IR 05000346/1993014
| ML20059J769 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1993 |
| From: | Foster J, Jickling R, Mccormickbarge, Reidinger T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059J744 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-93-14, NUDOCS 9311150044 | |
| Download: ML20059J769 (23) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/93014(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Centerior. Service Company 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted: October 12-15, 1993 Inspectors:
'T. D. RUidingpr Date //
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. Foster
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R. Jickditg Datd /
Accompanying Inspectors:
S. Stasek
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J. Shine Approved By:
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J.T. McCormick-Barge,r', phief Date /
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Radiological Programs ~ Section 1 Inspection Summary
Insoection on October 12-15. 1993 (Report No. 50-346/93014(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Davis-Besse emergency.
preparedness exercise involling review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302),
observations by five NRC representatives of key functions and locations during
the exercise (IP 82301), and follow-up on licensee actions on previously identified items (IP 82301).
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Results: No violations or_ deviations were identified. The licensee demonstrated a good response to a hypothetical scenario involving equipment failures, an injured, contaminated worker, and a radiological release. No
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concerns requiring corrective actions were identified.
Corrective actions for
the concerns identified during the 1992 exercise were successfully
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demonstrated.
t 9311150044 931105 ~
PDR ADOCK 05000346
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DETAILS 1.
NRC Observers and Areas Observed S. Stasek, Control Room Simulator (CRS)', Technical _ Support Center (TSC),
Emergency Control Center (ECC)
T. Reidinger, Operational Support Center' (OSC-)
J. Foster, TSC J. Shine, CRS, TSC R. Jickling, ECC 2.
Persons Contacted B. DeMaison, Emergency Preparedness Manager B. Cope, Onsite Emergency Preparedness A. Antrassian, Licensing Engineer D. Gordon, Emergency Planner All of the above listed individuals and approximately 45 o'thers attende'd -
the NRC exit interview held on October 15, 1993. The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (IP 82301)
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 346/92004-01: During.the 1992 annual exercise, Operational Support Center (OSC) personnel ' failed _to completely evaluate internal radiation exposure hazards' to inplant'
teams.
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During the 1993 annual exercise, OSC personnel promptly_ recognized radiological conditions which warranted the use of Self Contained
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Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and obtained air samples for evaluation.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 346/92004-02: _During the.1992- -
y annual exercise, OSC personnel failed to fully document the results of j
radiation surveys.
During the 1993 annual exercise, OSC personnel provided appropriate-.
documentation for' survey results conducted by radiation protection personnel. This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 346/92004-03: - During the 1992 annual exercise, the Technical Support Center failed to fully evaluate the need for issuance and use of potassium iodide (KI).
During the 1993 annual exercise, the TSC promptly recognized' the radiological conditions which warranted the issuance and use of KI.
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This option was properly evaluated, and as an alternative,' the use of l
SCBA was recommended. This item is closed.
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4.
General i
An announced, daytime exercise' of the Davis-Besse Emergency Plan was
conducted at the Davis-Besse site on October 13, 1993. This exercise =
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included full participation with Ottawa and Lucas Counties _and partial l
participation with Sandusky County and the State of Ohio. The exercise
tested the licensee's, State's and counties'. emergency response.
l organizations' capabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario
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resulting in a release of radioactive effluent.
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The performances of State and local response organizations were evaluated by representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which will document its findings in a separate report, NRC and FEMA representatives summarized their organizations' preliminary findings at a public critique hosted by FEMA on October 15, 1993.
Attachment 1 describes the Scope and Objectives of the exercise and Attachment 2 summarizes the 1993 scenario.
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The licensee's response' was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit State.and local
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authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health
and safety.
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Specific Observations (IP 82301)
a.
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
Management and control of the CRS was excellent. The Shift Supervisor (SS) kept his staff informed and' focused on priority tasks. He ensured that emergency. classifications and notifica-tions were performed in a timely manner. He augmented the CRS staff on recognition of the degraded plant conditions.
His staff briefings included emergency classifications, priority tasks, and l
the overall status of the plant.-
l Briefings in the CRS were conducted at-regular intervals and provided pertinent information to the aperators.
Briefings i
ensured the staff was aware of actions being taken to respond to the event; additional briefings could have been beneficial.
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The CRS staff was particularly efficient in identifying degraded plant conditions, directing support staff to areas of the plant needing investigation, and performing required corrective actions
in attempts to return affected equipment back to service.
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Excellent use of abnormal and emergency procedures was observed.
For example, the staff used available instrumentation to identify the combined effects of the turbine blading damage.to the turbine i
casing, the low pressure condenser and piping related to the
Condensate Storage Tank'(CST). The CRS staff efficiently verified
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the turbine trip and the subsequent turbine casing damage caused
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by ejected turbine blading. They took appropriate actions to
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respond to the reactor trip and loss of the main condenser.
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Detection and classification of events by the CRS staff was made in a very timely manner. The SS declared an Alert based on the l
turbine casing damage event within seven minutes of receipt of-the related turbine annunciators. The SS reacted rapidly to changing plant conditions in declaring the Alert and making recommendations i
to the TSC for the upgrade to the Site Area Emergency (SAE). The
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CRS staff were proactive in anticipating actions which would be
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necessary upon further plant degradation. The CRS staff closely l
monitored the low CST water levels caused by a turbine blading
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damage to CST piping. The low CST water levels combined with the subsequent unavailability of service water to the auxiliary feed i
pumps led the CRS staff to recommend an upgrade to a SAE should a-l loss of secondary feedwater occur.
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Public Address (PA) announcements were good.
Concurrent with th'e I
loss of the turbine, there was a worker injured and contaminated
in the auxiliary building. The first aid team was promptly called out over the PA system. The CRS staff made proceduralized
announcements following each event declaration.
Periodic announcements contained information indicating plant conditions which enabled plant personnel to be aware of changing
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plant conditions. Assembly and accountability was initiated by-F the SS directly following the Alert declaration. The SS initiated i
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the assembly through a PA notification to the plant.
The CRS staff maintained good communications with inplant operators.
The staff frequently requested updates from operators i
who were inspecting plant equipment.
Prior to the General
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Emergency declaration, the CRS staff had identified the potential
source of the offsite radioactive release path from high radiation i
levels observed in one Auxiliary Building mechanical penetration room.
This information was properly passed on to the OSC~ so that
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an inplant team could be dispatched for inspection of the area.
j Information regarding the injured worker, such as the extent of
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his injury and contamination, was promptly communicated back to the CRS.
Notifications following event declaration were made in a timely
manner. Notifications to the State and counties were cor aleted
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within 12 minutes of the Alert declaration.
The NRC was notified immediately following the state and counties, well within the 60
minute regulatory time limit. The CRS communicator notified the
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SS upon completion of the notifications. Notifications to offsite I
agencies were detailed and contained adequate information regarding plant conditions and event initiating conditions.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Technical Support Center (TSC)
TSC activation began following the Alert declaration.
Support personnel, such as status board keepers and communicators, arrived shortly after the declaration. A staff member activated the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) while the TSC was being activated.
The Emergency Plant Manager- (EPM) and the Emergency Director (ED)
conducted good turnover briefings by phone with the Emergency Assistant Plant Manager (EPM) and the SS in the Control Room for overall plant status. The ED also assured that the CRS staff had informed State, county and simulated NRC officials of the emergency declarations.
Communications with other facilities were:
excellent using the green command telephone.
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The TSC was declared to be fully operational several minutes after the ED assumed command and control. The ED maintained an aggressive presence over the facility after command and control of i
emergency response actions was assumed approximately 20 minutes after the Alert declaration.
I Plant. status boards were generally well maintained and updated periodically. The status of the injured contaminated worker was monitored in the TSC throughout the exercise. Two status' boards were effectively used during the exercise to list " Equipment Problems", " Potential Problems", and " Assignments" and' to list
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" Problem Analysis" respectively. The plant parameter data status boards were updated frequently and ~ contained accurate information.
The radiological status boards were also kept current.
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Accident Sampling System (PASS) results were utilized to estimate the approximate percentage of core damage with good results.
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During the exercise, information flow among key TSC staff remained
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very good.. The EPM or the TSC Engineering Manager conducted good, t
periodic briefings at appropriate intervals during which each manager provided an update on the status of current assignments.
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Public address announcements regarding classifications did not I
contain information as to the cause of the. emergency
classification. This could cause plant personnel to-needlessly
contact the Control Room during a real event.
Plant repair tasks were effectively prioritized with the OSC
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director and the manager in the Emergency Control Center (ECC).
General priorities and tasks were set-by TSC staff.
OSC teams and
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task completion status were not formally tracked in the TSC,
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although repair status was obtained on a periodic basis.
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The engineering support group worked well together in trending relevant parameters and responding to various requests for engineering analyses.
Engineering activities in the TSC were excellent.
Engineering staff displayed a comprehensive understanding of scenario events, looked ahead to anticipate potential problems, and developed solutions to plant problems.
The staff reviewed the sequence of plant malfunctions and related radiation readings throughout areas adjacent to the containment in the auxiliary building to determine the potential source of the offsite radiological release.
They related the chain hoist collapse in a mechanical penetration room as potentially responsible for damaging a containment penetration valve or piping.
The radiation protection staff closely monitored inplant radiological conditions. The ED showed excellent concern for..
-t personnel safety. He ensured the OSC staff were notified of the high radiation levels in the mechanical penetration room. The environs staff properly directed and monitored the activities of the offsite monitoring teams.
I Emergency Action Levels (EAls) were continuously reviewed and changes in the level of classification were anticipated, often well in advance of the need for reclassification.
The TSC staff developed a comprehensive list of it ams for consideration in recovery and recovery discussic,, and were thorough in developing action items which needed to be addressed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Operational Support Center (OSC)
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The staffing of the OSC was timely. Radiation protection,..
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operations, maintenance, and electrical personnel quickly staffed j
the OSC.
In addition, personnel closed appropriate OSC doors, repositioned work tables, and established communication links with l
other facilities to facilitate the efficient staffing of the OSC.
j A frisker was promptly and efficiently setup at the entrance of
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the OSC.
I Activation of the OSC was accomplish'ed in an orderly manner.
OSC personnel were proactive in setting up the OSC including plant i
procedures, OSC personnel pool status boards and the plant status boards. The OSC Manager conducted a good initial briefing,.
explaining plant conditions and current priorities.
The OSC was functional approximately 15 minutes following the
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i Alert declaration. The OSC Manager immediately announced the facility's activation and briefed the staff on plant conditions.
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OSC status boards accurately reflected facility staffing..
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Habitability surveys were conducted at regular intervals and
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personnel dosimetry was issued when the Site Area Emergency was declared.
The OSC Director maintained excellent command and control of the
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facility and of repair actions. The OSC Director provided periodic briefings to the OSC personnel which were generally '
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thorough. However, the briefings could have included more information regarding the reactor coolant system status,
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protective action recommendations and offsite radiological r
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readings. OSC staff were kept informed of current plant status.
The OSC Manager utilized input from OSC-supervisors to ensure important information was not overlooked and personnel were
adequately informed of plant conditions.-
The control and prioritization of work in the OSC was very good.
The OSC Director had vigorous discussion regarding team and work
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priorities. Work priorities were constantly and correctly re--
prioritized as emergent work surfaced and action were completed.
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The OSC Director interfaced very well with his staff regarding
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recommendations on changing priorities and discussions on using alternate means to make repairs to affected plant equipment. Upon indication of the potential CST piping failure, the OSC Manager
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recognized the immediate need to obtain water inventory by truck, in order to provide water to the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
The OSC staff maintained good communication and direction of
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inplant repair teams. The OSC status board accurately documented j
team composition, location, and progress.
The OSC-director
frequently monitored the progress of repairs and ensured that _
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teams were notified of changing plant conditions and radiological
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concerns.
Briefings and debriefings of inplant teams were detailed in addressing both physical hazards and radiological concerns.
Information was clearly communicated to team members.
Upon return i
to the facility, the teams relayed appropriate information to the OSC staff.
The OSC staff effectively monitored radiological conditions and controlled inplant team exposures. The staff appropriately used radiation monitor data in directing team activities and effectively used inplant teams to verify radiation levels.
However, dose extension authorization from the TSC was not promptly obtained for the inplant team dispatched to investigate
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the mechanical penetration room for source of the radiological offsite release.
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Inplant team dispatch was very good. Approximately 52 teams were dispatched during the exercise. The dispatch of the first aid team was espeH ally noteworthy.
Priority was given to dispatching this' team and the OSC was cognizant of the immediate need to respond and track the first aid team sent to the injured worker.
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i Teams were dispatched in a timely manner and given briefings regarding radiological conditions and plant conditions.
Briefings
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addressed both physical hazards and radiological concerns.
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Information was clearly communicated to team members'.
i Upon return to the facility, the teams relayed appropriate
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information to the OSC staff when debriefed by OSC debriefing
personnel.
Radiological surveys were documented upon-return to the OSC. There were no radaological survey postings in the briefing area for general review by OSC personnel.
The Radiation i
Protection Supervisor did not appear to have missed any of the relevant radiological conditions on the briefing or debriefing of
inplant teams.
The inplant repair teams evaluated demonstrated good teamwork and
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radiological practices.
Pre-job planning was good; teams gathered necessary tools and instruments.
Protective clothing was properly donned when required.
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Communications with inplant teams were excellent. The inplant
teams discussed their actions with the control room prior to simulating any local equipment repair actions or valve
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manipulations required for task completion.
i The overall technical response of the inplant teams was very good.
l The r 3mbers of one team had various discussions and recommenda-tions in addressing particular system malfunctions, i.e. the
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auxiliary feedwater pump trip throttle linkage. The inplant teams
made very good use of the Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams
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(P& ids) and procedures in preparing for their assigned tasks.
l OSC engineering staff were observed to make optimum.use of the
P&ID's to assess component failure modes or system valve and pump lineups.
They did an excellent job acting upon requests by the
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OSC manager / asst. manager. Tasks were properly prioritized, and recommendations made to appropriate personnel upon completion of their problem analysis.
-l Communications in the OSC in regards to the containment radiation dome monitors extremely high readings of 4000 R/hr to other facilities were not prompt. The recommendation by the Radiation Protection Supervisor to conduct area surveys of rooms adjacent to t
the containment and (later) station vents was very good.
The OSC staff's actions concerning onsite protective actions were excellent.
For example, they discussed steps to evacuate the
applicable areas in the auxiliary building to prevent unnecessary i
plant staff exposures, after identifying the mechanical
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penetration room as the possible source of the offsite release.
At least one inplant team was dispatched without authorization by the OSC manager.
In addition, another inplant team was dispatched
to close the common CST isolation valve CD-170 shortly after the
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~M OSC manager statedcin an OSC briefing' that the. east' condenser ~ pit I
was flooded;< Although the task _ was not completed at the direction'
of the Control Room,-the volve was-(per the scenario) indeed
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' discovered t'o be'under 4 feet of water. The 0SC manager was:not--
informed that'this= specific task was not comple.ed upon-return of-t the inplant team.
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q The OSC' dispatched inplant team 42 whose task' was to investigate.
the air leak reported in #3 mechanical penetration room. The-
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radiation. protection briefer stated that steam was observed-in~the.
room and a local survey indicated 5 rem /hr at the' door.
No protective clothing was specified'either by the briefer or-by.
the briefing form except for, respiratory protection and-an
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alarming: dosimeter. Another radiation-briefer had to caution the-i team to wear appropriate protective clothing' prior to.being.
.i dispatched for this task.
Discussion with licensee personnel i
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subsequent to'the exercise indicated that a'" planned ~
j contamination" was viewed as acceptable to terminate the offsite J
release.at this point. Although members of the inplant team.
donned protective clothing, one team member did not dress out'per d
procedure.
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A status board in a location in the OSC would. provide for general
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review for any of the potential selected crew members while in;the.
ll OSC area. OSC pool personnel were observed to be reading:non--
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station related materials. Their time could be more efficiently:-
used for problem solving and recommendations for. inplant' repair; teams.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emeroency Control Center (ECC)
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The Emergency Control Center (ECC) was activated following the i
Alert declaration and was fully operational.within about 25'
minutes. The ECC staff prepared to assume their duties in an:
organized, efficient manner.
Communications within the-ECC were good. The Emergency Offsite Manager (E0M) had very good command and control.of the facility.
He provided continual facility updates as new information' wasi received by the facility communicators.
Excellent command and.-
control was also demonstrated by the delegation of properly _
prioritized action items-to appropriate personnel.
Various ECC-managers provided frequent and detailed briefings to the-staff on t
changing plant conditions, onsite response activities and major decisions.
Teamwork and proactive thinking by.the ECC staff and support personnel was excellent, i.e.,
a radio communicator questioned the decision to relocate non-essential personnel from theLTraining
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Center to the Energy Education Center, considering the weather forecast. He voiced his concern that a potential wind direction shift (as predicted from the weather forecast) would bring-the radioactive release over the facility. As a result of this discussion, the final recommendation was to relocate non-essential personnel to another facility.
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Notifications were made in a timely manner following the
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activation of the facility. _The state and counties were notified of the General Emergency in a _ timely manner.
The ECC had excellent communications regarding the contaminated, injured person. These included communications with the person's
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immediate supervisor and family.
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The ECC maintained very good communications with the TSC, JPIC, Corporate, and Offsite Agencies. State and County Liaisons'
questions were efficiently handled by the E0M.
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Accident assessment and classification was very good with good use of procedures and Technical Specifications. Appropriate
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discussions were held concerning emergency reclassification and protective action recommendation upgrading.
The Dose Assessment group aggressively assessed plant and.
meteorological conditions. They provided timely speculative dose projections'when plant emergency or weather conditions changed significantly. The Dose Assessment CoordinatorLquickly and prudently formed field teams and sent them cut. The field teams
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began traversing the plume as the release began. The field teams
data was used to generate dose projections.
These dose
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projections also matched very closely the projections made utilizing the station vent monitors.
The dose assessment personnel were very proactive in trying 'to
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predict the offsite consequences of the-loss of the third fission
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product barrier.
It was discussed that a breach of containment would create a release, due to the fuel cladding and reactor-coolant system already being breached.
Following the exercise, an excellent discussion of issues which-
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would be addressed was held, utilizing the Recovery procedure.
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Recovery discussions were very thorough, and a detailed action plan was developed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Exercise Control and Critioues (IP 82301)
There were adequate controllers to control the exercise.
No instances of controllers prompting participants to initiate actions, which they
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might not otherwise have taken, were observed. There was a scenario
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a disjoint with.the Data Acquisition Display System (DADS) monitor
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providing incorrect radiation levels for the containment dome radiation-monitor. To maintain scenario integrity, the controllers provided -
corrected radiation readings to the Dose Assessment personnel.
The licensee's controllers held initial critiques in each facility with j
isarticipants immediately following the exercise. These critiques were well. detailed. The licensee provided a summary of its preliminary strengths and weaknesses prior to the exit interview, and these were in strong agreement with the inspectors' preliminary findings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview
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The inspectors held an exit interview on October 15, 1993, with the
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licensee representatives identified in Section 2 to present-and discuss
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the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none
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of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.
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Attachments:
1.
Davis-Besse 1993 Exercise Scope and Objectives 2.
Davis-Besse 1993 Exercise Scenario Outline e
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l 1-1 1993 Evaluated Exercise
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1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
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1.1 SCOPE j
The 1993 Davis-Besse Emergency Preparedness Exercise, to be conducted
on October 13, 1993, vill test and provide the opportunity to evaluate
the Onsite Davis-Besse Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures.
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It vill also test the onsite emergency response organization's ability
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to assess and respond to emergency conditions and take adequate actions to protect the health and safety of the public and Station
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personnel. The Exercise vill demonstrate the utilization of the
t Station's Emergency Response Organization and vill involve activation and operation of major elements of offsite emergency response a
organizations.
NOTE:
Information necessary to conduct the offsite portion of the l
Exercise, including the objectives, extent of play, sequence
of events, cue cards and supporting information, is provided i
in a separate volume of the Exercise manual.
Whenever practical, the drill incorporates provisions for " free play"
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on the part of the participants.
Selected "real time" activities vill
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be conducted to allow repair teams the opportunity t.o provide service and repairs to station equipment during the course _of the Exercise.
These " repairs" vill allow the response organization.to have an
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increased impact upon the direction that the Exercise proceeds as well
as impacting the completion of the Exercise activities.
In addition,
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O the Control Room Simulator vill be used to permit a degree of " free
play" on the part of the Operations staff. The extent of this " free play" may be partially restricted by Controllers as necessary to keep the sequence of events on track.
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The scenario vill simulate a sequence of events resulting in a i
radiological release to the environment. This. release vill be of a l
sufficient magnitude to varrant mobilization of state and local agencies in response to the simulated emergency.
The scenario vill also incorporate a Medical Drill with participation
by local emergency medical services and a support hospital.
In the development of an accident sequence which is severe enough to
adequately test the emergency response capabilities of participating
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organizations, it is necessary to postulate extremely unrealistic j
situations and multiple failures of redundant reactor protection
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I functions and systems. However remote the possibility of these events occurring, Players are reminded to respond appropriately.
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1-2 1993 Evaluated Exercise F
I.2 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POVER STATION OBJECTIVES-
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REF.
FACILITIES OBJECTIVE A.1 Administrative CONDUCT AN EXERCISE OF THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POVER STATION (DBNPS) EMERGENCY PLAN, ANNUALLY.
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A.2 Administrative PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE STATE OF OHIO, OTTAVA
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COUNTY, AND LUCAS COUNTY TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EXERCISE, ANNUALLY (FULL VS PARTIAL PARTICIPATION).
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A.3 Administrative PREPARE AN EXERCISE INFORMATION PACKAGE TO MEET MINIMUM STANDARDS.
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A.4 Administrative CONDUCT A CRITIQUE OF THE EXERCISE.
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A.5 Administrative ESTABLISH MEANS TO ENSURE COMPLETION OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.
A.6 Administrative INVOLVE FEDERAL, STATE, COUNTY EP RESPONSE PERSONNEL AND AGENCIES IN A JOINT EXERCISE AT LEAST ONCE EVERY TVO -
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YEARS.
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A.9 Administrative CONDUCT THE EXERCISE IN VARIOUS VEATHER CONDITIONS
(DURING DIFFERENT SEASONS).
B.1 All DEMONSTRATE THE DIRECTION OF THE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN AND EMERGENCY
PLAN PROCEDURES.
t B.2 Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE TRANSFER OF THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR
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ECC DUTIES.
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B.3 All DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY FOR TIMELY ACTIVATION AND STAFFING OF THE EMERGENCY FACILITIES.
B.4 All DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO CONTROL ACCESS TO EMERGENCY
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FACILITIES.
B.7 RTL DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY OF A CENTRAL POINT FOR THE
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A RECEIPT AND ANALYSIS OF ALL FIELD MONITORING DATA AND COORDINATION OF SAMPLE MEDIA.
B.9 ECC DEMONSTRATE THE AVAILABILITY AND DISPATCH OF A TECHNICAL LIAISON TO OFFSITE GOVERNMENTAL EOC'S (DEMONSTRATE ONLY VITH FULL OFFSITE PARTICIPATION).
C.1 Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO ASSESS THE INCIDENT
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TSC CONDITIONS.
C.2 Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE EMERGENCY ACTION O
ECC, TSC LEVELS (EAL'S) AND PROPERLY CLASSIFY THE INCIDE!G.
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1-4-1993 Evaluated Exercise
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FACILITIES OBJECTIVE E.5 OSC, ECC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO CONTINUOUSLY MONITOR AND
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CONTROL EMERGENCY VORKER EXPOSURE.
h E.7 ECC, RTL, RMT DEMONSTRATE THE RESOURCES AND CAPABILITY FOR FIELD MONITORING VITHIN THE PLUME EXPOSURE EPZ.
E.11 OSC DEMONSTRATE THE AVAILABILITY OF RESPIRATORY PROTECTION, f
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND KI.
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E.12 OSC, TSC DEMONSTRATE THE ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY TO AUTHORIZE.
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EMERGENCY VORKER EXPOSURE IN EXCESS OF 10CFR20 LIMITS.
i E.15 OSC, SEC DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY FOR TRANSPORTATION OF A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIM (MEDICAL DRILL REQUIREMENT).
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e E.17 DEMONSTRATE THE PISPONSE TO, AND ANALYSIS OF, SIMULATED l
ELEVATED AIRBORNE AND LIQUID SAMPLES AND DIRECT RADIATION
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MEASUREMENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENT.
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F.1 ECC DEMONSTRA*rE THE ABILITY TO RECOMMEND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TO APPROPRIATE OFFSITE AUTHORITIES; BASES OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF PROTECTION
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AFFORDED BY SHELTERING, AS VELL AS EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES.
F.2 JPIC DEMONSTRATE THE OPERATION OF THE JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION
[
CENTER AND THE AVAILABILITY OF SPACE FOR THE MEDIA.
t F.3 JPIC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO BRIEF THE MEDIA IN A CLEAR,
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ACCURATE AND TIMELY MANNER.
F.4 JPIC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE ADVANCE C00".DINATION l
OF INFORMATION RELEASED (DEMONSTRATED ONLY VITH FULL
.
OFFSITE PARTICIPATION).
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F.6 SEC DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY TO EVACUATE NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL.
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F.11 OSC DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY FOR ONSITE FIRST AID (MEDICAL j
DRILL REQUIREMENT).
i F.12 OSC DEMONSTRATE THAT PROVISIONS ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE EVALUATION OF RADIATION EXPOSURE OF, AND RADIATION UPTAF.E IN A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIM (MEDICAL DRILL
,
REQUIREMENT).
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G.1 All DEMONSTRATE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF REENTRY AND RECOVERY CAPABILITIES AND AVAILABILITY OF PROCEDURES.
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1-2 1993 Evaluated Exercise
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1.2 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POVER STATION OBJECTIVES
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REF.
FACILITIES OBJECTIVE A.1 Administrative CONDUCT AN EXERCISE OF THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POVER
'
STATION (DBNPS) EMERGENCY PLAN, ANNUALLY.
A.2 Administrative PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE STATE OF. OHIO, OTTAVA COUNTY, AND LUCAS COUNTY TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EXERCISE,
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ANNUALLY (FULL VS PARTIAL PARTICIPATION).
A.3 Administrative PREPARE AN EXERCISE INFORMATION PACKAGE TO MEET MINIMUM STANDARDS.
A.4 Administrative CONDUCT A CRITIQUE OF THE EXERCISE.
A.5 Administrative ESTABLISH MEANS TO ENSURE COMPLETION OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.
A.6 Administrative INVOLVE FEDERAL, STATE, COUNTY EP RESPONSE PERSONNEL AND AGENCIES IN A JOINT EXERCISE AT LEAST ONCE EVERY TVO YEARS.
A.9 Administrative CONDUCT THE EXERCISE IN VARIOUS VEATHER CONDITIONS (DURING DIFFERENT SEASONS).
B.1 All DEMONSTRATE THE DIRECTION OF THE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN AND EMERGENCY
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PLAN PROCEDURES.
B.2 Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE TRANSFER OF THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR
ECC DUTIES.
B.3 All DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY FOR TIMELY ACTIVATION AND STAFFING OF THE EMERGENCY FACILITIES.
B.4 All DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO CONTROL ACCESS TO EMERGENCY FACILITIES.
B.7 RTL DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY OF A CENTRAL POINT FOR THE RECEIPT AND ANALYSIS OF ALL rL MNITORING DATA AND COORDINATION OF SAMPLE MEP1A.
B.9 ECC DEMONSTRATE THE AVAILABILITY AND DISPATCH OF A TECHNICAL
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LIAISON TO OFFSITE GOVEINMENTAL EOC'S (DEMONSTRATE ONLY VITH FULL OFFSITE PARTICIPATION).
!
C.1 Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO ASSESS THE INCIDENT TSC CONDITIONS.
C.2 Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE EMERGENCY ACTION t
O ECC, TSC LEVELS (EAL'S) AND PROPERLY CLASSIFY THE INCIDENT.
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1-3 1993 Evslustcd Exercisa REF.
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FACILITIES OBJECTIVE D.1 Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO NOTIFY KEY OFFICIALS IN THE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONS (STATION, CORPORATE, STATE OF ECC OHIO, OTTAVA COUNTY, AND LUCAS COUNTY) VIA THE NOTIFICATION SYSTEM / PROCEDURES VITHIN 15 MINUTES OF CLASSIFICATION.
D.2 Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO NOTIFY THE NRC OF ANY EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION VITHIN ONE HOUR OF THE ECC OCCURRENCE.
D.3 All DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY TO NOTIFY AND/OR ACTIVATE EMERGENCY PERSONNEL IN EACH RESPONSE ORGANIZATION.
D.4 Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO DEVELOP AND SEND AN INITIAL ECC EMERGENCY MESSAGE FOR OFFSITE NOTIFICATION.
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D.5 Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO DEVELOP AND SEND FOLLOV-UP ECC MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION FOR OFFSITE AUTHORITIES.
D.6 Control Room, DEMONSTRATE THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY AMONG THE CONTROL ROOM, TSC AND ECC, AND AMONG DBNPS, THE STATE OF TSC, ECC OHIO, OTTAVA COUNTY, AND LUCAS COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS AND THE FIELD ASSESSMENT TEAMS, TO INCLUDE EVALUATION OF THE ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND MESSAGE CONTENT (COMMUNICATIONS DRILL REQUIREME!E).
DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO DEVELOP A LEGITIMATE, D.8 ECC INFORMATIVE, AND CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD MESSAGE TO BE SENT TO STATE, AND COUNTY OFFICIALS VHO MAKE DECISIONS TO ACTIVATE THE ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS.
DEMONSTRATE THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY VITH STATE, D.9 ECC OTTAVA COUNTY AND LUCAS COUNTY VITHIN THE PLUME EXPOSURE EPZ.
(COMMUNICATION DRILL VERIFY OBERABILITY OF HARDWARE ONLY).
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D.12 OSC, SEC DEMONSTRATE THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY VITH FIXED AND MOBILE MEDICAL SUPPORT FACILITIES (MEDICAL DRILL REQUIREMENT).
DEMONSTRATE THE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING E.1 ECC THE SOURCE TERM OF RELEASES OR POTENTIAL RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL VITHIN PLANT SYSTEMS.
DEMONSTRATE THE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING E.2 ECC THE MAGNITUDE OF THE RELEASES OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS BASED ON PLANT SYSTEM PARAMETERS AND EFFLUENT MONITORS.
DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO ESTIMATE INTEGRATED DOSE FROM l
E.3 ECC PROJECTED AND ACTUAL DOSE RATES AND TO COMPARE THESE l
ESTIMATES VITH THE PAG'S.
.
l E.4 OSC, ECC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT EXPOSURE GUIDELINES.
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'I-4 1993 Evalunted Exercism
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REF.
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FACILITIES OBJECTIVE E.5 OSC, ECC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO CONTINU0USLY MONITOR AND-l CONTROL EMERGENCY VORKER EXPOSURE.
E.7 ECC, RTL, RMT DEMONSTRATE THE RESOURCES AND CAPABILITY FOR FIELD MONITORING VITHIN THE PLUME EXPOSURE EPZ.
_
E.Il OSC DEMONSTRATE THE AVAILABILITY OF RESPIRATORY PROTECTION, PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND KI.
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E.I2 OSC, TSC DEMONSTRATE THE ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY TO AUTHORIZE l
EMERGENCY VORKER EXPOSURE IN EXCESS OF 10CFR20 LIMITS.
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E.15 OSC, SEC DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY FOR TRANSPORTATION OF A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIM (MEDICAL DRILL REQUIREMENT).
E.17 DEMONSTRATE THE RESPONSE TO, AND ANALYSIS OF, SIMULATED ELEVATED AIRBORNE AND LIQUID SAMPLES'AND DIRECT RADIATION MEASUREME!US IN THE ENVIRONMENT.
F.1 ECC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO RECOMMEND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TO APPROPRIATE OFFSITE AUTHORITIES; BASES OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF PROTECTION AFFORDED BY SHELTERING, AS VELL AS EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES.
F.2 JPIC DEMONSTRATE THE OPERATION OF THE JOIin PUBLIC INFORMATION i
CENTER AND THE AVAILt.BILITY OF SPACE FOR THE MEDIA.
F.3 JPIC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO BRIEF THE MEDIA IN A CLEAR, ACCURATE AND TIMELY MANNER.
F.4 JPIC DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE ADVANCE COORDINATION
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0F INF0PJMTION RELEASED (DEMONSTRATED ONLY VITH FULL OFFSITE PARTICIPATION).
F.6 SEC DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY TO EVACUATE NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL.
F.11 OSC DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY FOR ONSITE FIRST AID (MEDICAL DRILL REQUIREMENT).
F.12 OSC DEMONSTRATE THAT PROVISIONS ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE EVALUATION OF RADIATION EXPOSURE OF, AND RADIATION UPTAKE IN A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIM (MEDICAL DRILL
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REQUIREMENT).
G.1 All DEMONSTRATE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF REENTRY AND RECOVERY CAPABILITIES AND AVAILABILITY OF PROCEDURES.
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6-6 1993 Evaluated Exercise
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6.3 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS CC#
T: Time Time Event
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00/00 0800 The Shift Supervisor is briefed in the Control
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Room and the Drill Authorization Form is
approved.
NOTE:
The 1993 Evaluated Exercise vill utilize the Control Room Simulator.to
,
conduct Operator response.instead of the actual Control Room.
An off-shift Operations crev vill be pre-staged and briefed at the
'
Simulator with the exception of the Equipment Operators who will pre-stage in the plant.
Pre-
'
designated Haintenance, Chemistry and Radiation Protection personnel vill
+
assemble at the OSC once it is activated.
Since Players will not be able to use their normal communica-tions channels to contact each other, an " Exercise Phone List" vill be
.
provided.
.
)
The pre-designated Continuous Service Chemistry
,
and Radiation Protection personnel receive the-initial conditions and stand by at their respective offices to begin Exercise response when contacted via phone. The pre-designated Haintenance personnel can be reached via
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Gai-tronics.
00/10 0810 The Lead Exercise Controller at the Control Room
Simulator will direct the following actions:
1.
A Gai-tronics announcement for the start
,
of the Exercise.
2.
Activation of the ERO pager drill code.
which advises all ERO pager carriers t
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the pages which follow are related to 'he Drill.
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00/30 0830 A lightning strike in the switchyard on the 4=
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345 KV transmission system results in the
trip of the generator output break.ers 6.
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(ACB 34560 & 61). The rapid loss of load from
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the main turbine causes a high vibration trip of the turbine. These sudden stress-related changes
cause several blades to' separate from the turbine rotor and penetrate the casing. Additional damage O-inflicted by the blades includes the condensate
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storage tanks, the Lov Pressure (LP) Condenser tubes, and the LP Condenser shell.
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6-7 1993 Evaluated Exercise
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CC#
T: Time Time Event NOTE:
Refer to Section 10.0 of this manual for additional description of equipment transients or failures.
00/33 0833 In response to the Reactor trip, the Control Room Operators attempt to start #2 Hakeup Pump, however, it fails to start due to shaft seizure.
00/35 0835 The transient on the electrical grid induces a vibration on the 2-1 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP), which ultimately results in impeller damage. RCP vibration and loose parts monitor alarms occur.
00/40 0840 An ALERT declaration is made per EAL 7.F.2 due
to turbine failure causing casing penetration.
As per the Alert procedure, HS-EP-01700:
Station Alarm vill be sounded via a
request from the Control Room (Simulator)
to the real Control Room. The ALERT Gai-tronics announcement vill be made at the simulator.
The Computerized Automated Notification
System (CANS) vill be activated to notify and call out the on call Emergency Response Organization (ERO), notify the Toledo Edison Company Telephone Operator, and page the Davis-Besse NRC Resident Inspectors.
Ottava and Lucas Counties and the State of
Ohio are notified of the Alert.
NOTE:
In order to minimize the activities demanded of the actual on-shift Control Room staff, the Vhite Phone vill be simulated as out of service requiring the Simulator staff to use the alternate means of State and local notification via the Toledo Edison Company Telephone Operator.
The NRC will be notified that the Drill ~
has begun via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) Red Phone.
Follow-up calls to NRC vill be made to the Control Cell.
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6-8 1993 Evaluated Exercise CC#
f 's-LT: Time
' Time Event-
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NOTE:
These activities will be performed with assistance from.the.on-shift
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operations personnel from the real Control Room.
00/42 0842 Reports from Turbine Building indicate severe 8X flooding in the East and Vest Condenser Pits.
00/45+
0845+
~The Control Room (Simulator) staff vill be
,
directing the on-shift crew to perform various
,
plant shutdown' functions (e.g., startup of the Auxiliary Boiler).
NOTE:
Because of the Exercise artificiali-ties created by using the Simulator.
rather than the actual Control Room,
<
the " Exercise Phone List" vill be-
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used to make these notifications.
00/50 0850 ERO staff begin to arrive in the Emergency
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Response Facilities (ERFs).
The medical " victim", Controllers and Equipment Operator are pre-staged at the accident scene for the Medical Drill.
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00/50+
0850+
Non-essential personnel within the Protected
Area assemble in the designated Assembly Areas within the Personnel Shop Facilities (PSF)
Building.
- Access to the Ovner Controlled Area, DBAB ERFs and the Protected Area are restricted as per Security procedure HS-EP-02510.
NOTE:
Access to the Owner Controlled Area and Protected. Area vill be restored by the controllers after approxi-mately 30 minutes. Canceling of tours and training classes vill be
'
simulated.
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Flooding in the Turbine Building basement
!
causes a loss of most electrical equipment on that level, including the Motor Driven Feed l
t Pump.
10X 00/55 0855 Contingency input in the event an Alert has
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not been declared by this time.
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00/57 0857 Several fuel rods, aggravated by metal fragments from the'2-1 RCP impeller, begin releasing gap activity into the primary coolant. Activity equivalent'to approximately 35% gap is eventually released into the coolan.
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6-9 1993 Evaluated Exercise T: Time Time Event CC#
01/00 0900 For the Exercise,_ security access restrictions
are relaxed. Assembled personnel are returned
to work.
01/05 0905 Two maintenance individuals who did not hear the
announcement for site assembly are working in
the #3 Hechanical Penetration Room.
A chain hoist is being used to lift some heavy equip-ment.
Suddenly the hoist gives way, knocking one individual down into an area of the room with radioactive contamination.
Part of the hoisting. equipment crashes into Containment Penetration No. 59, breaking open the piping test connection.
The uninjured maintenance worker notifies a roving Equipment Operator who contacts the Control Room (Simulator). The First Aid Team is called out.
01/15 0915 The letdown monitor (failed fuel monitor)
alarms on high radiation.
Upon inspection by the First Aid Team, the injured victim is found to have several abrasions, a broken vrist and tvisted knee.
Contamination is present. The victim requests to be transported to the Fremont Memorial Hospital. The First Aid Team informs the Control Room (Simulator).
Security monitors the First Aid Team communications and subsequently CAS/SAS calls for offsite assistance via the Ottava County Sheriff's Dispatcher.
NOTE:
Normally 911 vould be used, however,
a non-emergency telephone number will be used for this Exercise.
Priority at the Sheriff's Office vill be directed to real emergencies that may be reported on the 911 system.
The Sheriff's Dispatcher vill tone out (page)
Mid-County Emergency Medical Services and advise them that the individual is contaminated.
01/25 0925 The CAS/SAS Operator vill call Fremont Hemorial
Hospital and advise them that a contaminated injured individual vill be transported from Davis-Besse.
NOTE: The procedure stipulates Hagruder Hospital, k
however, for the purposes of this Exercise, Hagruder vill not be utilized. Refer to Section 8.7 of this manual for additional medical drill informatio m
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6-10 1993 Evaluated Exercise i
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T: Time Time Event CC#
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01/30 0930 Due to the indications of high coolant activity, Chemistry personnel vill be requested to;take
a Reactor Coolant System sample.
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01/30+
0930+
An Auxiliary Feed Pump lov suction pressure j
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alarm occurs due to the decreasing Condensate Storage Tank levels. Operators may transfer j
suction to the Service Water supply header.
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01/40 0940 Chemistry personnel draw a RCS sample.
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NOTE: An actual RCS sample vill not be drawn, since it is not part of this year's extent of
'
play. Refer to Section 8.6 of this manual for
'
additional PASS information.
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02/10 1010 Conditions created by the ruptured condensate j
piping'causes the #1 Auxiliary Feed Pump
'
governor to fail, making the pump overspeed and eventually seize up.
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02/45 1045 Condensate Storage Tanks are nearly empty and j
aside from the #2 Auxiliary Feed Pump (AFP) lined i
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f~
up vith service water or the Fire Protection water
!
t system, no other feedvater source is available to
-
the Steam Generators.
,
02/50 1050 Suction Pressure svitch to $2 AFP fails, closing the steam supply valve, and stopping the pump.
,
Personnel are dispatched to investigate, but the
,
problem is not readily apparent. An attempt is r
made to cross-connect with the Fire Protection
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System, however, the cross-connect valve FP-27 von't open.
03/00 1100 A SITE AREA EMERGENCY declaration is made per
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EAL 3.d.3 due to a loss of all feedvater when the condensate storage tanks go dry and service water is unavailable for auxiliary feedvater.
As per the Site Area Emergency procedure, HS-EP-01800:
t Station Alarm vill be sounded and Site
Area Emergency announcement made via a
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request from the ECC to the real Control Room.
the ERO, Toledo Edison Company Telephone
,
(-)
Operator, and the Davis-Besse NRC Resident Inspectors are notified via phone contact
,
or announcements in the ERFs. The CANS
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vill be utilized in this activity.
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1993 Evaluated Exercise 6-11 CC#
T: Time Time. Event Ottava and Lucas Counties and the State of
Ohio are notified of the Site Area Emergency.
The NRC Incident Response Center notifica-
tions (i.e., Red Phone) are made to the Control Cell.
Ovner Controlled Area assembly vill NOTE:
be simulated.
Plant Operators Line-up systems for a Hake-up/
03/00 1100+
High Pressure Injection Reactor Cooling mode.
"
This provides water from the Borated Vater Storage Tank through the Reactor Coolant System out the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve for the purpose of removing decay heat from the reactor.
Due to the earlier fuel rod damage, radioactivity levels in the Containment Building atmosphere begin increasing dramatically.
20X 03/10 1110 Contingency input in the event a Site Area Emergency has not been declared by this tim'.
Because of increasing Containment pressure and 05/00 1300 the damaged test connection, penetration No. 59 releases radioactivity into the No. 3 Hechanical Room allowing the emergency ventilation system to drav the activity out through the Station Vent (refer to Figure 6.3-1).
Refer to Section 8.1 of this manual for NOTE:
data indicating the changes in in-plant radiation levels caused by this event.
This results in an offsite release to the environment, which produces increased dose assessment activities and efforts to track the plume with surveys taken by Radiation Monitoring Teams.
Refer to Section 9.4 of this manual for NOTE:
additional information on field moni-toring.
The dose assessment and/or field survey results 05/00+
1300+
vill be utilized to determine protective action recommendations for the public. These recommendations as a minimum should include to five sheltering in a two mile radius and out miles dovn vind.
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6-12 1993 Evaluated Exercise T: Time Time Event CC#
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f-s (
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05/10 1310 A GENERAL EMERGENCY declaration is made per 21-EAL 6.D.3 due to projected radiation levels at the site boundary of greater than 1 Rem /haur
.
Whole Body or EAL 1.E.1 due to loss of 2 of 3
.
'
fission product barriers with a potential loss; of the third.
.
As per the General Emergency procedure,
,
HS-EP-01900:
,
Station Alarm vill be sounded and General.
-
Emergency announcement made via a request from the ECC to the real Control Room.
}
I The ERO, Toledo Edison Company Telephone
"
Operator, and the Davis-Besse NRC Resident Inspectors are notified via phone contact or announcements in the ERFs. The CANS vill be utilized in this activity.
Ottava and Lucas Counties and the State of-
Ohio are notified of the General Emer-
,
gency.
The NRC incident Response Center notifica-
t k'~',s/
tions (i.e., Red Phone) are made to the s_
Control Cell.
News releases are prepared and press briefings
.
are held at the alternate Joint Public i
Information Center. The public alert and notification system activation is simulated.
r i
05/15 1315 Operators may shift to Decay Heat Removal at this time. Data in this package supports this
action, however, procedural guidance is limited and engineering judgement may be used to determine an alternate course of action.
05/25 1325 Contingency input in the event a General 22X
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Emergency has not been declared by this time.
,
05/45 1345 Additional dose assessment is performed (refer to Table 6.3-1).
Offsite protective action recommendations are upgraded because of increased offsite radiation levels. The-l revised protective actions are forwarded.to State and local officials.
'
06/02 1402 A Repair Team succeeds in sealing the broken test connection on penetration No. 59 stopping the-
'
release of radioactive materials from CTMT. The
'
Station Vent monitor begins to lover in value as the remaining radioactive material in the Auxiliary Building is. purged out.
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6-13 1993 Evaluated Exercise T: Time Time Event CC#
06/15
~1415 The Station Vent monitor reading drops off - the release has ended.
06/30 1430 Declassification discussions occur.
23X 06/45 1445 The Evaluated Exercise is terminated.
25 Termination announcement is made over the
Gai-tronics and in all ERFs.
The ERO pager all clear code is activated.
- This advises all ERO pager carriers that the Exercise is over.
,
The NRC vill be notified via the red phone
that the Davis-Besse drill activities have ended.
A short break vill be taker.
Following the break critiques will be hrad in each of the participating facilities.
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07/45 1545 Recovery meeting occurs in DBAB Rooms 209/210
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