IR 05000341/1990006
| ML20012D110 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 03/06/1990 |
| From: | Creed J, Pirtle G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20012D107 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-90-06, 50-341-90-6, NUDOCS 9003260478 | |
| Download: ML20012D110 (6) | |
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O.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION III
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. Report No. 50-341/90006(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2200 Second Avenue -
Detroit, MI 48226 J
Facility Name:
Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2
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-Inspection At:- Plant Site land NRC Region III Office
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Inspection Conducted: Between November 15, 1989 and February 28, 1990
Inspector:
h 3fk90
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G.~'.
Pirtle Date
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sical Security Inspector
- Approved By: N1u0
[D y/ R. Creed,. Chief-Date Vafeguards Section Inspection Sunnary
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Inspection between November 15, 1989 and February 28, 1990 (Report No. 50-341/90006(DRSS)
Areas Inspected: An announced inspection to review an allegation pertaining to
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security operations.at the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant.
Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements
within the areas inspected.
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I':'N 9003260478 900307 F
.PDR ADOCK 05000341 i
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Persons Contacted In addition to the key members of the licensee. staff listed below, the.
inspector interviewed other licensee employees and members of the security organization. The asterisk (*) denotes those present during a telephone exit meeting conducted on February 28, 1990.
- R. Kelm, Director, Nuclear Security, Detroit Edison Company (DECO)
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L. Goans, Supervisor, Security Plans and Programs (DECO)
J. Korte, General Supervisor Security Operations (DECO)
- R. Orwig, Nuclear Security Specialist (DECO)
- P. Anthony, Compliance Engineer (DECO)
The name of the person identified in the allegations is not included in the Report Details.to protect the personal privacy of the individual involved.
2.
Exit Meeting (30703)
A telephone exit meeting was conducted on February 28, 1990, with the personnel denoted in Section 1 above. The scope of the allegations and NRC conclusions, as described in Section 3 of the Report Details, were discussed with the personnel present. The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector.'s comments and presented no dissenting positions in reference to the allegation conclusions.
3.
Allegation Review: The following information provided in the form of an allegation was reviewed by the inspector as specifically noted below:
(Closed) Background (Allegation No. Rill-89-A-0148): On November 3, 1989, NRC Region III received an allegation pertaining to security activities at the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant. The initial allegation contained several parts which are described below.
During onsite inspections conducted in November and December 1989, preliminary evaluation of the allegation was initiated.
Follow-up review of the allegation was subsequently completed in the NRC Region III office. All of the allegations pertained to the same contractor security officer who was hired during a plant outage period.
The allegations covered the officer's period of employment which included September and October 1989. The security officer's employment was terminated in October, 1989 for continued performance problems, rather than for aberrant behavior.
During the review process, the inspector reviewed the personnel security screening file and psychological evaluation determination for the security officer named in the allegation. Although treatment for a medical condition was received at various periods between 1952 and the time of employment, the records reviewed by the inspector indicated l
no disqualifying factors.
The officer had also advised the medical
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department of the medication prescribed and treatment for the medical condition on the Letter of Certification dated September 5,1989. The a
inspector found no evidence of.significant information being omitted during the employment application and security screening process.
The psychological evaluation letter, dated September 6,1989, stated that
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no~significant signs of emotional instability or aberrant behavior were noted. The security officer performed no duties that required possession of firearms.
The licensee had. received the same allegations that were provided to NRC Region.III and had completed a preliminary inquiry of.the issues.
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a.
Allegation: A contractor security officer was found in the Reactor i
Building with a cup containing a small amount of coffee (drinking is prohibited in the Reactor Building which is within a Radiological Controlled Area (RCA)).
NRC peview Actions: The inspector interviewed the General Supervisor, Security Operations (GSS0) and reviewed a_ preliminary ' inquiry report pertaining to the incident. The report indicated that on October 28,
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1989, a security officer who relieved the contractor security officer noticed that the contractor security officer had a cup which was empty but had drops of coffee on the outside of the cup. The contractor-security officer denied drinking the coffee within the RCA and stated that the coffee was consumed prior to entering the RCA. The contractor security officer was counseled on the restrictions pertaining to drinking within a RCA and was advised not to take cups or other type of containers into the RCA.
Conclusion: The allegation could not be. substantiated. Documentation review indicated that the contractor security officer denied drinking coffee within the RCA and no one had observed coffee being consumed within the RCA. The security management's counseling of the officer
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in reference to drinking or taking cups into the RCA was appropriate, b.
Allegation: A contractor security officer was observed lying down at a compensatory post with no shoes on and doing aerobic exercises.
The implication was that the security officer was inattentive to assigned duties.
NRC Review Actions: The inspector interviewed the GSSO and reviewed a preliminary inquiry report pertaining to the incident. On September 26, 1989, a security supervisor while on a post check observed the contractor security officer running in place with no shoes on. The contractor security officer was at an isolated location and was required to observe a barrier to prevent it from being breached.
The officer stated that running in place prevented drowsiness. The supervisor advised the contractor security officer to discontinue the activity while on post. The supervisor determined that the barrier could be adequately observed by the officer even
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while running in place. The ihspector's interview of the supervisor who observed the incident confirmed the above details.
Conclusion: The contractor security officer was running in place while on post but was not lying down doing aerobic exercises i
as alleged. The supervisor's evaluation that the barrier could be adequately observed by the security officer and instructions to discontinue the activity while on post were appropriate.
No evidence of the officer being inattentive while on the post was noted.
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Allegation: A contractor security officer reported to work wearing
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"long johns" (similar to sweat pants) rather thsn uniform trousers.
This implied aberrant behavior.
NRC Review Actions: The inspector interviewed the GSSO, the Assist 6nt security Shift Supervisor (ASSS) involved in the incident,
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and reviewed a preliminary inquiry report perteining to the incident.
l On October 2,1989, the contractor security officer telephoned the ASSS and stated a pair of "long johns" (sweat pants) that happened to be the same color as uniform trousers was inadvertently put on while rushing to prepare for work. The ASS $ advised the officer to report for duty and indicated they would provide a pair of uniform coveralls to wear while on post.
Conclusion: The contractor security officer did report to work in a pair of. sweat pants rather than uniform trousers as alleged.
The contractor security officer was aware of the issue, called the
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supervisor, and was advised to report to work where uniform
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coveralls would be provided. Although the above incident may not constitute aberrant behavior, error in judgement was evident by the fact that the security officer was not dressed for duty when leaving home and reporting to work, d.
Allegation: A contractor security officer caused an alarm by walking into an alarm Zone along the perimeter of the protected area.
The implication was that the act was deliberate.
NRC Review Actions: The inspector interviewed the GSS0 and reviewed a preliminary inquiry report pertaining to the incident.
The report indicated that an alarm was caused by the contractor security officer along the perimeter of the protected area.
Upon receiving the alarm, the Central Alarm Station operator requested that another security officer in the immediate vicinity of the alarm zone assess the cause of the alarm. Another security officer who was in the immediate area when the alarm was caused, said the contractor security officer was observed with one foot on a cement curb block (immediately L
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adjacent to the zone of coverage) and the other foot was in the alarm
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zone.
The contractor security officer appeared to be off balance and trying to regain balance.
The inquiry concluded that the
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security officer s loss of balance and subsequent stepping into the alarm zone caused the alarm to be generated.
Conclusion: The contractor security officer did cause an alarm along the perimeter of the protected area. However, no evidence was
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noted to indicate that the alarm was deliberately caused. The security force's actions in having the cause of the alarm assessed
were appropriate.
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Allegation: A contractor security officer attempted to take a weapon 7 to 10 inch knife) into the protected area.
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NRC Review Actions:
The inspector interviewed the GSS0 and reviewed a preliminary inquiry report pertaining to the incident.
On October 10, 1989, a 8 to 10 inch knife (described as a bread knife) was detected in a dulfel bag, owned by a contractor security
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officer, while going through the personnel search area.
When questioned, the security officer stated the duffel bag was being used to move items from one room of the officer's house to another and the officer had forgotten that the knife was in the duffel bag.
The Security Shift Supervisor and his assistant, after questioning the security officer, determined that the incident did not constitute a threat to the facility based on their knowledge of the security
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officer and the explanation. The knife was confiscated and the security officer was allowed to report to duty. No incident report
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was prepared and the incident was not logged in the Security Event Log maintained by the licensee.
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The inspector noted a deficiency in the licensee's written procedure for reporting and logging of security events (Security Plan impicmentin Revision 2)g Procedure-32, " Reporting Physical Security Events,"
The procedure requires actual or attempted introduction
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i of a " weapon," explosive cr incendiary devices into the protected
area to be reported to the NRC within one hour if found during a search process and not identified prior to the discovery.
An interview with the GSSO showed that the type of knife the contractor security officer had in the duffel bag was not considered a " weapon" as it pertained to security of the facility. The te m
" weapon" was intended to include primarily firearms.
Upon furthar discussion, security management agreed to define the term
" weapon" more clearly in the procedure and include guidance on what type of knife would constitute a weapon for security event reporting purposes (341/90006-01). Security management also agreed to enter the incident in the Ouarterly Security Event Log pending completion of the procedural guidance.
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Conclusion: The contractor security officer did have a 8 to 10 inch
knife (bread knife) in a duffel bag that was detected during the
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personnel search process. The incident was determined not to be a i
security threat to the site by the onduty security supervisors. The security procedure pertaining to reporting of security events requires revision to provide guidance on what type of knive(s) should be considered as a weapon for security event reportitig purposes.
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