IR 05000341/1990008
| ML20043F154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1990 |
| From: | Belanger J, Creed J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043F151 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-90-08, 50-341-90-8, NUDOCS 9006140194 | |
| Download: ML20043F154 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No.
50-341/90008(DRSS)
l License No.
NPF-43 i
Licensee:
Detroit Edison Company 2200 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226
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Facility Name:
Fermi 2 Atomic Power Plant Inspection At:
Plant Site Inspection Dates: April 30 - May 4, 1990 Inspector:
9. k. h%ty
[o[/hO J.
L'. Belanger Date Signed
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Senior Physical Security Inspector Approved By: b Ni [90 James R. Creed, Chief Date Signed Tafeguards Section Inspection Summary Inspection on April 30 to May 4. 1990 (Report No. 50-341/90008(DRSS)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced physical security inspection involving:
Ranagement Support; Protected and Vital Area Barriers; Access Control-Personnel, Packages; Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures; Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings; Allegation Review; and a review of the licensee's investigation action plans to address three potential tampering incidents.
Results:
Based on the results of this inspection we have evaluated reviewed portions of the licensee's physical security program as indicated below:
No violations were identified General Evaluation: The inspection noted improved maintenance support to the security organization as a result of the licensee's
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implementation of a maintenance improvement program. An assessment system is marginally effective.
Protected and vital area barriers and their associated detection systems
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are being effectively maintained. A significant reduction i
in the use of compensatory measures has occurred due to Enclosure Contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMA 9006140194 900601 PDR 'ADOCV 05000341 gpon Separation This a
PDC PaBe is Decontrolled
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improved maintenance of security equipment, Plant management is very supportive of the security program.
The program is being effectively managed to meet security plan commitments.
The importance of prompt coordination by plant operational personnel with security regarding
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potential tampering incidents involving plant equipment, required re-emphasis.
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Allegation Review:
Several of the allegations were partially substantiatod;
however, there were no violations of NRC requirr;ments identified. No weaknesses in the security program were identified as a result of the allegation review.
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Enclosure Contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATI
Upon Separation This Page is Decontrolled /
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ATTACHMENT-ALLEGATION REVIEW (Closed) A11egition RIII-90-A-0021 This allegation, which consists of five parts, was received by Region III on
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February 26, 1993.
Listed below are the allegations, NRC review actions, and conclusions based upon the inspector's review of the issues.
a.
Allegation:
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The alleger, a fonner security officer at Fermi 2, stated that he was discharged from Detroit Edison Company on " November 4, 1989." The termination was for falsifying security checke, The alleger questions whether this violation was reported to the NRC.
NRC Review Actions:
A review of the terminated security officer's personnel file showed that
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he was terminated on November 4, 1988, not 1989 as stated in the letter sent to the NRC. The personnel file shows that the individual was terminated for untrustworthy / unreliable behavior. Specifically, the individual made entries on his Nuclear Security Activity log indicating that he initiated and completed protected area barrier and/or vital area barrier patrols at specific times. He could not have made the patrols as recorded because he was physically in a location (s) where he could not inspect the affected barriers. The licensee determined this fact through a review of keycard transaction reports.
A review of the Security Director's " Activity Summary" log shows that phone calls-were made to the NRC project security inspector for Fermi on November 3 and 4,1988.
Region III was advised that the licensee had initiated a compliance investigation on the matter. The Region III project security inspector confirmed that these calls were received. A review of the Safeguards Events Log for Fourth Quarter 1988 disclosed that the incident was logged with an event date of November 3, 1988 and titled " Falsification of Records (SecurityOfficer)." The log entry also shows that the individual's keycard was deactivated and that an investigation of the incident was initiated.
Conclusion:
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The incident was " reported" to the NRC via informational telephone i
calls since the incident did not meet the criteria of a one hour reportable event telephone call described in paragraph !(a)(1) of Appendix G to 10 CFR 73.71. The licensee recorded the event on their
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safeguards event log submitted to the NRC for the fourth quarter of l
1988inaccordancewith10CFR73.71(c). The allegation was not substantiated.
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b.
Allegation:
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Security supervision altered his keycard and then made a new card.
The a11eger (a former security officer) stated that he believed that security supervision tampered and deliberately broke his keycard (#1505) on November 3, 1989, the last day he worked at Fermi.
NRC Review Actions:
The alleger stated that he was contacted at home on November 3, 1989, by a security officer at the Fermi site.
The officer told him that
supervision had ordered the caller to obtain keycard #1505 from the
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Alternate Access Portal and bring it to the supervisor's office. After
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securing the keycard, the caller stated that he ran the keycard through the turnstiles and noted that the card had been made inactive and noticed no alterations or defects with the key card.
The caller told the alleger that he proceeded to hand the keycard to a (named) supervisor and that this supervisor gave the keycard to the keycard custodian. The supervisor is quoted as saying: "This keycard is broken... make up a new keycard."
The a11eger stated that a new keycard was then made up for him (#1512).
The alleger stated that when he left for the day on November 3, 1989, his keycard had no defects at all with it.
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The General Supervisor-Security Operations (GSS0), who was acting for the Security Director on November 3-4, 1988, was interviewed regarding the allegation.
Also interviewed were the supervisor alleged to have ordered the retrieval of the keycard #1505 and fabrication of a new keycard, and the keycard custodian.
(Note: A review of the personnel records and interviews with the above individuals showed that the incident happened in November 1988 and not 1989 as stated in the alleger's letter).
The GSSO stated that he held a meeting with the former security officer on November 3, 1988, confronting him with the patrol log discrepancies.
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The GSSO told the officer to call back at 10:00 a.m. the next morning and not to report for work at the midnight shift.
The GSSO stated that he then advised a supervisor (named in the allegation) that there were personnel problems and to pull keycard 1505. The supervisor was instructed to make it discreet.
The GSSO recalls that the supervisor, in error, did request the keycard custodian to make up a new keycard, but that the new card was not activated.
The GSSO stated that the supervisor was attempting to draw attention away from the fact that #1505 was being deactivated. The GSSO stated that at this time, no decision had been made to terminate the officer, but that based on the information available, termination was likely.
He stated that it was their intent to make the deactivation of keycard #1505 discreet in order to minimize rumors about what might be l
happening to the security officer.
The inspector interviewed the supervisor who ordered the new keycard l
(#1512) to be made.
The supervisor had no recollection of the incident.
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The inspector physically examined keycard #1505 which is stored in a sealed envelope within a locked security container, and observed that the card did not appear tampered with.
There was a slight h" cut on the upper border of the card that appeared to be normal wear but would have no effect on its operability. The cut did not penetrate the magnetically encoded portion of the card.
The keycard custodian stated that he recalled the supervisor giving him keycard #1505, but did not recall the supervisor's instructions. He remembered that #1505 was cut in the clip area and he assumed that a new card was to be fabricated because of the cut.
Conclusion:
The allegation that supervision tampered and deliberately broke keycard
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No violations of NRC requirements occurred.
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Allegation:
On March 6, 1989, keycard #1505 was utilized by a supervisor on all card read doors and turnstiles. The alleger understood that this keycard was broken, and as such, should have been destroyed.
NRC Review Actions:
The GSSO stated that keycard #1505 was not broken. The inspector physically examined #1505 and verified that it was not broken. The GSSO stated that the card was reactivated and sas used under the control of the supervisor (named in the allegation) in order to show that the badge had not been destroyed. The GSSO stated that he wanted to be able to show that keycard #1505 was not tampered with and that it operated as it should.
The inspector interviewed the supervisor that allegedly used #1505 on March 6, 1989.
The supervisor did not recall the exact date, but he remembered that management had asked him to run the keycard through the cardreaders to verify its operability. The keycard was determined to function properly on all doors and turnstiles.
After the determination, the card was retained by management.
Conclusion:
The keycard (#1505) was not broken and was used on one occasion subsequent to the officer's termination to verify its operability.
The allegation was partially substantiated in that the keycard was used.
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d.
A11eaation:
The licensee failed to adequately evaluate the trustworthiness of an individual prior to allowing him unescorted access to the protected supervisor that a contract worker (pril 1988 he informed a (named)
area. The alleger stated that in A last name only) in the Health Physics Department was working at Femi again after the individual had been banned from the site for failing to properly secure a security lock and chain to the drywell dcor.
NRC Review Action:
A review of security incident reports showed that on July 30, 1987, a health physics contract employee failed to adequately pull a chain through two wheels which secured the personnel airlock to the drywell.
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The individual returned to Fermi on February 15, 1988, working for a different contractor. A review of the individual's screening records showed that he was properly re-screened and the reason for the previous employment tennination was recognized. The licensee's Chief Personnel Investigator stated a simple security rules violation would not result in an unfavorable termination, and that disciplinary action in such a matter is up to the contractor.
Conclusion:
The licensee properly re-screened the contract employee prior to granting him unescorted access.
The allegation was not substantiated, e.
[11egation:
Theallegerstatedthathewastoldbyasupervisor(named): " keep quiet... management can do whatever they want," when the alleger brought the incident involving the terminated contract worker (Allegation d) to the supervisor's attention.
NRC Review Actions:
The inspector interviewed the named supervisor regarding the alleged statement. He denied making the Itatement. The inspector also spoke with six additional security officers selected at random and inquired of them if they had heard management express the attitude indicated in the alleged statement by management. All of the responses were negative.
Conclusion:
The alleged statement could not be substantiated.
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