IR 05000335/1981003
| ML17209A942 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1981 |
| From: | Herdt A, Kleinsorge W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17209A937 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-81-03, 50-335-81-3, 50-389-81-02, 50-389-81-2, NUDOCS 8104140724 | |
| Download: ML17209A942 (17) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RE@ON II 101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 FEB 20 198)
Report Nos.
50-335/81-03 and 50-389/81-02 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Docket Nos.
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St. Lucie r
License Nos.
DPR-67 and CPPR-144 Inspection at St. Lucie site near Fort Pierce, Florida
M. P. Kleinsorge Approved by:
err
/
'.
R. Herdt, ection Chief, RC&ES Branch Da e S1gned Date igned SUMMARY Inspection on January 20-23, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 28 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings (Unit 2),
equipment storage (Unit 2), reactor coolant pressure boundary piping - observation of work and work activities (Unit 2), safety-related piping (Unit 2), steel structures and supports (Unit 2) and inspector follow-up items (Unit 1).
Results Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in three areas; two violations were found in three areas (Violation - Failure to Adequately control NDE - paragraphs 3.c.
and 6.b.(5)(a)
1 and Violation Failure to properly annotate inspection requirement paragraph B.a.(l).
.'8'l6,4Z.,40 7PQ
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"B. J. Escue, Site Manager, PSL-2
"J. A. Thompson, Assistant Site Manager N. T. Weems, Assistant Manager QA Construction
"R. A. Garramore, Senior Resident Engineer
"W. M. Hayward, Supervising QA Engineer
~D. Cooper, Supervising QA Engineering
"W. F. Jackson, Welding Superintendent
~J. L.'Parker, Project QC Supervisor
"J.
W. Adams, Quality Engineer
- T. C. Grozan, Nuclear Licensing (GO)
"G, H. Krauss, ESSE Project Engineer
"G. A. Maxwell, Stores Supervisor
~D. L. McAfee, QA Engineer, QAO PSL-1
"E. W. Sherman, QA Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included several construction craftsmen, QC technicians, and office personnel.
"Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 23, 1981, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector identified areas inspected and discussed in detail the violations, unresolved items and the inspector follow-up item.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Open) Infraction (389/80-13-01)
Improper Storage.
This item concerns the licensee's improper storage of six ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 valves in one location.
The response from the licensee considered the above as an isolated case and dealt with the matter accordingly.
,Dur'ing this inspection, the following examples were noted.
(1)
One class 2 main steam stop valve, installed in the trestle, was uncovered out doors.
(2)
Three valves ASME Class 1 and 2, were stored out doors uncovered
'n the south long term storage area.
(3)
Two valves, ASME Class 2 and 3, were stored, in plastic bags containing holes and water, outdoors behind the stainless steel pipe fabrication sho I
(4)
Approximately fifty valves of unknown class were stored in opaque plastic bags, some containing holes and water stored outdoors behind the stainless steel pipe fabrication shop.
FP&L Procedure SQP-3 Rev 2, "Site Quality Procedure Material Control", identifies
,valves as requiring level C storage conditions.
SQP-3 further, specifies that Level C storage shall be indoors or equal, free from flooding and well ventilated.
In view of the above, the inspector informed the licensee that improper valve storage is not a problem isolated to one location.
The licensee indicated that
., they would re-examine their storage and storage inspection programs.
This item remains open.
b.
(Closed) Infraction (389/80-13-02)
Welding Filler Material Control.
FP&L letters of response dated November 7 and December 15, 1980, have been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
The inspector held discussions with Project Manager, Unit 2, and examined the corrective actions as stated in the letter of response.
The i inspector concluded that FP&L had determined the full extent of the subject noncompliance, performed the necessary survey and follow-up actions to correct the present conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to pre'elude recurrence of similar circumstances.
The corrective actions identified in the letter of response have been implemented.
C.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (389/80-15-06)
Evaluation of Repair Requests.
This item concerns a questions of whether an ultrasonic examination reflector (indication) was within the area of interest of Weld Joint 2F-2STL-G838-275 and therefore whether the reflector required repair.
Ultrasonic examination was conducted in accordance with Ebasco Speci-fication FLO-2998 G-761.
The licensee originally determined that the reflector did not require repair.
As a result of this item, the licensee re-evaluated the reflector, and determined that repair was required.
Repair was accomplished in accordance with WRR-2158.
Therefore, the licensee did not adequately control non-destructive examination evaluation.
This matter will be closed as an unresolved item and included as an example of violation 389/81-02-01.
Within the area examined, no violations or deviations except as described in paragraph 3.c. were identified.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5.b and 6.b.(5)(a).
Independent Inspecti on Effort a.
Const'ruction Activities (Unit 2)
The inspector conducted, a general inspection of the unit two reactor building, auxiliary building and stainless steel pipe fab shop to observe construction progress and construction activities such as welding, welding filler material control, material controls, and housekeeping and storage.
b.
Equipment Storage (Unit 2)
6; On January 21, 1981, the inspector accompanied by a representative of the licensee, made a general inspection of the Level A warehouse.
The inspector noted that the Level A warehouse temperature dropped below 60'F on three consecutive days during the previous week.
FP&L Procedure SPQ-3, Revision 2, "Site Quality Procedure, Material Control", requires Level A items to be maintained between 60'nd 80 F.
The inspector could not find any indication that the licensee had evaluated the effects of the above temperature excursions had on the contents of the warehouse.
The licensee indicated that they would look into the matter.
The inspector stated that the above would be an unresolved iteg identified as 389/81-02-04:
"Level A
Warehouse Temperature Excursions".
Within the area examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping
-. Observation of Work and Work Activities (Unit 2)
The inspector observed non-welding and welding work activities for reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) piping.'he applicable code for instal-lation of RCPB piping is the ASME B 'and PV Code Section III, 1977 Edition through the Summer 1977 Addenda.
a.
Observation of Non-Welding Activities Observation of specific work activities were conducted to determine conformance, where applicable, with the following; inspection and/or work procedures, record keeping requirements, installation specifi-cation requirements, specified material and qualified inspection personnel.
Safety Injection System A~ctivit Marking Marking Identification Weld Joint SI-245-SW-6 Weld Joint SI-239-SW-6 Procedure SQP-47 R-1 SQP-47 R-1
Marking Marking Storage Marking Marking Marking Marking Marking Marking Weld Joint SI-239-SW-6 Weld Joint SI-239-SW-6 Valves Various Reactor Coolant System Weld Joint RC-142-SW-002 Weld Joint RC-142-SW-003 Weld Joint RC-142-SW-004 Weld Joint RC-1'42-SW-008 Weld Joint RC-142-SW-010 Weld Joint RC-142-SW-012 SQP-47 R-1 SQP-47 R-1 SQP"3 R"2 SQP-47 R-1 SQP-47 R-1 SQP"47 R"1 SQP-47 R-1 SQP-47 R-1 SQP-47 R-1 (1)
With regard to the above inspection in the area of marking, the inspector identified unresolved item 389/81-02-03 discussed in detail in paragraph 6.b.(5)(a) 2.
(2)
With regard to the above inspection, the inspector noted one ASME Class 1 Safety Injection 'Valve stored contrary to the requirements of SQP-3.
This matter is discussed in detail in paragraph 3.a.
b.
Observation of Welding Activities The inspector observed in-process welding activities of RCPB piping field welds as described below to determine whether applicable code and procedure requireme'nts were being met.
(1)
Welding
- The below listed welds were examined in process to determine work conducted in accordance with traveler; welder identification and location; welding procedure; WPS assignment; welding technique and sequence; materials identify; weld geometry; fit-up; temporary
'ttachments; gas purging; preheat; electrical characteristics; shielding gas; welding equipment conditions;.interpass temper-ature; interpass cleaning; process control systems; identity of welders; qualifications of inspection personnel; and weld history records.
Joint No..
RC-150-SW"003 CH-148"SW-013 RC"124-FW"003 RC-124" FW"004 RC"115-FW-030 RC-121" FW-004 Size 2"x0.334" 2"x0.334 35.62 36.42" 35.62" 36.12" Stage of Fabrication Welding Out Welding Out Welding Out Welding Out Clad Welding Welding Out System Reactor Coolant Chemical and Volume Control Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant
(2)
Weld Heat Treatment The inspector reviewed'he FP&L program for weld heat treatment for compliance with gA procedure and Code requirements.
The welds listed in paragraph 6.b.(1), 7.b.(1),
and 8.a, were examined in process relative to weld joint preheating to determine; procedures available; procedures specify acceptable preheating method; procedures provide monitoring and recording requirements and procedure compliance.
(3)
Welder gualifications The inspector reviewed the FP&L program for qualification of welders and welding operators for compliance with gA procedures and ASME Code requirements.
(a)
The following welder qualification status records and
"Records of Performance gualification Test" were reviewed relative to the weld joints li'sted in paragraph 6.b.(1),
7.b.(1),
and 8.a.
Welder S mbol A
lication PTE PVT PYC FAM PO PRZ PSM PWT FCS PSL FAM PTP FEH PWV RCBP RCBP RCBP RCBP RCBP RCBP RCBP RCBP RCBP RCBP RCBP RCBP Safety Related Piping Steel Structures and Supports (b)
The following repair welder and "Records of Performance to determine whether they requirements.
Welder Symbol PWT PTM FBT PRZ PXU Weld Repair Report No.
1917 1917 1999 2062 1858
's qualification status records, gualification Test" were reviewed meet app1 icabl e qual ificati on
(4)
Welding Filler Material Control The inspector reviewed the FP&L program for control of welding materials to determine whether materials are being purchased, accepted, stored. and handled in accordance with QA procedures and applicable code requirements.
The following specific areas were examined:
-Purchasing procedures, receiving, storing, distributing and handling procedures, material identification, inspection of welding material issuing stations-Welding material purchasing and receiving records for the following materials were reviewed for conformance with applicable procedures and code requirements:
Type ER-308L 70S2 ER-308L 7018 7018 70S2 70S2 Size 1/8ii 0.045" 0.045" 1/8 II
'/32" 1/8ll 3/32" Material ID Code.
0176 0151 0170 0171 0174 0182 0101 Application RCPB RCPP RCPP Safety Related Piping and Steel Structures and supports Safety Related Piping Safety Related Piping Safety Related Piping (5)
The inspector visually examined completed RCPB Welds as described below to determine whether applicable code and procedure require-ments were being met.
(a)
The following welds were examined relative to the following:
location, length, size and shape; weld surface finish and appearance, include inside diameter of pipe welds when accessible; transitions between different wall thickness; weld reinforcement height and appearance; joint configu-rations of permanent attachments and structural supports; removal of temporary attachment, arc strikes and weld spatter; finish-grinding or machining of weld surface, surface finish and absence of wall thinning; surface defects, cracks, lapse lack of penetration, lack of fusion, porosity, slag, oxide film and undercut exceeding prescribed limits:
Joint Number System S I-245-SW-006 S I "239"SW-006 SI-230-SW-006 Safety Injection Safety Injection Safety Injection
SI-235-SW 006 RC-142-SW-002 RC-142-SW-003 RC-142-SW-004 RC-142-SW-008
. RC-142-SW-010 RC-142-SW-012 Safety Injecti on Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant With regard to the above inspection on January 21, 1981, the inspector noted that the completed and accepted Safety Injection System, socket weld flange to-pipe fillet welded joints above were undersized.
FPKL Procedure gI-9. 1 "Visual Inspection of Welds" Attachment',
Revision 4,
figure (b)
requires that one inch schedule 1'60 socket weld flange to pipe joints, like the safety injection system welds above, have a fillet weld leg size not less than 0.350".
The safety injection welds above had fillet weld leg sized 1/16" (0.062")
less than the 0.350" required.
The above and para-graph 3.c are examples of unacceptable conditions, accepted by the licensee's nondestructive examination program, detected, by the NRC inspectors.
The above examples indicate failure to establish adequate controls for nondestructive examination, and is in violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion IX.
This violation will be identified 389/81-02-01:
"Failure to Adequately Control NDE".
With regard to the inspection of paragraph 6.b.(5)(a)
above, the inspector noted on all the joints that the licensee was vibroetching joint identification and/or joint fit-up marks inside the one half inch nondestruc-tive examination area of interest.
At the time of this inspection, it could not be determined whether the marking could mask indications of unacceptable indi-cations.
The licensee indicated that they would. look further into the matter.
The inspector stated that the above would be an unresolved item and identified as 389/81-02-03 "Marking in NDE Area of Interest".
Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations except as described in paragraph 6.b.(5)(a)
1 were identified.
7.
Safety-Related Piping The inspector observed non-welding and welding work activities.for safety-related piping as described below to determine whether applicable code and procedure re'quirements were being met.
.The applicable code for safety-related piping is the ASME B and PV Code,Section III 1977 Edition with addenda through Summer 197 a.
Observation of Non Melding Activities Observation of specific work activities were conducted to determine conformance, where applicable, with the following; inspection and/or work procedures, record keeping, installation specifications or plans, specified materials, specified NDE, calibration and use of proper test equipment and qualified inspection and NDE personnel.
~Activit S stem or Com onent Procedure Storage Valves, Various SQP-3 R-2 (1)
With regard to the above inspection, the inspector noted.five valves (4 ASME Class
and 1 Class 3) stored contrary to the requirements
.SQP-3.
This matter is discussed in detail in paragraph 3.a.
b.
The inspector observed in-process welding activities of safety-related piping field welds as describ'ed below to determine whether applicable code and procedure requirements were being met.
(1)
We 1 di ng The below listed welds were examined in process to determine work conducted in accordance with traveler; welder identification and location; welding procedure; MPS assignment; welding technique and sequence; materias identify; weld geometry; fit-up; temporary attachments; gas purging; preheat; electrical characteristics; shielding gas; welding equipment condition; interpass temperature; interpass cleaning; process control systems; identify of welders; qualification of inspection personnel; and weld history records.
Joint No.
CC-0039-FM-008 Size 8"x0.322" Stage of Fabrication Welding Out
~Setem Component Cooling (2)
We 1 d Heat 'Treatment Weld heat treatment is discussed in paragraph 6.b.(2).
(3)
Welder Qualification Welder qualification is discussed in paragraph 6.b.(3).
(4)
Welding Material Control Welding material control is discussed in paragraph 6.b.(4).
Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie,
Steel Structures and Supports (Unit 2)
The inspector observed welding work activities for steel structures with the containment as described, below t'o determine whether applicable code and procedure requirements were being met.
The applicable code for main steam restraint structures is AWS D 1. 1-74.
Observation of Welding Activities The'nspector observed in-process welding activities of containment structural field welds as described below to determine whether applicable code and procedure requirements were being met.
a
Melding The following welds were examined in process to 'determine work conducted in accordance with traveler, welding procedures available; welding technique and sequence; weld geometry, fut-up electrical characteristics; equipment condition:
Joint No.
Sta e of Fabrication Structure STL-G799-131 Welding Out Hain Steam Restraint (1)
With regard to the above inspection, on January 21, 1981, the inspector noted. that the welder of record, for the above joint,.
had by-passed the traveler gC hold point for root inspection.
The Traveler (WRR 2107) required MT or PT inspection of the root.
The licensee stated that they intended the root inspection to be accomplished after backgouging of the root, for crack control.
The welder had been verbally informed of the above intention.
The inspector stated'hat if MT or PT inspection of the root after backgouging had been intended, then the traveler should have been so annotated.
Mithout the above annotation, the inspection record (the traveler)
would reflect "root inspection" and not "root inspection after backgouging".
Therefore, the record would erroneously state the stage of fabrication at which the inspection was accomplished.
Failure of inspection and test records to identify the type of observation is in violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVII. This violation shall be identified as 389/81-02-02,
"Failure to Properly Annotate Inspection Require-ments".
b.
Weld Heat Treatment C.
Weld heat treatment is discussed in paragraph 6.b.(2).
Welder gualification Welder qualification is discussed in paragraph 6.b.(3).
d.
Welding Material Control Melding material control is discussed in paragraph 6.b. (4).
e.
Melding Procedure Specification Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations except as described in paragraph 8.a.(1) were identified.
9.
Inspector Followup Items (Unit 1)
(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (335/80-31-01)
Review of Welder Qualifi" cation Audit".
This item involves an audit of welder qualification committed to by the licensee as the'result of a concern reported to NRC:RII.
The inspector reviewed the Licensee's Audit No. QAO-PSL-80-09-203,
"Quality Assurance Department Audit of Backfit Welding Qualifications".
The inspector identified no, violations or deviations, and has no further questions.
This item is considered closed.