IR 05000369/1993002
| ML20034E953 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1993 |
| From: | Cooper T, Herdt A, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034E936 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-93-02, 50-369-93-2, 50-370-93-02, 50-370-93-2, NUDOCS 9303020114 | |
| Download: ML20034E953 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES '
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Jg MUCLEAR REGULATORY CONMISSION l
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REGION 11
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ar 101 MARicTTA STRE ET, N.W.-
'E ATLANTA GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos. 50-369/93-02 and 50-370/93-02 Licensee:
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
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Charlotte, NC 28242-1007
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Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2
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Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17
Inspection Conducted:
January 17, 1993 - February 13, 1993 l
i Inspector:
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gA P. K. Van Door /, Seni r sident inspector D4te Signed Inspector: [
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%T. A. C,oo'per, R siden Insp(ctpr D4te 5igned Approved by:
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A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, resident inspection was conducted in the areas of plant operations, surveillance testing, maintenance observations, and evaluation of licensee self assessment capability.
Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. A lack of understanding as to when problems should be documented via the corrective action program was noted (paragraph 4.b.).
A continuing backlog was noted regarding completion of-corrective actions (paragraph 5.b.).
A good proactive thermography inspection of safeguards test cabinets was noted (paragraph 5.c.).
9303020114 930222 PDR ADDCK 05000369 G
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees D. Baxter Support Operations Manager.
A. Beaver Operations Manager J. Boyle Work Control Superintendent
- D. Bumgardner Unit 1 Operations Manager B. Caldwell Training Manager
- W. Cross Compliance Security Specialist T. Curtis System Engineering Manager J. Foster Station Health Physicist F. Fowler Human Resources Manager
- G. Gilbert Safety Assurance Manager P. Guill Compliance Engineer B. Hamilton Superintendent of Operations B. Hasty Emergency Planner
- P. Herran Engineering Manager L. Kunka Compliance Engineer E. Geddie Station Manager
- T. McMeekin Site Vice President'
R. Michael Station Chemist
- T. Pederson Safety. Review Supervisor
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Pope Instrument & Electrical Superintendent
- R. Sharpe Regulatory Compliance Manager
- W. Taylor Civil Engineering Manager
- B. Travis Component Engineering Manager R. White Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- P. Van _Doorn, SRI
- T. Cooper, RI
- Attended exit interview 2.
Plant Operations (71707)
a.
Observations The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records were routinely reviewed.
Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personne.
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Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were
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conducted as prescribed in applicable station administrative
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directives.
The complement of licensed personnel on each shift.
met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specifications (TS). The inspectors also reviewed Problem Investigation Reports l
(PIRs) to determine whether the licensee was appropriately
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documenting problems and implementing corrective actions.
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Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were
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not limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building,
electrical equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, and the station
yard zone inside the protected area.
1 During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, fire protection, security, equipment status and radiation control
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practices were observed.
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b.
Unit 1 Operations The unit began the period at 100 percent power. On January 23, 1993, a load decrease was initiated due to a cooling group failure i
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percent power when the cooling group.was restored to service. The
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unit was restored to 100 percent power and remained at that level
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the remainder of the period.
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l On February 2, 1993, one of the alignment pins for the inner door
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of the upper containment air lock failed to retract when an entry
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was attempted.
Personnel were able to maintain the inner door
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seals inflated while exiting through the outer door. The licensee contacted the NRC concerning a possible waiver of TS compliance to repair the door.
Interlocks were not working properly and the e
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licensee felt that the inner door may be inoperable. The TS does not allow entry through one door when the other is inoperable.
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Engineering personnel determined that the inner door was operable
as long as the seals were inflated. The licensee deve h ped a
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repair procedure to maintain the inner door seals inflated when
entering through the outer door so that a waiver was not required.
The inner door was successfully repaired on February 3, 1993.
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Unit 2 Operations The unit began the period at 100 percent power. On January 22, J
1993, power was reduced to 75 percent for turbine valve movement tests. The unit was returned to 100% power on January 23, 1993,
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and remained at that level the remainder of the period.
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d.
Drill Observations On January 22, 1993, the inspector observed a fire drill.
Initial response was timely, however, entry into the fire zone was not as
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timely. The inspector noted that the licensees critique did
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identify the untimely entry.
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On January 25, 1993 the inspector observed a tabletop emergency
drill.
The scenario involved a steam generator tube leak and a j
steam leak. The scenario was reasonably challenging and appeared
to be a good training exercise for the new Station Manager. There
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was some confusion as to whether a failed open steam drain valve
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was considered an "unisolable secondary break" as listed in the
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Emergency Action Level (EAL) guidance procedure. The licensee
team decided not to define it as such since the valve could be
gagged shut by an operator and the drain line was routed to the l
condenser. The licensee indicated that they would consider the
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need for clarification of the EAL guidance.
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e.
Reactor Engineering Interface
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Rector Engineering (RE) personnel are responsible for advising i
operators relative to performing reactivity changes. However,
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only licensed operators can perform reactivity changes. The inspector reviewed the licensee method for disseminating RE i
information/ instructions to operators. The licensee had recently
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changed from an informal process to a memorandum format signed by l
a reactor engineer. The inspector questioned whether a licensed i
operator reviewed the instructions and whether the turnover process assured that the instructions were passed on to other
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shifts.
The licensee indicated that these functions were
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accomplished informally, however, it would be an improvement to
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formalize the review and turnover process. The licensee indicated l
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that a licensed senior reactor operator and reactor operator i
signature would be included in the format.
The licensee also indicated that these instructions would be incorporated into the
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j turnover process.
The licensee indicated that this process would
not preclude RE personnel from advising operators during emergency
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situations.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Surveillance Testing (61726)
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l Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the i
resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance i
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adequacy and conformance with the applicable TS.
Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated,
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that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was completed
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and acceptance criteria were met.
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The selected tests listed below were reviewed or witnessed in detail:
PROCEDURE EQUIPMENT / TEST PT/1/A/4200/20A Unit 1 Upper Air Lock Operability Test PT/0/A/4601/088 Solid State Protection System Train B Periodic Test with Reactor Coolant Pressure Greater than 1985 PSIG (Unit 2)
PT/0/A/4150/041 RCCA Bank Repositioning PT/1/A/4252/18 Auxiliary feedwater Pump Discharge f
Pressure Verification
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PT/1/A/4209/138 Boric Acid Transfer Pump IB l
PT/1/A/4403/02A RN Train A Valve Stroke Timing i
Quarterly i
PT/2/A/4208/02A NS Train A Valve Stroke Timing Quarterly No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
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Observation
Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with the applicable TS.
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The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where applicable, approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were. met, that equipment restoration was
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completed and maintenance results were adequate.
The selected maintenance activities listed below were reviewed or
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witnessed in detail *
a WORK ORDER ACTIVITY 93006467 Oil Analysis and Replacement, Nuclear Service Water Pump 1A 92066722 Nuclear Station Modification of Diesel Generator Sump Piping--
Observed Welding and Inspection of Weld No. WNIFW4-15 -
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. Remove Diesel Building Ventilation Fan Differential Pressure Switches 93007369 Investigate / Repair Control Room Air -
Handling Unit B. Supply Fan 93005339 Infrared Thermography of Safeguards Test Cabinet Resistors 93008893 Unit 1 Upper Air Lock Inner Door Corrective Maintenance 92052777 NSM - MG 22289 - Install Test
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Connection on Groundwater Sump 'B'
Pump Connection
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93005326 Minor Modification MM-5234 - Install Isolation Valves for Unit 1 Flcw Totalizer
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MCIMVAFT5120
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93008508 PM/PT functional Test on Unit 1 SSPS Train B 93006421 Perform PT Functional Test on S/R 2ENBLP9310
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b.
Lack of Procedure for Control Room Air Handling Unit f
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During inspection of the bearing replacement on the 'B' control.
room air handling unit (CRAHU) supply fan on January 29, 1993 the inspector noted that a general preventive maintenance procedure (MP/0/A/7450/03) was being used. This procedure does not cover
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fan bearing replacement. The inspector also noted that engineering personnel were not present to assist; however, the
engineer had discussed the job with the crew who were experienced
'l CRAHU craftsmen. The engineer indicated that he planned to be
present during portions of the reassembly. Disassembly was in
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progress at the time of the inspector's observation. The engineer
also indicated that the need for a procedure for bearing j
replacement had been recognized but had not yet been developed,
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however, this procedure development would now receive a higher
.I priority. He also indicated that a team had begun to evaluate-1 procedure needs for ventilation systems. The job appeared within-the skill of the craft and, considering that the engineer was -
available if problems developed, the' licensee decided that a detailed procedure was not required at this time. This appears reasonable. However, the licensee has been stressing procedure
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compliance in light of repetitive problems in this area.
In addition, the inspector had previously identified a' weakness regarding an extensive procedure discrepancy backlog (see NRC
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Report No. 369, 370/92-10, paragraph 6.c.).
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The craftsmen indicated that a protective shroud appeared to have
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been rubbing on the fan shaft which may have contributed to the
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failure. The shroud had been removed and replaced a few weeks
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earlier for routine maintenance. The inspector questioned the
engineer about how this problem would be addressed.
He indicated that he needed to consult with management regarding this issue.
j The licensee had recently revised its corrective action program,
which is titled the Problem Investigation Process (PIP).
The new
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I program requires that employees document any unexpected occurrences or areas for improvement for evaluation and appropriate action. This low threshold for documentation of problems is apparently not well understood by all licensee personnel. A PIP form (PIP No. M93-0047) was written several days
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after the inspector questioned the engineer.
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c.
Thermography Inspection j
The licensee implemented infrared thermography of safeguards test l
cabinet resistors due to a problem experienced at another facility
(Diablo Canyon).
Resistors had failed possibly causing i
misinterpretation of test data.
Thermal aging was thought to have
been a contributor to failure.
Thermography of the resistors had j
disclosed temperatures of 300 to 400 degrees fahrenheit (F).
The licensee's thermography showed typical temperatures around 170 degrees F with the highest at 240 degrees F.
The 240 degree reading was thought to be suspect, i.e. actually lower.
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addition, a visual inspection did not disclose any problems. The i
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licensee plans to recheck the hotter regions during an upcoming outage. Additional discussions, held after the inspection,
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between the licensee and Diablo Canyon personnel indicated that j
Diablo Canyon circuitry was different resulting in' higher loads on
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the resistors, probably resulting in the higher temperatures.
l This was considered a good proactive effort.
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Selection / Activation Meeting
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The licensee periodically meets to discuss whether certain
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requested plant modifications should be performed. The inspector i
attended a meeting on January 28, 1993 to evaluate whether the
licensee was appropriately considering plant safety aspects for
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modification approvals. A modification was approved for the Unit
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1 pressurizer safety valves. Minor modifications were approved j
involving power cable swaps for switchgear room dampers,
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replacement of small movement snubbers with struts, coating of
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component cooling tubesheets and waterboxes, and adding two
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demineralizers to the waste monitor and disposal system. A building for the reverse osmosis secondary plant chemical cleanup i
system was also approved. The licensee appeared to appropriately
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consider plant safety in the review process.
f No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
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Self Initiated Technical Audit (SITA) Review The inspector observed portions of the licensee's SITA review of the Nuclear Service Water System. The licensee appeared to be conducting thorough walkdowns; thoroughly evaluating system design and design analysis; and thoroughly evaluating operations, testing and maintenance practices. The team identified potential findings involving the quality of instrumentation for indicating loss of the lake suction source, inadequate procedure for testing of time delay relays, untimely corrective maintenance on several valves, maintenance procedures with bolt torque values greater than manufacturers recommendation, and 33 material condition
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deficiencies. The licensee's evaluation was continuing with an exit interview tentatively scheduled for March 1,1993.-
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PIR Status The inspector reviewed the backlog reduction program for Problem Investigation Reports (PIRs). The original goals, adopted in
1992, were to have no more than 30 percent of the incomplete PIR
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corrective actions greater than three months old by December 31, i
1992. At the end of December,1992, approximately 98 percent of i
the incomplete corrective actions were greater than three months old, and 81 percent were greater than six months old.
Reductions were made in the total number of outstanding items, but the reductions were made in the outstanding actions less than six months old, not in the items older than six months. As a result of the inability to meet the original goals and the adoption of
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the PIP, the goals were revised, with separate goals for.Less Significant Events (LSEs) and More Significant Events (MSEs). The
new goals are that by April 1,1993, no more than 30 percent of i
the LSEs will be older than three months and no more than 30
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percent of the MSEs will be older than six months. At the time of f
the inspection, approximately 80 percent of the MSEs were older
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than six months. The total number of MSEs older than six months i
was 150, approximately what it had been since the backlog
reduction program had started.
Engineering has accountability for t
approximately 50 percent of the outstanding PIPS.
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The tracking of the MSEs and LSEs does not include packages which are related to station problem reports, station modifications,
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variation notices, design studies, or pending equipment i
availability. Once an item has been classified in one of the modification categories, it is no longer tracked as open, by the
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PIP.
Engineering personnel are aware that if one of the assigned PIP packages is t w.igned to the modification related categories,
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it is removed from the PIP tracking system, assisting them in meeting their goal. Although a goal is not established, a program does exist to reduce the backlog of outstanding modification..=
This program appears to be working effectively, as evidenced by the reduction in the number of outstanding station modifications to less than half of the original number.
In addition, outstanding station problem reports have been reduced to within established target goals. The inspector reviewed ten outstanding corrective actions which are commitments and found that they were all scheduled to be completed on schedule. No items were identified where safety concerns had not been addressed in a timely manner. The older items typically deal with reliability issues.
The recognition of the need to reduce the backlog-of various plant documentation processes and the establishment of a reduction effort is a strong proactive approach to ma, aging the station.
While some backlog reduction has occurred, goals for backlog of older corrective actions appear to be in jeopardy.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings identified below were summarized on February 17, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.
The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the inspectors during the course of their inspection.
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