IR 05000369/2014004
| ML14297A429 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  (NPF-009, NPF-017) |
| Issue date: | 10/24/2014 |
| From: | Frank Ehrhardt NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1 |
| To: | Capps S Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2014004 | |
| Download: ML14297A429 (24) | |
Text
October 24, 2014
SUBJECT:
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2014004 AND 05000370/2014004
Dear Mr. Capps:
On September 30, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. On October 8, 2014, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.
Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Frank Ehrhardt, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17
Enclosure:
NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2014004
and 05000370/2014004
w/Attachment - Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.:
50-369, 50-370
License Nos.:
Report No.:
05000369/2014004, 05000370/2014004
Licensee:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Facility:
McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Huntersville, NC 28078
Dates:
July 1, 2014, through September 30, 2014
Inspectors:
J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Cureton, Resident Inspector
P. Cooper, Acting Resident Inspector C. Fontana, Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP2, 1EP3, 1EP4, 1EP5, and 4OA1)
S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP2, 1EP3, 1EP4, 1EP5, and 4OA1)
A. Vargas, Reactor Inspector (1R08)
Approved by:
Frank Ehrhardt, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR05000369/2014004, IR05000370/2014004; 07/01/2014 - 09/30/2014; McGuire Nuclear
Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Inspection Report.
The report covered a three month period of inspection by the resident inspectors and four regional inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision (Rev. 5). No findings or violations of greater than minor significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) until September 13, 2014, when the unit was shutdown for a refueling outage.
Unit 2 operated at approximately 100 percent RTP for the entire inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
==1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdowns:==
The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following four systems to assess the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable or degraded. The inspectors focused on discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures and walked down control systems components to verify selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- 2A and 2B motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDCA) pumps while the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDCA) pump was out of service for outboard bearing oil flush and testing following identification of high particulate in the bearing oil reservoir
- 1B residual heat removal (ND) pump while the 1A ND pump was out of service for planned preventive maintenance
- 2A emergency diesel generator (EDG) while the 2B EDG was out of service for planned maintenance and testing
- 1A EDG while the 1B EDG was out of service for emergent repairs following failure of the #5 left cylinder intake valve
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Fire Protection Walkdowns:==
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following five plant areas to determine if they were consistent with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the fire protection program for defense in depth features. The features assessed included the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, firefighting equipment, and passive fire features such as fire barriers. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees compensatory measures for fire deficiencies to determine if they were commensurate with the significance of the deficiency. The inspectors reviewed the fire plans for the areas selected to determine if they were consistent with the fire protection program and presented a adequate firefighting strategies. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1 control rod drive power supply and reactor trip switchgear room (Fire Area 22)
- 2A and 2B EDG rooms (Fire Areas 7 and 8)
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary building 716 elevation (Fire Area 4)
- Unit 1 MDCA and TDCA pump rooms (Fire Areas 2 and 2A)
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary building 695 elevation (Fire Area 1)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
Annual Review of Electrical Manholes:==
On August 12 and September 3, 2014, the inspectors conducted a visual examination of the Protected Area plant underground electrical cable manholes, including; CMHP-1, CMHP-1A, CMHP-2, CMHP-4, CMHP-5, CMHP-6, CMHP-18, CMHP-28, CMHP-T1, CMHP-T2, TR-21, TR-22, TR-29, and TR-35. The inspectors assessed the condition of the electrical cables located inside these manholes by verifying the cables, spices, support structures, and sump pumps were not being adversely impacted by standing water. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program (CAP) database to verify that electrical manhole related problems were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the CAP, and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R08 Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activities
a. Inspection Scope
==
Non-Destructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities: The inspectors conducted an onsite review of the implementation of the licensees inservice inspection (ISI) program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system (RCS),emergency feedwater systems, risk-significant piping and components, and containment systems in Unit 1. The inspectors activities included a review of non-destructive examinations (NDEs) and to verify that indications and defects were appropriately evaluated and appropriately dispositioned.
b. Findings
Unresolved ltem (URl)05000369/2014004-01, 1B/1C Reactor Coolant System Loop Safety Injection Piping Flaws
Introduction:
The inspectors identified an unresolved item associated with flaws identified in the 1B/1C Reactor Coolant System Loop Safety Injection piping welds.
Description:
The licensee identified flaws with ultrasonic testing in the 1B and 1C cold leg safety injection pipe welds as part of their extent of condition from Unit 2 for MRP-146, Thermal Fatigue. Further evaluation determined these flaws were a circumferential flaw with an axial component on the nozzle side for 1B and an axial flaw from the centerline of the weld into the base metal for 1C. The licensee completed examinations on all welds included in the MRP-146 program and found them to be within the acceptance criteria. The licensee also removed and repaired the 1B and 1C nozzles.
Welding of the new components have been examined and have passed all quality assurance examinations. The licensee determined that the flaws were a result of thermal fatigue. The licensee has performed all required examinations and repairs and is completing a metallurgical analysis of the flaws. This is an unresolved item pending review of the licensees metallurgical analysis of the flaws to determine if there is a performance deficiency. This issue will be tracked as URI 05000369/2014004-01, 1B/1C Reactor Coolant System Loop Safety Injection Piping Flaws.
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR) Program and Licensed Operator Performance a.
==
Inspection Scope
Quarterly Resident Inspector LOR Activity Review: On August 27, 2014, the inspectors observed operators in the plant simulator during a licensed operator requalification examination. The simulator examination scenario involved a failed open pressurizer spray valve, turbine/generator trip and reactor trip, followed by a stuck open pressurizer power operated relief valve loss of coolant accident. The inspectors assessed overall crew performance, clarity and formality of communications, use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics and supervisory oversight. The inspectors observed the post-exercise critique to determine if the licensee identified deficiencies and discrepancies that occurred during the simulator training. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Quarterly Resident Inspector Licensed Operator Performance Review: On September 13, 2014, the inspectors observed operators in the main control room and assessed their performance during reactor shutdown activities associated with commencing a refueling outage. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the two issues listed below for items such as: 1) appropriate work practices; 2) identifying and addressing common cause failures; 3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the Maintenance Rule; 4) characterizing reliability issues for performance; 5) charging unavailability for performance; 6) balancing reliability and unavailability; 7) trending key parameters for condition monitoring; 8) classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and 9) appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(1). The inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problem. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the licensees risk assessments and risk management actions used to manage risk for the plant configurations associated with the six activities listed below. The inspectors assessed whether the licensee performed adequate risk assessments and implemented appropriate risk management actions when required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors verified that any increase in risk was promptly assessed, that appropriate risk management actions were promptly implemented, and that work activities did not place the plant in unacceptable configurations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Yellow risk on Unit 2 for planned 2A EDG preventive maintenance
- Yellow risk on Unit 2 for emergent outboard bearing oil flush and testing on the Unit 2 TDCA pump following unexpected elevated particulate in the bearing oil reservoir
- Yellow risk on Unit 1 for emergent repair of the 1B EDG #5 left cylinder intake valve
- Yellow risk on Unit 2 for planned replacement of in-line check valve 2RN-1137
- Yellow risk on Unit 1 for planned reactor coolant system (RCS) draindown to lowered inventory conditions for refueling outage activities
- Yellow risk on Unit 1 for planned main generator stator replacement heavy lifts
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the six technical evaluations listed below to determine whether Technical Specification (TS) operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed any compensatory measures taken for degraded SSCs to determine whether the measures were in-place and adequately compensated for the degradation. For the degraded SSCs, or those credited as part of compensatory measures, the inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to determine whether the measures resulted in changes to the licensing basis functions, as described in the UFSAR, and whether a license amendment was required per 10 CFR 50.59. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- PIP M-14-06546, 1B boric acid pump motor electrical fault alarm during start
- PIP M-14-06884, 1C pressurizer heater group capacity failure
- PIP M-14-06951, High particulates and dark color of oil in Unit 2 TDCA pump outboard bearing
- PIP M-14-07949, Positive ground detected on vital battery EVCA
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the following two permanent plant modifications to verify the adequacy of the modification packages and 10 CFR 50.59 screenings. Each modification was evaluated against the TS, UFSAR, and licensee design bases documents for the systems affected to ensure the modification did not adversely affect the availability, reliability, and functional capability of important SSCs. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Engineering Change (EC) 112020; Instrument air (VI) connections, bypass valves, and deletion of the interlock associated with power operated relief valve 1S7ABC, Rev. 3
- EC 112236; Creation of an assured air source from the abandoned upper head injection tank, Rev. 3
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the six post-maintenance tests listed below to determine if procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the licensees test procedures to determine if the procedures adequately tested the safety function(s) that may have been affected by the maintenance activities, that the acceptance criteria in the procedures were consistent with information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedures had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the tests and/or reviewed the test data to determine if test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- 2A EDG functional testing following scheduled preventive maintenance
- 2A MDCA pump functional testing following scheduled preventive maintenance
- Unit 2 TDCA pump functional testing following emergent maintenance to flush elevated oil particulate from outboard bearing oil reservoir
- 1B ND pump functional testing following preventive maintenance
- Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) functional testing following planned complex plan maintenance activities
- 1B EDG functional testing following emergent maintenance to repair #5 left cylinder intake valve
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
==
Unit 1 began a refueling outage on September 13, 2014. Prior to the refueling outage, the inspectors reviewed the licensees outage risk control plan to determine if the licensee had adequately considered risk in developing the outage schedule. The inspectors reviewed the licensee procedures listed in the attachment to determine if they contained mitigation/response strategies for losses of decay heat removal, inventory control, power availability, and containment. During the outage, the inspectors observed portions of the following refueling outage activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Observed portions of the cooldown process to determine if TS cooldown restrictions were followed
- Walked down containment shortly after the shutdown to determine if there was indication of previously unidentified leakage from components containing reactor coolant
- Reviewed the licensees responses to emergent work and unexpected conditions to determine if configuration changes were controlled in accordance with the outage risk control plan
- Observed outage activities to determine if the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk control plan for the key safety functions and applicable TS
- Assessed outage activities that were conducted during short time-to-boil periods
- During lowered RCS inventory conditions, the inspectors reviewed the licensees commitments to NRC Generic Letter 88-17 to determine if they were still in place and adequate
- Observed fuel handling operations (offload) and other ongoing fuel handling activities to determine if those operations and activities were being performed in accordance with TS and licensee procedures
- Prior to mode changes, the inspectors reviewed selected system lineups and/or control board indications to determine if TS, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant configurations
- Reviewed RCS boundary leakage data and observed/reviewed controls for establishing containment closure to determine whether the RCS and containment boundaries were in place when necessary
- Reviewed items that had been entered into the licensees CAP to determine if the licensee had identified problems related to outage activities at an appropriate threshold and had entered them into the corrective action program
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
For the six surveillance tests identified below, the inspectors witnessed testing and reviewed the test data to determine if the SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the Technical Specifications, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and applicable licensee procedures. In addition, the inspectors verified that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.
Surveillance Tests
- PT/0/A/4200/047, Train A SNSWP Supply and Return Header Flush, Rev. 24
- PT/1/A/4350/036B, D/G 1B 24 Hour Run, Rev. 45
- PT/2/A/4350/002B, Diesel Generator 2B Operability Test, Rev. 93
- PT/0/A/4250/037, Main Steam Valve Setpoint Test Using Set Pressure Verification Device (SPVD), Rev. 12
- PT/1/A/4200/009B, Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Test Train B, Rev. 12
In-Service Tests
- PT/1/A/4252/001C, #1 TDCA Pump Performance Test Opening 1SA-49 First, Rev. 18
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees methods for testing the alert and notification system in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 02, Alert and Notification System (ANS) Testing. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(5) and its related 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV.D requirements were used as reference criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, were also used as a reference. The inspectors interviewed personnel involved with siren system maintenance and observed the condition of a sample of siren installations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Preparedness Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees Emergency Response Organization (ERO)augmentation staffing requirements and process for notifying the ERO to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and timely facility activation. The qualification records of key position ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO qualifications were current. A sample of problems identified from augmentation drills or system tests performed since the last inspection was reviewed to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 03, Emergency Preparedness Organization Staffing and Augmentation System. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
Several changes were made to the Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) since the last NRC inspection of this program area. The licensee determined that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), the REP continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The inspectors reviewed these changes and sampled implementing procedure changes made between May 2013 and September 2014 to evaluate for potential reductions in the effectiveness of the REP. This review was not documented in a Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 04, Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes. The applicable planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b), and its related requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions identified through the Emergency Preparedness program to determine the significance of the issues, the completeness and effectiveness of corrective actions, and to determine if issues were recurring. The licensees post-event action reports, self-assessments, and audits were reviewed to assess the licensees ability to be self-critical, thus avoiding complacency and degradation of their emergency preparedness program. The inspectors reviewed the licensees 10 CFR 50.54(q) change process, personnel training, and selected screenings and evaluations to assess adequacy. The inspectors toured facilities and reviewed equipment and facility maintenance records to assess licensees adequacy in maintaining them. The inspectors evaluated the capabilities of selected radiation monitoring instrumentation to adequately support Emergency Action Level (EAL)declarations. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114.05, Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness. The applicable planning standards, related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements, and 10 CFR 50.54(q)and
- (t) were used as reference criteria. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
Licensed Operator Simulator Emergency Preparedness Training: On August 27, 2014, the inspectors observed the performance of a simulator-based licensed operator requalification examination that required implementation of emergency preparedness actions for the declaration of a Alert Emergency. The examination scenario involved a failed open pressurizer spray valve, turbine/generator trip and reactor trip, followed by a stuck open pressurizer power operated relief valve loss of coolant accident. The inspectors assessed emergency procedure usage including emergency plan classifications and notifications. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees conduct of the simulator examination and critique performance and verified that, as appropriate, performance weaknesses were captured in the licensees operator training program or corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee data to confirm the accuracy of reported PI data for the following nine indicators. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, the inspectors compared the licensees basis in reporting each data element to the PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 7, as well as licensee procedural guidance for reporting PI information. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
- MSPI - Secondary Heat Removal (Units 1 and 2)
- MSPI - Residual Heat Removal (Units 1 and 2)
- MSPI - Cooling Water (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors reviewed the PI data for the period July 2013 through June 2014 for the secondary heat removal and residual heat removal MSPI and the period April 2013 through June 2014 for the cooling water MSPI. The inspectors independently screened TS Action Item Logs, selected control room logs, the CAP database, and maintenance rule database, to determine if equipment unavailability/unreliability hours and failure data were properly reported.
Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone
- Drill/Exercise Performance
- Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation
- Alert and Notification System Reliability
For the period October 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014, the inspectors examined data reported to the NRC, procedural guidance for reporting PI information, and records used by the licensee to identify potential PI occurrences. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill and exercise performance through review of a sample of drill and event records. The inspectors reviewed selected training records to verify the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill participation for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO.
The inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for alert and notification system reliability through review of a sample of the licensees records of periodic system tests. The inspectors also interviewed licensee personnel who were responsible for collecting and evaluating the PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program: As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing copies of condition reports, attending some daily screening meetings, and accessing the licensees computerized CAP database.
Annual Sample Reviews: The inspectors reviewed the issue listed below in detail to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees corrective actions for important safety issues.
- PIP M-14-02777, Entry into Unit 2 abnormal operating procedure for loss of ND due to malfunction of ND heat exchanger outlet control valves
The inspectors assessed whether the issue was properly identified; documented accurately and completely; properly classified and prioritized; adequately considered extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences; adequately identified root causes/apparent causes; and identified appropriate and timely corrective actions. The inspectors evaluated the licensee documents against the requirements of the licensees CAP and implementing procedures, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOED)
a. Inspection Scope
On August 18, 2014, the 1B EDG was declared inoperable for corrective maintenance following failure of an intake valve stem on cylinder 5L. The failure occurred approximately 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> into a 24-hour surveillance test run. The licensee entered TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Condition B.4, requiring the EDG be returned to operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. If the 1B EDG could not be restored to an operable condition within the allowed TS LCO action statement, TS LCO 3.8.1, Condition G, required the unit to be shutdown. While investigating the valve stem failure, the licensee found the intake valve seat insert had broken into many small pieces which in turn had damaged the cylinder liner and piston requiring replacement. The licensee determined engine repairs would require approximately 58 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br /> to complete, to be followed by a series of maintenance break-in runs totaling an additional 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br />, and a three hour post-maintenance operability run. Based on the extent of maintenance repairs and testing, the licensee determined the 1B EDG could not be restored to operable prior to the end of the TS LCO action statement.
On August 21, 2014, the licensee requested enforcement discretion for an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> allowed outage time to complete the activities to preclude a shutdown of Unit 1.
The NRC verbally granted NOED 14-2-002 at 1:36 p.m. on August 21, 2014. The licensee subsequently returned the 1B EDG to an operable status on August 23 at 4:24 a.m., which was within the completion time approved in the NOED. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
Introduction:
The inspectors identified a URI regarding NOED 14-2-002 granted by the NRC on August 21, 2014.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed NOED 14-2-002 and related documents to determine the accuracy and consistency with the licensees assertions and implementation of the licensees compensatory measures and commitments. The inspectors independently verified the proper implementation of these compensatory measures which included deferring non-essential surveillances and other maintenance activities on the 1A EDG, TDCA pump, SSF, switchyard, and posting dedicated fire watches in selected risk significant areas. Additional inspection of this issue will be conducted as part of the NRCs review of the subsequent Licensee Event Report (LER)to be submitted by the licensee within 90 days. This LER will describe the circumstances of the 1B EDG failure, the root cause, and planned licensee corrective actions. This URI is identified as URI 05000369/2014004-02, Review NOED 14-2-02 Granting Exercise of Enforcement Discretion to Complete 1B EDG Repairs.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exits
On October 8, 2014, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Steven Capps and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- B. Anderson, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Black, Security Manager
- S. Capps, Vice President, McGuire Nuclear
- K. Crane, Senior Licensing Specialist
- J. Gabbert, Chemistry Manager
- J. Glenn, Organizational Effectiveness Manager
- B. Gragg, Engineering Manager (Acting)
- M. Kelly, Outage and Scheduling Manager
- S. Mooneyhan, Radiation Protection Manager
- C. Morris, Station Manager
- J. Robertson, Regulatory Affairs Manager
- P. Schuerger, Training Manager
- S. Snider, Maintenance Superintendent (Acting)
LIST OF REPORT ITEMS
Opened
- 05000369/2014004-01 URI 1B/1C Reactor Coolant System Loop Safety Injection Piping Flaws (Section 1R08)
- 05000369/2014004-02 URI Review NOED 14-2-002 Granting Exercise of Enforcement
Discretion to Complete 1B EDG Repairs (Section 4OA3)