IR 05000369/1993007
| ML20045E372 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1993 |
| From: | Cooper T, Lesser M, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045E364 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-93-07, 50-369-93-7, 50-370-93-07, 50-370-93-7, NUDOCS 9307020063 | |
| Download: ML20045E372 (8) | |
Text
-
j
.
..
.
+j # ""'8%g.
umlTED STATES fg
' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON j
,
%.
n REGION ll
'
l'
,$
101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
i
's ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
'l s...../
.
.
Report Nos. 50-369/93-07.and 50-370/93-07 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street
,
Charlotte, NC 28242-1007
'
facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.
Inspection Conducted: April 18, 1993 ) May 15, 1993 Inspecto G/,2 /f3 Fot-P. K. Van Doorn, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed Inspector: #
d3 -
Frs-T. 'A. Cooper, Resident Inspector Date Signed Approved b G
f3
_*
M. S. Lesser, Chief, Branch 3A Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection was conducted in the areas of plant operations, surveillance testing, maintenance observations,
'
Licensee Event Report followup, followup on previous inspection findings, and licensee evaluations of changes to the environs.
Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were noted.
One followup item was identified for evaluation of licensee efforts regarding a formalized program for updating the Final Safety Analysis Report involving changing environs (paragraph 7). The inspectors notedLa-conservative. licensee-action-regarding erosion / corrosion (paragraph 2.c.).
A continuing weakness was noted regarding evaluations for reportability (paragraph 5.b.).
<
l-9307020063 930603 PDR ADOCK 05000369 G
PDR l
n
.
-
-
.
REPORT DETAILS
,
- 1.
Persons Contacted licensee Emplovees D. Baxter, Support Operations Manager A. Beaver, Operations Manager
- J. Boyle, Work Control Superintendent
D. Bumgardner, Unit 1 Operations Manager
- B. Caldwell, Training Manager
- W. Cross, Compliance Security Specialist T. Curtis, System Engineering Manager
,
J. Foster, Station Health Physicist
'
F. Fowler, Human Resources Manager
'
- G. Gilbert, Safety Assurance Manager P. Guill, Compliance Engineer
- B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Operations B. Hasty, Emergency Planner
- P. Herran, Engineering Manager L. Kunka, Compliance Engineer e
E. Geddie, Station Manager
,
T. McHeekin, Site'Vice-President R. Michael, Station Chemist
- T. Pederson, Safety Review Supervisor
- N. Pope, Instrument & Electrical Superintendent
- R. Sharpe, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- B. Travis, Component Engineering Manager R. White, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- P. Van Doorn, SRI
- T. Cooper, RI
,
- Attended exit interview 2.
Plant Operations (71707)
a.
Observations The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory
-
requirements.
Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift -
turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records were
,
routinely reviewed.
Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel.
L -
- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ - -.
.
.
.
.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were
,
conducted as prescribed in applicable station administrative
directives. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met
'
or exceeded the minimum required by Technical. Specifications (TS).
The inspectors also reviewed Problem Investigation Process (PIPS)
'
reports to determine whether the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective actions.
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building,
electrical equipment rooms,' cable spreading rooms, and the station yard zone inside the protected area.
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, fire protection, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
b.
Unit 1 Operations The unit began the inspection period with the core off-loaded, for the end-of-cycle 8 refueling outage. On May 8, fuel reload began.
On May 12, the core was totally reloaded. The scheduled on-line date for the end of the refueling outage is June 11, 1993.
While performing erosion / corrosion measurements on the Unit I secondary piping, the extraction steam line to the first stage Moisture Separater Reheaters (MSRs) was found to be as low as 0.040 inches thick at an elbow. The code requirements specify a minimum acceptable thickness of 0.109 inches. Plans are to repair this section of piping prior to the end of the refueling outage.
Pressurizer indications were noted during ultrasonic inspections.
Refer to NRC Inspection Report No. 369,370/93-09 for additional details.
-
c.
Unit 2 Operations The unit began the inspection pei..,o at 100 percent power. On April 30, power was reduced to 50 percent in order to reinforce the steam extraction piping to the first stage MSR, in response to the finding on Unit 1.
A clamp type fixture was placed on the outside of the piping to reinforce and strengthen that'run of pipe. There-was no indication that the erosion problem also existed on Unit'2.
Since.the configuration, of piping was similar to. that_ on Unit 1, the decision was made to be conservative and address the issue on the operating unit.
Inspections of this piping will be made during
.the next Unit 2 refueling outage which is scheduled for July 1993.
Power was returned to 100 percent on May 1, and was maintained at that level for the remainder of the inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
.
-
_.
,,
--_
- ______ -
..
.
3.
Surveillance Testing (61726)
a.
Observed Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with the applicable TS.
Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was completed and acceptance criteria were met.
The selected test listed below was reviewed or witnessed in detail:
l.
PROCEDURE EQUIPMENT / TEST PT/2/A/4252/03A CA Valve Stroke Timing - Quarterly Turbine Driven Pump Flowpath PT/0/A/4971/12A RIS Type 90303-100 Undervoltage
,
Sensor With C-H M300 Auxiliary Relay Monthly Testing PT/0/A/4971/13A RIS Type 90634-100A Underfrequency Sensor With C-H M300 Auxiliary Relay Monthly Testing PT/0/A/4350/21 Nordberg Diesel Engine Periodic Maintenance - Test Run-q
PT/2/A/4601/01 Protective System Channel 1
'
Functional Test PT/0/A/4150/041 RCCA Bank Repositioning (Unit 2)
.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
a.
Observation l
{
Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed-by the resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and
-- l performance adequacy and conformance with the applicable TS.
The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, I
where applicable, approved procedures were available and in use, i
that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was
'
completed and maintenance results were adequate.
.
__--
- _ _ _. - - _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _. - _. _ _.. -
.
-
-
-
-
.
i
4
)
The selected maintenance activities listed below were reviewed or i
witnessed in detail:
.!
WORK ORDER ACTIVITY 92091323 PM/PT on Diesel Generator IA -
a Disassembly and Cleaning 93030363 Perform Preventative Maintenance on Valve INV456 92091909 PT Service Test on Diesel-Generator Battery EDGB 92091322 PM/PT on Diesel Generator IB -
-
Replace Seal on Actuator TT/1/A/9700/96 Post Modification Testing Procedure for NSM MG-12301/01 (Wide Range Pressure Transmitter for Annulus Ventilation)
TT/1/A/9700/101 IB 89-10 Differential Pressure Testing of Valve Number IND-15B:
TT/1/A/9700/104 IB 89-10 Differential Pressure Testing of Valve Number IND-30A b.
Differential Pressure Testing On May 7, the inspectors observed differential pressure (DP)
closure testing of Residual Heat Removal System valve number IND158.
Initial conditions were approximately 4850 gallons per minute (gpm) flow at 140 pounds per square inch (psi) DP.
The DP.
reached is approximately 200 psi upon closure.
Upon completion of the test there was flow through the valve of-approximately 1,000 gpm, although the valve indicated closed in the Control Room. The licensee suspected that the valve had not fully seated.
In addition, the diagnostic (VOTES) test of the valve indicated.that no margin was available.for long term degradation. The licensee determined that the flow condition of the test was higher than that which would be experienced under postulated accident conditions.
The licensee ran-two additional-tests-on-May 8, at' different flow and DP conditions. Although the valve closed during each of these tests, the VOTES test still showed that additional closing torque from the valve motor was not available. The licensee also tested valve number IND30A under similar conditions. Although some torque margin was available, the licensee considered the margin to be insufficient for long term degradation. -The licensee replaced the motors for the two valves with a slower speed, higher torque motor and retested the valves satisfactorily. The valves were retested
,
.
,
at the higher flow rate which appeared to be conservative.
Additional review of test results by the inspectors and licensee was ongoing at the end of the inspection period. The. inspectors witnessed portions of the retest, reviewed-licensee test results
-
and held discussions with licensee personnel. The licensee appears to have made a conservative decision to replace the motors to assure long term operability.
The inspectors noted that no single person had knowledge of all of ~
the significant aspects of the valve testing process, e.g. design basis for test criteria, results of V0TES test, results of each test, and understanding of test methodology. This lack of a central knowledge base for testing can lead to errors and confusion.
The licensee was informed of this observation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712,92700)
a.
Licensee Event Report Closeout The below listed LER was reviewed to' determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included:
adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for-the report below.
The following LER is closed:
369/93-01 Technical Specification Required Surveillances Were Not Performed Due.to Test Circuit Wiring Error Because of l
Vendor Fabrication Deficiency b.
Reportability Evaluation Weakness On March 1,1993, the licensee's mechanical maintenance personnel identified inleakage into the Control Room Area Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (VC) system. VC functions to maintain post accident habitability in the Control Room. One of these functions is to maintain dose rates less than 10 CFR 50, General Design Criteria 19 limits. The design analysis assumes a maximum of 10 cubic feet-per-minute-(CFM) inleakage. -The licensee discovered inleakage was approximated at 52 CFM. A PIP was generated to investigate the problem. Approximately two weeks after the i
discovery of the problem, the inspectors questioned the licensee as l
to whether an LER was in progress. The licensee indicated that a special report which would be submitted to NRC voluntarily was in progress. The licensee further indicated that the issue was not considered reportable because TS surveillances were met.. The inspectors questioned whether the system was past inoperable due to l
.
.
6 design basis not being met. Upon further consideration, the licensee determined that Train B of VC was past inoperable for an extended period of time and, therefore, the issue.was reportable as a deviation from TS. _An LER was generated within the 10 CFR 50.73
,
required time period. Therefore, a violation of requirements wasy avoided. However, this problem points out a continuing weakness'in the licensee's evaluation process for reportability. A violation' '
was recently issued for failure.to report an event to NRC (Violation Number 370/93-05-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92701,92702)
The following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain that the licensee's responses,. where applicable, and licensee actions were in compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions have been implemented. Selective verification included record review, observations, and discussions with licensee personnel.
a.
(Closed) Violation 369,370/92-15-03: Inadequate Procedure Cau.sd a Loss of Vent Path During Mid-Loop Operations. The liccasee responded to this violation in a letter dated August 7,1992. The inspectors verified completion of the corrective actions _which included procedure changes, improved vent path status in the control room, incorporation of shutdown risk commitments in the Selected Licensee Commitments manual, individual station group reviews of' procedure related problems and schedules for corrections, additional human factors training, and formation of a procedure steering committee.
b.
(Closed) Violation 369/92-24-05: Failure to Meet Licensee Condition for Standby Shutdown Facility. The licensee responded to this
violation in a letter dated December 11, 1992.
The inspectors verified completion of corrective actions which included correction of the specific problem involving miswiring of the makeup pump, procedure enhancement, and a wiring verification of the Unit 2 pump.
.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Licensee Evaluations of Changes to the Environs Around Licensed Reactor.
Facilities (TI 2515/112)
The inspectors conducted a review to evaluate the licensee's program for evaluating public health and safety issues resulting from changes in population distribution or industrial, military, or transportation hazards that could. arise on or near reactor sites.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.71 (e), appropriate chapters of the Final Safety Analysis -
Report (FS: ) should be updated when significant changes to the area.
around a ree tor site have occurre _ ___
.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had reviewed external hazards for a Level 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment which was submitted to NRC on August 31, 1991. Hazards included were aircraft impact, fire, industrial or military facilities, pipelines, toxic gas, and transportation accidents.
In addition, the licensee evaluated whether new pipelines or wells were added in the vicinity as a followup to NRC Information Notice
,
No. 91-63:
Natural Gas Hazards at Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating i
Station. The licensee's Emergency Plan (EP) requires periodic
'
updating / evaluation of population changes for consideration of evacuation routes and siren placement. A licensee's contractor has completed a study which is to be incorporated into the EP by June, 1993.
Although increases in population have been noted, no significant changes to the environs appear to have occurred. However, the licensee does not have a formal process for reviewing changes and updating the FSAR accordingly.
The licensee indicated that a formal process is appropriate and that a review would be done to determine what actions are necessary.
Further followup will be conducted regarding the licensee's actions in this area.
This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 369,370/93-07-01:
Followup of Licensee Actions Regarding FSAR Updating for Changing Environs.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings identified below were summarized on May 17, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The following items were discussed in detail:
,
Inspector Followup Item 369,370/93-07-01:
Followup of Licensee Actions Regarding FSAP Updating for Changing Environs (paragraph 7).
The licensee's conservative action regarding erosion / corrosion (paragraph 2.c.).
A continuing weakness regarding evaluations for reportability (paragraph 5.b.).
The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the inspectors during the course of their inspection.
^
l
)
.