IR 05000346/1993001

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Final SALP Rept 50-346/93-01 for Period of 911201-930630
ML20057D373
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 09/24/1993
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20057D363 List:
References
50-346-93-01-01, 50-346-93-1-1, NUDOCS 9310040156
Download: ML20057D373 (17)


Text

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Enclosure 1 SALP 10

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FINAL SALP REPORT l

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE Inspection Report No. 50-346/93001

Toledo Edison Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station December 1, 1991, through June 30, 1993 9310040156 930924 PDR ADOCK 05000346 G

PDR

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Enclosure 1

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Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

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A.

Summary of Meetino with Toledo Edison Company on September 16. 1993

The findings and conclusions of the SALP Board are documented in' Report No. 50-346/93001 and were discussed with the licensee on September 16,

,

1993, at the Davis-Besse Administration Building.

l During the meeting, several specific items were brought up for discussion. These included:

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1.

Control room noise levels.

The NRC indicated that noise levels were fairly high but within regulatory limits. The licensee agreed but noted that, although not directly a regulatory concern, substantial efforts had been made to reduce overall noise levels

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in the control room, including a recently implemented modification

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to change the #3 and #4 main turbine control valves' controlling position.

It was noted that this modification has resulted in i

some overall loss in generating capacity. The Vice President -

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Nuclear then committed to reassess followup actions taken to date

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and to continue evaluation of potential corrective actions.

2.

Personnel errors.

A brief discussion was held regarding personnel errors that had occurred during the assessment period, primarily in the operations area. The licensee indicated that management would continue to be sensitive to these problems and

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would continue efforts to further reduce the number and significance.

Some of the actions discussed included outage i

related training for the operating crews, more self assessments to be done within the operations organization, and restriction of the authority to perform independent verifications to senior reactor operators (as a minimum, for some interim period of time).

j 3.

Contamination control problems.

In response to contamination control problems that occurred at the beginning of the last refueling outage, the licensee indicated future outage schedules would incorporate more flexibility to address unforeseen radiological conditions and associated deconning activities within containment. Additionally, efforts would-be made to better assure, overall, that significant work activities such as the one discussed would not be as schedular driven in the future.

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i B.

Comments Received From Licensee

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The Toledo Edison response to the initial SALP 10 report, dated September 23, 1993, had no comments requiring revision to the initial SALP report. However, based on discusssion with the licensee and further review of the report, several minor changes were identified.

These changes are listed in Enclosure 3 and the revised pages are included as Enclosure 4.

C.

Meetina Attendeet While.the meeting was primarily a discussion between the licensee and NRC, it was open to members of the public as observers.

The following licensee and NRC personnel were in attendance, as well as the noted observers.

l Centerior Enerav Corporation R. J. Farling, Chairman, President, CEO D. C. Shelton, Senior Vice President - Nuclear L. F. Storz, Vice President - Nuclear Toledo Edison Company J. K. Wood, Plant Manager G. A. Gibbs, Director, Engineering j

J. E. Moyers, Manager, Quality Assessment S. C. Jain, Director, Nuclear Services W. T. O'Connor, Manager, Regulatory Affairs Numerous other Toledo Edison Company personnel also attended.

Nuclear Reaulatory Commission H. J. Miller, Deputy Regional Administrator R. D. Lanksbury, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B S. Stasek, Senior Resident Inspector J. M. Shine, Resident Inspector J. B. Hopkins, Senior Project Manager, NRR Other.

B. Halsey, Director, Lucas County Emergency Management Agency (EMA)

D. Opfer, State Representative C. A._0'Claire, Radiological Planner, Ohio EMA J. R. Williams, Chief of Staff / State Liaison to NRC, Ohio EMA Z. A. Clayton, Radiation Response Coordinator, Ohio EPA D. C. Baer, Senior Health Physicist, Ohio Bureau of Rad Health J. Longenberger, State of Ohio Inspector J. C. Kuehner, Plain Dealer K. Bruce, Utility Rate Coordinator, City of Toledo

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Enclosure 2 U.S.NRC

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REGION lli

DAVIS BESSE

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NUCLEAR POWER STATION

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i SALP 10 MEETING

September 16,1993 Davis Besse Administration Building

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Oak Harbor, OH

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DAVIS BESSE SALP 10

l September 16,1993 AGENDA Opening Remarks:

H. J. Miller, Deputy Regional Administrator SALP Presentation:

S. Stasek, SRI (Plant Operations, Radiological Controls, Maintenance /

Surveillance, and Emergency Preparedness)

J. Shine, RI (Security and Engineering /

Technical Support)

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J. Hopkins, LPM, NRR (Safety Assessment / Quality Verification)

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Licensee Comments Closing Remarks:

H. J. Miller Inquiries:

Public and Media

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DAVIS-BESSE SALP 10 PLANT OPERATIONS

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CATEGORY 2

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i Performance was characterized by a conservative

operating philosophy with good involvement and-

support by management.

Programs were well

delineated; however, implementation errors continued to occur.

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STREhGTHS

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Conservative Operating Philosophy

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Shutdown Risk Program

Operator Response to At-Power Events

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Staffing C

- A _LE \\!GES

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Communicating Management Expectations

Shutdown System Response Knowledge OTH ER

Self-Assessment initiatives

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DAVIS-BESSE SALP 10

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RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS i

l CATEGORY 2t

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Performance improved and was very good, due to strong management support and a competent radiological controls staff.

S-9 E \\ G-HS

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e Management Support of ALARA/ Source l

Term Reduction

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i e

Staffing CF A _L E \\ G ES

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Contamination Control During Outage

Activities

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OTF ER e

Accuracy of Radiation Work Permits and Radiological Survey Maps

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DAVIS-BESSE SALP 10

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MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE CATEGORY 1 Performance continued to be excellent.

High quality programs and procedures maintained plant equipment in an excellent state of repair.

STR E \\ GT-S

Equipment Material Condition

Staffing

Program Implementation

Outage Planning OTF E l

Attention to Detail l

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DAVIS-BESSE SALP 10

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CATEGORY 1 Performance was characterized by excellent maintenance of the program, excellent interactions with State and county agencies, and annual exercise improvements.

S 9E\\GT iS e

Response Facilities and Equipment e

Interactions with Offsite Agencies e

Staffing e

Extensive Drill Program C 4 A _LE \\ G ES e

None

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DAVIS-BESSE SALP 10

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. SECURITY

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CATEGORY 1 Performance was characterized by excellent management' attention and support which resulted in effective implementation of the program.

STRENGTHS e

Management Support and Oversight e

Staffing e

Equipment C l A

_ _Eh GES e

None

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l DAVIS-BESSE SALP 10

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ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT

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l CATEGORY 1

Engineering and technical support improved and-

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was excellent with a well trained and

knowledgeable staff.

.i STRE\\ GTHS i

Staffing

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System Engineering i

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Support to Operations and Maintenance j

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CHALLEl\\ G ES

Examination Security-j j

Test Reviews OTHE9

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Backlog Reduction

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DAVIS-BESSE SALP 10

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SAFETY ASSESSMENT /

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QUALITY VERIFICATION

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i CATEGORY.1 i

Performance was characterized by excellent management support for programs that identified,

tracked, and resolved safety issues.

ST 9 El\\ GTF S

Interdepartmental Communications

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Quality Assurance Surveillances and

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Audits i

e Safety Review Groups OT -lE l

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Maintain Effectiveness with New Organization

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Operations Performance Oversight

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Enclosure 3

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REVISION SHEET I

PAGE LINE NOW READS SHOULD READ

23-25 Although improved, noise During the previous levels in the control assessment period, noise room from overhead steam levels in the control room piping continued to from overhead steam piping

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detract from were high, though within communications.

NRC guidlines. During this assessment period the noise levels were improved by

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i steam throttle valve repositioning.

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Basis: To more accurately describe the previous condition and actions taken by the licensee.

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... National Registry

... National Registry of of Radiation Protection of Radiation Protection Technicians...

-Technologists...

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Basis:

To accurately reflect name of the national certifying organization.

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1

... identifying a freon

... identifying a freon leak in one train...

migration in one train...

Basis: To more accurately describe that freon had migrated from one portion

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of the system to another and had not been released from the system.

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...such as Thermal

...such as Thermo-lag 330

Lag-330 fire barrier...

fire barrier...

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Basis: To accurately reflect the fire barrier's manufacturer's name.

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Enclosure' :4

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ntilation system. Although somewhat improved, improper equipment operation

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ha been a concern discussed in previous SALPs.

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The.a roach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety standpo' t was good. The operations department employed a critical self-assessme philosophy with management conducting ongoing observations and reviews o perator performance. The fire brigade responded well to fire alarms and i dications of fire.

Shift team response to operational events at power was exc lent with one exception. Control room operators, responding to a failure in th integrated control system late in the assessment period, took action that inad rtently caused reactor coolant system pressure to increase to its high pressu trip setpoint, causing the reactor to trip.

Operator cognizance o anel indications and equipment status was good.

However, there were a instances where operator cognizance was inadequate.

For example, early in the ssessment period, a hydrogen analyzer was inoperable for about 10 ho s and a mkeup pump was inoperable during a mode change near the end of the a sment period. Additionally, during the refueling outage, reactor ve ater level was allowed to increase, which resulted in borated water leak ast the reactor vessel head o-ring seals and wetting vessel head stud ho s sulting in additional unplanned radiation exposure.

The onshift crews continued to conduc cselves in a professional manner.

Access to the operating areas of the c room was controlled and extraneous activities were kept to a mi Although improved, noise levels in the control room from overhead steam p continued to detract from communications.

Log keeping improved, and

nformation in the log provided sufficient detail to reconstruct shift activi Plant housekeeping and

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control of combustible materials was good.

,

Staffing was ample. A six-shift rotation continue be effectively implemented.

Control room staffing greatly exceede chnical specification requirements.

In addition to the shift supervisor and sistant shift supervisor, a shift canager who is a licensed senior rea or operator continued to be assigned to support administrative and mai enance interface activities.

Use of overtime was not excessive and technica pecification overtime requirements were routinely met.

Operator initial q lification pass rate was 94 percent; operator requalification pass rate was 88 rcent.

However, some weaknesses, relating to operator knowledge of equip nt and i

system response during shutdown conditions, were self-identified.

2.

Perfomance rating Performance is rated Category 2 in this area. Performance was rated Cate ry 2 during the previous assessment period.

3.

Recorrnendations None.

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Radiological Controls

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1.

Analysis Good 'rformance in the radiation safety program was a result of strong manage nt support and a competent radiological controls staff.

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Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was good.

A commitment to source-term eduction was evidenced by early boration and hydrogen peroxide

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addition duri refueling shutdowns.

Efforts to maintain exposure as-low-as-reasonably-a ^ vable were excellent as demonstrated by the use of a new reactor head mi id, upgrading of the plant video tour program, and the use of a specially desig d high integrity waste container for shipping high activity

'

'

filters. Managemen was also involved in ensuring continued good water quality and upgradin facilities such as the new portable demineralizer and hot machine shop. Ad 'tional initiatives included continued support for the

,

National Registry of Ra 'ation Protection Technicians (NRRPT), an aggressive

self-assessment program, nd the implementation of the revised 10 CFR Part 20, I year before the deadlin

However, there were instance en management was less effective in ensuring quality.

Examples included:

the failure to use the liquid radwaste discharge monitor during a rel (2) the failure to complete decontamination in containment b commencing outage work,- and (3) the failure to properly evaluate the r ogical consequences before opening the equipment hatch which resulted in t ead of contamination and increased personnel contaminations.

In 'additio diation work permits and local survey maps occasionally did not accur y reflect actual working and plant

'

conditions.

'

The approach to identifying and resolving t cal issues from a safety standpoint was very good.

The overall expos istory was very good.

Cumulative dose in 1992 (no refueling outage)

bout 20 person-rem (0.2 person-Sieverts), and the dose for the 1993 60-refueling outage (RFO-8)

was about 330 person-rem (3.3 person-Sieverts). A hough the dose for RF0-8

,

was higher than anticipated, it was reasonable given the scope of RF0-8.

The'

i scope involved emergent work on the reactor head vent ine; steam generatcr

tube sleeving; and replacement of the feedwater nozzles one reactor coolant

!

pump motor, and both letdown coolers.

Comparisons of co chemistry measurements with the NRC remained good (26 agreements in comparisons), and i

j the station maintained a satisfactory cross-check program w h vendors.

p Radioactivity in liquid and gaseous effluents remained well b low regulatory

'

limits. Efforts to reduce solid radwaste and contaminated cre continued

,

with good success.

Improvements were also made in reducing radw te monitor operability problems. A performance weakness was noted when the ntainment

,

i emergency airlock access door was improperly secured resulting in i dequate controls over a high radiation area (containment).

Overall, staff levels, training, and qualifications were excellent.

Fo example, about half of the radiological protection (RP) technicians and s ff were certified by the NRRPT at the end of the assessment period.

Sufficie staff was available to provide coverage during routine and refueling outage

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d (2) identifying a freon leak in one train of the control roont emergency ve tilation system while working on the other train. Radiation monitor

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rel ed equipment problems were significantly reduced by improved preventive

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maint nance activities.

Alterna 'vely, early in the assessment period, a reactor trip was generated during sh tdown conditions (Group 1 rods were fully withdrawn in Mode 3) due to a persor el error while taking voltage readings on a non-vital electrical bus, j

Staffing levels were ample and qualifications of personnel were good.

Personnel perfor ing maintenance and surveillance act.ivities were' qualified,

!

knowledgeable, an< attentive to their tasks. The maintenance training program was well implemente However, deficiencies were noted in training personnel to perform independe verification and tagging.

2 -.

Performance Ratin Performance is rated Cate_

1 in this area.

Performance was rated Category

,

1 during the previous asse.

t period.

3.

Recommendations None.

  • i D.

Emeroency Preparedness

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1.

Analysis

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Performance was characterized by excellen intenance of the em gency preparedness (EP) program, excellent inter

~ ns with State anc county

'

agencies, and improved exercise performance Management effectiveness in ensuring quality w dxcellent. The emergency

.

response facilities and equiprent were maintained in an excellent state of

readiness.

The onsite meteorological monitoring p gram was significantly upgraded to better ensure the availability of good ta to emergency

responders. A notable achievement was the completion f an emergency radio communications system after several years of developme Additionally, the

.

public information brochure, developed in cooperation wi county officials, received a commendation from the Governor.

The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues f m a safety standpoint was good. After a thorough re-evaluation, plannin for radiation i

protection support during a fire response situation was accepta y revised.

Frequent remote circuit checks and monthly performance test resu s led to an acceptable reduction in the frequency of preventive maintenance on the emergency planning zone's (EPZ's) siren system.

The impact of an i, assable bridge was thoroughly addressed in a temporary revision to the EPZ's l

evacuation planning.

'!

No actual activations of the emergency plan occurred during the assessmen

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'ilcox and a new reactor coolant pump motor received from Westinghouse. Also, t

licensee was proactive in researching and resolving an issue concerning

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loc 1 leak rate testing of containment penetration bellows.

A higt energy-line-break equipment qualification issue was evaluated and acted upon wi i compensatory and long-term corrective measures in a high quality manner.

ndustry issues, such as Thermal Lag-330 fire barrier problems, were adequately. valuated and compensatory measures appropriately implemented.

Staffing of t Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB) and the Station Review Board was exce ent. Member qualifications greatly exceeded minimum regulatory requi.ments. Discussions in both forums were good, and all members were acti ly inv'olved.

Of note was the CNRB's review and discussion

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of the new 10 CFR P t 20 program implementation.

2.

Performance Rati Performance is rated Cate rv 1 in this area.

Performance was rated Category

,

i 2 with an improving trend ng the previous assessment period.

3.

Recommendations None.

IV.

SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES A.

Major Licensee Activities 1.

On December 6,1991, the plant was sh n to repair a failed emergency diesel generator (EDG) speed h.

2.

On December 11, 1991, the plant was restar e and synchronized to the grid after the EDG speed switch repairs were ompleted.

3.

On March 1, 1992, a reactor trip occurred as a sult of a maintenance personnel error.

4.

On March 2,1992, the plant was restarted and synchr ized to the grid.

5.

On february 28, 1993, the plant was shut down to commen the eighth refueling outage.

6.

On April 28, 1993, the plant was restarted and synchronized o the grid following completion of the eighth refueling outage.

7.

On May 20, 1993, a reactor trip occurred due to an it ut failure o the integrated control system.

8.

On May 21, 1993, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the gri

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Wilcox and a new reactor coolant pump motor received from Westinghouse. Also,

'

the licensee was proactive in researching and resolving an issue concerning l

local leak rate testing of containment penetration bellows.

!

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A high-energy-line-break equipment qualification issue was evaluated and acted upon with-compensatory and long-term corrective measures. in a high quality

,

'

manner.

Industry issues, such as Thermo-lag 330 fire barrier problems, were adequately evaluated and compensatory measures appropriately implemented.

i

!

Staffing of the Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB) and the Station Review Board was excellent. Member qualifications greatly exceeded minimum regulatory requirements.

Discussions in both forums were good, and all

!

members were actively involved. Of note was the CNRB's review and discussion of the new 10 CFR Part 20 program implementation.

'

2.

Performance Ratinq

Performance is rated Category 1 in this area.

Performance was rated Category

,

2 with an improving trend during the previous assessment period.

3.

Recommendations None.

IV.

SU.PPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES A.

Major Licensee Activities i

1.

On December 6,1991, the plant was shut down to repair a failed emergency diesel generator (EDG) speed switch.

j 2.

On December 11, 1991, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid after the EDG speed switch repairs were completed.

3.

On March 1, 1992, a reactor trip occurred as a result of a maintenance personnel error.

4.

'On March 2, 1992, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid.

5.

On Februar.t 28, 1993, the plant was shut down to commence the eighth refueling o tage.

6.

On April 28, 1993,. the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid following completion of the eighth refueling outage.

7.

On May 20, 1993, a reactor trip occurred due to an input failure to the integrated control system.

8.

On May 21, 1993, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid.

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. ventilation system. Although somewhat improved, improper equipment operation has been a concern discussed in previous SALPs.

.

The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety i

standpoint was good. The operations department employed a critical self-l assessment philosophy with management conducting ongoing observations and

!

reviews of operator performance. The fire brigade responded well to fire alarms and indications of fire. Shift team response to operational events at power was excellent with one exception.

Control room operators, responding to a failure in the integrated control system late in'the assessment period, took i

action that inadvertently caused reactor coolant system pressure to increase to its high pressure trip setpoint, causing the reactor to trip.

Operator cognizance of panel indications and equipment status was good.

However, there were a few instances where operator cognizance was inadequate.

For example, early in the assessment period, a hydrogen analyzer was

!

inoperable for about 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> and a makeup pump was inoperable during a mode l

change near the end of the assessment period. Additionally, during the

refueling outage, reactor vessel water level was allowed to increase, which

~ !

resulted in borated water leaking past the reactor vessel head o-ring seals and wetting vessel head stud holes resulting in additional unplanned radiation j

exposure.

l The onshift crews continued to conduct themselves in a professional manner.

Access to the operating areas of the control room was controlled and

!

extraneous activities were kept to a minimum.

During the previous assessment period, noise levels in the control room from overhead steam piping were high, i

though within NRC guidelines. During this assessment period the noise levels

-;

were improved somewhat by steam throttle valve repositioning.

Log keeping

'

improvd, and the information in the log provided sufficient detail to reconstruct shift activities.

Plant housekeeping and control of combustible materials was good.

'

Staffing was ample. A six-shift rotation continued to be effectively implemented.

Control room staffing greatly exceeded technical specification

requirements.

In addition to the shift supervisor and assistant shift t

supervisor, a shift manager who is a licensed senior reactor operator

!

continued to be assigned to support administrative and maintenance interface activities. Use of overtime was not excersive and technical specification

overtime requirements were routinely met. Operator initial qualification pass

!

rate was 94 percent; operator requalification pass rate was 88 percent.

However, some weaknesses, relating to operator knowledge of equipment and

system response during shutdown conditions, were self-identified.

2.

Performance ratina l

Performance is rated Category 2 in this area.

Performance was rated Category 2 during the previous assessment period.

3.

Recommendations None.

L

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B.

Radiological Controls

1.

Anal ysi s_

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Good performance in the radiation safety program was a result of strong management support and a competent odiological controls staff.

Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was good. A commitment to source-term reduction was evidenced by early boration and hydrogen peroxide addition during refueling shutdowns.

Efforts to maintain exposure as-low-as-reasonably-achievable were excellent as demonstrated by the use of a new reactor head shield, upgrading of the plant video tour program, and the use of a specially designed high integrity waste container for shipping high activity filters. Management was also involved in ensuring continued good water quality and upgrading facilities such as the new portable demineralizer and hot machine shop. Additional initiatives included continued support for the National Registry of Radiation Protection Technologists (NRRPT), an aggressive self-assessment program, and the implementation of the revised 10 CFR Part 20, 1 year before the deadline.

However, there were instances when management was less effective in ensuring quality.

Examples included:

(1) the failure to use the liquid radwaste discharge monitor during a release, (2) the failure to complete decontamination in containment before commencing outage work, and (3) the failure to properly evaluate the radiological consequences before opening the equipment hatch which resulted in the spread of contamination and increased personnel contaminations.

In addition, radiation work permits and local survey maps occasionally did not accurately reflect actual working and plant conditions.

The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety standpoint was very good. The overall exposure history was very good.

Cumulative dose in 1992 (no refueling outage) was about 20 person-rem (0.2 person-Sieverts), and the dose for the 1993 60-day refueling outage (RF0-8)

was about 330 person-rem (3.3 person-Sieverts). Although the dose for RFO-8 was higher than anticipated, it was reasonable given the scope of RF0-8. The scope involved emergent work on the reactor head vent line; steam generator tube sleeving; and replacement of the feedwater nozzles, one reactor coolant pump motor, and both letdown coolers.

Comparisons of cold chemistry measurements with the NRC remained good (26 agreements in 29 comparisons), and the station maintained a satisfactory cross-check program with vendors.

Radioactivity in liquid and gaseous effluents remained well below regulatory limits.

Efforts to reduce solid radwaste and contaminated areas continued with good success.

Improvements were also made in reducing radwaste monitor operability problems. A performance weakness was noted when the containment emergency airkck access door was improperly secured resulting in inadequate controls over a high radiation area (containment).

Overall, staff levels, training, and qualifications were excellent.

For example, about half of the radiological protection (RP) technicians and staff were certified by the NRRPT at the end of the assess

+ period. Sufficient staff was available to provide coverage during rout 1 1 refueling outage

{

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_

..

.

__

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!

.

.

and (2) identifying a freon migration in one train of the control room

!

emergency ventilation system while working on the other train.

Radiation a

monitor related equipment problems were significantly reduced by improved

preventive maintenance activities.

i Alternatively, early in th'e assessment period, a reactor trip was generated during' shutdown conditions (Group 1 rods were fully withdrawn in Mode 3) due

,

to a personnel error while taking voltage readings on a non-vital electrical bus.

Staffing levels were ample and qualifications of personnel were good.

Personnel performing maintenance and surveillance activities were qualified,

!

knowledgeable, and attentive to their tasks.

The maintenance training program

'

was well implemented. However, deficiencies were noted in training personnel

!

to perform independent verification and tagging.

2.

Performance Rating I

Performance is rated Category 1 in this area.

Performance was rated Category

!

I during the previous assessment period.

3.

Recommendations None.

D.

Emergency Preparedness i

l 1.

Analysis

!

!

Performance was characterized by excellent maintenance of the emergency

preparedness (EP) program, excellent interactions with State and county i

agencies, and improved exercise performance.

j i

Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was excellent. The emergency

.

response facilities and equipment were maintained in an excellent state of readiness. The onsite meteorological monitoring program was significantly i

upgraded to better ensure the availability of good data to emergency responders. A notable achievement was the completion of an emergency radio communications system after several years of development. Additionally, the public information brochure, developed in cooperation with county officials, received a commendation from the Governor.

The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety standpoint was good. After a thorough re-evaluation, planning for radiation protection support during a fire response situation was acceptably revised.

Frequent remote circuit checks and monthly performance test results led to an acceptable reduction in the frequency of preventive maintenance on the emergency planning zone's (EPZ's) siren system. The impact of an impassable

bridge was thoroughly addressed in a temporary revision to the EPZ's evacuation planning.

No actual activations of the emergency plan occurred during the assessment

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Dockee h aber 50-346 License Number NPF-3

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Serial Number 1-1026

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Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Villian T. O'Connor, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (419) 249-2366.

Very truly yours, o

s NKP/dle cc J. B. Hopkins, NRC Senior Project Manager S. Stasek, DB-1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector USNRC Document Control Desk Utility Padiological Safety Board i

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