaluation for CER 05-3241 for OE20884 related
06-02106, INITIAL PART 21 NOTIFICATION -PRIME MEASUREMENT PRODUCTS, MODELS
06-03720, Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-06-15, Unqualified Service Level 1 Coatings on
07-00419, Regulatory Issue Summary, RIS 2007-01, Clarification of NRC Guidance for Maintain
07-00531, NRC Generic Letter, GL 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures
07-00693, NRC Information Notice IN 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Ess
07-00696, NRC Information Notice IN 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling F
07-01698, OED 2007-09 - April 2007 - External Degradation of Buried Piping.
07-01851, IN 2007-11. Recent Operator Performance Issues at Nuclear Power Plants.
07-02937, Rosemount Nuclear - Notification under Part 21 for Certain Model 1152 Pressure Tr
07-03150, This CR is to document a timeliness issue in regards to the processing and evaluatin
Procedures, Instructions, Guidance Documents, and Operating Manuals
ES-322, On-Site Certification
SAP-999, Corrective Action Program
CAPG-01, Corrective Action Program Guidelines
ES-514, Maintenance Rule Program Implementation
SAP-1351, Operating Experience Program
SAP-209, Operability Determination Process
SAP-1356, Cause Determination
SAP-0127, Emergency Preparedness
ES-120, Operability Recommendation and JCO Development
Miscellaneous Documents Reviewed
4Q 2007 System Health Report, Chill Water System
4Q 2007 System Health Report, Component Cooling Water System
4Q 2007 System Health Report, Service Water System
4Q 2007 V.C. Summer Trend Report
Chill Water System, Design Basis Document
Chill Water System, Flow Diagram
Chill Water System, OE Screening Report
Component Cooling Water System, Design Basis Document
Component Cooling Water System, Flow Diagram
Component Cooling Water System, OE Screening Report
January 2008 V.C. Summer Performance Indicators
Letter # RC-06-0106, 60-Day Response to GL 2006-03
Letter # RC-06-0138, 60-Day Response to GL 2006-03 - Request for Additional Information"
Letter # RC-07-0074, 90-Day Response to GL 2007-01
Letter # RC-07-0122, Predecisional Conference Response
Operator Challenges List
Operator Workaround List
Overdue and Extended CR List
Past Due Preventative Maintenance List
PR 650464, Electric Motor Balance and Vibration Criteria
Purchase Order NU-02SR731425
Service Water System, Design Basis Document
Service Water System, Flow Diagram
Service Water System, OE Screening Report