IR 05000382/1979009
| ML19254B423 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1979 |
| From: | Gilbert L, Randy Hall, Renee Taylor NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19254B421 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-79-09, 50-382-79-9, NUDOCS 7909270505 | |
| Download: ML19254B423 (13) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No. 50-382/79-09 Docket No. 50-382 Category A2 Licensee:
Louisiana Power and Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit No. 3 Investigation at: Waterford Site, Taft, Louisiana Investigation conducted: July 18 and 24-26, 1979 8/ZB/79 Inspectors:
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R. G. Taylor, Reactor Inspector, Projects Section Date dd 2 awn
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L.l. Gilber*, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Date
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Support Section
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Reviewed:
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R. C. Stewart',Jdactor Inspector, Projects Section Dite II Approved:
e W. A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section Date YA9 e fj R E'.
Hall, ief, 'ngineering Support Section D#te 7
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s Investigation Summary:
Investigation on July 18 and 24-26, 1979 (Report No. 50-382/79-09)
Areas Investigated:
Special investigation of allegations contained in a petition filed in the Federal District Court in New Orleans, Louisiana, 1048 350 7 909m3Qf
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pertaining to materials warehousing and Qaality Control practices, security practices and civil rights violations.
The investigation involved forty-four inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
Five of the allegations could not be substantiated.
One allegation was substantiated by the licensee and will be considered an unresolved item.
The allegations regarding construction site security 2.nd civil rights violations were not investigated as theca matters are not within the jurisdictional scope of the K!C Construction Permit. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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INTRODUCTION Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit No. 3 (Waterford, Unit No. 3) is under construction in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana, near the town of Taf t, Louisiana.
Louisiana Power and Light Company is the Construction Permit holder with Ebasco, Inc. serving as both the Architect / Engineer and the Construction Manager.
REASON FOR INVESTIGATION The licensee notified the Region IV Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Brarzb on July 16, 1979, that a former employee of Waterford, Unit No. 3 filed a pettuion with the Federal District Court in New Orleans requesting that con-struction of Waterford, Unit No. 3 be stopped due to certain violations of NRC required Quality Assurance and security procedures.
The New Orleans Times Picayune and the New Orleans States-Item newspapers published articles discussing the petition on July 16, 1979.
SUMMARY OF FACTS The Region IV Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch was notified by the licensee on July 16, 1979, to the effect that a former employee of Ebasco, Inc. at the Waterford, Unit No. 3 site had filed a petition with the Federal District Court in New Orleans, Louisiana, requesting that the court stop construction at the Waterford, Unit No. 3 plant until the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission checks out hundreds of violations of Commission regulations.
Two New Orleans newspapers carried articles discussing the petition on July 16, 1979.
The licensee transmitted the newspaper articles and the petition to the Region f/ office via facsimile on July 16 and 17, 1979.
The petitioa states in part that the alleger was employed by Ebasco on May 29, 1979, and was assigned to the South Storage Yard and the South Storage Yard Annex. The petition further states th4t one of the alleger's main duties was to see to it that items entering the yards, as well as those going out of the yards, did so properly. The allegations as extracted from the petition were:
1.
The alleger reviewed hundreds of memoranda sent to Ebasco's Warehouse Division saying that they repeatedly observed numerous items going out of the yards without QC checks.
2.
American Bridge and Iron was taking things out of the yard that had no QC approval tags on the items.
3.
American Bridge and Iron would take things out of areas roped off as quality hold areas and take them out of the yard.
If an item did not have a tag on it, they would just place another item on top of the one without marking.
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Another way that they would do it (take material from the yard) is they take a tag off of an item that passed Quality Control and place the tag on one that was not tagged.
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5.
The people with Ebasco assigned to Quality Control are not making inspections.
All they are doing at tit.s is making up labels in their offices and going out and tagging items without inspecting them first.
6.
Pipe hangers were taken from surplus and put into the permanent building.
7.
There have been Lundreds and hundreds of security violations at the project.
8.
The alleger (plaintiff) noted gross civil rights violations as to hiring blacks, females and handicapped. The alleger hoped the court would require a report from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission concerning this matter.
Two Region IV IE inspectors interviewed the alleger on the evening of July 18, 1979, in order to obtain more specific information relative to the allegations.
The information obtained as related to each of the above allegations is as follows:
1.
The memoranda were written by Ebasco Quality Control nersonnel to Ebasco warehouse personnel and mostly concern rebar (concrete reinforcing steel).
2.
The alleger could provide no specific information except that the material involved was structural steel fabricated shapes.
3.
Same as (2).
4.
Same as (2).
5.
The allegation applied specifically to a group of prefabricated pipe spools.
The alleger did not have item identification but did provide the approximate location of the spools at the time of his observation.
6.
The alleger indicated that the hanger material was various lengths of rod with eye and threaded ends but could provide no further details, such as part numbers or quantity.
7.
The IE inspectors explained to the alleger that the NRC has no regulations relative to security practices during reactor construction.
The IE inspectors explained, while most sites do have a security force to monitor personnel entering and leaving the site and also practice area control within the site, that this is a licensee option aimed largely at preventi.ng theft, vandalism and sabotage.
The IE inspectors pointed out that during construction the NRC is concerned with the security of safety-related equipment and material in so far as theft, vandalism or sabotage of the equipment may impact on the health and
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safety of the public during operation of the plant.
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The IE inspe_ tors also explained that the NRC does not have regulations which require the licensee to abide by laws pertaining to civil rights.
These r"quirements are imposed by other agencies and are monitored by these agencies to the extent allowed and/or required by law. The alleger inquireu about NRC organizations that appeared to have EE0 functions as shown on the NRC organization chart. The IE inspectors explained that such offices function within and for the Commission but have no function outside the Commission such as with licensees.
CONCLUSIONS The following conclusions are based on an investigation at the Waterford, Unit No. 3 site by two IE inspectors during the period July 24-26, 1979:
1.
Allegation 1: This allegation could not be substantiated.
The memoranda referenced by the alleger could not be located in the temporary office that he had shared with other Ebasco personnel in the South Storag-. Yard even though the exact location had been given by the alleger.
Work _ng personnel of the licensee, Ebasco management and Quality Control had no knowledge of the memoranda.
The Ebasco personnel sharing the temporary office with the alleger had no knowledge of the memoranda.
2.
Allegations 2, 3 and 4: These allegations could not be substantiated.
The IE inspectors determined that although the tags do furnish a certain measure of control, they are a status indicator only.
Documents such as Material Receiving Inspection Reports, Discrepancy Reports and Deficiency Reports control the materials and must be accounted for prior to plant start-up testing.
3.
Allegation 5: This allegation could not be substantiated.
The pipe spools in question could not be identified by the alleger.
The pipe spools of the type described are prefabricated by the Dravo Corporation and are inspected in the Dravo facility by an Ebasco Quality Control inspector prior to release for shipment to the site. The site Quality Control function is to verify identification and determine if shipping damage occurred.
Althou3h it is the alleger's opinion that the inspection performed was not suf ficient, records reviewed and personnel interviewed by the IE inspectors did not substantiate this view.
4.
Allegation 6:
Th.s allegation was confirmed by the licensee during the course of the iraestigation. According to documentation made available to the IE inspectors, the hanger tie-rods in question were taken from the storage yard surplus material stock at 6:04 p.m. on June 20, 1979, by personnel of Tompkins-Beckwith Co.
The Ebasco warehouseman involved was a new employee apparently not knowledgeable of requirements. This person was no longer employed at the site and was not available for interview.
This matter will be considered an unresolved item subject to verification that the material was used for temporary pipe hangers in the nonsafety-related turbine building and that more stringent controls have been placed on surplus materials.
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Allegations 7 and 8: The allegations regarding construction site security and civi' rights violations were not investigated since these matters are not within the jurisdictional scope of the NRC Construction Permit.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Alleger The alleger is identified as Robert L. Liesen in the " Petition for a Court Injtaction" filed in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on July 13, 1979. The petition states that Mr. Liesen was an employee of Ebasco, Inc. from May 29, 1979, until an unspecified date when he was fired. Review of Mr. Liesen's personnel file by the IE inspectors revealed that he had been employed by Ebasco from May 29 through July 9, 1979, when he was discharged.
Principal Licensee Employees T. F. Gerrets, Quality Assurance Manager B. P. Brown, Quality Assurance Engineer J. Woods, Quality Assurance Engineer Ebasco, Inc.
L. A. Stinson, Site Quality Assurance Manager J. D. Elmore, Site Security Manager In addition to the above personnel, the IE inspectors interviewed other personnel employed in Quality Control, warehousing and security functions.
2.
Background of Allegations The Region IV Reactor Construction and Engineering Support branch became aware of the allegations involved in this investigation when the-licensee telephoned the Projects Section Chief on July 16, 1979. He informed Region IV that New Orleans newspapers had that day published articles stating that the alleger had filed a petition in Federal Court asking for an injunction to stop construction at the Waterford, Unit No. 3 site until such time as the NRC had time to investigate certain allegations of improprieties in Quality Control, security and employment practices at the site. The licensee sent copies of the articles to Region IV via facsimile on July 16, 1979, and followed with a copy of the petition on July 17, 1979.
A review of the petition section dealing with Quality Assurance matters
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appeared to have sufficient substance to warrant an investigation. Two IE inspectors from the Branch were dispatched on July 18, 1979, to the site to make a preliminary evaluatica and to interview the alleger.
3.
Preliminary Investigation A preliminary investigation revealed that the alleger was employed by Ebasco at the Waterford, Unit No. 3 site for the period May 29 to July 9,
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He was employed as a "Haterials Man B" in the Ebasco warehouse section.
It was determined, by review of documentation and discussions with appro-priate personnel, that there had been no written complaints filed to his supervisor by the alleger himself in regard to the alleged discrepancies.
4.
Interview Contact was made by telephone with the alleger on July 18, 1979, and arrangements were made for an interview that same evening which was accomplished by two IE inspectors. The IE inspectors reviewed the " Quality Control" portion of the petition in detail with the alleger. The following summarizes additional information provided by the alleger:
Allegation 1:
The memoranda referred to in the petition were written by Ebasco QC to the Ebasco materials division and concerned mostly rebar.
The memoranda could be located in a cubby-hole in a cabinet in the South Yard shack. The alleger stated that the memoranda should also be in the QC files, although he (the alleger) had no specific knowledge that they were.
Allegations 2, 3 and 4: The alleger could give no specific numbers, descriptions or dates relative to the actions of American Bridge and Iron except that structural, prefabricated steel was always involved.
In response to the IE inspectors' request for any additional information that would help narrow down the field, the alleger indicated that they should work with MRRs (Material Receiving Reports) in the 900,000 series.
Allegation 5: The alleger could not provide specific descriptions of the prefabricated pipe spools that he alleged had received inadequate inspection by Ebasco QC. The alleger did provide a sketched map of the South Yard indicating where the spools were when he made the observation.
Allegation 6:
The alleger indicated that the material taken from the surplus materials section of the South Storage Yard were eye-bolts of various sizes and lengths and that the event occurred sometime between June 23 and 22, C79.
Allegations 7 and 8: The IE inspectors discussed with the alleger the allegations in the petition dealing with security and civil rights violations.
The IE inspectors explained that the NRC does not have rules and regulations covering security controls of nuclear power sites during construction; that the type of security, implied by the alleger, is a requirement only imposed on the licensee after the nuclear fuel is on the station property.
The alleger stated that the thefts of materials from the site were going to run up the cost of constructien a great deal and that the NRC had ought to be very mach concerned. The IE inspectors acknowledged the alleger's concerns; however, these matters are not within the jurisdictional scope of the NRC Construction Permit.
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The alleger then asked why the NRC didn't force the construction unions at the site to hire minorities, women and the handicapped via require-ments placed on the licensee. lie indicated that the Department of Defense routinely did this. The IE inspectors indicated that the actions of D0D were accomplished through appropriate paragraphs included within contracts.
The NRC has no contracts with the licensee and the NRC has been chartered by law to protect the health and safety of the public, not enforce laws dealing with civil rights.
The alleger then inquired of the function of the " Equal Opportunities Office" shown on the NRC organization charts. The IE inspectors explained that the Office functions within the NRC to assure minorities, women and the handicapped within the NRC are treated fairly and properly in accordance wi,th the requirements of law but has no function outside of the Commission.
The alleger closed the interview by saying that he is an " activist" and that he did not agree with NRC policies if they were as stated by the IE inspectors.
He stated that he hoped that neither Chairman Hendrie nor the IE inspectors would "take it personal" if he attempted to cause the NRC to expand its role.
5.
Site Investigation Allegation 1: The memoranda concerning reinforcing steel described by the alleger could not be located.
The IE inspectors searched the yard shack described by the alleger and interviewed personnel now using the shack (some of which used the shack in a sharing arrangement with the alleger).
Licensee and Ebasco personnel stated that they were unaware of memoranda of the type described and stated that they doubted that they ever existed. No substantial amount of reinforcing steel was issued from the storage yard where the alleger worked during his tenure.
It was ascertained that the particular shack involved had, up to about a year and half ago, been located in the main reinforcing steel yard and was then moved to the south yard.
It appears that the memoranda may have been moved with the shack and came into the alleger's hands. The IE inspectors interviewed the only Ebasco QC inspector still employed at the project who had worked in the reinforcing steel yard. He denied any knowledge of hundreds of memoranda, but indicated that, during his time in the reinforcing steel yard, he occasionally dropped a " speed letter" to the warehouse people asking that they do something.
Such " speed letters" usually allow the originator to keep a copy.
The Ebasco inspector stated that he threw his copy away when the requested action was taken. He indi-cated that it was possible that his predecessors in the yard might not have done so.
The personnel currently occupying the shack sixted they had cleaned out the shack of all left over paper prior to the arrival of the alleger and could not understand how he came to possess them. They stated that they had observed the alleger writing a " lot" of memoranda himself, but hardly hundreds, but that they had not read the memoranda nor did they have copies. The IE inspectors determined that this allegation could not be substantiated.
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Allegations 2, 3 and 4:
The IE inspectors conducted a follow-on investi-gation at the Waterford, Unit No. 3 site during the period of July 24-26, 1979, in an effort to substantiate the allegations concerning Quality Control.
The IE inspectors visited the South Storage Yard and its Annex to ascertain the types of materials being stored and found that it contained prefabricated steel shapes used in buildings such as steel stairways, kick plates and equipment supports.
Also stored were piping system hangers, prefabricated pipe spools, small amounts of reinforcing steel and some equipment. The materials being stored were tagged as follows with one major exception:
Green tags were on most materials (this denotes accepted materials a.
per site procedures).
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Yellow tags (this denotes material in a hold status because it either has not been inspected or when inspected, was not acceptable). Two different yellow tags are used to clearly distinguish the type of hold involved.
The exception noted is that some pipe hangers consist of assemblies c.
made up of a number of separate loose parts. One tag is applied to a principal part to denote the status of the entire assembly.
Should the parts be separated for some reason, the status of a given part is not indicated.
Since components of the type involved in the allegations have been moving through the yard to the permanent plant structures for over two years and now number in the thousands, the IE inspectors deemed it impractical to research each such component through the records systems to see if they had been handled properly. This would have been a practical course only had the alleger been able to provide specific identifications.
The IE inspectors reviewed the Ebasco system for receiving materials, inspecting time prior to warehousing, and finally for issuing the materials to the installation contractors.
In essence, the process involves having materials (warehouse) people receive the materials from the shippers, identify the material and make an initial inspection for damage. These actions are documented on a Material Receiving Report (MRR).
If the material is for permanent plant use as distinguished from consumable supplies, the Ebasco Quality Control section is notified and the material is tagged with a yellow " Hold for Inspection" tag.
Quality Control then inspects the material while Quality Assurance personnel review vendor supplied documentation involved with the shipment.
Should the matarial be found to be acceptable by both groups, a Material Receiving Inspection Report (MRIR) is prepared and the material tagged with a green tag denoting both the MRR and MRIR number. Should the material be found not acceptable by Quality Control, a " Discrepancy Report" is issued, while if the documentation is missing or unacceptable, a " Deficiency Report" is issued.
If either of these latter reports are issued, the MRIR is so noted and a yellow tag placed on the ruaterial indicating " Hold" and is-10-1048 359
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appropriately marked to give reference to the controlling report. The MRIR and the MRR are both stamped " Hold" and remain so until action is taken to return the material to the vendor or to correct whatever caused the material to be unacceptable.
The installation contractors are notified of the presence of materials on the site and the status of the materials by a copy of the MRR stamped as above. The contractors prepare and present to the warehouse a " Requisition ou Warehouse" (R0W) to obtain materials from the warehouse. The R0W notes the item part number and references the MPR number. The warehouseman assigns a sequence number to the R0W and then records the MRIR number for each item being reqaisitioned from the green tag on the item.
Guards stationed at the yard entrance function to assure that only authorized personnel gain access to the yard and that they have the necessary paper-work with them. They also scan material haulers as they leave the yard in an attempt to assure that only authorized materials are taken.
The IE inspectors obtained all MRRs, MRIRs and R0Ws issued on or after May 15, 1979. They also obtained all open Discrepancy Reports and Deficiency Reports and all of those completed after May 15, 1979. These documents, amounting to several hundred collectively, were selectively examined and crosschecked with each other in an effort to determine if the described scheme was being effectively implemented during the alleger's tenure in the yard.
The IE inspectors also selectively verified that materia]s identified as being in " Hold" status were in fact still in the yard.
The IE inspectors concluded that perhaps the contractors might on ocsasion switch tags around on the materials as alleged, but that eventually Ebasco will have to account for what amounts to the utilization of unacceptable material by the contractors since the MRIRs, Discrepancy Reports and Deficiency Reports are the controlling documents rather than the tags.
The system appears to be self policing in the long term although not in the short or immediate term.
Discussions with members of the security and Quality Control forces provided additional information regarding one other facet of the yard operations not directly involved in the above description. During the past several months, Americen Bridge Division has been contracted to repaint structural steel and hangers that have been in the outdoor storage yard for a period of time such that vendor supplied coatings have deteriorated.
These items, which are otherwise acceptable, are listed in a memorandum. The memoran-dum directs that the listed items be turned over to American Bridge for sandblasting and painting and returned to the yard for reidentification and reinspection by Ebasco QC. The memoranda reviewed were approved by Ebasco QA prior to issuing the material to American Bridge. The sandblarting and repainting operation would destroy any tags on the materials and would, therefore, have to be retagged after being returned. These actions appeared to be well controlled and should not allow unacceptable materials to be installed.
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Allegation 5: The IE inspectors were unable to locate the specific pipe spools in the location given by the alleger. The IE inspectors did observe that there was a considerable number of spools in the South Storage Yard and in the Annex. Each of the spools examined on a selective basis was tagged as previously described.
The alleger stated, during the interview, that he was concerned generally with the male Ebasco QC inspectors really inspecting as he thought they should.
He stated the fema?e inspectors always did a good job.
In the case of pipe spools in general, it was developed that the spools are fabricated off site by the Dravo Corporation and shipped to the site as complete components ready for installation. The spools are fabricated under the surveillance of an Ebasco inspector in the Dravo shop and inspected by him prior to release for shipment.
The receiving inspection function then is to examine the spools for identification and damage that may have been incurred in shipment. The allegation could not be substantiated.
Allegation 6: The licensee disclosed that a number of hanger tie-rode had been taken from the South Storage Yard pile of so called " surplus material" by personnel employed by Tompkins-Beckwith (T-B) during the early evening of June 20, 1979.
The missing tie-rods were observed by another ware-houseman, not the alleger, and reported to his supervisors who apparently initiated an investigation.
The investigation, it was reported, eventually turned up a " Requisition on Warehouse" listing a quantity of fifteen tie-rods by description only, with no reference to an MRR number, nor was the requisition logged as required. The Ebasco warehouse supervisors stated that the warehousemat; on duty that evening was new and inexperienced and, further, that he was no longer employed at the site.
The licensee committed to immediately locating the material. The IE inspectors were notified by telephone on July 27 that the tie-rods had been located in the nonsafety-related turbine building and had never been used. This allegation was confirmed so far as uncontrolled removal of the hanger tie-rods from the South Storage Yard is concerned. The IE inspectors raised a question as to the effectiveness of material control program regarding surplus materials.
The licensee committed to providing improved controls over such surplus materials since they are outside the previously described materials control program.
Licensee and Ebasco personnel claimed that the occurrence was an isolated incident allowed by the negligence of a single warehouseman no longer employed.
The licensee also stated that the audit of T-B would have detected, and subsequently rejected, any permanent pipe hangers with unidentified tie-rods installed.
Since the licensee, through his or his agent's efforts, detected and subsequently pursued the matter, this occurrence will be considered an unresolved ites.
IE inspectors will verify, during a future inspection, that the hanger tie-rods were not installed in a permanent building and that the QC audit of T-B would have detected the unauthorized installation-12-1048 361
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of the hanger tie-rods.
Also, the IE inspectors will review measures developed by the licensee to improve the effectiveness of the materials control program in the area of surplus materials.
6.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, itema of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the investigation is discussed in paragraph 5.
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