IR 05000346/1993014

Insp Rept 50-346/93-14 on 931012-15.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Review of Emergency Exercise Scenario, Observations of Key Functions & Locations During Exercise, & follow-up on Licensee Previously Identified Items

ML20059J769
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	11/04/1993
From:	Foster J, Jickling R, Mccormickbarge, Reidinger T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059J744	List: IR 05000346/1993014 ML20059J741
References
50-346-93-14, NUDOCS 9311150044
Download: ML20059J769 (23)

Text

E

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-346/93014(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Centerior. Service Company 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted: October 12-15, 1993 Inspectors:

'T. D. RUidingpr Date //

// 6 4' ~7

. Foster

' - Dfe /

'

'- '

H foY f3 ,

Datd R. Jickditg

/

Accompanying Inspectors: S. Stasek -

J. Shine Approved By: A '" N 3 J.T. McCormick-Barge,r', phief Date / /

Radiological Programs ~ Section 1 Inspection Summary *

Insoection on October 12-15. 1993 (Report No. 50-346/93014(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Davis-Besse emergenc preparedness exercise involling review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302),

observations by five NRC representatives of key functions and locations during *

the exercise (IP 82301), and follow-up on licensee actions on previously identified items (IP 82301). -

Results: No violations or_ deviations were identified. The licensee demonstrated a good response to a hypothetical scenario involving equipment failures, an injured, contaminated worker, and a radiological release. No

-

!

concerns requiring corrective actions were identifie Corrective actions for ;

the concerns identified during the 1992 exercise were successfully ,

demonstrate t 9311150044 931105 ~

PDR ADOCK 05000346 '

O PDR 3

.

.

DETAILS NRC Observers and Areas Observed S. Stasek, Control Room Simulator (CRS)', Technical _ Support Center (TSC),

Emergency Control Center (ECC)

T. Reidinger, Operational Support Center' (OSC-)

J. Foster, TSC J. Shine, CRS, TSC R. Jickling, ECC Persons Contacted B. DeMaison, Emergency Preparedness Manager B. Cope, Onsite Emergency Preparedness A. Antrassian, Licensing Engineer D. Gordon, Emergency Planner All of the above listed individuals and approximately 45 o'thers attende'd -

the NRC exit interview held on October 15, 1993. The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the course of the inspectio . Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (IP 82301)

(Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 346/92004-01: During.the 1992 annual exercise, Operational Support Center (OSC) personnel ' failed _to completely evaluate internal radiation exposure hazards' to inplant'

team ,

During the 1993 annual exercise, OSC personnel promptly_ recognized radiological conditions which warranted the use of Self Contained .

'

Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and obtained air samples for evaluatio This item is close (Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 346/92004-02: _During the.1992- - y annual exercise, OSC personnel failed to fully document the results of j radiation survey During the 1993 annual exercise, OSC personnel provided appropriate-.

documentation for' survey results conducted by radiation protection personnel. This item is close (Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 346/92004-03: - During the 1992 annual exercise, the Technical Support Center failed to fully evaluate the need for issuance and use of potassium iodide (KI).

During the 1993 annual exercise, the TSC promptly recognized' the radiological conditions which warranted the issuance and use of K ]

This option was properly evaluated, and as an alternative,' the use of l SCBA was recommended. This item is close l i

l

g

i N

. , -,

-.

.

,

4. General i

An announced, daytime exercise' of the Davis-Besse Emergency Plan was :

conducted at the Davis-Besse site on October 13, 1993. This exercise = "

included full participation with Ottawa and Lucas Counties _and partial l participation with Sandusky County and the State of Ohio. The exercise :

tested the licensee's, State's and counties'. emergency respons l organizations' capabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario ~

resulting in a release of radioactive effluen The performances of State and local response organizations were evaluated by representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which will document its findings in a separate report, NRC and FEMA representatives summarized their organizations' preliminary findings at a public critique hosted by FEMA on October 15, 199 Attachment 1 describes the Scope and Objectives of the exercise and Attachment 2 summarizes the 1993 scenari The licensee's response' was coordinated, orderly and timely. If the scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit State.and local ,

authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health 1 and safet !

5. Specific Observations (IP 82301)

l Control Room Simulator (CRS)

Management and control of the CRS was excellent. The Shift Supervisor (SS) kept his staff informed and' focused on priority tasks. He ensured that emergency. classifications and notifica-tions were performed in a timely manner. He augmented the CRS staff on recognition of the degraded plant conditions. His staff briefings included emergency classifications, priority tasks, and l the overall status of the plant.- l Briefings in the CRS were conducted at-regular intervals and provided pertinent information to the aperators. Briefings i ensured the staff was aware of actions being taken to respond to l the event; additional briefings could have been beneficia '

The CRS staff was particularly efficient in identifying degraded plant conditions, directing support staff to areas of the plant needing investigation, and performing required corrective actions ;

in attempts to return affected equipment back to servic '

.

Excellent use of abnormal and emergency procedures was observe For example, the staff used available instrumentation to identify the combined effects of the turbine blading damage.to the turbine i

casing, the low pressure condenser and piping related to the

'

Condensate Storage Tank'(CST). The CRS staff efficiently verified the turbine trip and the subsequent turbine casing damage caused

i

.

i

by ejected turbine blading. They took appropriate actions to .

respond to the reactor trip and loss of the main condense >

Detection and classification of events by the CRS staff was made in a very timely manner. The SS declared an Alert based on the l turbine casing damage event within seven minutes of receipt of-the related turbine annunciators. The SS reacted rapidly to changing plant conditions in declaring the Alert and making recommendations i to the TSC for the upgrade to the Site Area Emergency (SAE). The !

CRS staff were proactive in anticipating actions which would be !

necessary upon further plant degradation. The CRS staff closely l monitored the low CST water levels caused by a turbine blading

'

.

damage to CST piping. The low CST water levels combined with the subsequent unavailability of service water to the auxiliary feed i pumps led the CRS staff to recommend an upgrade to a SAE should a- l loss of secondary feedwater occu ,

Public Address (PA) announcements were goo Concurrent with th'e I loss of the turbine, there was a worker injured and contaminated ;

in the auxiliary building. The first aid team was promptly called out over the PA system. The CRS staff made proceduralized ;

announcements following each event declaratio Periodic announcements contained information indicating plant conditions which enabled plant personnel to be aware of changing

'

plant conditions. Assembly and accountability was initiated by- F the SS directly following the Alert declaration. The SS initiated i

'

the assembly through a PA notification to the plan The CRS staff maintained good communications with inplant operators. The staff frequently requested updates from operators i who were inspecting plant equipment. Prior to the General -

Emergency declaration, the CRS staff had identified the potential

_

source of the offsite radioactive release path from high radiation i levels observed in one Auxiliary Building mechanical penetration roo This information was properly passed on to the OSC~ so that ,

an inplant team could be dispatched for inspection of the are j Information regarding the injured worker, such as the extent of >

his injury and contamination, was promptly communicated back to the CR Notifications following event declaration were made in a timely ;

'

manner. Notifications to the State and counties were cor aleted within 12 minutes of the Alert declaration. The NRC was notified immediately following the state and counties, well within the 60 *

minute regulatory time limit. The CRS communicator notified the <

SS upon completion of the notifications. Notifications to offsite I agencies were detailed and contained adequate information regarding plant conditions and event initiating condition ,

?

p-:_a

'

,

.

No violations or deviations were identifie c. Technical Support Center (TSC)

TSC activation began following the Alert declaratio Support personnel, such as status board keepers and communicators, arrived shortly after the declaration. A staff member activated the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) while the TSC was being activate The Emergency Plant Manager- (EPM) and the Emergency Director (ED)

conducted good turnover briefings by phone with the Emergency Assistant Plant Manager (EPM) and the SS in the Control Room for overall plant status. The ED also assured that the CRS staff had informed State, county and simulated NRC officials of the emergency declarations. Communications with other facilities were: ;

excellent using the green command telephon ,

The TSC was declared to be fully operational several minutes after the ED assumed command and control. The ED maintained an aggressive presence over the facility after command and control of i emergency response actions was assumed approximately 20 minutes after the Alert declaratio :

Plant. status boards were generally well maintained and updated I periodically. The status of the injured contaminated worker was monitored in the TSC throughout the exercise. Two status' boards were effectively used during the exercise to list " Equipment Problems", " Potential Problems", and " Assignments" and' to list '

" Problem Analysis" respectively. The plant parameter data status boards were updated frequently and ~ contained accurate informatio The radiological status boards were also kept current. Post .

Accident Sampling System (PASS) results were utilized to estimate the approximate percentage of core damage with good result '

During the exercise, information flow among key TSC staff remained ,

very good. . The EPM or the TSC Engineering Manager conducted good, t periodic briefings at appropriate intervals during which each manager provided an update on the status of current assignment ,

Public address announcements regarding classifications did not I contain information as to the cause of the. emergency  ;

classification. This could cause plant personnel to-needlessly :

contact the Control Room during a real even :

Plant repair tasks were effectively prioritized with the OSC .

director and the manager in the Emergency Control Center (ECC).

General priorities and tasks were set- by TSC staff. OSC teams and ,

task completion status were not formally tracked in the TSC, !

although repair status was obtained on a periodic basi i r

l

i

!

,

..

The engineering support group worked well together in trending relevant parameters and responding to various requests for engineering analyses. Engineering activities in the TSC were excellent. Engineering staff displayed a comprehensive understanding of scenario events, looked ahead to anticipate potential problems, and developed solutions to plant problem The staff reviewed the sequence of plant malfunctions and related radiation readings throughout areas adjacent to the containment in the auxiliary building to determine the potential source of the offsite radiological releas They related the chain hoist collapse in a mechanical penetration room as potentially responsible for damaging a containment penetration valve or pipin The radiation protection staff closely monitored inplant radiological conditions. The ED showed excellent concern fo t personnel safety. He ensured the OSC staff were notified of the high radiation levels in the mechanical penetration room. The environs staff properly directed and monitored the activities of the offsite monitoring team I Emergency Action Levels (EAls) were continuously reviewed and changes in the level of classification were anticipated, often well in advance of the need for reclassificatio The TSC staff developed a comprehensive list of it ams for !

consideration in recovery and recovery discussic, , and were

'

thorough in developing action items which needed to be addresse No violations or deviations were identifie d. Operational Support Center (OSC) ,

The staffing of the OSC was timely. Radiation protection,. . )

operations, maintenance, and electrical personnel quickly staffed j the OS In addition, personnel closed appropriate OSC doors, :

repositioned work tables, and established communication links with l other facilities to facilitate the efficient staffing of the OS j A frisker was promptly and efficiently setup at the entrance of '

the OS Activation of the OSC was accomplish'ed in an orderly manner. OSC I personnel were proactive in setting up the OSC including plant i procedures, OSC personnel pool status boards and the plant status boards. The OSC Manager conducted a good initial briefing, . ;

explaining plant conditions and current prioritie The OSC was functional approximately 15 minutes following the ,

Alert declaration. The OSC Manager immediately announced the i facility's activation and briefed the staff on plant condition OSC status boards accurately reflected facility staffing. .

.

!

Habitability surveys were conducted at regular intervals and !

_ .

.

personnel dosimetry was issued when the Site Area Emergency was declare The OSC Director maintained excellent command and control of the !

facility and of repair actions. The OSC Director provided periodic briefings to the OSC personnel which were generally '

'

thorough. However, the briefings could have included more *

information regarding the reactor coolant system status, '

protective action recommendations and offsite radiological r

'

readings. OSC staff were kept informed of current plant statu The OSC Manager utilized input from OSC-supervisors to ensure important information was not overlooked and personnel were 1 adequately informed of plant conditions.-

The control and prioritization of work in the OSC was very goo The OSC Director had vigorous discussion regarding team and work .

priorities. Work priorities were constantly and correctly re--

prioritized as emergent work surfaced and action were complete ,

The OSC Director interfaced very well with his staff regarding '

recommendations on changing priorities and discussions on using alternate means to make repairs to affected plant equipment. Upon indication of the potential CST piping failure, the OSC Manager !

recognized the immediate need to obtain water inventory by truck, in order to provide water to the auxiliary feedwater pump The OSC staff maintained good communication and direction of !

inplant repair teams. The OSC status board accurately documented j team composition, location, and progress. The OSC-director ;

frequently monitored the progress of repairs and ensured that _ '

teams were notified of changing plant conditions and radiological _

"

concern Briefings and debriefings of inplant teams were detailed in addressing both physical hazards and radiological concern Information was clearly communicated to team member Upon return i to the facility, the teams relayed appropriate information to the OSC staf The OSC staff effectively monitored radiological conditions and controlled inplant team exposures. The staff appropriately used radiation monitor data in directing team activities and effectively used inplant teams to verify radiation level However, dose extension authorization from the TSC was not promptly obtained for the inplant team dispatched to investigate .

the mechanical penetration room for source of the radiological offsite releas '

Inplant team dispatch was very good. Approximately 52 teams were dispatched during the exercise. The dispatch of the first aid team was espeH ally noteworthy. Priority was given to dispatching this' team and the OSC was cognizant of the immediate need to respond and track the first aid team sent to the injured worke ;

l I

I i

'

Teams were dispatched in a timely manner and given briefings i regarding radiological conditions and plant conditions. Briefings ,

addressed both physical hazards and radiological concern .

Information was clearly communicated to team members'.  !

i Upon return to the facility, the teams relayed appropriate ,

information to the OSC staff when debriefed by OSC debriefing :

personnel. Radiological surveys were documented upon-return to the OSC. There were no radaological survey postings in the briefing area for general review by OSC personnel. The Radiation i Protection Supervisor did not appear to have missed any of the relevant radiological conditions on the briefing or debriefing of ;

inplant team The inplant repair teams evaluated demonstrated good teamwork and ^

radiological practice Pre-job planning was good; teams gathered necessary tools and instruments. Protective clothing was properly donned when require i i

Communications with inplant teams were excellent. The inplant ;

teams discussed their actions with the control room prior to simulating any local equipment repair actions or valve -!

manipulations required for task completio ;

i The overall technical response of the inplant teams was very goo l The r 3mbers of one team had various discussions and recommenda-tions in addressing particular system malfunctions, i.e. the

'

auxiliary feedwater pump trip throttle linkage. The inplant teams ;

made very good use of the Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams '

(P& ids) and procedures in preparing for their assigned task l OSC engineering staff were observed to make optimum.use of the ;

P&ID's to assess component failure modes or system valve and pump lineups. They did an excellent job acting upon requests by the +

'

OSC manager / asst. manager. Tasks were properly prioritized, and recommendations made to appropriate personnel upon completion of their problem analysi l Communications in the OSC in regards to the containment radiation !

dome monitors extremely high readings of 4000 R/hr to other facilities were not prompt. The recommendation by the Radiation Protection Supervisor to conduct area surveys of rooms adjacent to t the containment and (later) station vents was very good. The OSC staff's actions concerning onsite protective actions were excellent. For example, they discussed steps to evacuate the ;

applicable areas in the auxiliary building to prevent unnecessary i plant staff exposures, after identifying the mechanical .

penetration room as the possible source of the offsite releas At least one inplant team was dispatched without authorization by the OSC manager. In addition, another inplant team was dispatched ;

to close the common CST isolation valve CD-170 shortly after the 8 l l

l

1 l

,

>

-

n- -

_

' <

.

, f-] .f

. . .

t; _

.;

!

o- '

'

1 ,

s

~M OSC manager statedcin an OSC briefing' that the. east' condenser ~ pit I was flooded;< Although the task _ was not completed at the direction'

, of the Control Room,-the volve was-(per the scenario) indeed -

..

' discovered t'o be'under 4 feet of water. The 0SC manager was:not-- *

informed that'this= specific task was not comple.ed t upon-return of-the inplant tea ~

~ '

q The OSC' dispatched inplant team 42 whose task' was to investigat the air leak reported in #3 mechanical penetration room. The- - . ,

radiation. protection briefer stated that steam was observed-in~th O room and a local survey indicated 5 rem /hr at the' doo :

No protective clothing was specified'either by the briefer or-b the briefing form except for, respiratory protection and- an .'~ ..

alarming: dosimeter. Another radiation-briefer had to caution the- i team to wear appropriate protective clothing' prior to.bein .i dispatched for this tas Discussion with licensee personnel

'

subsequent to'the exercise indicated that a'" planned ~ jJ i contamination" was viewed as acceptable to terminate the offsite release.at this point. Although members of the inplant tea :

donned protective clothing, one team member did not dress out'per d procedur ,

A status board in a location in the OSC would. provide for general review for any of the potential selected crew members while in;the .

]

ll OSC area. OSC pool personnel were observed to be reading:non--  !

station related materials. Their time could be more efficiently:- 1 used for problem solving and recommendations for. inplant' repair; team No violations or deviations were identifie l Emeroency Control Center (ECC) j i

The Emergency Control Center (ECC) was activated following the i Alert declaration and was fully operational.within about 25'

minutes. The ECC staff prepared to assume their duties in an:

organized, efficient manne Communications within the-ECC were good. The Emergency Offsite Manager (E0M) had very good command and control .of the facilit He provided continual facility updates as new information' wasi received by the facility communicators. Excellent command and.-

control was also demonstrated by the delegation of properly _

prioritized action items-to appropriate personnel. Various ECC-managers provided frequent and detailed briefings to the-staff on t changing plant conditions, onsite response activities and major decision Teamwork and proactive thinking by.the ECC staff and support  !

personnel was excellent, i.e., a radio communicator questioned the decision to relocate non-essential personnel from theLTraining

1 i

m-- > > - - , . - _, _ _ . , _ _ _.-.s _, ,_ - _,_ . -, .,-

, _ , . . .

-

.

t

. u

,

Center to the Energy Education Center, considering the weather forecast. He voiced his concern that a potential wind direction shift (as predicted from the weather forecast) would bring-the radioactive release over the facility. As a result of this discussion, the final recommendation was to relocate non-essential personnel to another facilit +

Notifications were made in a timely manner following the '

activation of the facility. _The state and counties were notified of the General Emergency in a _ timely manne The ECC had excellent communications regarding the contaminated, injured person. These included communications with the person's -

immediate supervisor and famil .

The ECC maintained very good communications with the TSC, JPIC, Corporate, and Offsite Agencies. State and County Liaisons' 1 questions were efficiently handled by the E0 a

'

Accident assessment and classification was very good with good use of procedures and Technical Specifications. Appropriate -

,

discussions were held concerning emergency reclassification and protective action recommendation upgradin The Dose Assessment group aggressively assessed plant an meteorological conditions. They provided timely speculative dose projections'when plant emergency or weather conditions changed significantly. The Dose Assessment CoordinatorLquickly and prudently formed field teams and sent them cut. The field teams

'

began traversing the plume as the release began. The field teams 3 data was used to generate dose projections. These dose +

projections also matched very closely the projections made utilizing the station vent monitor The dose assessment personnel were very proactive in trying 'to

~

predict the offsite consequences of the-loss of the third fission ,

product barrier. It was discussed that a breach of containment would create a release, due to the fuel cladding and reactor-coolant system already being breache Following the exercise, an excellent discussion of issues which- -

would be addressed was held, utilizing the Recovery procedur "

Recovery discussions were very thorough, and a detailed action plan was develope No violations or deviations were identifie ,

6. Exercise Control and Critioues (IP 82301)

There were adequate controllers to control the exercis No instances of controllers prompting participants to initiate actions, which they ,

might not otherwise have taken, were observed. There was a scenario ;

,

'

-

a

-

a disjoint with.the Data Acquisition Display System (DADS) monitor . ,

providing incorrect radiation levels for the containment dome radiation-monitor. To maintain scenario integrity, the controllers provided -

corrected radiation readings to the Dose Assessment personne The licensee's controllers held initial critiques in each facility with j isarticipants immediately following the exercise. These critiques were well. detailed. The licensee provided a summary of its preliminary strengths and weaknesses prior to the exit interview, and these were in strong agreement with the inspectors' preliminary finding No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview ,

The inspectors held an exit interview on October 15, 1993, with the '

licensee representatives identified in Section 2 to present-and discuss ,

the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none !

of the matters discussed were proprietary in natur !

Attachments: Davis-Besse 1993 Exercise Scope and Objectives Davis-Besse 1993 Exercise Scenario Outline e

i

..

'h i

!

'

s t

.

11

. . . _ - . .

.

-i l

1-1 1993 Evaluated Exercise :

.

1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES --

'

-

1.1 SCOPE j The 1993 Davis-Besse Emergency Preparedness Exercise, to be conducted ;

on October 13, 1993, vill test and provide the opportunity to evaluate :

the Onsite Davis-Besse Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedure [

It vill also test the onsite emergency response organization's ability -

to assess and respond to emergency conditions and take adequate actions to protect the health and safety of the public and Station ,

personnel. The Exercise vill demonstrate the utilization of the  ;

Station's Emergency Response Organization and vill involve activation t and operation of major elements of offsite emergency response a organization ;

NOTE: Information necessary to conduct the offsite portion of the l Exercise, including the objectives, extent of play, sequence ;

of events, cue cards and supporting information, is provided i in a separate volume of the Exercise manua Whenever practical, the drill incorporates provisions for " free play" ,

on the part of the participants. Selected "real time" activities vill

'

be conducted to allow repair teams the opportunity t.o provide service and repairs to station equipment during the course _of the Exercis These " repairs" vill allow the response organization.to have an '

increased impact upon the direction that the Exercise proceeds as well ;

as impacting the completion of the Exercise activities. In addition, O the Control Room Simulator vill be used to permit a degree of " free play" on the part of the Operations staff. The extent of this " free

[

play" may be partially restricted by Controllers as necessary to keep the sequence of events on trac ,

The scenario vill simulate a sequence of events resulting in a i radiological release to the environment. This. release vill be of a l sufficient magnitude to varrant mobilization of state and local agencies in response to the simulated emergenc The scenario vill also incorporate a Medical Drill with participation ;

by local emergency medical services and a support hospita In the development of an accident sequence which is severe enough to :

adequately test the emergency response capabilities of participating [

organizations, it is necessary to postulate extremely unrealistic j situations and multiple failures of redundant reactor protection  !

I functions and systems. However remote the possibility of these events occurring, Players are reminded to respond appropriatel >

'

!

O  :

.

m

--CT

.

~

i

,.

1-2 1993 Evaluated Exercise F

_

I.2 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POVER STATION OBJECTIVES- '

'

-

RE # FACILITIES OBJECTIVE Administrative CONDUCT AN EXERCISE OF THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POVER STATION (DBNPS) EMERGENCY PLAN, ANNUALL I

' Administrative PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE STATE OF OHIO, OTTAVA '

COUNTY, AND LUCAS COUNTY TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EXERCISE,

-

ANNUALLY (FULL VS PARTIAL PARTICIPATION).

' Administrative PREPARE AN EXERCISE INFORMATION PACKAGE TO MEET MINIMUM STANDARD . Administrative CONDUCT A CRITIQUE OF THE EXERCIS :

' Administrative ESTABLISH MEANS TO ENSURE COMPLETION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION Administrative INVOLVE FEDERAL, STATE, COUNTY EP RESPONSE PERSONNEL AND

,

AGENCIES IN A JOINT EXERCISE AT LEAST ONCE EVERY TVO -

YEAR ,

Administrative CONDUCT THE EXERCISE IN VARIOUS VEATHER CONDITIONS (DURING DIFFERENT SEASONS).  ; All DEMONSTRATE THE DIRECTION OF THE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN AND EMERGENCY ;

PLAN PROCEDURE t Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE TRANSFER OF THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR ,

ECC DUTIE , All DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY FOR TIMELY ACTIVATION AND STAFFING OF THE EMERGENCY FACILITIE All DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO CONTROL ACCESS TO EMERGENCY ^

FACILITIE ! RTL DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY OF A CENTRAL POINT FOR THE A RECEIPT AND ANALYSIS OF ALL FIELD MONITORING DATA AND

COORDINATION OF SAMPLE MEDI ECC DEMONSTRATE THE AVAILABILITY AND DISPATCH OF A TECHNICAL LIAISON TO OFFSITE GOVERNMENTAL EOC'S (DEMONSTRATE ONLY VITH FULL OFFSITE PARTICIPATION). Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO ASSESS THE INCIDENT ,

TSC CONDITION Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE EMERGENCY ACTION O ECC, TSC LEVELS (EAL'S) AND PROPERLY CLASSIFY THE INCIDE! f

!

- ,

-

.

-

(

,

1-4- 1993 Evaluated Exercise RE FACILITIES OBJECTIVE

, OSC, ECC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO CONTINUOUSLY MONITOR AND CONTROL EMERGENCY VORKER EXPOSUR ;

ECC, RTL, RMT DEMONSTRATE THE RESOURCES AND CAPABILITY FOR FIELD h MONITORING VITHIN THE PLUME EXPOSURE EP E.11 OSC DEMONSTRATE THE AVAILABILITY OF RESPIRATORY PROTECTION, f PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND K ,

E.12 OSC, TSC DEMONSTRATE THE ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY TO AUTHORIZ [i!

i EMERGENCY VORKER EXPOSURE IN EXCESS OF 10CFR20 LIMIT E.15 OSC, SEC DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY FOR TRANSPORTATION OF A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIM (MEDICAL DRILL REQUIREMENT). ,

e DEMONSTRATE THE PISPONSE TO, AND ANALYSIS OF, SIMULATED l E.17 ELEVATED AIRBORNE AND LIQUID SAMPLES AND DIRECT RADIATION -

!

MEASUREMENTS IN THE ENVIRONMEN ECC DEMONSTRA*rE THE ABILITY TO RECOMMEND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TO APPROPRIATE OFFSITE AUTHORITIES; BASES OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF PROTECTION '

AFFORDED BY SHELTERING, AS VELL AS EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATE JPIC DEMONSTRATE THE OPERATION OF THE JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION [

t CENTER AND THE AVAILABILITY OF SPACE FOR THE MEDI JPIC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO BRIEF THE MEDIA IN A CLEAR, ,

ACCURATE AND TIMELY MANNE JPIC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE ADVANCE C00".DINATION l OF INFORMATION RELEASED (DEMONSTRATED ONLY VITH FULL .

OFFSITE PARTICIPATION).  ! SEC DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY TO EVACUATE NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNE !

F.11 OSC DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY FOR ONSITE FIRST AID (MEDICAL j DRILL REQUIREMENT).

i F.12 OSC DEMONSTRATE THAT PROVISIONS ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE EVALUATION OF RADIATION EXPOSURE OF, AND RADIATION UPTA IN A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIM (MEDICAL DRILL ,

REQUIREMENT).

,

, All DEMONSTRATE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF REENTRY AND RECOVERY CAPABILITIES AND AVAILABILITY OF PROCEDURE '

O

<

[

$

.

,

.

1-2 1993 Evaluated Exercise

-;

1.2 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POVER STATION OBJECTIVES

'

RE # FACILITIES OBJECTIVE

Administrative CONDUCT AN EXERCISE OF THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POVER '

STATION (DBNPS) EMERGENCY PLAN, ANNUALL ; Administrative PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE STATE OF. OHIO, OTTAVA

>

COUNTY, AND LUCAS COUNTY TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EXERCISE, *

ANNUALLY (FULL VS PARTIAL PARTICIPATION). Administrative PREPARE AN EXERCISE INFORMATION PACKAGE TO MEET MINIMUM STANDARD Administrative CONDUCT A CRITIQUE OF THE EXERCIS Administrative ESTABLISH MEANS TO ENSURE COMPLETION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION Administrative INVOLVE FEDERAL, STATE, COUNTY EP RESPONSE PERSONNEL AND AGENCIES IN A JOINT EXERCISE AT LEAST ONCE EVERY TVO YEAR Administrative CONDUCT THE EXERCISE IN VARIOUS VEATHER CONDITIONS (DURING DIFFERENT SEASONS). All DEMONSTRATE THE DIRECTION OF THE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN AND EMERGENCY ,

PLAN PROCEDURE Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE TRANSFER OF THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR ;

ECC DUTIE All DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY FOR TIMELY ACTIVATION AND STAFFING OF THE EMERGENCY FACILITIE ; All DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO CONTROL ACCESS TO EMERGENCY FACILITIE RTL DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY OF A CENTRAL POINT FOR THE RECEIPT AND ANALYSIS OF ALL rL MNITORING DATA AND COORDINATION OF SAMPLE MEP1 ECC DEMONSTRATE THE AVAILABILITY AND DISPATCH OF A TECHNICAL LIAISON TO OFFSITE GOVEINMENTAL EOC'S (DEMONSTRATE ONLY VITH FULL OFFSITE PARTICIPATION).

! Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO ASSESS THE INCIDENT TSC CONDITION Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE EMERGENCY ACTION t O ECC, TSC LEVELS (EAL'S) AND PROPERLY CLASSIFY THE INCIDEN ,

,

d

.

1-3 1993 Evslustcd Exercisa RE .

1. FACILITIES OBJECTIVE Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO NOTIFY KEY OFFICIALS IN THE ECC EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONS (STATION, CORPORATE, STATE OF OHIO, OTTAVA COUNTY, AND LUCAS COUNTY) VIA THE NOTIFICATION SYSTEM / PROCEDURES VITHIN 15 MINUTES OF CLASSIFICATIO Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO NOTIFY THE NRC OF ANY ECC EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION VITHIN ONE HOUR OF THE OCCURRENC All DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY TO NOTIFY AND/OR ACTIVATE EMERGENCY PERSONNEL IN EACH RESPONSE ORGANIZATIO Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO DEVELOP AND SEND AN INITIAL ECC EMERGENCY MESSAGE FOR OFFSITE NOTIFICATIO , Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO DEVELOP AND SEND FOLLOV-UP ECC MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION FOR OFFSITE AUTHORITIE Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY AMONG THE TSC, ECC CONTROL ROOM, TSC AND ECC, AND AMONG DBNPS, THE STATE OF OHIO, OTTAVA COUNTY, AND LUCAS COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS AND THE FIELD ASSESSMENT TEAMS, TO INCLUDE EVALUATION OF THE ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND MESSAGE CONTENT (COMMUNICATIONS DRILL REQUIREME!E). ECC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO DEVELOP A LEGITIMATE, INFORMATIVE, AND CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD MESSAGE TO BE SENT TO STATE, AND COUNTY OFFICIALS VHO MAKE DECISIONS TO ACTIVATE THE ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM ECC DEMONSTRATE THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY VITH STATE, OTTAVA COUNTY AND LUCAS COUNTY VITHIN THE PLUME EXPOSURE EPZ. (COMMUNICATION DRILL VERIFY OBERABILITY OF HARDWARE ONLY). ,

,

D.12 OSC, SEC DEMONSTRATE THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY VITH FIXED AND MOBILE MEDICAL SUPPORT FACILITIES (MEDICAL DRILL REQUIREMENT). ECC DEMONSTRATE THE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE SOURCE TERM OF RELEASES OR POTENTIAL RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL VITHIN PLANT SYSTEM ECC DEMONSTRATE THE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE MAGNITUDE OF THE RELEASES OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS BASED ON PLANT SYSTEM PARAMETERS AND EFFLUENT MONITORS.

l ECC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO ESTIMATE INTEGRATED DOSE FROM PROJECTED AND ACTUAL DOSE RATES AND TO COMPARE THESE l .

l ESTIMATES VITH THE PAG' OSC, ECC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT EXPOSURE GUIDELINES.

!

.. .

.

'I-4 1993 Evalunted Exercism

- % ~

RE # FACILITIES OBJECTIVE OSC, ECC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO CONTINU0USLY MONITOR AND- l CONTROL EMERGENCY VORKER EXPOSUR ECC, RTL, RMT DEMONSTRATE THE RESOURCES AND CAPABILITY FOR FIELD MONITORING VITHIN THE PLUME EXPOSURE EP _

E.Il OSC DEMONSTRATE THE AVAILABILITY OF RESPIRATORY PROTECTION,

-

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND K E.I2 OSC, TSC DEMONSTRATE THE ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY TO AUTHORIZE EMERGENCY VORKER EXPOSURE IN EXCESS OF 10CFR20 LIMIT .; l E.15 OSC, SEC DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY FOR TRANSPORTATION OF A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIM (MEDICAL DRILL REQUIREMENT).

E.17 DEMONSTRATE THE RESPONSE TO, AND ANALYSIS OF, SIMULATED ELEVATED AIRBORNE AND LIQUID SAMPLES'AND DIRECT RADIATION MEASUREME!US IN THE ENVIRONMEN ECC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO RECOMMEND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TO APPROPRIATE OFFSITE AUTHORITIES; BASES OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF PROTECTION AFFORDED BY SHELTERING, AS VELL AS EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATE JPIC DEMONSTRATE THE OPERATION OF THE JOIin PUBLIC INFORMATION i

CENTER AND THE AVAILt.BILITY OF SPACE FOR THE MEDI JPIC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO BRIEF THE MEDIA IN A CLEAR, ACCURATE AND TIMELY MANNE JPIC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE ADVANCE COORDINATION 0F INF0PJMTION RELEASED (DEMONSTRATED ONLY VITH FULL OFFSITE PARTICIPATION). SEC DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY TO EVACUATE NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNE F.11 OSC DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY FOR ONSITE FIRST AID (MEDICAL DRILL REQUIREMENT).

F.12 OSC DEMONSTRATE THAT PROVISIONS ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE EVALUATION OF RADIATION EXPOSURE OF, AND RADIATION UPTAKE IN A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIM (MEDICAL DRILL

-

,

REQUIREMENT). All DEMONSTRATE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF REENTRY AND RECOVERY CAPABILITIES AND AVAILABILITY OF PROCEDURE >

,

.

,- -. .-,

. , ,

.

-l

'

6-6 1993 Evaluated Exercise

!

6.3 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS CC#

T: Time Time Event ,

00/00 0800 The Shift Supervisor is briefed in the Control 'l ,

Room and the Drill Authorization Form is  ;

approve NOTE: The 1993 Evaluated Exercise vill utilize the Control Room Simulator.to ,

conduct Operator response.instead of the actual Control Room. An off-shift Operations crev vill be pre-staged and briefed at the '

Simulator with the exception of the Equipment Operators who will pre-stage in the plant. Pre- '

designated Haintenance, Chemistry and Radiation Protection personnel vill +

assemble at the OSC once it is activated. Since Players will not be able to use their normal communica-tions channels to contact each other, an " Exercise Phone List" vill be .

provide .

The pre-designated Continuous Service Chemistry 2 1 ) and Radiation Protection personnel receive the-

,

initial conditions and stand by at their respective offices to begin Exercise response when contacted via phone. The pre-designated Haintenance personnel can be reached via ,

Gai-tronic The Lead Exercise Controller at the Control Room 3 00/10 0810 Simulator will direct the following actions: A Gai-tronics announcement for the start ,

of the Exercis ; Activation of the ERO pager drill cod which advises all ERO pager carriers t ,

the pages which follow are related to 'he

,

Dril /30 0830 A lightning strike in the switchyard on the 4=

'

345 KV transmission system results in the 5 trip of the generator output break.ers ,

(ACB 34560 & 61). The rapid loss of load from '

.

the main turbine causes a high vibration trip of the turbine. These sudden stress-related changes 4 cause several blades to' separate from the turbine rotor and penetrate the casing. Additional damage ,

O- inflicted by the blades includes the condensate storage tanks, the Lov Pressure (LP) Condenser

'

tubes, and the LP Condenser shel ,

,

'

..

6-7 1993 Evaluated Exercise -

Event CC#

T: Time Time NOTE: Refer to Section 10.0 of this manual for additional description of equipment transients or failure /33 0833 In response to the Reactor trip, the Control Room Operators attempt to start #2 Hakeup Pump, however, it fails to start due to shaft seizur /35 0835 The transient on the electrical grid induces a vibration on the 2-1 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP), which ultimately results in impeller damage. RCP vibration and loose parts monitor alarms occu /40 0840 An ALERT declaration is made per EAL 7.F.2 due 7 to turbine failure causing casing penetratio As per the Alert procedure, HS-EP-01700:

Station Alarm vill be sounded via a request from the Control Room (Simulator)

to the real Control Room. The ALERT Gai-tronics announcement vill be made at the simulato * The Computerized Automated Notification System (CANS) vill be activated to notify and call out the on call Emergency Response Organization (ERO), notify the Toledo Edison Company Telephone Operator, and page the Davis-Besse NRC Resident Inspector *

Ottava and Lucas Counties and the State of Ohio are notified of the Aler NOTE: In order to minimize the activities demanded of the actual on-shift Control Room staff, the Vhite Phone vill be simulated as out of service requiring the Simulator staff to use the alternate means of State and local notification via the Toledo Edison Company Telephone Operato *

The NRC will be notified that the Drill ~

has begun via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) Red Phon Follow-up calls to NRC vill be made to the Control Cel l

, .

b

.. I 6-8 1993 Evaluated Exercise CC#

LT: Time ' Time Event-f 's-)

>

.

~# NOTE: These activities will be performed with assistance from.the.on-shift

,

operations personnel from the real Control Roo Reports from Turbine Building indicate severe 8X 00/42 0842 flooding in the East and Vest Condenser Pit *

00/45+ 0845+ ~The Control Room (Simulator) staff vill be ,

directing the on-shift crew to perform various ,

plant shutdown' functions (e.g., startup of the Auxiliary Boiler).

NOTE: Because of the Exercise artificiali-ties created by using the Simulato ;

rather than the actual Control Room, <

the " Exercise Phone List" vill be- ,

used to make these notification /50 0850 ERO staff begin to arrive in the Emergency '

Response Facilities (ERFs).

The medical " victim", Controllers and Equipment Operator are pre-staged at the accident scene for the Medical Drill.

-( )

00/50+ 0850+ Non-essential personnel within the Protected 9 Area assemble in the designated Assembly Areas within the Personnel Shop Facilities (PSF)

Buildin *

Access to the Ovner Controlled Area, DBAB ERFs and the Protected Area are restricted as per Security procedure HS-EP-0251 NOTE: Access to the Owner Controlled Area and Protected. Area vill be restored by the controllers after approxi-mately 30 minutes. Canceling of tours and training classes vill be '

simulate ,

Flooding in the Turbine Building basement  !

causes a loss of most electrical equipment on that level, including the Motor Driven Feed l t

Pum Contingency input in the event an Alert has 10X ,

00/55 0855 not been declared by this tim z f

(~ 00/57 0857 Several fuel rods, aggravated by metal fragments from the'2-1 RCP impeller, begin releasing gap activity into the primary coolant. Activity equivalent'to approximately 35% gap is eventually released into the coolan .

'

6-9 1993 Evaluated Exercise T: Time Time Event CC#

01/00 0900 For the Exercise,_ security access restrictions 11 are relaxed. Assembled personnel are returned 12 to work.

01/05 0905 Two maintenance individuals who did not hear the 13 announcement for site assembly are working in 14 the #3 Hechanical Penetration Room. A chain hoist is being used to lift some heavy equip-men Suddenly the hoist gives way, knocking one individual down into an area of the room with radioactive contamination. Part of the hoisting. equipment crashes into Containment Penetration No. 59, breaking open the piping test connectio The uninjured maintenance worker notifies a roving Equipment Operator who contacts the Control Room (Simulator). The First Aid Team is called out.

01/15 0915 The letdown monitor (failed fuel monitor)

alarms on high radiatio Upon inspection by the First Aid Team, the injured victim is found to have several abrasions, a broken vrist and tvisted kne Contamination is present. The victim requests to be transported to the Fremont Memorial Hospital. The First Aid Team informs the Control Room (Simulator). Security monitors the First Aid Team communications and subsequently CAS/SAS calls for offsite assistance via the Ottava County Sheriff's Dispatche NOTE: Normally 911 vould be used, however, 15 a non-emergency telephone number will be used for this Exercis Priority at the Sheriff's Office vill be directed to real emergencies that may be reported on the 911 syste The Sheriff's Dispatcher vill tone out (page)

Mid-County Emergency Medical Services and advise them that the individual is contaminated.

01/25 0925 The CAS/SAS Operator vill call Fremont Hemorial 16 Hospital and advise them that a contaminated injured individual vill be transported from Davis-Bess NOTE: The procedure stipulates Hagruder Hospital, k however, for the purposes of this Exercise, Hagruder vill not be utilized. Refer to Section 8.7 of this manual for additional medical drill informatio m -

.

!

.

6-10 1993 Evaluated Exercise i

'~'

T: Time Time Event CC#

'

%.

01/30 0930 Due to the indications of high coolant activity, Chemistry personnel vill be requested to;take  :

a Reactor Coolant System sampl !

01/30+ 0930+ An Auxiliary Feed Pump lov suction pressure j

'

alarm occurs due to the decreasing Condensate Storage Tank levels. Operators may transfer j suction to the Service Water supply heade .

?

01/40 0940 Chemistry personnel draw a RCS sampl !

NOTE: An actual RCS sample vill not be drawn, since it is not part of this year's extent of '

play. Refer to Section 8.6 of this manual for '

additional PASS informatio ,

02/10 1010 Conditions created by the ruptured condensate j'

piping'causes the #1 Auxiliary Feed Pump governor to fail, making the pump overspeed and eventually seize u !

02/45 1045 Condensate Storage Tanks are nearly empty and j aside from the #2 Auxiliary Feed Pump (AFP) lined i up vith service water or the Fire Protection water

'

f~

t system, no other feedvater source is available to !

-

the Steam Generator ,

02/50 1050 Suction Pressure svitch to $2 AFP fails, closing the steam supply valve, and stopping the pum ,

Personnel are dispatched to investigate, but the ,

problem is not readily apparent. An attempt is r made to cross-connect with the Fire Protection  !

'

System, however, the cross-connect valve FP-27 von't ope /00 1100 A SITE AREA EMERGENCY declaration is made per 17 '

EAL 3.d.3 due to a loss of all feedvater when the condensate storage tanks go dry and service water is unavailable for auxiliary feedvate As per the Site Area Emergency procedure, HS-EP-01800:

t

Station Alarm vill be sounded and Site Area Emergency announcement made via a -

request from the ECC to the real Control Roo * the ERO, Toledo Edison Company Telephone ,

Operator, and the Davis-Besse NRC Resident (-) Inspectors are notified via phone contact ,

or announcements in the ERFs. The CANS  !

vill be utilized in this activit L

,

,

.

'

6-11 1993 Evaluated Exercise CC#

T: Time Time. Event

• Ottava and Lucas Counties and the State of Ohio are notified of the Site Area Emergenc * The NRC Incident Response Center notifica-tions (i.e., Red Phone) are made to the Control Cel NOTE: Ovner Controlled Area assembly vill

be simulate /00 1100+ Plant Operators Line-up systems for a Hake-up/

High Pressure Injection Reactor Cooling mod "

This provides water from the Borated Vater Storage Tank through the Reactor Coolant System out the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve for the purpose of removing decay heat from the reacto Due to the earlier fuel rod damage, radioactivity levels in the Containment Building atmosphere begin increasing dramaticall X 03/10 1110 Contingency input in the event a Site Area Emergency has not been declared by this tim'.

1300 Because of increasing Containment pressure and 05/00 the damaged test connection, penetration No. 59 releases radioactivity into the No. 3 Hechanical Room allowing the emergency ventilation system to drav the activity out through the Station Vent (refer to Figure 6.3-1).

NOTE: Refer to Section 8.1 of this manual for data indicating the changes in in-plant radiation levels caused by this even This results in an offsite release to the environment, which produces increased dose assessment activities and efforts to track the plume with surveys taken by Radiation Monitoring Team NOTE: Refer to Section 9.4 of this manual for additional information on field moni-torin /00+ 1300+ The dose assessment and/or field survey results vill be utilized to determine protective action recommendations for the public. These recommendations as a minimum should includeto five sheltering in a two mile radius and out miles dovn vin ]

,

6-12 1993 Evaluated Exercise f-s T: Time Time Event CC# .

(  :

\ -

05/10 1310 A GENERAL EMERGENCY declaration is made per 21-EAL 6.D.3 due to projected radiation levels at the site boundary of greater than 1 Rem /haur .

Whole Body or EAL 1.E.1 due to loss of 2 of 3 .

'

fission product barriers with a potential loss; of the thir .

As per the General Emergency procedure, ,

HS-EP-01900: ,

Station Alarm vill be sounded and Genera Emergency announcement made via a request from the ECC to the real Control Roo }

" The ERO, Toledo Edison Company Telephone I Operator, and the Davis-Besse NRC Resident Inspectors are notified via phone contact or announcements in the ERFs. The CANS vill be utilized in this activit *

Ottava and Lucas Counties and the State of-Ohio are notified of the General Emer- ,

genc * The NRC incident Response Center notifica- t k'~',s/

s_

tions (i.e., Red Phone) are made to the Control Cel News releases are prepared and press briefings .

are held at the alternate Joint Public i Information Center. The public alert and notification system activation is simulate r 05/15 1315 Operators may shift to Decay Heat Removal at i this time. Data in this package supports this *

action, however, procedural guidance is limited and engineering judgement may be used to determine an alternate course of actio !

05/25 1325 Contingency input in the event a General 22X Emergency has not been declared by this tim '

,

05/45 1345 Additional dose assessment is performed (refer to Table 6.3-1). Offsite protective action recommendations are upgraded because of increased offsite radiation levels. The -l revised protective actions are forwarded.to State and local official '

06/02 1402 A Repair Team succeeds in sealing the broken test connection on penetration No. 59 stopping the- '

release of radioactive materials from CTMT. The '

Station Vent monitor begins to lover in value as the remaining radioactive material in the Auxiliary Building is. purged ou J

.

6-13 1993 Evaluated Exercise Time Event CC#

T: Time The Station Vent monitor reading drops off - the

06/15 ~1415 release has ended.

06/30 1430 Declassification discussions occu X 06/45 1445 The Evaluated Exercise is terminate *

Termination announcement is made over the Gai-tronics and in all ERF * The ERO pager all clear code is activate This advises all ERO pager carriers that the Exercise is ove ,

• The NRC vill be notified via the red phone that the Davis-Besse drill activities have ende A short break vill be taker. Following the break critiques will be hrad in each of the participating facilitie >

07/45 1545 Recovery meeting occurs in DBAB Rooms 209/210 26 q O,

b

>

-%

k