IR 05000346/1993003
| ML20012G524 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1993 |
| From: | Mccormickbarge, Ploski T, Reidinger T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20012G522 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-93-03, 50-346-93-3, NUDOCS 9303050049 | |
| Download: ML20012G524 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/93003(DRSS)
f Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 l
r Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Centerior Service Company 300 Madison Avenue
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Toledo, OH 43652
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Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1
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Inspection At: Davis-Besse site, Oak Harbor, Ohio
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Inspection Conducted:
February 8-12, 1993 Inspectors:
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T. Ploski Date
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y.N mL,4 Aq fri ahsh3
Reidinger
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A!2 6/9 3 Approved By: hd) /U
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(A. W. McCormick-Barger, Chief Date
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Emergency Preparedness and Non-Power Reactor Section
Inspection Summary Inspection on February 8-12. 1993 (Report No. 50-346/93003(DRSS)
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Arees Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the operational status of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station's emergency preparedness (EP) program i
(IP 82701), follow-up on licensee action on previously identified item (IP
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82701) and review of changes to the onsite meteorological monitoring program
(IP 84750). Two NRC inspectors performed the inspection.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified. The overall status of i
the plant's EP program was excellent.
i No actual emergency plan activations occurred since October 1990. The
emergency response facilities remained well maintained. The emergency-
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response organization's (ER0's) staffing levels remained excellent.
Review of
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a random sample of records indicated that ERO members were not overdue for
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requalification training. The licensee continued the excellent practice of l
conducting annual emergency response facility walkthoughs and integrated j
facility drills, each of which involved three teams of response personnel.
j 9303050049 930226 ~
PDR ADOCK 05000346
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The licensee coordinated with offsite officials in addressing the impact on I
emergency planning zone's (EPZ's) evacuation planning caused by a lengthy j
bridge outage along one of the EPZ's evacuation routes.
The licensee had a major role in the multi-year development of a common emergency radio system
used by the majority of the following types of eligible organizations within j
the Ottawa County portion of the EPZ: providers of evacuation transportation
services, ambulance services, fire departments, law enforcement agencies and i
state parks. This radio system became fully operational in March 1992.
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DETAILS i
1.
Persons Contacted J. Wood, Operations Manager T. Anderson, Maintenance Services Superintendent
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M. Stewart, Nuclear Training Manager
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B. DeMaison, Emergency Preparedness Manager
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B. Cope, Onsite Emergency Planning Supervisor
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The above and ten other licensee staff attended the exit interview on February 12, 1993.
The inspectors contacted other licensee personnel during the inspection.
2.
Operational Status of the Emeroency Preparedness Proaram flP 82701)
a.
Actual Emeroency Plan Activations Review of NRC records indicated that no actual activations of the licensee's emergency plan occurred since October 8, 1990. The
evaluation of the Unusual Event which was declared on that date was documented in Inspection Report No. 50-346/91004(DRSS).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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b.
Emeroency Plan and Implementina Procedures
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By letter dated January 8, 1993, NRC approved Revision 16 of the licensee's emergency plan.
Records review indicated that the
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licensee sent NRC copies of all new and revised emergency plan
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implementing procedures (EPIPs) within 30 days of their effective dates, as required.
l Abnormal Procedure DB-0P-02508, " Control Room Evacuation," was
reviewed and was determined to contain good guidance to onshift
personnel on how the following actions would be accomplished:
l emergency classification; notification of state, county and NRC
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officials; activation of the licensee's emergency organization;
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and informing onsite personnel of the control room evacuation.
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Procedure DB-0P-02508 directed the assistant shift supervisor and the administrative assistant to report to a specific location in
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the personnel shop facility (PSF) in order to perform the offsite
agency notifications and to activate the emergency organization.
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The procedure then directed the former to do a shutdown margin calculation in accordance with a specified reactivity balance
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calculation procedure. The inspectors toured the designated
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location in the PSF and could not locate the referenced
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calculation procedure.
The licensee determined that the
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calculation procedure's identification number had changed and that j
the procedure's new number was not listed in the control room i
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evacuation procedure. The licensee updated the calculation procedure's reference in the control room evacuation procedure f
prior to the exit interview.
j Procedure HS-EP-02520, " Assembly and Accountability," listed a number of predesignated assembly areas in the site's protected and
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owner controlled areas and addressed all personnel within both I
areas.
Persons within the protected area would assemble following
any Alert or higher emergency class declaration, or when otherwise J
directed by the emergency plant manager.
The procedure indicated that all nonessential contractor personnel and visitors would be
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instructed to leave the site if an assembly was ordered within the
protected area. All persons remaining in the owner controlled
area would report to their assembly areas following any site area or general emergency declaration, or as directed by the emergency plant manager, while persons within the protected area would be accounted for upon leaving the protected area following either of those emergency declarations.
EPIP HS-EP-02270, " Facilities Support," provided guidance to the emergency facilities services manager responsible for the response facilities housed within the Davis-Besse Administration Building (DBAB). Steps 6.5.1 and 6.9.3 of this procedure indicated that the level in the DBAB's emergency diesel generator's fuel storage tank and the DBAB's potable water storage tank must be checked.
However, the procedure did not identify a minimum acceptable quantity of liquid for either storage tank and did not provide guidance on how either tank should be replenished.
l An inspector observed a successful, periodic run test of the DBAB's diesel generator, which was performed per procedure DBAB-i DG-4.
One procedure step required that the fuel level in the
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diesel's day tank be recorded.
Since this tank was not equipped
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with level instrumentation, the tank's level was recorded as "not applicable." The licensee indicated that the day tank lacked level instrumentation for several years and that the level of fuel in this tank was roughly estimated by tapping the side of the
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tank.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). Eouipment and Supolies
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The inspectors toured the operational support center (OSC),
technical support center (TSC), radiological testing laboratory (RTL), and the emergency control center (ECC), which was the
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licensee's emergency operations facility. The TSC, RTL and ECC were located in adjacent rooms on the first floor of the DBAB and shared a common emergency ventilation system.
Records review indicated that both trains of the ventilation system's particulate and radioiodine filters had passed performance tests conducted in October 1991 and February 1993, with the exception that the
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laboratory test results on samples of activated charcoal removed i
from the radiciodine filter beds in February 1993 were not yet
available from the vendor who performed the tests.
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Records indicated that all procedurally required emergency
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equipment inventories and communications equipment tests were
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performed since the previous inspection. The inspector noted infrequent instances of a failure to properly document one or more items on inventory and communications test checklists, even though i
the checklists were later reviewed and approved by a supervisor.
The inspectors checked the contents of several emergency equipment
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lockers within the RTL versus the relevant inventory checklists.
l Several minor discrepancies were noted and were corrected by the
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end of the inspection.
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There were 54 sirens within the plume pathway emergency planning
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zone (EPZ). County officials conducted monthly siren tests, while
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the licensee had the capability to remotely interrogate certain siren components to further ensure siren operability.
Remote
interrogations were performed on a weekly basis by a member of the EP staff, who was the point of contact for county officials and
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l for the vendor responsible for performing preventive and emergency
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l maintenance.
Preventive maintenance on each siren was reduced in frequency from annual to biennial several years ago.
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indicated that the latest preventive maintenance was completed in
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l late 1992.
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l In June 1986, the licensee committed to provide a common radio system to school districts that would provide emergency
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transportation services to their students and to mobility impaired l
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persons within the Ottawa County portion of the plume pathway EPZ.
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The " evacuation vehicle communications project" later expanded in
scope to include fire departments, emergency medical response i
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services, law enforcement agencies and state parks. The common
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communications system, also known as the 800 Mega Hertz (MHz)
i system, became operational in March 1992.
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l The multi-million dollar, 800 MHz system included the following
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equipment: four transmission towers; dispatch consoles installed
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I at three law enforcement agencies' offices; portable radios and radio chargers; radio base stations; mobile radios; and pagers and l
pager chargers.
The licensee agreed to totally fund the 800 MHz l
system, with the exception that users will begin funding 50
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percent of the maintenance costs on their radios in April 1996 or
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June 1997, depending on the type of user organization.
The licensee indicated that about 81 percent of the eligible l
l organizations were 800 MHz system users.
Besides the licensee,
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user organizations included: 11 of 17 fire departments and
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emergency medical response services; five of six school districts; l
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15 of 16 law enforcement agencies; all three state parks; and a
U. S. Coast Guard station.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
d.
Orcanization and Management Control
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The emergency preparedness (EP) manager continued to report to the
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vice president-nuclear through the technical services director.
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The manager's staff continued to be divided into onsite and i
offsite groups led by supervisors. Although the groups' duties i
were unchanged, each group decreased in size by one person since i
the January 1991 inspection, j
The emergency response organization's (ER0's) staffing levels l
remained excellent for all positions. Very few positions had only
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three qualified persons. The ERO remained divided into three j
response teams which periodically rotated being oncall.
Effective l
administrative mechanisms remained in place to ensure that only
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currently trained persons were on the callout roster and that i
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j arrangements for a qualified substitute were made if a member of l
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the oncall team would become unavailable for reasons such as
travel out of the local area.
Records indicated that the licensee continued to conduct semi-l
annual, off-hours telephone drills to demonstrate the capability
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to augment onshift personnel in a timely manner.
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Letters of agreement with offsite support organizations were
current. The agreement with a contractor, who provided expertise
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i in the event of an serious injury having radiological complications, was in the form of a purchase order.
Records indicated that good compensatory measures were taken due
to a bridge outage affecting one offsite evacuation route some l
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miles south of the site on Highway 19. A bridge was taken out of j
service for upgrading in late 1992 and was scheduled to be placed
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back in service in mid-1993. The licensee submitted an annex to its evacuation time estimate study addressing the unavailability of this bridge. A project plan indicated that the licensee coordinated with county, police, school, township and other officials in developing a traffic re-routing strategy for the duration of the bridge outage.
The licensee's annual public information brochure was revised in format about five years ago to include a calendar. The calendar
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included scenery photographs chosen from entrees submitted in response to a contest run by county officials. The licensee
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indicated that the latest distribution of the brochure / calendar
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was performed during the fourth quarter of 1992 and that approximately 22,000 copies of the publication were distributed within the EPZ.
In 1992, the licensee received a commendation
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from the Governor of Ohio for the public information
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brochure / calendar.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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e.
Trainina
The licensee continued the excellent practice of conducting l
emergency response facility walkthroughs, which were followed by
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integrated drills involving activation of all emergency response
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facilities.
These walkthroughs and drills involved each.of the three teams of emergency response personnel.
In cases where more than three persons were qualified for a response position, the extra individual (s) could either substitute for a counterpart on one of the teams or could serve as a drill controller, Records
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indicated that the integrated facility drills and the annual exercise were critiqued and that these activities more than met
the periodic functional drill commitments specified in the
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Records of EP training provided to licensed and non-licensed members of the licensee's ERO were reviewed to determine whether
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included several dozen operations personnel and several dozen persons assigned to key and support positions in the various
i emergency response facilities.
No cases were identified
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indicating that a person was overdue in completing requalification
a training required for his/her-assigned ERO position.
l The inspectors observed a training session on offsite dose i
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assessment provided to a group of licensed personnel. The
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training was adequate and included a lecture and several dose j
calculation problems to be done by using either a computerized j
i methodology or a nomogram.
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Inspection followup item (IFI) No. 346/91006-02 addressed the j
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needs for the licensee to consider providing fire response i
training to its radiation protection technicians (P, pts).
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indicated in Inspection Report No. 346/92004(DRSS), this IFI was
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considered " closed" once the licensee provided fire response
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training to the RPTs. The licensee reevaluated its position and
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no longer planned to train the RPTs in fire response. The
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licensee indicated that fire brigade personnel would be equipped with self-reading dosimetry so that they could remain aware of
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their radiological exposures.
Fire brigade personnel also received periodic training in radiation protection, including the use of certain radiation survey instruments. The licensee
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recognized that a survey instrument, or an individual's ability to read the instrument, could be adversely affected by conditions at
a fire scene.
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At least two RPTs were onshift at all times.
In the event of a i
fire within the radiologically controlled area (RCA) during I
offhours, the licensee now planned to have one RPT report to the control room to assist operations personnel in monitoring area
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radiation monitor and process radiation monitor readouts.
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Relevant radiation monitor readings would be relayed to the fire i
brigade, which would maintain communications with control room
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personnel. Another RPT would be available to assist the brigade
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by establishing a contamination control point at a safe location;
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however, this RPT would not be a member of the brigade and would not be at the fire scene.
If a fire occurred while the ERO was
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operational, the OSC's staff included a fire protection advisor and an RP coordinator who would help determine the optimum use of
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available RP and fire brigade-qualified staff. The licensee's i
revised planning regarding the interfaces of operations and RP staff during a fire response was acceptable.
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In late 1992, the licensee revised its method of meeting the requirement of offering orientation training to the local media.
Due to an apparent lack of media interest in attending an orientation session, the licensee cooperated with state and county emergency management agencies in developing a media information
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packet.
Records indicated that copies of this packet were sent to i
broadcast and print media organizations located within about a 50
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mile radius of the site. The licensee indicated that it planned to continue hosting a media "open house" prior to those exercises which involved the required participation of state and county agencies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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f.
Independent Reviews / Audits
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Records of 1991 and 1992 audits and surveillances of the EP
program were reviewed. The audits were thorough and met the
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requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t).
Records indicated good followup by the auditors on previously identified concerns.
Relevant portions of the audits were made available to state and county
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officials, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(t).
An inspector attended the exit meeting for the 1993 audit of the program. The audit appeared similar in scope to the previous two years' audits. The final 1993 audit report will be reviewed during a future inspection.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Onsite Meteoroloaical Monitorina Proaram (IP 84750)
l An inspector toured the monitoring site and discussed monitoring system
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upgrades with the cognizant system engineer. During 1990, the licensee made several excellent upgrades to the monitoring program. A redundant
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i train of wind and temperature sensors was installed on the freestanding
tower, while a redundant train of-wind sensors was installed on the nearby satellite tower. The primary train of wind and temperature
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sensors, as well as the associated signal conditioning and analog
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recording equipment, had primary and backup power supplies. The other train of sensors and signal conditioning equipment had one power supply.
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More modern wind speed and direction sensors were installed on both
towers to replace models of sensors used for over ten years. More
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modern signal conditioning equipment was installed for both sensor
trains. Wind speed and direction measurements were discontinued at the
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35 foot level on the freestanding tower due to its relatively w4de base.
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The 35 foot wind speed and direction measurements continued to '
made
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using sensors mounted on the satellite tower.
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i Following these equipment uporades, the licensee reduced the frequency of monitoring system calibrations from quarterly to semiannual. The semiannual frequency was consistent with the guidance in Regulatory
Guide 1.23 and was reasonable in view of the equipment upgrades and the j
provisions for periodic replacement of all wind sensors. The system I
engineer indicated that the 1992 valid data recovery rates associated j
with those combinations of primary train sensors, whose measurements
would be utilized in offsite dose calculations, were almost 97 percent.
These recovery rates exceeded the 90 percent criterion in Regulatory Guide 1.23.
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Onsite meteorological data remained available in the control room, TSC l
and ECC as 15 minute block averages. The system engineer performed l
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daily reviews of the data from both sensor trains and had the capability i
to select which of the redundant sensors' data would be available to users in the control room, TSC and ECC.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Exit Interview
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The inspectors held an exit interview on February 12, 1993, with those j
j licensee representatives identified in Section 1 to present and discuss the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none s
i of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.
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