IR 05000348/1978032
| ML19274D110 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1978 |
| From: | Robert Lewis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19274D106 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-78-32, NUDOCS 7901120169 | |
| Download: ML19274D110 (6) | |
Text
ASRfGo UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o,,
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Report No. : 50-348/78-32 Docket No. : 50-348 License No. : NPF-2 Licensee: Alabama Power Company
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Post Office Box 2631 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 Facility Name: Farley Unit-1 Inspection at: Farley Site, Ashford, Alabama Inspection conducted: November 6-9, 1978 Inspector:
A. K. Hardin Reviewed by: [.C.
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R. C. Lewis, Chief Date Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on November 6-9, 1978 (Report No. 50-348/78-32)
Areas Inspected: Organization and Administration, Licensee Event Reports, IE Circulars, open and unresolved items. The inspection involved 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> of on-site inspection by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or devia-tions were identified in 3 areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was observed in one area (deficiency-organization is not as shown in the Technical Specifications (348/78-32-01) paragraph 8.
790112Ll6 Fj
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RII Report No. 50-348/78-32 I-1
/2[V!M DETAILS I Prepared by:
c A. K. Hardin, Reactor Inspector Date Reactor Project Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection: November 6-9, 1978 Reviewed by: [. C, pM
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R. C. Lewis, Chief Date Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.
Persons Contacted
- W. G. Hairston, Plant Manager
- J. D. Woodard, Assistant Plant Manager
- J. E. Garlington, Operations Supervisor
- F. Wurster, Operations Quality Assurance
- D. L. Cox, Operations Quality Assurance T. C. Grozan, Plant Engineer Other licensee employees interviewed during the course of the inspec-tion included Shift Supervisors, Shift Foremen and Reactor Operators.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Noncompliance (348/78-25-01):
Starting air receivers for the IB emergency diesel generators too low in air pressure to insure starting of the diesel. The licensee immediately restored the diesel to service and met technical specifications on testing other AC electrical sources. These actions were observed by the inspector.
The licensee has reviewed the sequence of events leading to the noncompliance and subm.itted a licensee report describing the event.
(LER No. 078-066/03L-1) The corrective action described in the licensee event report and confirmed in the licensee's response to the cited noncompliance was considered acceptable.
b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (348/78-22-02): The subject unresolved item dealt with lack of charts on certain control room instrumen-tation. On the current inspection, the inspector verified that the instruments in question were equipped with charts.
The licensee has established a minimum reorder level for the charts which they believe will assure availability of chart.
RII Report No. 50-348/78-32 I-2 3.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 5.
4.
Exit Interview
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The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted by an asterisk in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on November 9, 1978. The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The licensee did not agree with the potential for a noncompliance citation on an organization change made without an approved Technical Specification. However, on a subsequent telephone call in which he was informed the item would be cited as noncompliance no questions were raised (paragraph 8). With regard to the unresolved item, in paragraph 5, the licensee stated they would review their position and be prepared to discuss the item on a subsequent visit by the inspector.
On unresolved item 348/78-12-03 in paragraph 6, the licensee stated they believe they meet regulatory requirements and would be prepared to discuss their reasoning with the inspector on a subsequent inspection.
5.
Heat Tracing on Boric Acid Lines The inspector observed the annuciators for both A and B trains of neat tracing were in alarm. These annuciators do not have reflash capability.
The inspector reviewed local heat trace indicating panels for the boron injection tank (BIT), surge tank and associated valves and lines. At the time of the review, there was at least one train of heat tracina which indicated operability on each line in the flow path. However, in one case, local heat trace alarms for both A and B train were indicating inoperable on one line of a redundant line in t'ae system.
Under these conditions, the Technical Specifications require operability to be verified at least once pe_ 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The licensee stated that temperature alarms on the BIT and recirculation of the boric acid between the surge tank and BIT gave them a monitored flow and temperature for the system, demonstrating that system condi-tions met Technical Specifications.
The inspector stated that pending further review of the licensee's methods for assuring operability of the BIT, the item would be left as unresolved. (348/78-32-01)
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RII Report No. 50-348/78-32 I-3 6.
Maintenance Work Requests Unresolved Item (348/78-12-03): The inspector reviewed several work requests to ascertain whether instructions for maintenance are being given without the appropriate level of approval. There appeared to be a tendency to provide step wise instructions in the work sequence portion of the work requests and these could be interpreted as procedural steps. At the exit interview, the licensee was asked what they proposed to do to avoid having safety-related maintenance procedural steps being used in work requests without appropriate approval. The licensee statr' they felt they had resolved this issue at one time. Their basic dependence for assurance that safety-related maintenance is done correctly is on test and restoration of the system. The licensee stated they would review their methods of preparing work requests and would be prepared to review their program with the inspector during the next inspection. Unresolved item 348/78-12-03 remains open.
7.
Licensee Event Reports Eight licensee event reports were rr..ewed at the site.
Records review and interviews with licensee personnel were conducted to ascer-tain the event was treated as required by Technical Specificationr.
Unless otherwise stated, the inspector had no further question relative to the listed licensee event.
a.
LER 063-FW Flow Transmitter FT 476 Failed Low b.
LER 064-Turbine Driven FW Pump Failure The original report on this subject stated that the pump failed to start because the trip / throttle valve was closed. Further review by the licensee resulted in a conclusion that the trip /
throttle valve shot when the pump was started.
The licensee stated a supplemental report would be issued.
Review of this event will be completed on a subsequent inspection (348/78-32-03).
c.
LER 065-SG Pressure on Hot Shutdown Panel Inoperable d.
LER 066-Diesel Air Start Receivers-Low Pressure e.
LER 067-Containment Spray Pumps Tagged Out in Wrong Mode f.
LER 068-DG Frequency Could Not be Increased Above 58.5Hz g.
LER 069-RHR Flow to RCS Lost When Suction Valve Closed
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d RII Report No. 50-348/78-32 I-4
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h.
LER 070-Loss of Both Source Range Channels in Mode 5 8.
Organization and Administration Prior to the current inspection, the inspector reviewed Technical Specifications (TS) regarding plant organization. The TS are specific in stating, "the Facility organization shall be as shown on Figure 6.2-2".
The present facility organization is not as shown on Figure 6.2-2 in that a new position has been added. At the exit interview, the inspector stated that the item appeared to be noncompliance. The licensee stated they felt that since the change was an improvement and added to the organization rather than subtracted, and that the incumbent in the new position had not approved safety-related procedures or voted as a plant safety committee member, that in the context of the TS, an orgsnizational change had not been made. The inspector stated that the TS was written very clearly, but that he would review the licensee's position with Region II management and let him know the results. On November 14, 1978, the inspector informed the licensee by telephone that the organizational change which involved a change to the Technical Specifications without an approved Technical Specifica-tion change was considered noncompliance. The licensee did not provide further comment. (348/78-32-02)
9.
IE Circulars Circular No. 78-05, " Inadvertent Safety Injection During a.
Cooldown" Discussion with the licensee and comparison of Farley Unit 1 potential for the subject event against that described in the circular, verified, that the licensee has considered the potential for occurrence of the event describs 3 in the circular.
The inspector had no further questions.
b.
Circular 78-16, "Limitorque Valve Actuators" The subject circular discussed potential failure of limitorque valve clutches.
Limitorque communicated to the licensee certain recommendation designed to minimize such an occurrence. A licensee representative committed to a licensee position by December 15, 1978, regarding the manufacturer's recommendations. This item remains open.
10.
Open Items a.
(Closed) 348/78-19-01:
Loss ot a circulating water pump motor during a severe electrical storm initiated a relatively severe reactor transient. This item was held open pending the licensee's
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RII Report No. 50-348/78-32 I-5 review of the cause of loss of the motor.
Review of available documentation does not confirm the exact mode of motor failure; however, the licensee plans additional grounding in the vicinity of the circulating water pumps and the addition of surge packs consisting of arrestors and capacitators for both Unit I and 2 motors.
b.
(0 pen) 348/78-19-02: Failure of a lower adjusting ring lock pin resulted in failure of a steam generators safety valve to reseat.
The licensee sent the valve to the vendor for analysis of the failure. The vendor has concluded the pin failure was a random failure caused by fatigue and has supplied replacement pins for installation in the remaining valves. A supplemental report to LER 78038-03 will be submitted by the licensee.
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