IR 05000354/2019011
| ML19127A094 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 05/06/2019 |
| From: | Christopher Cahill Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Sena P Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| IR 2019011 | |
| Download: ML19127A094 (21) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION -TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2019011
Dear Mr. Sena:
On March 29, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Hope Creek Generating Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Paul Davison, Vice President - Engineering and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
These findings involved violations of NRC requirements.
The inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at Hope Creek.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC resident inspector at Hope Creek.
P Sena 2 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Christopher G. Cahill, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-354 License No.: NPF-57
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000354/2019011
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 05000354 License Number: NPF-57 Report Number: 05000354/2019011 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-011-0014 Licensee: PSEG Nuclear, LLC Facility: Hope Creek Generating Station Location: Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Inspection Dates: March 11, 2019, to March 29, 2019 Inspectors: J. Patel, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Leader)
D. Kern, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Rady, Reactor Inspector D. Werkheiser, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: Christopher G. Cahill, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Triennial Fire Protection inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.
Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in report sections: 71111.05T.
List of Findings and Violations Failure to Protect Automatic Start Capability of Fire Pumps Due to Fire Damage Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.05T Systems NCV 05000354/2019011-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green), involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) Operating License Condition 2.C.(7) for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program (FPP). Specifically, PSEG did not adequately protect the automatic start capability of the motor driven and diesel driven fire pumps as described in the HCGS FPP (Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSAR) 9.5.1) due to the effects of a fire.
Inadequate Procedural Guidance to Perform Time Critical Actions Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [P.2] - Evaluation 71111.05T Systems NCV 05000354/2019011-02 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) License Condition 2.C.(7) for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program (FPP), in that procedures for shutting down the plant in response to a fire that requires main control room evacuation were not adequate. Specifically, the alternate (remote) post-fire shutdown procedures and supporting master list of time critical actions were not accurate or adequate to secure in a timely manner high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) to prevent overfilling of the reactor vessel following a spurious fire-induced start of HPCI pump and failed reactor water high-level automatic shutdown of HPCI.
Additional Tracking Items None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.05T - Fire Protection Fire Protection Inspection Requirements (IP Section 02.02)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas and/or fire zones, including analyzed electrical circuits:
- (1) CD 35, Control Equipment Room Mezzanine
- (2) AB1, Electrical Access Area, Division I
- (3) RB1, Reactor Building, Division I
- Room 4112, HPCI Electrical Equipment Room
- Room 4309, SACS Heat Exchanger and Pump Room
- (4) CD71, Class 1E Inverter Room Analyzed Circuits:
- PSV-F013F(H)(M), Safety Relief Valves
- KJ-CG400, Emergency Diesel Generator C Output Breaker
- EG-BP210, Safety Auxiliary Cooling System Pump B
- BD-FIC-4158, RCIC Pump Flow Controller
- FC-HV-F045, RCIC Turbine Steam Stop Valve
- SB-TE-3647J-2, Suppression Pool Indicator and Transmitter
B.5.b Inspection Activities (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following B.5.b Mitigating Strategies:
- Manually Open Containment Vent Lines
- Inject Water into the Drywell
INSPECTION RESULTS
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.05T This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: HCGS License Condition 2.C.(7), in part, requires PSEG to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the UFSAR and as approved by the NRC as in the Safety Evaluation Report dated October 1984.
UFSAR Section 9.5.1.6, Standard Review Plan (SRP) Review, stated that HCGS has implemented the requirements of Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 Revision 2, dated July 1981 per NUREG 0800 (SRP 9.5.1, Revision 3) in the development of the fire protection program. Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.4.h, Corrective Action, required that measures be established to ensure that conditions adverse to fire protection are promptly identified, reported, and corrected.
Contrary to the above, from April 4, 2016, until December 4, 2018, PSEG did not promptly correct a condition adverse to fire protection associated with an issue previously documented as NCV 05000354/2016007-01, Inadequate Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
Takeover Switches and Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) Transfer/Isolation Relays.
Specifically, the corrective actions created by PSEG to address this NCV did not fully resolve the identified performance deficiency of not adequately verifying or demonstrating that the EDG normal-emergency takeover switches and RSP transfer/isolation relays would perform their intended function. Therefore, the previously NRC-identified condition adverse to fire protection was not corrected and compliance was not restored.
Significance: Green.
The inspectors assessed this finding in accordance with the NRC IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Process. In Appendix F, the inspectors answered NO to step 1.4.7-C because this finding did not adversely affect the ability to reach and maintain hot shutdown conditions using the credited safe shutdown success path. Subsequently, PSEG adequately tested EDG takeover switches and RSP transfer/isolation relays and demonstrated reasonable expectation of functionality of these switches. Therefore, based on these aspects, the finding is determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
Corrective Action Reference: Notification 20803353 Failure to Protect Automatic Start Capability of Fire Pumps Due to Fire Damage Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.05T Systems NCV 05000354/2019011-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green), involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) Operating License Condition 2.C.(7) for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program (FPP). Specifically, PSEG did not adequately protect the automatic start capability of the motor driven and diesel driven fire pumps as described in the HCGS FPP (Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSAR) 9.5.1) due to the effects of a fire.
Description:
The UFSAR Section 9.5.1.2.3.2, Pumps, stated that the electric motor driven fire pump starts automatically at 110 psig of fire water system header pressure. If it fails to start or cannot meet the water flow demand, the diesel driven fire pump starts automatically when the fire water system header pressure drops to 100 psig. The fire pumps continue to operate until manually stopped at the local pump control panel. Both fire pumps can be manually started remotely from the main control room or locally within the fire pump house.
The inspectors reviewed the circuit analysis of Hope Creek's electric motor driven and diesel driven fire pumps. The inspectors noted that Hope Creek has a capability to remotely start any of the two fire pumps using the switches located in the main control room. The inspectors performed a review of cable routing associated with remote start circuits and determined that the cables associated with remote start circuit of the fire pumps could be damaged by a fire occurring in the areas between the main control room and the fire pump house, through which cables are routed. The inspectors determined that a short-to-ground fault on the remote start cables could result in a loss of capability of both fire pumps to automatically start, continue to run if already auto-started on low fire water header pressure, or to manually start from the main control room. The cables for both fire pumps are routed through three fire areas (Fire areas CD35, CD46, and AB3) in close proximity to each other.
Therefore, both pumps remote start circuit cables could be exposed to potential damage by a single fire. Fire Area CD35, Control Equipment Room Mezzanine, credits a backup manual water deluge system and water hose stations for suppression. Fire Area CD46, Main Control Room, credits water hose stations for suppression. Fire Area AB3, Auxiliary Building Radwaste Area, credits an automatic water suppression system. The inspectors determined if both pumps' cables were damaged due to an exposure fire, then no water would be available for fire suppression in these fire areas until at least one fire pump was manually started at the fire pump house. Cable damage to the motor driven fire pump would render its operation unavailable until adequate repairs were implemented. However, the inspectors determined that the diesel driven fire pump could be started manually at the local control panel.
Corrective Action: PSEG placed this issue into the corrective action program and implemented compensatory measures by issuing Hope Creek standing order 2019-20. The Standing order directs Hope Creek to utilize procedure HC.FP-EO.ZZ-0001, Fire and Medical Emergency Response Manual Hope Creek Control Room Fire Response, upon notification of a confirmed fire in those three fire areas to dispatch an operator to the fire pump house to monitor and/or start the diesel driven fire pump.
Corrective Action Reference: Notification 20823038
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that failure to protect the automatic start capability of fire pumps due to fire damage and ensure a reliable fire protection water supply for the fixed and manual fire suppression systems credited as part of the fire protection program was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The finding adversely affected the Mitigating System cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to fire events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to protect the automatic start capability of fire pumps affected the defense-in-depth barriers of the FPP to rapidly suppress fire that occurs in the plant areas. If fire is not suppressed in a timely manner could result in a damage to the safe shutdown systems and could challenge the plant operations.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. Using Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors assigned the category to fire water supply. Using Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance the inspectors assigned a LOW degradation to the performance deficiency because there would be adequate fire water capacity for fixed and manual fire suppression after the nuclear equipment operator is dispatched to manually start a diesel driven fire pump at the local control panel. Therefore, based on these aspects, the finding is determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: HCGS License Condition 2.C.(7), in part, requires PSEG to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the UFSAR and as approved by the NRC. Hope Creeks' FPP is described in the UFSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Program. UFSAR Section 9.5.1.2.3.2, Pumps, stated that the electric motor driven fire pump starts automatically at 110 psig. If it fails to start or cannot meet the water flow demand, the diesel engine driven fire pump starts automatically when the system pressure drops to 100 psig. Contrary to the above, as of March 28, 2019, PSEG had not protected the automatic start capability of the fire pumps due to fire damage and ensure a reliable fire protection water supply for the fixed and manual fire suppression systems credited as part of the fire protection program.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Inadequate Procedural Guidance to Perform Time Critical Actions Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [P.2] - 71111.05T Systems NCV 05000354/2019011-02 Evaluation Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) License Condition 2.C.(7) for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program (FPP), in that procedures for shutting down the plant in response to a fire that requires main control room evacuation were not adequate. Specifically, the alternate (remote) post-fire shutdown procedures and supporting master list of time critical actions were not accurate or adequate to secure in a timely manner high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)to prevent overfilling of the reactor vessel following a spurious fire-induced start of HPCI pump and failed reactor water high-level automatic shutdown of HPCI.
Description:
HCGS's thermal hydraulic analysis BJ-0024, Failure of the High-level HPCI Turbine Trip, Revision 2, analyzed a scenario for a fire in the main control room that causes HPCI to malfunction so that the HPCI high-level trip is disabled with or without a spurious start of HPCI. For a fire in the main control room, operators would evacuate the control room and transfer the controls of the required equipment at the remote shutdown panel (RSP). If HPCI is no longer required, and if necessary, operators perform a manual action at the Class 1E switchgear room to open the 1AD417-10 breaker to induce a HPCI trip. While operators are transiting from the main control room to the RSP room and from the RSP room to the Class 1E switchgear room, HPCI injection would continue to fill the reactor vessel. The analysis determined that for the worst-case scenario, water would enter the steam lines at 4 minutes and 10 seconds. If HPCI is not promptly secured, it will overfill the reactor vessel and water would enter the main steam lines which would adversely impact the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine driven pump. For the alternate safe shutdown method, RCIC is the only credited system for inventory control function. The analysis showed that if RCIC is not operating and if HPCI is secured within 10 minutes, then there is adequate time for the RCIC steam line to drain prior to being required for inventory control.
The inspectors walked down procedures with PSEG to evaluate their response to a fire that would require control room evacuation (HC.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Fire - Spurious Operations, Revision 2), evaluate main control room evacuation and transfer of control to the RSP (HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002, Control Room Environment, Revision 10), and complete remote shutdown and cooldown from the RSP (HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0008, Shutdown From Outside Control Room, Revision 37). Also, the inspectors compared time-critical actions (TCAs) documented in Hope Creeks master list HC-OP-102-106, Hope Creek's Master List of Time Critical and Time Sensitive Operator Activities, Revision 4, to the referenced procedures that were walked down.
The inspectors questioned the applicability and timeliness of TCA-9 and TCA-10, where each required actions to secure HPCI to prevent reactor vessel overfill, since TCA-10 included additional actions to establish control at the RSP and spanned across different procedures.
The inspectors also noted that the expected performance time for TCA-9 and TCA-10 were the same (5 minutes) in Table 1 of OP-HC-102-106, though TCA-10 included more actions.
These actions include
- (1) scramming the reactor from the reactor protections system (RPS)breakers,
- (2) closing main steam line isolation valves from the RPS panel,
- (3) verifying reactor scram from lower relay room, and
- (4) trip/secure HPCI to prevent overfill. The expected performance time of 5 minutes did not appear to be consistent with what was observed by the inspectors during the walkdown.
The inspectors reviewed PSEGs evaluation and response in notification 20723308 regarding a previous time critical action concern during the 2016 NRC fire protection inspection. A revalidation of actions by PSEG under order 80107159, operations 25 and 26, documented a time to secure HPCI to be approximately 5 minutes and 7 seconds but did not account for diagnosis time of HPCI fire-damage spurious operation. After discussions with PSEG, the inspectors observed an additional ad-hoc timed walkdown of control room evacuation procedures HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002 and HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0008 to identify the approximate time to evacuate the control room and diagnosis spurious operation of HPCI. PSEG recorded 5 minutes and 2 seconds on March 15, 2019. The addition of the time to evacuate the control room and diagnosis spurious operation of HPCI (5 min 2 sec), and the time to secure HPCI (5 min 7 sec) did not completely bound the expected performance time of TCA-10 (10 min 9 sec). This approximation exceeded the 10 minute maximum allowed time for TCA-10 and provided reasonable doubt that TCA-10 would be reliably completed in the required time based on the existing procedures and guidance.
Corrective Action: PSEG reviewed the issue and agreed there are errors in the TCA procedure OP-HC-102-106 and that the TCA and alternate post-fire safe shutdown procedures need to be revised to clarify required actions and priorities. PSEG issued Hope Creek standing order 2019-17 to require each crew to tabletop HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002, Condition C, control room evacuation, to prioritize actions to prevent HPCI overfill. Other corrective actions are to evaluate affected time-critical actions and revise related procedures.
Corrective Action References: Notifications 20820914, 20821021, and 20821328.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that PSEGs failure to provide adequate procedural guidance for post-fire safe shutdown was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within PSEGs ability to foresee and prevent.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The finding affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability and availability of the RCIC system under postulated fire safe shutdown conditions. The finding is also similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 3.k, where there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of RCIC system because inadequate procedure guidance could result in overfill of the reactor vessel, and water would enter the main steam lines which would impact RCIC turbine driven pump.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. Using Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors assigned the category to post-fire safe shutdown. Using Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance the inspectors assigned a LOW degradation to the performance deficiency because the identified procedure inadequacies were compensated by operator training and familiarity, such that it would not affect the ability to reach and maintain a stable hot shutdown conditions. Therefore, based on these aspects, the finding is determined to be of very low significance (Green).
Cross-cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, PSEG's evaluation of time critical actions under notification 20723308 and order 80107159, operations 25 and 26, was not thorough, in that it did not consider the diagnosis time of HPCI fire-damage spurious operation in the performance time of the TCA 9 and 10.
Enforcement:
Violation: License Condition 2.C(7) for HCGS states in part that, PSEG Nuclear LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Appendix 9A states in part that, Procedures are in effect to implement this [alternate shutdown] capability. Contrary to the above, until March 15, 2019, when Hope Creek standing order 2019-017 was issued as a temporary compensatory measure, PSEG failed to provide adequate procedural guidance for post-fire safe shutdown in that the alternate (remote) post-fire shutdown procedures and supporting master list of time critical actions were not accurate or adequate to timely secure HPCI to prevent overfilling of the reactor vessel following a spurious fire-induced start of HPCI pump and failed reactor water high-level automatic shutdown of HPCI.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On March 29, 2019, the inspector presented the inspection results to Paul Davison, Vice President - Engineering and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.05T Calculations 11-0028 Reactor Building Flood Calculation for Elevation 102 4
11-0092 Reactor Building Flood Calculation for Elevation 54/ and 77 5
19-0018 Maximum Flood Levels in Control/Diesel Generator Areas 8
431856 Hope Creek Generating Station Safe Shutdown Analysis 1
Reports for Fire Areas RB1, RB2, AB1, CD20, CD71, and
CD82
70143136-0410 Time Critical Operator Action Validation to Secure HPCI per 3/4/13
HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0008, Attachment 9
70185264-10-80 Evaluation of Securing HPCI as a Time Critical Action and 2/22/19
Procedure HC.OP-AB.FIRE-0001
80107159-25 Re-Validation of HPCI Time Critical Actions 3/17/18
BJ-0024 Failure of High Level Turbine Trip 2
E-26 Breaker and Fuse Coordination for Appendix R Systems 4
E-7.4 Class 1E 4.16kV System Protective Relay Settings 6
E-7.7 Class 1E 480V System Protective Relaying 7
H-1-KC-FEE- Gypsum Board Wall and Fire Dampers 262D2 and 263D2 0
1582
H-1-KC-FEE- Carbon Dioxide System 1C10 Preop Test Review Room 0
1889 5403
H-1-ZZ-SEE- Evaluation of Gypsum Board Fire Barrier between Rooms 0
278-1 5301 and 5339
H-1-ZZ-SEE-0279 Evaluation of Gypsum Board Fire Barrier Rooms 5237 and 1
207
PM652-0066 Vendor Calculation for Control Equipment Room Mezzanine, 7
System 1C10
Corrective Action 20442810
Documents 20452227
20452335
20722147
20723341
20723357
20723901
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
20723902
20803353
20804672
20804674
20804675
20804990
20813283
20818156
Corrective Action 20722174
Documents 20723308
Resulting from 20723338
Inspection 20819997
20820010
20820020
20820080
20820082
20820083
20820301
20820551
20820565
20820601
20820606
20820689
20820690
20820691
20820707
20820812
20820879
20820895
20820913
20820914
20820915
20820924
20820926
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
20820927
20821021
20821328
20821331
20821703
20821704
20822786
20822823
20822848
20823038
20823433
Drawings E-0001-0 Single Line Station Diagram 24
E-0005-0 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 4.16kV Station Power 10
System
E-0006-1, Sht. 1 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 4.16kV Class 1E 15
Power System
E-0006-1, Sht. 2 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 4.16kV Class 1E 13
Power System
E-0013-0, Sht. 2 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 480V Units 20
E-0084-0 Electrical Schematic Diagram Class 1E 4.16kV Station 12
Power System
E-0086-0 Electrical Schematic Diagram Class 1E 4.16kV Station 12
Power System
E-6067-0, Sht. 4 Electrical Schematic Diagram Solenoid Pilot Valves 9
E-6084-0, Sht. 7 Electrical Schematic Diagram RCIC Main Steam Supply 10
Valve
J-0399-0, Sht. 13 Remote Shutdown Control Panels 10C399 Instrument and 5
Control Section
J-0399-0, Sht. 3 Remote Shutdown Control Panels 10C399 Instrument and 9
Control Section
J-0399-0, Sht. 4 Remote Shutdown Control Panels 10C399 Instrument and 11
Control Section
J-4041-0, Sht. 3 Loop Diagram for Nuclear Boiler Suppression Pool 7
Temperature Recorder on Remote Shutdown Panel
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
J-4049-0, Sht. 2 RCIC Pump Turbine Control 7
M-11-1, Sht. 1 Safety Auxiliary Cooling System Reactor Building 33
M-22-0, Sht. 1 Fire Protection Fire-Water Permanent & Temporary Fire 21
Pump House
M-22-0, Sht. 2 Fire Protection Fire-Water Permanent & Temporary Fire 20
Pump House
M-22-0, Sht. 3 Fire Protection Fire-Water Permanent & Temporary Fire 17
Pump House
M-41-1, Sht. 1 Nuclear Boiler 42
M-41-1, Sht. 2 Nuclear Boiler 30
M-49-1, Sht. 1 RCIC 31
M-50-1, Sht. 1 RCIC Pump Turbine 33
Engineering 80106533 Replace Pyrotechnics Panels, Reactor Building Smoke 0
Changes Detectors
80112397 New Fire Door at U2 Reactor Building South Wall, Elevation 0
2
80112930 Fire Detection System Upgrade, DCP Part 1 0
80112931 Fire Detection System Upgrade, DCP Part 2 0
80117295 Delete CREG Deluge Flow Trip 0
80120545 TSC (RB6, 132) Smoke Detector Changes and Retired CAS 0
Floor Detector Removal
80122468 MPT FP On-Line Initiation Interlock 0
Engineering 0003-00A3-013- Hope Creek Manual Action Feasibility Assessment by 0
Evaluations 001 Hughes Associates, Inc.
70143136-0410 Scenerio 35, Time Validation to Secure HPCI by Opening 2/11/13
Breaker 10, HPCI Relay Vertical Board
80107159-0025 Time Validation to Secure HPCI by Opening Breaker 10, 3/17/18
HPCI Relay Vertical Board
Fire Plans FP-HC-3413 HPCI Pump & Turbine Room, RHR Pump & Heat Exchanger 0
Rooms
FP-HC-3423 MCC Area, RHR Heat Exchanger Room, Safeguard 0
Instrument Rooms & RACS Pumps & Heat Exchanger Area
FP-HC-3424 MCC Area 0
FP-HC-3433 A SACS Heat Exchanger & Pump Room 0
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
FP-HC-3523 Diesel/Control & Radwaste Building 0
FP-HC-3533 Electric Access Area 0
FP-HC-3542 Control Equipment Mezzanine Area 0
FP-HC-3543 Electric Access Area and HVAC Wing 0
FP-HC-3562 HVAC Equipment, Inverter & Battery Rooms 0
Miscellaneous 10855-M660-51 Installation and Operating Instructions for Engine Driven Fire 5/2/80
Pump Control Panel
313234-01 Patterson Pump Company Motor Driven Fire Pump - Pump 1
Performance Curve
313235-01 Patterson Pump Company Diesel Engine Driven Fire Pump - 1
Pump Performance Curve
55700508 Unannounced Fire Drill 6/25/18
55752660 Unannounced Fire Drill Assessed by Independent Third 9/19/18
Party
55826571 Offsite Assistance Training and Fire Drill 11/14/18
80121712 Fire Drill Lessons Learned Program, 1st Quarter 2018
80121712 Fire Drill Lessons Learned Program, 2nd & 3rd Quarter 2018
BC001 Place A RHR loop in Suppression Pool Cooling IAW
of HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0008
BD008 Place RCIC in Service from the RSP and Commence
Injection to the Reactor Vessel IAW HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002
Bisco Test Report Bisco Product Equivalency Fire Test Utilizing Bisco SF-20 5/14/84
748-134 and Bisco SE-Foam
EA002 PERFORM Steps 1.1 and 1.2 of HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0008,
4, Shutdown from Outside Control Room A RHR
Loop Suppression Pool Cooling
HC Standing Procedure HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002 Control Room 3/15/19
Order 2019-17 Environment Condition C clarification and emphasis to
secure HPCI
HCGS UFSAR Table 9A-14, Fire Hazard Analysis Tabulation Summary 22
HCGS UFSAR Appendix 9A, Appendix R Comparison to NRC Generic 0
Letter 81-12
HCGS UFSAR Section 9.5, HCGS Safe Shutdown Analysis and Fire 23
Hazards Analysis
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
NOH04IO008C- Operator Lesson Plan for Shutdown from Outside Control 11/6/13
Room, HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0008
NOH04IOP008C Operator Lesson Plan PowerPoint Slide deck for Shutdown 12/8/18
from Outside Control Room, HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0008
NOSA-HPC-18- Fire Brigade Drills 9/28/18
NRC Information Potential Failure of Fire Water Supply Pumps to 11/24/09
Notice 2009-29 Automatically Start Due to a Fire
NUREG-1852 Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator 10/2007
Manual Actions in Response to Fire
PM018-0366 EDG B Electrical Control Schematic 11/29/95
SB005 Open the RPS circuit breakers in accordance with Step 5.1.2 11/4/15
of HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0008.NOH04ABPROCUC-08, Lesson Plan
for Upgraded Abnormal Operating Procedures
TCP 2018-008 RB1 room 4315 0
TCP 2018-053 AB3 room 3202 0
TCP 2019-019 AB1 room 5501 0
TCP 2019-031 RB7 room 4220 0
TCP 2019-034 RB1 room 4211 0
Procedures CC-AA-211 Fire Protection Program 5
CC-AA-320-011 Transient Loads 1
CY-AB-140-410 Hope Creek Station Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program 0
FP-AA-002 Fire Protection Impairment Program 5
FP-AA-005 Fire Protection Surveillance and Periodic Test Program 5
FP-AA-010 Pre-Fire Plans 1
FP-AA-011 Control of Transient Combustible Material 6
FP-AA-012 Fire Protection Organization, Duties and Staffing 3
FP-AA-014 Fire Protection Training Program 4
FP-AA-024 Fire Drill Performance 1
FP-AA-105 Compensatory Measure Firewatch Program 9
FP-HC-004 Actions for Inoperable Fire Protection - Hope Creek Station 6
HC-OP-102-106 Hope Creek Master List of Time Critical and Time Sensitive 4
Operator Activities
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
HC.FP-PM.KC- Annual and Monthly Fire Extinguisher Inspection 10
0038
HC.FP-ST.KC- Diesel Driven Fire Pump Operability Test 22
0009
HC.FP-ST.QB- Standby Self Contained 8 Hour Battery Powered Emergency 10
0039(F) Light Unit Test and Inspection
HC.FP-ST.QK- Class 1 Fire Detection Functional Test 16
29(F)
HC.FP-ST.ZZ- Class 1 Fire Damper Functional Test 7
0031(F)
HC.IC-CC.FC- RCIC Turbine Pump Control 15
0013
HC.MD-CM.PG- Low Voltage Breaker Overhaul and Repair 5
0002
HC.MD-PM.PB- 4.16kV Breaker Cleaning and Maintenance 29
0001
HC.OP-AB.FIRE- Fire - Spurious Operations 2
001(Q)
HC.OP- Control Room Environment 10
AB.HVAC-
0002(Q)
HC.OP-AB.ZZ- Transient Plant Conditions 34
0001
HC.OP-AB.ZZ- Station Blackout // Loss of Offsite Power // Diesel Generator 44
0135(Q) Malfunction
HC.OP-AM.TSC- Alternate Containment Flooding Via Fire Water 8
23
HC.OP-AM.TSC- Remote Operation of SRVs With RPV Injection 9
24
HC.OP-EO.ZZ- Containment Venting 13
0318
HC.OP-IO.ZZ- Shutdown from Outside Control Room 37
0008(Q)
HC.OP-ST.SV- Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation Channel 26
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
0001 Check
HC.OP-ST.SV- Remote Shutdown Control Operability 25
0002
HC.OP-ST.SV- Remote Shutdown Control Operability 12
0003
HC.OP-ST.SV- Remote Shutdown Control Operability 11
0004
HC.OP-ST.SV- Remote Shutdown Control Operability 1
0012
HR-AA-07-106 Respirator/Heat Stress Surveillance Exam 7
HR-AA-07-107 Fire Department Surveillance Exam 5
SH.FP-TI.FP- FP Freeze Prevention and Winter Readiness 5
0001(Z)
Work Orders 30299934 Non-Class 1 Fire Suppression Water System Flush 3/11/18
30308297-10 B.5.b Hope Creek Equipment Inventory 2/25/18
30318289 Class 1 Fire Detector Functional Test 7/28/18
30324901 Firefighting and Rescue Equipment Inventory 10/08/18
30327322 Firefighting and Rescue Equipment Inventory 1/07/19
30330339 Fire Engine Operability Test and Firefighting Equipment 1/27/19
Inventory
30330998 Fire Department and EMS Equipment Inspection and 2/10/19
Inventory
50087206 Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection 10/02/06
50135226 Fire Main Flow Test 5/11/14
50167497 Fire Main Flow Test 01/11/18
50179725 Fire Pump Capacity Test 9/21/16
50184932 Pre-Action Sprinkler System Functional Test and Inspection 6/9/17
50186965 Class I Fire Suppression Water System Flush 8/2/17
50187289 Deluge System 1D28 Functional Test 7/6/16
50189177 Fire Pump Capacity Test 12/3/17
50195504 Pre-Action Sprinkler System Functional Test and Inspection 6/5/18
50196834 Deluge System 1D28 Functional Test 8/2/18
50197517 Class I Fire Suppression Water System Flush 10/9/18
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
50199093 Class 1 Fire Detector Functional Test 3/31/18
201002 Class 1 Fire Detector Functional Test 7/31/18
202975 Class 1 Fire Detector Functional Test 10/8/18
203065 Class 1 Fire Detector Functional Test 9/30/18
HC.FP-ST.QB- Standby Self Contained 8 Hour Battery Powered Emergency 1/18/19
0070(F) Light Unit Test and Inspection
HC.OP-ST.SV- Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation Channel 12/10/18
0001 Check
HC.OP-ST.SV- Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation Channel 12/10/18
0001 Check
HC.OP-ST.SV- Remote Shutdown Control Operability 4/12/15
0002
HC.OP-ST.SV- Remote Shutdown Control Operability 5/6/18
0003
HC.OP-ST.SV- Remote Shutdown Control Operability 10/31/16
0004
HC.OP-ST.SV- Remote Shutdown Control Operability 4/13/18
0005
HC.OP-ST.SV- Remote Shutdown Control Operability 11/8/16
0012