IR 05000335/1988017
| ML17222A444 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1988 |
| From: | Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Paulk G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17222A443 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-88-17, 50-389-88-17, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8809070063 | |
| Download: ML17222A444 (18) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 P
Report Nos.:
50-335/88-17 and 50-389/88-17 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Inspection 'Conducted:
July 3-31, 1988 l
Inspectors:
G. Paulk, Senior Resident Inspect r
H.
E. B'
Re i nt I spector Approved by:
R
.
C lenjak ction Ch'ivision of Reactor Projects 8 z~Z-"
Date Signed 8 ~~m 0 te i ned g 2g gII ate igned SUMMARY Scope:
This inspection involved on site activities in the areas of Technical Specification compliance, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities, surveillance activities, Facility Review Group (FRG)
activities, refueling activities, and reactor trip.
Results:
Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Sg09Iy700 5OOO3 8S0823 PDR AD~CK pDC
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"J. Barrow, Fire Prevention Coordinator J.
Barrow, Operations Superintendent
"G. Boissy, Plant Manager
"H. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor
"C. Burton, Operations Supervisor R.
Dawson, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Electrical T. Dillard, Maintenance Superintendent R. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor
"J. Harper, gA Supervisor K. Harris, St.
Lucie Vice President
"C. Leppla, I&C Supervisor
"C. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor N. Roos, guality Control Supervisor
"B. Sculthorpe, Reliability and Support Supervisor R. Sipos, Service Manager W. White, Security Supervisor
"CD Wilson, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Mechanical
"E. Wunder lich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
"Attended exit interview 2.
Plant Tour s (Units 1 and 2) (71707 and 71710)
The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible materials and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshift The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns on ECCS systems.
Valves, breaker/switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
During the inspection period the inspectors conducted complete walkdowns in the accessible area of the Units 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Systems to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
Additionally, flowpath verifications were performed on the 'following systems:
Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater, Chemical and Volume Control, and High/Low Pressure Safety Injection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2) (71707)
The inspectors, periodically during the inspection interval, reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs, auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
During routine operations, operator performance and response actions
,were observed and evaluated.
The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that'hey were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the following safety-related tagouts (clearances):
Unit
Clearance No.
1-5-19 1-7-1B6 1"7-203 Unit 2 Spent Fuel Handling Machine A Intake Cooling Water Train MV-21-3 Movats Testing 2-7-65 2-7-66 2A Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator Air Compressor The inspector reviewed the applicable sections of the St.
Lucie June Monthly Operating Report, dated 15 July 1988, as required by Technical Specification 6.9. 1.6.
Routine reports of operation statistics and shutdown experience, including documentation of all challenges to the PORV's or safety valves are required to be submitted to the NRC on a
monthly basis.
The review indicated the status report accurately met all facility Technical Specification requirement No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2) (71707)
During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with limiting conditions for operations ( LCO')
and results of selected surveillance tests.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occur-rences as they happened.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Preparation For Refueling (60705)
During the inspection period, the inspector continued review of the licensee's preparations for refueling Unit
as previously discussed in inspection report 88-14.
The inspection objectives were:
a.
Ascertain the adequacy of licensee procedures for the conduct of refueling operations.
b.
Ascertain the adequacy of the licensee's administrative requirements for control of (1) refueling operations and (2) plant conditions during refueling.
c.
Ascertain the adequacy of the licensee's implementation of controls for a and b above.
The following additional procedures were reviewed to assure that the inspection objectives were met:
0 eratin Procedure Title 1-0030127, R42 Reactor Plant Cooldown - Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown 1-003012B, R7 1-0110022, R10 1-0120021, R19 1-1600022, R21 1-1600023, R30 1-1600024, R15 Reactor Shutdown Coupling and Upcoupling of CEA I'Control Element Assembly'] Extension Shafts Draining the Reactor Coolant System Unit 1 Refueling Operation Refueling Sequencing Guidelines Filling and Draining the Refueling Cavity and Canal
1-1630021, R3 1-1630022, R11 1-1630023, R6 1-630024, R23 1-1630029, RO Off Normal Procedure New Fuel Elevator Operation Spent Fuel Handling Machine Operation Fuel Transfer System Operation Refueling Machine Operation Spent Fuel Movement and Rack Indexing for Unit 1 Density Spent Fuel Rack Installation Title 1-1600030, R5 Accident Involving New or Spent Fuel No violations or deviations were noted in this area 6.
Refueling Activities (60710 and 71711)
During the inspection period, the inspector observed the licensee's pre-fueling activities and the initial phases of refueling operations.
The inspection objectives were to:
a.
Ascertain whether pre-refueling activities specified in the Technical Specifications (TS) had been completed.
b.
Ascertain whether on-going refueling activities are being controlled and conducted as required by TS and approved procedures.
The inspector conducted interviews with key personnel during refueling to assure their knowledge of procedure and requirements, observed equipment checkouts, fuel handling operations, reviewed TS surveillance testing, observed daily outage planning meetings, assured that site management was intimately involved in refueling acti'vities, reviewed the licensee's
CFR 50.59 safety evaluation, and observed control of housekeeping activities.
The NRR Project Manager (PM) assisted the resident inspector (RI) in carrying out this inspection procedure (¹60710)
on refueling activities for Unit l.
Every surveillance requi rement associated with Section 9 of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications, entitled Refueling Operations, were reviewed.
Additionally, a plant implementing procedure for every surveillance requirement was located.
The results of the review are summarized in Table 1.
The following inconsistencies between the implementing procedures and the surveillance requirements were noted.
Surveillance requirements 4.9. 1. 1a and b required a minimum of 1720 ppm boron in the reactor cavity water.
The procedure did not specify a value of ppm boron.
The procedure stated
"later, a cycle specific number."
Surveillance requirement 4.9.3 requi res the time and date of subcritically.
The procedure only requires the date to be entered.
Surveillance requirement 4.9. 13 requires a
loaded spent
fuel assembly cask total weight to not exceed 25 tons.
The procedure requires weighing the cask before loading it and that the unloaded weight be under 25 tons.
The procedure did not account for the load in the cask.
These problems were discussed with the licensee.
The licensee agreed with the inconsistencies and also agreed that the procedure will be updated to resolve the concerns.
The implementing procedures were in effect for the subject surveillance requirements.
A number of procedures were review at the following locations:
the Unit
control room, the Unit 1 refueling deck, and the Unit
QC vault.
The procedures selected and found in the control room on Thursday, July 28, 1988, address surveillance requirements 4.9.5, 4.9.8. 1, and 4.9. 10.
The procedures selected and found in the Unit
QC vault address surveil-lance requirements 4.9.2. 1 (7/22/88),
4.9.8.2 (7/22/88),
4.9.5(7/22/88),
4.9.2.C(7/22/88),
4.9.9(7/22/88),
4.9.5(7/23/88),
4.9.8.1(7/23/88),
4.9.8.2(7/23/88),
4.9.2.C(7/23/88),
4.9.10(7/23/88),
4.9.10(7/24/88),
4.9.7 (7/23/88)
4.9.1.1.a(7/20/88),
4 gal.l.b(7/20/88),
4.9.4(7/23/88),
4.9.2.b(7/23/88),
4.9. 11(7/24/88),
and 4.9.3(7/ll/88).
The date after the surveillance requirements signifies the date that the procedure was carried out.
It was concluded that the licensee was meeting the surveillance requi rements.
Tours of the containment and the annulus between the containment vessel and the shield building were conducted.
The observed general condition of the safety injection tanks (4), containment fan coolers (4),
and hydrogen recombiners (2),
were satisfactory.
It was noted that the licensee/
contractor personnel were scraping paint in places inside containment with the intent to repaint these places before returning the unit to service.
TABLE 1 Refueling Activities Survei llances Specification Nature TS Surveillance Im lementin Procedure Boron
.Concentration Core Instrumentation 4.9.1.1a 4.9.1.1b 4.9.1.2 4 '.2.a 4.9.2.b AP1-0010125, R72" Check Sh 1, para 27q; OP 1-1600023, R29""
Check Sh 1, para la, 1b C-01; C-84, R6 OP1-1600023, Check Sh 3, 1C OP1-1600023, Check Sh 1, para 2B 4.9.2.c OP1-1600023, Check Sh 2, para 3D
Core Decay Time Containment Penetrations Communications Refueling Manipulation Crane Spent Fuel Pool Handling Crane Shutdown Cooling (SDC) High Water Level SDC Low Water Level Containment Isolation Rx Vessel Water Spent Fuel Pool Water Level Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Spent Fuel Pool Cask Crane Load Spent Fuel Pool Cask Crane Minimum Fuel Decay Time 4.9.3 4.9.4.a,b 4.9.5 4.9.6 4.9.7 4.9.8.1 4.9.8.2 4.9.9 4.9.10 4.9.11 4.9.12.a 4.9.12.b -
e (except c.3)
4.9 '2.c.3 4.9 '3 4.9.13 OP1-1600023, Check Sh 1,
para 2E OP1-1600023, Check Sh 1,
para 2A2; Check Sh 3,
para lE OP1-1600023, Check Sh 1, para 2D; Check Sh 2,
para 3.A OP1-1600023, Check Sh 1,
2A1 OP1-1600023, Check Sh 1, para 1C; Check Sh 3, para 1D OP1-1600023, Check Sh 2, para 3B OP1-1600023, Check Sh 2, para 3C OP1-1600023, Check Sh 1, para 2A2D; Check Sh 183, para lE4 OP1-1600023, Check Sh 1, para 2C1; Check Sh, para 1A AP1-0010125, Check Sh 4, para 1D (pg 5)
AP1-0010125, Check Sh 6, para 2A(pg 5)
C-74, R3, para B. 1 OP1-1600025, RO GMP M-0022, R4, para 9.10 GMP M-0022, R4, Note and Signatures after Para 9,.B
Al 1 references in Table 1 to this procedure means revision 72.
All references in Table 1 to this procedure means revision 29.
At the end of this inspection period, refueling activities were continuing and it was expected that the unit would be back on line by about
August 1988.
Continued refueling activities will be discussed in the next monthly report.
No violation or deviations were identified.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements'he following items were considered during this review; limiting conditions for operations were met, activities were accomplished using approved procedures, functional tests and/or calibra-tions were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure the priority was assigned'o safety-related equipment.
The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit
PWO Plant Work Order No.
6649 7047 4229 Security System Minor IEC Maintenance HCV-08-2B Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve, Adjust Linkage 1B Battery - Pilot Cell Monthly Unit 2 4717 4761 4823 Reactor Trip Switchgear - quarterly PM [Preventive Maintenance]
Control Room Booster Fan HVE-13A Annual PM 2B Intake Cooling Water Pump Motor Quarterly PM The site director and plant manager briefed the resident inspector and NRR project manager on the current status of the steam generator (S/G)
tube inspection and program during the current Unit 1 outage.
The inspections revealed some new corrosion indications that were not identified during the previous shutdown.
At the conclusion of this outage the "A" S/G will have about 6% of its tubes plugged with the
"B" S/G at about 5% of its tubes plugged.
This percentage will not be limiting to operation for either S/G.
The briefing was informative and provided NRC with adequate awareness of current licensee project No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Facility Review Group (FRG) (40700)
The inspector reviewed the activities associated with the Facility Review Group to assure the requirements of the facility technical specifications and licensee procedures were being met.
The FRG administrative controls are delineated in Technical Specification 6.5. 1 and facility Administra-tive Procedure 0010520.
The FRG functions to advise the Plant Manager on all matters related to nuclear safety.
The inspector reviewed FRG meeting minutes 88-61 through 88-75 conducted in June 1988.
The following requirements were verified:
a.
The FRG chairman was as required by the facility procedure.
b.
The FRG members and alternates were as approved by Technical Specifications and/or plant records.
c.
No more than two voting alternate members were present at any FRG meeting.
d.
The meeting minutes indicated numerous reviews of nuclear safety procedures, work activities, amendments to the plant Technical Specifications, technical manual updates, and other required reviews.
All reviewed items were reviewed for
CFR 50.59 and
CFR
requirements.
e.
Alternate members were approved by the FRG chairman as required.
f.
Meeting minutes were maintained in a concise and properly formatted manner.
Discussions with the FRG secretary indicated a
proper knowledge of FRG assignments, training requirements, and current organizational changes.
g.
Review of FRG records, quorum requirements, responsibility fulfillment, authority, and administrative controls indicated no significant deficiencies.
h.
The inspector reviewed the annual FRG membership training and requalification program with no deficiencies noted.
The inspector attended a
FRG meeting on July 26, 1988.
The meeting was properly conducted in a professional manner with a freeflow of information and an open exchange of communications.
The meeting was conducted as required by Technical Specifications and plant procedure 0010520.
A review of the FRG meeting minutes distribution list indicated some deficiencies due to recent organizational changes of the Corporate Nuclear Review Board members and nuclear plant supervisors.
The FRG secretary committed to update the distribution list immediately to reflect the current licensee organizatio No violations or deviations were noted in this area.
9.
Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2) (71881)
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met
. current requirements.
Areas inspected included the organization of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper conditions, that access control and badging was proper, and procedures were followed.
No violations or, deviations were noted in this area.
10.
Surveillance Observations (61726)
During the inspection period, the inspectors verified plant operations in compliance with selected technical specifications (TS)
requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, containment pressure, control room ventilation and AC and DC electrical sources.
The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operations were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspectors observed or reviewed all of the TS required surveillances for the Unit 1 refueling.
Operating Procedure (OP)
No 2-2200050 Unit
Diesel Generator Periodic Test During the observation of Emergency Diesel 2B Periodic Test, OP No.
2-2200050, on July 12, 1988, th'e inspector noted some minor procedural deficiencies that should be clarified and/or corrected.
The facility operating license NPF-16 requires that the Remote Control Transfer Panels have a security seal installed.
Procedural step 8.2. 18 requi res breaking of the seal on the Unit 2 transfer panel during readout of the diesel load and voltage from the remote shutdown panel.
The procedure did not include a procedural sign off or step to direct the operator to reseal the transfer panel.
The transfer panel is required to be sealed by the facility license.
A remote shutdown panel checkout surveillance had previously been upgraded by the licensee to include a verification step that lockwire be reattached to the transfer panel after respective shutdown panel surveillance completion, however; the diesel testing surveillance was over looked and riot updated at the same time.
Additionally, it was noted that step 8.2.22 should be clarified to address the precise actions required by the operator to verify
"proper restart conditions" are met prior to securing the diesel at
the surveillance completion.
Di scussions with several licensed operators and managers indicated, some confusion existed related to thi s procedural direction.
The licensee committed during the exit meeting to make the two procedural clarifications.
The operator's awareness and technical competence related to diesel control panel operation in the control room was above average.
The inspector had no further concerns.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Licensee Action of Previous Enforcement Matters (92701)
(Open - Unit 2)
IFI-86-20-02 - Incorrect Numbering System on Valves.
Inspection report number 86-20 (unit 2) discussed the fact the numerous valves in two different system (waste management and containment spray)
were found to have the same valve numbers.
This was due to the fact that two different designers (Ebasco and Combustion Engineering)
designed the two systems.
Further investigation, however, revealed that the contain-ment spray system drawing contained a pre-designator (2I) before the valve numbers, e.g.,
2I-V7103, and the waste management drawing only listed the valve number, e.g.,
V7103.
The designator 2I means Unit
and safety class I. The licensee, rather than executing a large program of changing valve numbers on one of the systems, plans to augment existing plant procedures to ensure that the 2I designator is used wherever containment spray valves are identified.
This will reach into equipment clearances, valve tagging, plant work orders, and the plant total equipment data base.
The inspector reviewed the entry method on the computer for the plant total equipment data base and found that the above two valves were identified as V7103 (waste management)
and V07103 (containment spray).
This was derived from the systems being designated on the plant's valve operational number index, drawing 2998-B-057B, as 7 and 07 respectively.
However, the containment spray piping and instrumentation drawing (P&ID)
do not utilize the 07 designation on the valves.
This item will remain open until the licensee implements final resolution for correction.
(Closed Unit 1) IFI-86-21-02 Incorrect Numbering System on Valves.
.This IFI was incorrectly entered for Unit 1.
The conflicting valve numbering (as discussed above) exists only on Unit 2.
(Closed Unit 1) IFI-85-28-04 - The results of the fuel inspection and experience with recycled fuel will be reviewed in future inspections.
The fuel pin failures that were addressed by this followup item were associated with Combustion Engineering (CE) fuel assemblies.
The balance of these CE fuel assemblies were removed during the Spring 1987 Unit
refueling and replaced with improved design assemblies supplied by Exxon Nuclear (subsequently purchased and renamed Advanced Nuclear Fuels-ANF).
The improved fuel assemblies feature longer bottom end caps to minimize foreign material impingement fai lures and improved support cages designed to prevent fretting damage.
Fuel performance during this past cycle has been sufficiently improved such that fuel pin inspection was not performed
dur ing thi s refueling.
The inspector considers thi s fol1owup item to be closed
~
12.
Unit 1 Post Trip Review (93702)
The inspector reviewed the post trip review completed by the licensee in regards to the Unit 1 reactor trip of June 30, 1988.
Operating Procedure No.
0030119, Post Trip Review, was reviewed for technical adequacy, procedural compliance, and adequate corrective action.
The following status of plant systems was reviewed; initial conditions, reactor power, PORV block valves status (both closed for this event),
control station status, safety systems, reactor protection system operation, control system responses, operation actions, and reactor chart printouts.
The initial summary of this trip was included in IE Report 88-14.
The post trip review was adequately performed following the unplanned reactor trip.
No significant deficiencies with the review process were noted.
Only one review status block was incomplete (confirmation of main steam safety valve reseating after lifting by what indications)
as required by step 2.A(4) of the procedure.
This data point was insignificant to the evaluation process.
It was observed by the operator however; that one main steam safety of the "B" header stayed open for three minutes before reseating.
The initiating event was the trip of the 1B condensate pump due to an actuation for the current balance relay.
Although the trip review does not indicate the completed status of the corrective action for the relay, it was indicated to the inspector by the plant manager that the affected cur rent balance relay was replaced and more importantly a design change to broaden the trip range was made to minimize future trips.
No violations or deviations were noted during this review.
13.
Fire Protection - Appendix R,
Concrete Masonry Block Walls Deficiencies (42051)
During a routine tour of the Unit 2 cable spreading room the inspector noted construction work permit II-87-258 attached near a structural masonry concrete block wall.
The work permit directed work.activities related to the grouting of masonry block walls in the cable spreading room.
The inspector requested further background information related to these activities.
During the preparation of FSAR Fire Protection Appendices for St.
Lucie Units
and 2,
the licensee identified that some specific masonry block walls that were assumed to be 3-hour fire barriers may not be completely filled with grout.
An ungrouted block wall has a 1.75-hour fire rating verses the 3-hours rating assumed in the licensee's NRC Appendix R
submittal.
This concern was identified by FPL's Power Plant Engineering Department (JPE)
in late January 1987.
The licensee took action to evaluate the concer The safety significance of the 22 potentially upgrouted block walls (8 on Unit
and
on Unit 2)
was evaluated.
The licensee determined that a
1.75-hour fire rating provided sufficient capability to contain a fire that could be reasonably associated with the 22 walls until such time that the fire extinguishes itself or was identified by plant personnel'dditionally, the 1.75-hour rating provides sufficient time for fire detection and fire fighting action.
Automatic fire suppression on Unit
(sprinklers) is associated with 9 of the 22 walls'lthough the potential 1.75-hour rating is less than the assumed 3-hour rating, the condition was evaluated by the licensee and found not to involve an unreviewed safety question.
Test dri llings of several block walls on Unit 1 were conducted in 1980 as part of the bulletin ( IEB) 80-11 masonry wall program.
About one-half of the walls tested were filled with grout.
Two of the 8 Unit 1 walls in question were test drilled in 1980, and they showed evidence of being partially filled with grout.
All Unit 2 block walls contained vertical reinforcement in every third block to accommodate the IEB 80-11 structural concern.
The block containing the vertical reinforcement is grouted.
The equivalent wall thickness obtained by determining the average thickness of grouted and ungrouted block would provide a 3-hour fire rating.
However, the licensee determined that the use of equivalent wall thickness is inappropriate for this type of construction.
A safety evaluation, Appendix R Block Wall Fire Barriers for St.
Lucie Units
and 2 JEP-LR-87-006, Revision 1 dated March 1987, was written to justify continued operation until this deficiency was corrected.
The evaluation justified continued operation of the Units based on in-situ combustible loading, fire detection and suppression systems, and implementing additonal fire prevention measures (i.e.,
a roving fire watch).
In addition, this evaluation recommended an inspection program to verify the existing condition of the walls in question and required that a
final engineering disposition be issued.
The results of the inspection program and Power Plant Engineer's final recommendation were completed in November 1987.
Non-destructive examination testing of the 22 block walls in question was conducted.during the period of August 17 to 21, 1987.
The results of the test conducted are summarized below:
Out of a sample of 226 masonry units from the 22 block walls; 23% of the units were found full 31% of the units were found empty 46% of the units were found partially filled In summary, all of the 22 block walls in question were found to have some empty (or partially empty) masonry block In light of the above results, the licensee has performed a preliminary review of the safe shutdown train separation protection provided by these block walls and has concluded that upgrading (i.e., grouting) the walls to a 3-hour fire barrier should be accomplished.
Many of the affected walls separate areas heavily congested with safe shutdown equipment
'and cables, making alternative protection schemes impractical.
To date, the licensee has issued an engineering package (PCM 120-287)
which addressed five (5) Unit 2 walls.
The licensee has now completed their engineering work plan and schedule for upgrading the remaining walls and has established the following milestone dates:
a.
Issuance of an engineering package providing the necessary details to upgrade the eight (8) Unit 1 affected block walls no later than August 5, 1988.
b.
Issuance of an engineering package supplement (PCM 120-287 Supplement 1) to upgrade the nine (9) remaining Unit 2 block walls no later than November 18, 1988.
The inspector verified the licensee was meeting the Technical Specification LCO action statement for failure to have an adequate fire barrier where required by maintaining operable fire detectors and an hourly roving firewatch.
Discussions, log reviews, and walkdowns of the affected areas were conducted with the fire protection manager.
No deficiencies were noted.
The fire watches in conjunction with operable fire detectors in the zones adjacent to the 22 walls provide adequate compensatory measures for any reduction in fire barrier capability that may exist.
The inspector had several additional questions that the licensee committed to follow up on:
a.
Does the engineering evaluation affect the Bulletin 80-11 response in refer ence to masonry wall structural soundness?
b.
Due to the high defect rates found; should the sample size be increased to more thoroughly inspect all plant affected areas?
c ~
Has a
reportabi lity determination been completed due to these structural and/or Appendix R deficiencies?
The licensee committed to submitting an LER to describe the details of this licensee identifi'ed deficiency.
A The in-depth inspection by the inspector in the fire protection area related to this event indicated above average management control awareness and effectiveness by the fire protection supervision.
This area will be followed up by an Appendix R inspection team during future inspection No violation or deviations were identified.
14.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on August 5, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the
'inspectors
'during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Licensee management was informed that the two Unit 1 inspector followup items discussed in paragraph
were considered closed and that the one Unit 2 inspector follow-up item discussed in paragraph 11 will remain ope,
Acronyms and Initialisms AFW ASME-B8cPV-CS CCW CHG CMTR-FPRL-HPSI-IEIN-IFI IST LPSI-MSIV-M8TE-QA QC QI R
RI RII S83 TS W81 Auxiliary Feedwater American Society of Mechanical Engineer Boiler and Pressure Vessel Containment Spray Component Cooling Water Charging Certified Material Test Report Florida Power and Light Company High Pressure Safety Injection Inspection and Enforcement Information Notice
Inspector Followup Item Inservice Testing Low Pressure Safety Injection Main Steam Isolation Valve Measuring and Test Equipment Quality Assurance Quality Control Quality Instruction Revision Receipt Inspection Region II Summer 1983 Technical Specification Winter 1981