IR 05000373/1986037
| ML20209G122 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1987 |
| From: | Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209G109 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-86-37, 50-374-86-37, NUDOCS 8702050282 | |
| Download: ML20209G122 (20) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-373/86037(DRP); 50-374/86037(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensees: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois Inspection Conducted: September 29 through October 3, 1986 Inspectors:
B. L. Jorgensen A. D. Toth E. M. Kelly D. D. Chamberlain R. L. Hague Team Leader:
W. G. Guldemond l
__ A I J Approved By:
G. C W'r
//J7/87 Reactor Projects Section 2C Da'te
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Inspection Summary Inspection on September 29 through October 3, 1986 (Reports No. 373/86037(DRP);
50-374/86037(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Special announced team inspection of control room activities; effectiveness of shift supervision; non-licensed operator activities; and management involvement in operations.
Results:
In the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8702050282 870128
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison
- W. R. Huntington, Assistant Superintendent for Operations, LaSalle
- J. C. Renwick, Production Superintendent, LaSalle
- R. D. Bishop, Services Superintendent, LaSalle
- G. J. Diederich, Station Manager, LaSalle
- T. A. Hammerich, Technical Staff Supervisor, LaSalle
- R. F. Manning, Assistant Superintendent For Technical Services, LaSalle
- H. E. McLain, Nuclear Safety, LaSalle
- T. J. Borzym, Security Director, LaSalle
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- R. J. Allen, Planning, LaSalle
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- J. H. Atchley, Operating Engineer, LaSalle
- M. P. Votg, Quality Control, LaSalle
- J. E. Lockwood, Operating Engineer, LaSalle
- B. S. Westphal, Operating Engineer, LaSalle
- R. J. Cozzi, Quality Assurance (QA), LaSalle
- W. F. Sheldon, Assistant Superintendent of Maintenance, LaSalle
- M. Craig, Instrument Maintenance Supervisor, LaSalle
- H. Mulderink, Master Electrician, LaSalle
- L. R. Aldrich, Rad / Chem Supervisor, LaSalle
- P. Weber, Shift Engineer
- M. S. Turbak, Licensing Director, CECO
- D. Galle, Assistant Vice President and General Manager, Nuclear Stations Division, CECO
- K. L. Grasser, Division Vice President, Nuclear Stations Division, CECO
- D. J. Scott, Operations Manager, Nuclear Stations Division, CECO
- B. B. Stephenson, Manager, Department of Nuclear Safety, CECO
- R. W. Stobert, QA Supervisor, CECO
- C. M. Allen, License Administrator, CECO M. David, Shift Control Room Engineer, LaSalle G. Swihart, Shift Control Room Engineer, LaSalle D. Leggett, Shift Control Room Engineer, LaSalle J. Damron, Shift Control Room Engineer, LaSalle K. Rack, Nuclear Station Operator, LaSalle B. Gould, Nuclear Station Operator, LaSalle L. Lundberg, Nuclear Station Operator, LaSalle J. Stephens, Nuclear Station Operator, LaSalle D. Werts, Nuclear Station Operator, LaSalle R. Graham, Nuclear Station Operator, LaSalle L. Gerlach, Nuclear Station Operator, LaSal~..
R. Boynston, Nuclear Station Operator, LaSalle R. Hitchboard, Nuclear Station Operator, LaSalle V. Baliff, Nuclear Station Operator, LaSalle R. Weber, Nuclear Station Operator, LaSalle A. C. Settles, Technical Staff Group Supervisor, LaSalle
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G. Ford, Mechanical Group Leader, Technical Staff, LaSalle R. Saymore, Modifications Coordinator, Technical Staff, LaSalle K. Wittenberg, Environmental Quality Staff, LaSalle W. Sly, Shift Engineer, LaSalle
- S. M. Lorenz, Stationmen Foreman, LaSalle
- D. P. Blonie, Stationmen Foreman, LaSalle P. Thouvenis, Shift Foreman, LaSalle S. Seaborn, Shift Foreman, LaSalle NRC
- R. L. Hague, Senior Resident Inspector, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Region III
- B. L. Jorgensen, Senior Resident Inspector, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Region III
- D. D. Chamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector, River Bend Nuclear Plant, Region IV
- A. D. Toth, Team Planner / Reactor Inspector, Region V
- E. M. Kelly, Senior Resident Inspector, Limmerick Nuclear Plant, Region I
- W. G. Guldemond, Chief, Projects Branch 2, Region III
- M. J. Jordan, Senior Resident Inspector, LaSalle County Station, Region III
- J. S. Mueller, Resident Co-op, LaSalle County. Station, Region III
- E. G. Greenman, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III The inspectors also contacted other member of the licensee's staff during the course of the inspection.
- Denotes those personnel attending the exit interview on October 3. 1986.
2.
Assessment Objectives and Methodology During the period September 29 through October 3,1986, the NRC conducted a special team assessment of operational activities at LaSalle County Station (LSCS) Units 1 and 2.
The objectives of this assessment were to determine whether LSCS had in place viable management mechanisms to
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produce safe and reliable plant operations, the level of support those mechanisms received from on-shift personnel and management, and the attitude and morale of the LSCS staff.
To this end, the following areas were selected for observation and evaluation:
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Control Room Operations including:
-Face to face, telephonic, and radio communications-0perator attentiveness to control boards-Alarm response-Shift turnover-Control of activities outside the control room
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-Use of information including ESF status panel and alarm typer, degraded equipment log, etc.
-Total workload
Non-Licensed Operator activities including:
-Shift turnover-Log keeping-Time spent touring the plant-Communciations-Alarm response-Response to abnormal / unexpected conditions or equipment deficiencies.
- Effectiveness of Shift Supervision including:
-Time spent directly supervising / monitoring activities in progress-Interface / coordination with other work groups (e.g., maintenance, HP)
-Participation in planning / scheduling Management involvement in Operations, including:
-Time spent in plant and in the control room monitoring activities.
-Extent to which management feeds back directly to workers and supervision from their monitoring activities.
-Comunication effectiveness in the management cnain.
In order to accomplish these objectives, individual team members were assigned to key locations / individuals at the facility. One team member was assigned to monitor control room activities. A second team member was assigned to follow and monitor the activities of the non-licensed operators.
The third and fourth team members were assigned to monitor the activities of the Shift Engineer and the Shift Foreman. The fifth team member attended planning, scheduling, oversight, and problem resolution management meetings and monitored the activities of selected members of plant management. Portions of all three shifts were monitored as well as the return to duty of a shift which has been on scheduled days off.
Each afternoon the team members met as a group to discuss individual observations for the previous 24-hour period, allowing the team as a whole to offer comments on individual observations, and to define individual areas deserving additional attention. Following each of these team meetings, representatives from the team met with station management to discuss team findings and observations.
Team members were selected to satisfy two criteria. The first criterion was that each member possess significant and relevant operations inspection experience. The second criterion was that team members were to have had minimal contact with LSCS or Commonwealth Edison Company prior to this assessment. The first criterion was established to ensure that maximum efficiency and relevancy would be achieved during the
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assessment. The second criteria was chosen to ensure that the overall assessment was not influenced by the operating history of LaSalle or l
prior knowledge of the operating philosophy of Commonwealth Edison Company.
The final team assembled for this assessment consisted of the current
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or former senior resident inspectors from the Limmerick (Region 1),
River Bend (Region IV), WNP-2 (Region V), Donald C. Cook (Regica III),
and Point Beach (Region III) facilities, thereby satisfying the criteria enumerated above.
In audition, the team represented a nearly complete cross section of the NRC Regional Offices (Regions I, III, IV, and V) as well as a good cross section of plant types from plants like Point Beach which has operated with a relatively small staff and custom' technical specifications, to licensing contemporaries of LSCS with Standard Technical Specifications like Limerick, River Bend, and WNP-2.
The remainder of this report discusses observations from each of the areas selected for observation. Additionally, a section discussing miscellaneous observations not strictly related to the areas chosen for observation is included.
Finally, a conclusions section is provided where area observations and common themes are brought together and team recommendations are provided.
3.
Control Room Operations
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The team monitored activities in the common control room for both units for three consecutive days, including morning and afternoon shift turnover activities and activities during the early evening of each day. This included observation of four different operating crews, in addition to operating crew members on training or relief shifts who were assisting the assigned staff.
The assessment considered the following aspects of operations:
a.
Effectiveness of Personal, Telephone, and Radio Communications
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Communications between operators and other staff were open and inquisitive. When coordinating activities outside the control room, operators were observed to implement a lessons learned policy of repeating and confirming information transmitted by radio and telephone. Behavior of personnel assigned to and visiting the control room was professional. Noise levels were kept low. Good use as made of the Gaitronics public address system to keep plant personnel informed of changing plant conditions.
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Two-zone colored carpet was recently installed in the control room
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to provide demarcation of a controlled area in front of the control panels. Access to this area is restricted and controlled by the operators in accordance with management policy. The inspector noted that plant maintenance and surveillance technicians were generally disregarding this policy by queuing at the operator's desk in the controlled zone to wait for operator review and approval of planned
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work. Presence in this location obstructed the operator's view of secondary system panels when he was at his desk working on papers presented by the technicinns.
Enforcement of this management policy should be improved.
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The entire oncoming shift met at the beginning of each shift to review plant status and planned work. Afternoon shift turnover meetings were held in a quiet conference room with good information transfer. Morning meetings were held in the lunchroom, subject to distracting background noise, decreasing the effectiveness of information transfer. This problem was aggravated by the reluctance of some staff members to speak loudly enough to be heard by all participants, or to be overly cryptic in their remarks.
b.
Operator Attentiveness to Control Panels Shift manning procedures called for operators to monitor the panels on an hourly basis.
Pointed panel walkdowns on an hourly basis were not obvious to the inspector, although the operators appeared to monitor individual areas of the panels at least that frequently.
Operators stated that the " green panel" design (all indicators in their normal positions display green indicating lights), coupled with the color code bands on indicating meters and recorders, permitted most panel assessment from a distance. Other more distant panels were approached for more close observation.
The level of normal attention to the panels appeared acceptable.
Four hours after one shift turnover, the inspector noted that the
"less than 85% open" position indicator for one of two feedwater check valves was illuminated, whereas the same indicator for the second valve was not illuminated. The plant was at 60% power, with feedwater flow indicators showing equal flow for both loops. The operator did not demonstrate prior recognition of this condition nor could he describe any inquiry in-process. Subsequently, he verified that the difference was not due to a burned out light bulb and stated that he would prepare a maintenance work request to explore the difference.
Several control room panel instruments were not labelled with their equipment identification numbers. However, many plant procedures required actions involving obtaining data from specific instruments, often calling out the instrument identification number.
In some cases, the operators had posted paper and ink labels to assist in their identification of the proper instrument.
For two pressure indicators associated with the main steam leakage collection system (MS-LCS), two operators selected at random were unsuccessful in promptly determining the instrument corresponding to the procedure and the process drawings (P&ID) and it was necessary to go behind the control panels to positively identify the subject instruments.
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c.
Operator Utilization of Available Plant Status Information Operators effectively used the alarm display on the cathode ray screen on their desk to assess and confirm activated and cleared annunciator alarms.
In accordance with a lessons learned policy, the operators obtained printouts of the alarm log at the beginning of each shift and reviewed this to assure that they understood the reason for each alarm. The value of this was demonstrated to the inspector as one operator identified a newly developed problem with a RCIC valve whose condition was masked by a long-standing RCIC system alarm attributable to other causes.
Operators appeared to effectively use a principle of short and long duration " clocks", recording entry and exit of Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) on logs specifically designed for that purpose. They consistently demonstrated awareness of which clocks were active during interviews conducted at random.
Operators were noted effectively using the shift turnover meeting notes to assess unusual equipment status, to verify that required special logs were maintained as scheduled, and to anticipate significant work activities expected to affect control room operations. The operators each maintained their own notes of surveillance activities in progress and were observed to maintain these notes current as. activities progressed. However, there appeared to be a weakness in information flow regarding maintenance work in progress at any time.
For example, reactor operators were not all aware of welding work in the emergency switchgear room, an area where personnel error could initiate a plant transient.
All control room personnel (center desk operator, reactor operators, and shift control room engineer) participated in the preparation of, and were noted making thorough use of the shift turnover data sheets.
It was noted, however, that the section of the reactor operator shift turnover checklist dealing with component status was not consistently filled out. Detailed work planning by the instrument maintenance planner was also observed being coordinated with the shift control room engineer in the control room. The inspector has observed that a Group Supervisor of the Technical Department performed daily reviews of the operator logs in the control room, a practice conducive to communications of plant performance information to the licensee engineering staff.
d.
Operator Alarm Response Operators were attentive to alarm annunicators, promptly acknowledging the alarms and referring often to the cathode ray screen display of active alarms at their cesk. Most of the operators assigned to the main panels were individually interviewed by the inspector relative to activated alarm annunciators, and each was able to discuss in detail the reason for the active alarm and
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the actions being taken in the control room or in the plant relative to the abnormal condition. Some minor delay was observed in operators resetting cleared alarms; however, the operator in each case noted the fact that the alarm had cleared (many of which were from known surveillance actions approved and in-progress) and tended to reset the alarm as soon as he became disengaged from other matters in which he was involved.
In no case did the inspector notice unjustified failure to clear an alara (e.g., when the operator was free from other priority work).
With exception of one instance where work on one unit affected the fire alarms on the other unit, the inspector noticed no instances where the operator was surprised by an alarm which was due simply to planned surveillance work in progress.
Such surveillances are required to be approved by the operator immediately prior to start of work, and there was ample evidence that such approvals were being faithfully obtained.
Alarm response procedures for each control panel are conveniently contained in a holder attached directly to the subject panel.
While operators generally made use of these procedures following receipt of alarms that were not part of a planned activity (e.g.,
surveillance), several instances were noted where reference to the procedures could have been more timely.
e.
Operator Control of Activities Outside the Control Room Operators clearly demonstrated control over maintenance and surveillance activities outside the control room, with the exception of maintaining current status of prior approved maintenance work in-progress in the plant as described in Paragraph C above.
A policy was clearly implemented where personnel entering the control room first obtained approval of the shift control room engineer at the center desk prior to approaching reactor operator work stations. Technicians requiring discussions or work approvals from reactor operators waited in line in a quiet and orderly manner until the operator freed himself from other activities. When a high pace of activities developed, the operators deconstrated the willingness and authority to withhold approval to commence additional surveillance or maintenance activities.
A positive action taken by the licensee to ensure that work activities receive attention in accordance with appropriate priorities is the color coding of the folders containing the paperwork associated with the work. This enables the operators to tell at a glance which work awaiting authorization deserves priority attention, relieving them of a potentially time and attention consuming review process.
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f.
Shift Turnover Shift turnover activities were noted to include several aids to promote comprehensive dissemination of relevant plant status information.
Each reactor operator, shift foreman, the shift control room engineer, and the shift engineer prepared a written one page summary of plant status and work status information which was compiled into a package and a copy provided to each individual.
This information was noted to be utilized by the various individuals during shift turnover discussions with counterparts and later during the shift.
Individual counterpart interviews and joint panel walkdowns were supplemented by a shift meeting at which all members of the oncoming shift were present; the control panels were manned by the prior shift during this meeting. During the period when control room turnover was taking place, a good practice of restricting control room access to those having legitimate reasons to be there by use of the security system was noted. These control room " quiet periods" ensured that that portion of shift turnover was accomplished with minimal interruption.
It was noted that a representative of the off-going shift did not consistently attend the shift meeting for the oncoming shift, and the afternoon shift turnover meeting was not attended by anyone from the daily scheduling meeting to discuss upcoming activities.
g.
Total Workload Total control room workload did not appear to be excessive.
The operators demonstrated on several occasions their sensitivity to this subject by indicating to their supervision that they could not support additional activities; however, it was noted that the operators were not maintaining a current status of work being performed out in the plant. As noted above, the team considers this to be an area where improvement is needed.
If this recommendation is acted upon, it will impact the operator's ability to control other activities simultaneously in progress. Additionally, a couple of instances were identified where operators were not fully current on the status of surveillance tests in progress. This suggests that the licensee should ensure that operators maintain the proper threshold for excessive workload.
On a positive note, good exchanges were noted between the Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE) and the Instrument Maintenance Planner regarding what work was planned for the fift, when it was expected to be performed, who was going to perform the work, and what support would be required of control room personnel. This type of information exchange facilitates on-shift planning of activities and more even distribution of work load. Additionally, licensee management demonstrated appropriate sensitivity to workload by assigning additional operators, management, and support staff to cover special, complicated, or involved evolutions.
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h.
General Control Room Observations (1) Use of Surveillance Checklists at Multiple Locations Some instrument / system surveillance testing involved a technician in the control room and one or more elsewhere in the plant.
In accordance with Procedure No. LAP-100-28, Revision 0, activities of the man in the plant could be entered on the control room copy of the checklist by the control room technician. The technician in the field was not required to record numerical or other data on his copy of the checklist and check this with verbal based data entered on the control room copy of the checklist. The reliance on effectiveness of verbal telephone communications to document numerical data has inherent vulnerabilities to error.
There also appears to be some ambiguity regarding the timing and recording of independent verifications of data taken by technicians in the plant.
(2) Deferred Maintenance Indicating lights on radiation monitor controls on the standby gas treatment system control room panels were activated.
Reactor operators stated that the controls were for equipment which had been disconnected several months ago. A new alternate radiation monitoring system was being relied upon.
This inspector considered the activated indicating lights to be an unnecessary distraction to operators who were unsure of just what equipment is still active.
4.
Non-Licensed Operator Activities The team monitored the activities of several non-licensed operators (NLO's) for three consecutive days on portions of two shifts, considering the attributes listed in Paragraph 2.
The following observations were made:
a.
Shift Turnover In addition to attendance at the shift meetings described in Paragraph 3 above, the NLO's complete a formal face-to-face turnover. This turnover is supported by a formal turnover sheet documenting current plant conditions and highlighting discrepancies and abnormal conditions.
Several turnovers were witnessed by the team. The exchange of information was judged to be very good.
The team did note that the NLO's do not maintain a chronological log of activities.
Such a log may be beneficial to the turnover process, allowing the parties to review all activities conducted on the previous shift (s).
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b.
Logkeeping In addition to the turnover sheet discussed above, the NLO's maintain a " rounds sheet" which identifies key plant and equipment-parameters to be checked. The rounds sheet was reviewed by the team.
and found to be adequate. A particular strength noted was the j
extensive section on the diesel generators. The team did note that the cautions provided concerning valve packing adjustments could be strengthened to ensure that valves were stroked after the fact as required.
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The team observed that the NLO's were conscientious regarding completion of the rounds sheet; however, it appeared that the NLO's
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were reviewing the data taken only for time trends, and not for
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adherence to prescribed limits.
In.the case of a Standby Liquid
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Control System Tank Level value which was outside the limits prescribed on the rounds sheet, no action was taken to either correct the condition or highlight it for further review.
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As noted in "a" above, the NLO's do not maintain a chronological log. As such, discrepant conditions, alarms, and evolutions conducted by the NLO's are not recorded in a single convenient document. This policy should be reassessed by the licensee.
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c.
Time Spent Touring the Plant
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The NLO's spend virtually all of their time in the plant completing
rounds sheets and other assigned duties including alarm response (discussed later in this report), system / component lineup /manipula-
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tion, and surveillances. Their time was used effectively to i
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complete their tasks.
i Regarding the performance of Technical Specification surveillances,
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the team noted two specific deficiencies indicative of a potential i
training weakness. The first situation occurred during the
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performance of channel checks on reactor vessel water level. The NLO observed and recorded the required data properly; however, he was unsure whether reviews for trends were to involve comparison of the indicated levels on the various channels or to compare the r
indicated level for each channel as a function of time. The second situating involved the NLO observed being unsure as to which recorder to use as source of information for containment air particulate readings.
d.
Communications NLO communications were judged to be very good. Frequent contact was made with the appropriate licensed operators regarding l.
conditions observed and status of activities in progress. A good j
practice was observed where hand held radio communications were
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repeated over the telephone system to ensure proper information l
was transmitted and received.
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e.
Alarm Response The team noted that NLO's were sensitive to local alarms and responded in a timely fashion.. It was also noted that the licensee had done a good job at making emergency procedures and~ alarm instructions available locally for ready use.
f.
Pursuit of Abnormal / Unexpected Conditions or Equipment Deficiencies
Y The team noted that the NLO's were both conscientious and inquisitive regarding their assigned duties. When unexpected
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conditions were encountered they were promptly communicated to shift supervision and followup was initiated. A particular example of
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this related to the discovery by a NLO of an apparent discrepancy
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between the drawings for and the actual configuration of the Station L
i Heat Recovery System. This problem was aggressively pursued by the
'NLO assigned to line up the system. Shift Supervisor was informed and became involved as did the responsible system engineer.
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It did appear to the team that the NLO's were not sufficiently sensitive to minor material deficiencies (e.g. valve packing leaks)
and housekeeping problems. During tours of the plant the team identified numerous minor material problems which had not been
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tagged and entered into the work request system. Miscellaneous j
equipment was observed to be stored in areas such that ready access
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to fire protection equipment and instrument racks was obstructed.
Excessive amounts of unsecured rolling stock (e.g. wheeled tool boxes and temporary shielding rigs) were found in the reactor building.
In addition, it appeared to the team that the NLO's were not sufficiently inquisitive regarding minor radiological' control deficiencies.
Examples of deficiencies observed included outdated
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and apparently uncontrol?ed hot spot stickers, scaffolding placed in
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suchafashionthatahighradiationgg9abarriercouldbeviolated,
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an unsecured and apparently unused Cs source stored'in the reactor building, radiation barrier rope secured to fire hose reels and other plant equipment rather than to stanchions, and
unnecessary debris and material in step-off pad areas.
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In conclusion, the team felt that the NLD's were sufficiently
sensitive to equipment / material conditions which directly impacted performance of their duties; however, they were not sufficiently
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sensitive to generally observable minor equipment, housekeeping,
and radiological controls discrepancies and appeared to lack a l
sense of ownership for their assigned areas of the plant.
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5.
Effectiveness of Shift Supervision
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The team monitored the activities of the Shift Engineers (SE) and Shift Foremen (SF) for three consecutive days, including shift turnover i
activities, considering the attributes listed in Paragraph 2.
The SE's
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and SF's observed were found to be conscientious, highly motivated, professional, and knowledgeable concerning their assigned responsibilities.
With respect to the SE's, the following observations were made:
a.
Time Spent Directly Supervising / Monitoring Activities in Progress This particular attribute was the most significant weakness observed by the team. The administrative and paperwork burden on the SE's is such that they have little time to get out into the plant unless there is a problem requiring their attention. Of particular note to the team was the amount of time consumed processing temporary modifications (e.g., Jumpers). Two factors contributed to this situation.
First, the number of jumpers required is excessive.
Second, the drawings available to the SE to verify the correctness of temporary modifications are not up to date in that many require that reference be made to one or more Drawing Change Notices.
Thus, what should be a simple verification process becomes a complicated document cross reference process.
The licensee has accommodated this problem by assigning additional management personnel to the operating shifts. While this has been successful in providing adequate shift oversight, until such time as the SE is relieved of the excessive administrative burden, the functioning of a vital member of the shift will remain at least partially compromised, b.
Interface With Other Groups The SE's were observed to work well within the Production Department (Operations and Maintenance).
Points of contact and communications were generally well established and effective. Outside the Production Department communications were somewhat less effective but noted to be improving.
Two examples of this were noted.
The first involved station construction seeking approval of unscheduled Construction Work Permits despite being advised to have them scheduled.
The second example involved a drywell chiller problem where the SE was not apprised why a particular chiller was running.
c.
Participation in Planning and Scheduling The team observed little direct participation by the on-shift SE's in the scheduling process. Daily planning meetings are attended by
the day shift SE. While operating expertise does exist in the Planning Department in the form of a former Operating Engineer and fonner SE's and SF's, and there is contact between the shift and planning, the on-shift SE primarily acts in the capacity of completing scheduled items. This problem is exacerbated by the noted absence of a representative from the daily scheduling meeting
at the afternoon shift turnover meetings.
This may have contributed f
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to a situation wherein the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) was taken out of service in anticipation of upcoming maintenance when, in fact, the maintenance had been deferred.
The team also noted that there was no systematic statusing of active work in progress made available to on-shift personnel.
It thus became necessary for the shift personnel to seek out work status information.
With respect to the SF's, the following observations were made:
Time Spent Directly Supervising / Monitoring Activities in Progress a.
The SF's-spend a significant portion of their time in the plant participating in and coordinating activities in progress; however, relatively little time is spent supervising these activities.
Like the NLO's, the SF's become aggressively involved in resolving problems which directly impact activities in progress; however, also like the NLO's, the SF's were not particularly aggressive regarding minor material deficiencies and housekeeping problems.
Two other observations were made by the team regarding the performance of the SF's.
The first it;m was that the SF's do not maintain a running log. As such, they must rely in part on the SE's log as a source of information to support their turnovers. On more than one occasion the SE's log was not completely up to date at the end of a shift.
The second observation was that SF's frequently relieve other shift members temporarily during the shift for a variety of reasons.
While this maintains staffing continuity, if done to excess, it could, unless.such reliefs are formal, result in items not being consistently tracked to completion, b.
Interface With Other Groups As was the case for r 2 SE's, the SF's were observed to interface effectively with other members of the Production Department.
Outside the Production Department communications were somewhat less effective but improving.
The team did note that the licensee, in an effort at improving communications, has implemented a foreman exchange program wherein foremen from other work groups spend several hours with the SF's.
This program appears to have been very effective in helping other work groups understand the obstacles faced by the operating shifts.
c.
Participation in Planning and Scheduling As was noted for the SE's, the team observed little direct
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participation by the on-shift SF's in the planning and scheduling process.
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6.
Management Involvement in Operations This portion of the assessment was accomplished by assigning one team member to attend planning, scheduling, oversight, and problem resolution management meetings.
In addition, all team members, during execution of their assigned responsibilities, monitored for the extent of direct management involvement and made inquiries of staff members regarding management presence and support for operating activities and initiatives.
The following meetings were attended on the dates indicated:
Shift Turnover Meeting - Daily
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Daily Planning Meeting - September 29
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Units 1 and 2 Scheduling Meeting - September 29, October 1 Unit 2 Outage Meeting - October 1 Special Unit 1 Load Reduction Meeting - October 1, 2 Station Manager's Weekly Meeting - September 29 Based on these activities, the following observations were made:
a.
Time Spent In Plant The team observed a generally strong management presence in the control room. Management individuals did attend the morning shift turnover meetings. Somewhat less participation was noted at the afternoon shift turnover meetings. Routine management visits were made to the control room to monitor activities in progress and review operations logs.
The licensee has assigned staff managers to perform a shift overview function. This places an individual manager on each shift approximately once every nine weeks for a full week. While this activity provides assistance to the SE's as noted above, makes management easily accessible to on shift personnel, and provides individual members valuable insight into on-shift activities, the team noted that no mechanisms are currently in place to formally document the activities and observations of these shift managers.
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As such, an opportunity is lost to collectively review and trend these items with an eye toward overall performance improvement.
The team received mixed signals regarding management presence in the plant outside the control room. Management individuals were only infrequently encountered by team members outside the control room.
The large number of unidentified minor material discrepancies and housekeeping items identified by the team, some of them old, is indicative of either a lack of management presence or an inappropriate level of sensitivity to such items.
On the other hand, in discussions with corporate management, it was disclosed that goals
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had been set for time-in-plant by members of station management and that performance in this area is monitored.
Furthermore, during daily team briefings with station management it was noted that
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managers present, including the station superintendent, were familiar with physical conditions in the plant as discussed by the team.
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As noted in Paragraph 3.g of this report, the licensee has been routinely assigning managers to cover special, complicated, or involved evolutions, and management call-out lists are provided, b.
Management Feedback / Management Communications Effectiveness-As the inspection progressed it became apparent that the distinction between the attributes of management feedback to workers'and
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communications effectiveness in the management chain was blurred.
Consequently, these attributes were combined.
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The team noted that a number of formal communications mechanisms have been established which extend vertically through the
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organization. These include the following:
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1.
Standing Orders and Daily Orders. These written documents
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communicate management policy and priorities to the shifts on a long term and day-to-day basis, respectively. Each requires review by multiple levels of management before transmittal to the shifts.
Each is required to be reviewed by each shift.
While this is a generally effective communication technique, the team noted two implementation discrepancies, one minor and one more significant. The minor discrepancy involved one set of daily orders transmitted to the shift without the required management approval. Approval is significant in so far as it documents concurrence / cognizance within the management
organization with the direction being given. The more significant discrepancy involved directica to remove the RCIC j
system from service. This direction was given to the shifts and was executed; however, a subsequent management decision to
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j defer the maintenance on the RCIC system was not effectively transmitted with the result that the plant was unnecessarily
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placed in a Limiting Condition for Operations.
l 2.
Routing Meetings. The plant conducts a series of routine meetings involving individuals and management from all station i
departments. These include daily planning meetings, daily scheduling meetings, department coordination meetings, weekly l
Station Manager's meetings, department head meetings, operations review meetings, and outage planning meetings.
As noted above, several of these meetings were attended by team members.
In general, there was a good exchange of status information at these meetings and most parties, with the
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exception of Quality Assurance and the Technical Staff,
participated actively. Both management and represented personnel expressed their views. Some of the meetings suffered from the lack of a composite list of system problems
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or items that needed special attention. Also, completion dates for work in progress were not consistently established.
3.
The licensee has in place a deviation reporting system. The purpose of this system is to bring significant or potentially reportable conditions to the attention of management. The system is used and, according to the licensee, functions well. However, the team noted that the reports generated are not numbered or tracked until after they have been reviewed and approved by the Operating Engineer. This is viewed as a weakness in that reports could be lost or misplaced with the result that conditions adverse to quality may not come to the attention of management in a timely manner.
4.
No formal method exists for plant personnel to document routine problems or concerns for management attention and corrective actions. Management does periodically solicit staff input in this area and the Station Superintendent does maintain an "open door" policy; however, the absence of a formal reporting mechanism creates the potential for lost items or failure to feedback to request initiators.
Team interviews of station personnel indicated that these communications mechanisms are generally working well, particularly recently with some of the management changes and initiatives which have occurred. Overall, there was a positive attitude expressed from both management and operations personnel about LaSalle's changes and programs.
Personnel were highly motivated and felt that they were getting strong management support.
Resources were being devoted to resolve important operating issues, including hardware, administration, and personnel.
7.
Miscellaneous Observations Throughout the assessment, the team members made numerous observations, both positive and negative, which were not directly related to the subject of the assessment but which contributed to the overall perception the team gained of LaSalle. Each observation was discussed with station management during the daily meeting conducted between the team and the station.
For the sake of emphasis and completeness, the more significant observations are reiterated here.
a.
Positive Observations 1.
During the process of evaluating NLO performance, the evaluator has occasion to talk to the Training and Quality Assurance Departments. With regard to training, the evaluator determined that operating experience is being fed back into the training program. Two recent examples involving torquing and lubricating were discussed.
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Regarding Quality Assurance (QA), the NLO evaluator determined that QA periodically reviews NLO rounds sheets and monitors operations activities outside the control room. Capability in this area is significantly enhanced by the presence of three Senior Reactor Operators on the QA audit staff.
2.
A number of the NLO's are also licensed reactor operators.
This situation significantly strengthens NLO capability.
It was noted, however, that some of the licensed NLO's expressed concern over their ability to remain current on license information given their other duties.
3.
The licensee has recently assembled a full time planning staff. This organization is still being integrated into the overall organization and, as such, has yet to reach its full performance level; however, positive results are already being obtained.
4.
The licensee has a radwaste reduction program which is highly publicized and posted and should be effective in reducing the volume of radwaste generated at LaSalle.
5.
The licensee has a computerized lubrication schedule which appears to be well thought out and implemented. Responsibility for this program currently rests with one individual.
Maintenance of the program may be enhanced if another individual was involved in a backup capacity, b.
Potentially Negative Observations 1.
The team observed an excessive number of temporary system connections including air lines, drains lines, temporary electrical lines, and telephones. A number of these were installed to facilitate routine evolutions and, as such,
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should be permanently installed.
2.
Many portions of the plant are not " user friendly." Most notable in this regard is accessibility to valve operators.
NLO's were observed on several occasions to have to climb over and/or stand on other pieces of plant equipment to operate valves. This condition represents a hazard to both personnel and equipment.
3.
Numerous minor radiological discrepancies were noted including poorly maintained step-off areas, unnecessary storage of a radioactive source in the reactor building, and out of date and apparently uncontrolled hot spot stickers.
These types of problems are indicative of a lack of attention to detail both on the part of the radiological protection staff-and the operations staff.
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4.
Several long standing deficiencies remain open. Two of particular concern to the team were a caution tag on an instrument rack indicating that instrument valve labels may be improper and a tag on the hydrogen recombiner system indicating that startup testing needed to be performed.
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5.
The remote shutdown panels are laid out in a somewhat confusing fashion, particularly as it relates to divisional separation.
8.
Conclusions During the period September 29 through October 3, 1986, the NRC conducted a special team assessment of operational activities at LSCS. The express objective of this assessment was to determine whether LSCS had in place viable management mechanisms implemented to produce safe and reliable plant operations which were supported by the plant staff and management.
As discussed in Paragraph 2 of this report, this assessment involved observation and evaluation of several key areas including control room operations, NLO activities, effectiveness of shift supervision, and management involvement.
Succeeding paragraphs provided detailed observations in each of these areas.
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As a result of this assessment, the team reached tne following general conclusions:
a.
The mechanisms needed to support safe and reliable plant operation are in place. These mechanisms have been refined and-strengthened recently by a management commitment to excellence; the devotion of additional resources, both in management oversight of operating activities and the creation of a new planning organization; certain personnel changes; and increased involvement of the corporate office in the operation of LSCS. This connitment to LSCS has been reflected in its recent period of reliable operation.
If LSCS is to continue to operate successfully, this sarre high level of commitment must be maintained at all levels from the represented worker through the most senior corporate official.
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b.
Morale at the plant is very good.
Plant personnel at all levels expressed positive attitudes toward their jobs and the responsibilities they involved and the support they get from management.
c.
To this point in time the plant has struggled to overcome issues left over from the construction phase, both managerial and hardware.
Resolution of these issues has required the utilization of significant resources which, had they been available to support operations, may have resulted in earlier ;;erformance enhancements.
With the completion of the first Unit I refueling outage shortly before this assessment and the changes noted in "a" above, many of the construction phase issues are closed.
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d.
A number of issues remain to be addressed before continued success can be reasonably expected. Among these are:
1.
On-shift supervision needs to be relieved of what is currently viewed as an excessive administrative burden. Only by so doing will these individuals be allowed to use their considerable experience to oversee operating activities and operators and provide input into the inevitable adjustments and refinements
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that will be necessary in the future.
2.
The Support Services organization must be come more actively involved with the Production Department in day-to-day and planning activities. Communications need to be improved and engi.neering involvement enhanced.
3.
The plant needs to be made more " user friendly" by improving equipment accessibility improving equipment labeling, making permanent the numerous temporary system configurations including jumpers and the items noted in Paragraph 7, and improving the quality of available reference material (drawings,etc.).
4.
A mechanism should be developed to allow staff concerns and problems to be documented, evaluated, and dispositioned with feedback to the originator, e.
The current material condition of the plant suggests that the threshold for identifying and reacting to plant deficiencies both in plant equipment and housekeeping remains too high. A greater sense of pride and ownership needs to be developed.
In summary, the team found that LaSalle has the tools to support safe and reliable plant operations. These tools are being used; however, the level of commitment must remain high if recent successes are to continue.
9.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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