IR 05000341/1978018
| ML19274D740 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 01/03/1979 |
| From: | Erb C, Hayes D, Naidu K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19274D731 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-78-18, NUDOCS 7902220248 | |
| Download: ML19274D740 (24) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0""I F S 1 m 0FFICE OF INSPECIIO: AND EN!MLL.'.
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REGION III
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Report No. 50-341/78-18 Docket No. 50-341 License No. CPPR-87 Licensee:
Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name:
Enrico Termi 2 Inspection At:
Detroit Office, Monroe Michigan Site Inspection Conducted:
November 13; Site - November 14-17, 1978
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Inspectors:
C. M.
Erb
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K.
. YaYd"u'
O & ';R's.j7i
_ /[2 [79
/ ft1/ '
,
. W.P.%' f(bed H
Wescott
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,
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[w II.
S, Phillips
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Approved By:
D.kkHaye's,C
//g h>
Proiects Section Inspection Summarv Inspection on November 13-17, la75 (Pg ort No. 50-341/7?-18)
Areas Inspected:
Followup on Bulletins / Circulars; previously identified items of noncompliance / unresolved items; 50.55e report on core spras pic..p vane cracks; reactor internals, procedures / work; safety related compon-ents, work / records; containment penetrations, work / records; structural steel and supports, work / records; structural velding, procedures / work /
records; structural concrete, records; general housekeeping / storage /
handling. The inspection involved 128 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors.
790 2220 AW
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Results-Three items of noncer pliance were identified in three of eleven areas inspected.
(Infractions - failure to control special r>rocesses and document test results,Section I, paragraph 3.b and Section 111, para-
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granh Sb; failure to properly store / protect equipment, Section T.
paragraph 3.c; deficiency - failure to assure minin.uc inspecter cua21: 1-cations met and documented in QA recordr. file,Section I, Paragraph 5.c(1).
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DETAll.S
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Persons Contacted
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Principal Licensee Employees
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Hines, Assistant Vice President and Manager, Q.i
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Everett, Project Superintendent A. Ale. iou, Assistant Project Superintendent
- W.
Fahner, Project Manager
- J.
D. Ryan, Site Project QA Engineer
- H.
A. Walker, Project Site QA Engineer
- C.
R.
Bacon, Field Project En gir.ee r
- C.
J. Miller, Senior QA Engineer
- G.
Carter, QA Engineer Other Personnel
- M.
Albertin, Construction Manager, Daniel International Corporation, DI
- J.
G.
Bolt, Project QA Manager, DI
- C.
B. Gliesener, Project OC Manager, DI
- D.
E.
Seifert, Project Manager, DI
- R.
R.
Turner, Assistant Construction Manager, DI
- R.
O.
Donnel, QA Engineer, DI J. Gresham, Civil Inspector, DI G. Warntr, OAPE, Ut ley-James, (U-J)
- C.
Keller, Field DA Manager, Wismer-Becker, (WB)
E.
L. Young, Project Executive Manager, (WB)
- D. Rybarik, Site Manager, General Electric Company, GE (16 F T ',
- T.
Dykes, Inspector, Quality Control, GE (16SE)
- H. Kenkle, Site Manager, GE (NED)
nJ. E. Norton, QA Engineer, Stone and Webster, (S6W)
The ins ector also talked with and interviewed scveral other licensee r
and contractor employees, including members of the quality, technical and engineering staffs.
- Denotes those attending the exit interviev Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Item of Noncompliance (341/78-0'-01) - Audit schedules not filed in QA records center, The inspector reviewed present schedules and found that audit schedules are retained with audit records.
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(0 pen) Item of Noncompliance (341/78-09-02) - Program adequacy bv hieher management not assessed. The inspector revieweu two canagement reports from Project GA Director to the QA Director and to the Assistant Vice President Manager - Quality Assurance.
It appears that this report gives
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greater visibility to the QA program.
The remaining item is the inde-pendent audit of the QA organization.
(0 pen) Item of Noncompliance (341/78-09-03) - Inadequate followup on findings identified by Edison OA audits (EFZ-34 8-2 / EFZ-39 74 6 ). Final shielding calculations had been submitted to Edison engineerine b'
Sargent & Lundy and QA will close out this item during the next audit.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected Details of functional or program areas inspected are documented in Sections I, II, III and IV.
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Section I
Prepared by H.
S.
Phillips Reviewed by D. W.
Hayes, Chief Projects Section 1.
Review of IE Bulletins at Detroit Offices The R111 inspector reviewed the licensees system for handling bulletins and action taken on IE Bulletin Nes. 78-01 through 78-12 as follows:
a.
Written responses were made within tine stated in t$c bulletin.
b.
Written responces included infornation required-c.
Written responses included corrective action to correct problem stated in bulletin.
d.
Onsite management was advised of written response to bulletins.
e, Corrective action, where required, was adec,uate and compatible with written response, f.
Appropriate actier was taken on information only bulletins.
No itenc of nonconnliance were identified.
2.
Review of Circulars (Detroit Offices)
The inspector reviewed Circular Nos. 7S-01 through 78-16.
All circulars, applicable to the Fermi 2 project, were on file.
Assignment to and evaluation by appropriate engineers had been documented.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Plant Tour The inspector visually inspected all floors of the reactor building and the RHR service building. The areas inspected were satisfac-tory except as follows:
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c a.
Reactor Pressure Vessel Area Jet pumps Nos.
4, 8,
10 and 12 welds had different surface
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conditions. That is, some welds were almost flush with the surface while others were rein orced.
The weld processes f
which made the welds appeared to be different.
The workman-ship on one weld on jet pump No. 8 joining the ram head a throat, appeared to be of lesser quality than similar welds on ot her j et pumps.
Excessive weld spatter was found cr.
jet pumps 6, 11, 15, 18 and 19.
There appeared to be a small amount of spatter on almost every jet punp.
GE I6SE stated that the weld spatter would be removed.
This matter is unresolved pending removal of the spatter and review of welding requirements and records which were not available on site.
(341/78-18-01)
b.
Nondestructive Examination of Vessel Internals The inspector found dye penetrant and developer solution which had not been cleaned off test surfaces after testing.
The time ranged from days to more than a week.
The following items of noncompliance were identified in Item 1 of Appendix "A" (341/78-18-02):
(1) Feedwater Nozzle at 90 Az The inside of the subject nozzle had penetrant and developer which had been applied to the inside diameter of the nozzle several days earlier.
In addition to the penetrant left for an extended period, no test report had been completed although unacceptable indications were founm.
No tag or nonconformance report was noted.
(2) Feedwater Nozz_le at 30 Az Just below the feedwater nozzle at approximately 30",
penetrant stain extended down the wall of the vessel for approximately 18".
(3)
Bottom of Vessel (approximate 1v 350-260" Az)
An area near the bottom of the vessel located near the bottom of the vessel located near the 350 Az was found to have a residual of penetrant solution after the area was cleaned.
Cleaning was inadequate.
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(4) Jet Pumps (a ppro_x i ma t el y 180 An)
Two j et pumps located at approximately 180 wert visualls
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examined where the inside of the diffuser was welded to
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the support.
Penetrant / developer was not adequately cleaned after testing.
These items represent nonconpliances to 10 CFR 50, Appendix 'L",
Criterion IX which states in part, maeasure shall be established to assure that special processess and nondestructive testinc are controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified procedures," and to Edison QAP No. 10; GE I&SE procedure No. NDE-PT-1002, Revision 3, post examination clea,-
ing (paragraph 13.0) and examination records (paragraoh 14.0).
c.
Storage / Protection of QA Level I Valves The inspector observed the following storage / protection conditions as described in Item 2 of Appendix "A".
(341/
78-18-03)
(1) RHR swing check valve (P4500) 18" gate, Ell-50, was observed to have the end cap burst.
This same valve was observed in a similar condition during previous inspections. The equipment was not in an area to afford proper protection.
(2) Two check valves Cll-52 (V8208) were improperly stored /
protected inside the reactor building.
One valve had the end cap missing as well as laying in steel debris.
The valves were not in an area to afford proper protection.
The above conditions are in noncompliance with 10 CFR, Appendix B, Criterion XIII which states in part, " Measures shall be established to control handling, storage.... and preservation of material and equipment in accordance with work and inspection instructions to prevent damage or deterioration and Edison OAP No. 14 requires the same.
No iters of noncompliance were identified except as noted in para-graph 3.b and 3.c.
4.
Observation of Structural Concrete Work Activity The inspector found that containment structural concrete work on the RHR service building is complete.
The contractor was in the process of turning over records to the documented center and will leave the site soon.
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5.
Review of Structural Concrete Records a.
The inspector selected Utley-James Report No. 195 for reviet
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This work on RHR complex wall WP-39 (pour release No. 2104a, 2142 and slab SSoB between 5 and 6 column and column lines A and D; 6 and 7) was observed during a previous NRC inspection.
The following actions were recorded and in file:
(1)
Preplacement preparation / inspection completed per DCP IV checklist, Revision O.
(2) Design mix No. 96 of 4000 psig specified, delivered and batches recorded on concrete field test report.
(3) Required tests made, i.e.,
ASTM C127 and 125, ASIM C-150-76A, Type I.
(4)
Inspections of placement made.
(5)
Curing done as required.
(6) No rebar placement was required.
(7) Materials were tested and certified as required.
"edusa cement order dated December 2-7, 1977 for Type 50 cement per CSA STD A5 gave chemical analysis but there was ne statement to certify that testing met specification.
Since the cement met chemical requirements the inspector had no further questions, but commented that such docu-ments should state requirements cet.
(8) The batch plant operation was reviewed by the National Ready Mix Association June 7, 1977 and the certificate issued was valid through June 7, 1978.
(9)
Batch plant calibration records were reviewed.
The inspector found the following:
Batch plant scales for weighing cement and aggregate had been calibrated, however, the records did not contain the calculated percentage error and did not contain a statement that error was within the range allowed by ASTM C94, paragraph 8. 3 (0.4L' of total capacity).
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Batch plant admixture measuring devices had been checked.
however, again no percentage error was calculated from the difference found between required and actual volur.
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No comparison was made to show in the records that the volume met the requirements of ASTM C94, paragraph 7.2 (+ 3%).
Further the records indicated that the measuring device for pozzolon exceeded the 37 allowed but was never identified and corrected.
The inspector reviewed compressive strength log for cylinders 15147-15178 (June 24, 1977-June 13, 1978) and found all brecks above the 4000 psi required.
Based on this in ferraa t ion the compressive strength of concrete materials did not appear to be adversely affected.
Since all concrete work has been completed, this matter is closed; however, the inspector requested a review of other areas and received a commitment that other activities on site would be reviewed and audited to assure that similar calibrations are in accordance with ASTM or other requirements. Likewise, certifications should state the requirements met.
The condition described in 5.a(P) above is unresolved and will be reviewed during subsequent inspec-tions to assure other areas of calibration have been reviewed.
(341/78-18-04)
b.
The inspector reviewed records contained in report 154, RHR complex wall WP 17, wall section between 9 and 7 along "A" line at elevation (EL) 590-613'; WP 22A, C and E along 9 line EL 590-613' ; WP 9, 4 and 2 along
"E" line, EL 590-613' where design mix 91 was placed.
The FIII inspector reviewed records of actions as described in the previous paragraph.
Qualificat_ ion of Personnel c.
(1) Daniel International QC personnel records for Messrs.
Herman, Gresham, Kinne and Hargrave were reviewed.
The file contained resumes and onsite/offsite training records which showed qualifications. Visual acuity tests were also in the file as required except for Mr. Kinne who started to work February 1977 and was tested June 9, 1078.
This is described in Appendix A, Item 3.
(341/76-16-05)
This item is in noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII which states in part, "The records shall also include closely related data such as qualification of personnel" and Edison QA manual QAP-1, paragraph 1.9.1, which states, " Minimum qualifications shall be established for personnel who perform quality assurance functions."
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(2) Rebar crew qualification at Utley-James Company records indicated that five workmen had received training regardine placing reinforcment material per Utley-James procedure
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No. 4.
Mr. Dennis Sarpen's file showed QA/QC qualifications and training in WPC No.
4, 5 and 12 (curing, reinforceau placement, formwork).
d.
QA Audits Daniel audit of Kuhlman Corporation dated July 14, 1978, findings 78-07-07 through 78-07-28 was reviewed to determine that such audits assured conformance to procedures and test requirements.
The audit appeared to be comprehensive and adequate.
e.
Contractor Deficiency or Deviation Reports The following report numbers were reviewed for problem iden-tification/ resolution and were adequate:
(1) Period / February-November 1978 2254, 2248, 2247, 2177, 2161, 2152, 2126, 2069, 2065, 1899, 1653 and 1411.
(2)
July 27, 1978-September 25, 1978 2125, 2124, 2107, 2106, 2065, 2051, 2015, 1995, 1987, 198'. 1955 and 1918.
(2125 and 1995 replaced 1987 and 195a respectively).
(3) DDR 1054 (June 3, 1977) petrographic examination did not clearly address the stated deficiency, however.
the inspector's questions regarding ASTM-C-295 (soft particle) content was answered by reviewing compression test results.
The inspector has no further questier.s on this matter.
No itees of noncompliance were identified except as noted in para-graph 5.c(1).
6.
Review of Penetration Records Interior bulkhead assembly 4'-0 x 6'6 Personnel Lock Records were reviewed for engineering part No. 156-12 on purchase specification 69-5562. Difficulty was experienced in retrieving the information when requested by subject i.e. material certifications, receiving inspection etc.
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a.
File 5.2 No. 68A553, (1)
U.S. Steel Company material certification Heat 166117, ASME SA-516-67 Gr 70.
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(2) CBI receiving report dated January 6, 1971.
b.
File 6.4 CBI letter dated August 3, 1971 contained CNQA audit release pertaining to material records, fabrication / examination record',
welder qualifications, NDT personnel qualifications, x-ray reports and repair records. The overload pressure test (1.5 x 56 psig) was witnessed August 2, 1971, however, no records were readily retrievable concerning the minus 2 psig This matter is unresolved pending retrieval of the test.
subject records.
(341/78-18-06)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Standby Liquid Control (SLC) Installation and Records (C41-03-C0013).
The inspector observed the SLC tank and SLC pumps Maintenance records for the subject pumps were reviewed to a.
handling, and protection vas adequate assure that storage, prior to and after setting in place as follows:
(1) Crankcase and gear packing checked.
(2) Machine surfaces coated with Shell Ennis 210 (3) Covered wich Herculite 50. 6.
(L) Packing removed from plunger boxes.
(5)
Internal heaters hooked up.
(6) Motor bearings lubricated.
(7) Annual samples Shell US1-32 oil analyzed.
(8) Maintenance / inspection documented.
(9)
Inspection steps 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 completed.
(10) Megger test performed July 6, 1978.
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b.
Dravo boss welds on piping between twin valves, 1E 86734, were visually examined.
1he weld surface roughness was excessive.
These welds require dye penetrant examination, however, the
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RIII inspector questioned the ability to perform meaningful examination becaust of " hill and valle)" effect.
These wcl6 were made at vendor shops. Records were not readily available.
After identifying this questionable welding /NDE practice, the inspector was inf ormed that the problem is more extensive.
This matter will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
(341/78-18-07)
- 40 items of noncompliance were identified.
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Section II
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Prepared by K. R. Naidu
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Reviewed by R. L. Spessard, Chief Engineering Support Section 1 1.
Observation of Safety Related Structures Installation Work Activities The inspector ebserved work performance and partially completed work on the Steam Tunnel Lower Pipewhip Restraints (STLPR) and determined that applicable requirements and inspection procedures are being met in the following areas:
a.
Beans and plates specified in drawing 6C-721-2538 were beine used.
b.
Beam B 3113 was being welded to a 1 1/2" x 1 1/2" x l'-0 5/8" plate as specified in isometric drawing 6C-721-2543, detail C.
c.
Inspections were being performed as necessary.
d.
Record keeping appeared to be commensurate with the work in progress.
e.
Nondestructive Testing has not cor enced.
f.
At the inspector's request, the shopwelds on beams identified as A-3109 and A-3107 were reinspected for size and conformance.
One of the welds on beam A-3109 had a 3/64" undercut at one location.
Two fillet welds on beam A-3107 wyre measured to be less than the specified 1 1/2" at two locations.
These nonconformities are considered isolated instances since other beams were not accessible for inspection. During the exit interview, the DI Project Manager agreed to reinspect all of the beams furnished by the manufacturer to confirm that these were indeed isolated instances and to recommend suit-able corrective action.
This is considered an unresolved item.
(341/78-18-08)
g.
The Operation Process Traveller (OPT) No. 15140A for the installation of the whip restraint structure beam B-3113 in
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accordance with drawing 6C-721-2538 indicates the following attributes which are to be completed:
(1) Grout to procedure WB-C-104
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(2)
Tension bolts to procedure W3-E-106 (3) Final installation signoff.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in the above areas.
2.
Observation of Safety Related Structures Welding Activities The inspector observed the various stages of weld completion of Field Weld (FW) No. 13 attaching a plate to beam B 3113 in the STLPR structure.
The inspector determined that the welding activities met the applicable specifications and inspection pro-cedures in the f ollowirg areas:
a.
Weld Procedure Cor. trol Sheet (WPCS) traveller No. 21303 references detail 6 on isometric drawing 6C-721-2544 and identifies the we]d No. FW 12 as a full penetration groove weld with 1/S" reinforcement.
b.
Weld procedure WPS 7002 was specified.
c, Weld rod type E 7018 was specified and being used.
d.
The WPCS identifies the following steps and the inspection points are identified with asterisks.
(1)
- Prefit up cleanliness (2)
- Fitup inspection (3)
- Preheat terperature 200 F.
(4)
Interpass temperature 350 F maximum.
(5)
- Visual inspection of the root pass.
(6)
- >bgnetic Particle (MT) exanine the backgouged root pass.
(7)
- Final visual inspection (8)
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e.
The QC inspector made one check during the completion of the weld to determine whether the welding variables were within the para-meters specified in the WPS; record indicates that the current
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and voltage were within the specified range.
f.
Weldred was being stored at the work location in portaale weldrod ovens. Depleted weldrod was being discarded appro-priately.
5e items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in the above areas.
3.
Observation of Containment Penetrations Work Activities The inspector observed activities relative to the installation of containment penetrations - Mainsteam identified as X7C and Residual Heat Removal system (RHR) identified as X13h The inspecter deter-mined that the requirements specified in the respective Operation Process Traveller (OPT) were being net in the following areas:
a.
Penetration X7C (1) The OPT No. 10032, Revision F for the insta11atien of penetration X7C references the General Electric (GE) drawing as 731E756 and the applicable WPCS's as 00544, 13663, 13664, 13666, 13667, 13668, 13669 and 13821. Verification of the following is required:
(a)
Receiving Inspection Report.
(b) Measure anJ record the as built dimensions o: th<
penetration assembly and penetration nozzle.
(c) Mark and identify plumb lines from elevation 607 radial steel.
(d) Alignment method per GE procedure 731-E-756 including erection and leveling of alignment scope and veri-fication of the fitup of the backing ring in the penetration assembly to the nozzle joint.
(e) The centering flange is firmly seated on the end preparations.
(f) Weld penetration X7C to the internal isolation valve utilizing WPS-106.
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(2) WPCS No 13669 indicated the f ol l owi nc.
(a)
The weld is identified as C7; 26" diameter 1.2" I
thick type A-216-WCB material to SA-155-KCF-70 (b) UPS-106 is specified.
(c) Weldrod types used are:
Root pass with Gas Tunesten Arc Welding (CTAW) 1/8" diameter type E 70S-2 an consumable insert E 70S; for Shielded ' fetal Arc Welding (SMAW), 3/32" diameter type E 7018 weldred for the initial three passes and 1/8" diameter type E 7018 weldrod for the remaining passes.
(3) The inspector selectively observed the welding in progress of the first, second and third passes.
Interpass terper-atures were selectively checked by the contractor DC inspector and determined acceptable.
(4) The weldrod withdrawal requisition numbers, identified on the WPCS, provide a means to retrieve the quality records. The inspector reviewed the quality records on weldrod 3/32" diameter typc E 7018 weldrod with heat No. 21660. A Certified Material Test Report from Chemtron indicates that the weldrod met the requirements of AS"E Section III Code,Section II, Part C including 1977 Winter Addenda.
(5) The WPCS indicates that the fitup and preliminary radio-graph examination of the root pass were inspected and accepted by the Authorized Inspector.
b.
Penetration X133 (1) WPCS 50. 20171 identifies the following.
(a) The weld joining penetration Y13E te 34" diameter nozzle with wall thickness.500" is identified am E-11-2298-1VW2.
(b) WPS 103 is specified.
(c) The fitup inspection was signed off as acceptabic by representatives of the contractor, AI and Daniel.
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(d) Interpass temperature is specified as 350 F maximur; the contractor QC inspector indicated the verificat; by his signature.
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(e)
b' eld Filler Vaterial Issue slips indicate that 3/32" and 1/8" diameters type E-70S-2 and 3/32" diameter type E-7018 weldrods were used in the initial and subsequent passes.
(f) The inspector observed the welding in progress at various intervals and had no adverse comments.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in the above areas.
4.
Review of Safety Related Structures Quality Records The inspector reviewed the quality records relative to the components of the STLPR structure and determined that the records meet established requirements and reflect work accomplishment in the following areas:
a.
Beams identified on drawings SS 721-3106, Revision C and SS 721-3109, Revision D and SS 721-3110, Revision C were receipt inspected. Receiving Inspection Report (RIR) No. 6.2.78-1 indicates no adverse findings on these beams.
In addition, the following material was received without any visible shipping damact.
(1)
Support plate P. 3106 (2) Support plate B 3109 (3) Angle bracket A 3109 (4) Pest C 3110 (5) Beam B 3110 (6)
Beam D 3110 (7) Plate A 3110 b.
Vendor Surveillance was performed during fabrication.
Review of Detroit Edison Inspection Report No. 2 dated June 1, 1978, indicates that the beams mentioned abeve were inspected for final fabrication quality and dimensional tolerances; also Ultrasonic and Magnetic Particle examinations performed bv Utex, an independent testing agency were witnessed.
Material Test Reports for the following were included.
c.
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(1) Certification on 5/32" diameter weldred type LH-718Si, used by the manufacturer.
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(2) Certification on the beams.
(3) Nondestructive examinations.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in the above areas.
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Section III
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Prepared by C. M. Erb Reviewed by D. H. Danielson, Chief Engineering Support Section 2 1.
Safe End Replacement Program a.
All six of the 12" feedwater safe ends are being replaced with a newer design which will accept a redesigned thermal g sleeve with piston ring seals.
No. N4A weld at azimuth 30 and No. N4E weld at 270 were inspected as were the radio-graphs and Penetrant Test records. A qualified welder 50.
GE-100 made the weld which used a Grinell insert and two additional tungsten inert gas layers for the root.
The weld was completed using the shielded metal arc process.
Repairs were properly noted and rechecked by the applicable NDT method, b.
Both 10" core spray safe ends are being replaced.
This weld is an inconel (P43) to inconel (P43) weld.
Specification, WPS 4.3.9.4.1, Revision 1, is applicable and the weld is made by GTAW process for the root followed by the SMAW process.
Interpass temperature is kept below 400 F and a minimum 3/16 inch root is deposited before removing the purge gas inside the nozzle.
FDDR-KHI-104 was issued to repair one of the welds on Unit 1.
Upon completion of the weld, a weld suckback condition was noticed in the radiograph and a grindout for veld repair made.
Procedure NDE-RT-3001 was used for the radiography.
The core spray nozzles in the two spargers were removed and are to be replaced.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were found.
2.
Reactor Pressure Vessel Lif ting and Setting Several procedures for lifting and setting the vessel were examined as shown below:
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Reliance Truck - Tests on lifting materials including inpact tests on clevis ass'y, tie rods, side plate, pin, studs, bracket
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ass'y.
RT-111 - Transport and Hoisting Procedure.
RT-115 - Hoist Prelift Checkout.
IT-2000, Revision 2 - Alignment Level-grout Ring Cirder.
IP-2003, Revision 2 - Check Azimuth Vessel, Concentricity to Ring Girder.
IP-2004 - Bolt Load and Sequence.
GE 22A2286, Revision - - Skirt Attachment.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were found.
3.
Cable Tray Inspection and Resolution (Report No. 050-341/78-05)
DECO Engineering and S&L investigated 800 samples of coated welds from all their suppliers by stripping and evaluating for cracks, porosity, undercut or other defects.
One cracked weld was found.
Applying MIL-STD-105 and a statistical approach, they have concluded that the coated welds marked " indeterminate" are acceptable.
Ant
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welds marked as " rejected" will be repaired.
Mechanical type repair will be used on trays where cables have been pulled.
For the past several months, welded items were inspected at the source prior to the galvanice operation and evaluation of the veld is readily made-DCN 984, Revision D, is an engineering supplement to Ak'S D1.1-19 7 5 which better defines visual acceptance standards for manual metal arc welds.
The inspection of existing welds is complete and when repair oper-ations are completed, Deco Ouality Assurance will issue a final report on this matter.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were found in this area.
4.
Torus Reinforcement (341/78-XX-05)
A serious welding problem exists inside the torus, where the ring girders to shell fillet welds are being enlarged.
Cracks are occurring at the toe of the weld on the thinner member side which is the shell side. The materials are P-1 to P-1 and the manual metal arc process is used with D-7018 or E-70T-1 electrode.
The
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welds are being given an MT inspection with PT also being used.
Presently the preheat requirement is 50 minimum with no post tent.
A revised weld procedure No. WPS 112 for repair requires a 300 preheat
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before, during and after completion of the weld repair. A meeting was to be held the week of November 20, 1978, for further rodification of the weld procedure.
This torus is part of containment; bears en N stamp Class B, Manufacturer's No. C-4512 and was built in 1971 by CBI.
5.
Core Spray Nozzles and Steam Separator a.
The core spray spargers have been removed from the shroud.
The nozzles have been removed from the spargers and replace-ment nozzles will have changed orificing.
b.
Rework of the welds at the bottom of the standpipes on the steam separator has been performed.
Some weld was added where needed and 100% PT examination made. Developer for PT had not been removed from 11 standpipe welds in the steam separator.
NDE-PI-1002, Revision 3 requires that developer be removed after PT.
This is part of and item of noncompliance in Appendix "A".
(341/78-18-09)
c.
NDT Records Jet Pumps Radiographs for welds G-JP-01 and G-JP-02 in Jee Pumps No. 1 and 2 were examined.
The pipe was 22 x.375 wall and the weld was made with an insert.
Radiography procedure RT-3001, Revision 2, was used and five films were necessary.
The PT was done to PT-1002, Revision 1, and results were acceptable.
No items of nonconpliance or deviations were found except as noted in 5.b.
Core Spray Pumps ( 3 41/ 7 8-XX- 04 ')
The inspector was shown a report from Byron Jackson on the crached impeller vanes. This report held that cracks in the center rib next to the acute angle rib to vane intersection should be of no conccrn because the area being on the low pressure side of the vane is in comprescien.
They further stated that the licensee could grind cut these cracks if they so desired.
The licensee has turned this investigation report over to the supplier, GE Company, and are awaiting word from them as to whether the item is reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
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.
.
Section IV Prepared by H. M. Wescott Reviewed by D. W. Hayes, Chief Projects Section 1.
Observation of Welding, Record Review and Review of Weld Rod Controls a.
Observation of approximately twelve (12) weld rod hold ovens established that three (3) of the ovens did not have cali-bration stickers affixed to the temperature indicators.
Further review established that one of these ovens was overdue calibratior, by approximately one (1) month.
This item was corrected prior to the termination of this inspection and is considered closed, b.
The inspector reviewed two (2) velder qualification records and established that they rere qualified to the welding pro-cedure specification, and also ascertained that their quali-fication had not expired.
Observation of weld preparation for structural steel in the c.
drywell area for WPS 7002 weld ID No. B3113 FVI 12.
d.
Review of welding records established that in several instances the welding voltages and amperages were not being recorded nor verified. Discussions with the Daniel Construction welding engineer established that this was a problem area that was being monitored and that the welding power supplies were being calibrated, also, the system for grounding, to complete the welding circuit is being changed.
This is an unresolved item pending further review by the NRC inspector.
(341/78-18-10)
2.
Review of Audit Training Records, Audit Reports and Procedures a.
Reviewed three (3) Detroit Edison and two (2) Stone and Webster personnel Auditor Training Records (Detroit Edison contracted two auditors from Stone and Webster).
Detroit Edison is currently updating the training records to reflect the current training status of each auditor. This is to be completed in December 1978.
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...,.
.
b.
Reviewed the " Edison Field Quality Assurance Audit Schedule" for September through December 1978, dated September 21, 1978.
.'
c.
Reviewed the Edison Site OA Quality Auditing Status Log.
d.
Reviewed the Field SR's quality Findings for April through July 1978.
Reviewed Quality Assurance procedures as follows:
e.
(1) QAP No. 19, Revision 4, dated May 2, 1977, " Audits."
(2)
AP-111-02, Revision 1, dated May 15, 1978, " Quality Assurance Audit Planning and Scheduling."
(3)
AP-111-03, Revision 2, dated June 13, 1978, " Quality Assurance Surveillance and Audit."
(4) FQAP No. 200, Revision 0, oated September 1,1978,
" Audits of the Construction Site."
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted in the above areas.
3.
Identification and Control of Material a.
Review of QAP No. 8. Revision 50. 4 dated May 2, 1977,
" Identification and Control of Material Parts, and Con-ponents."
b.
Observation made of materials and parts used for onsite fabrication of Level I pipe hangers and supports.
The inspector was unable to verify that materials and parts used for onsite fabrication of Level I pipe hangers and supports were traceable to material test reports.
This is an unresolved item pending further review by the NRC inspector.
(341/78-]S-11)
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncom-pliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection-23-
..,s,
.
are discussed in Section I, paragraphs 3.a.
5.a, 6.b, 7.b;Section II, paragraph lf and Section IV, paragraphs 1.d and 3.b.
.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with site staff representatives (denoted in the Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspecti n on November 13-17, 1978.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection, including the apparent items of noncomnliance iden-tified in the Details Section of this report.
The licensee acknowledced the findings.
Since an NRC inspector recently experienced access dif ficulties, NRC site access to perform off-shift inspections was discussed tc establish ground rules for NRC irspectors entering af ter hours.
The licensee stated their intent to photograph inspectors and make special badges to expedite entry.
The licensee also stated that af ter procer idt n-tification, NRC inspectors would be allowed to enter without excessive delays. The project inspector added that NRC inspectors should have the same access rights as licensee QA/QC personnel af ter proper iden-tification.
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