IR 05000335/1988028
| ML17222A654 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1988 |
| From: | Blake J, Chou R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17222A653 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-88-28, 50-389-88-28, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8901120508 | |
| Download: ML17222A654 (11) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.Wi'TLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos ~
50-335/88-28 and 50-389/88-28 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Inspection Conducted:
October
- November 4, 1988 C.
Inspector: R..
ou Approved by:J..
11 e, Chief M
e als and Processes Section ng'neering Branch Division of Reactor Safety (z. ~o-&8 Date Sig ed
/g.
g y
Cc, Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
Results:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of previous open items and pipe support base plate design using concrete expansion anchor bolts (IEB 79-02).
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
One Unresolved Item (UNR)
was identified on base plates, anchor bolts, and pipe supports, paragraph 4.
The licensee attributed the numerous discrepancies found by the inspector due to a practice of the different engineering judgement.
The licensee agreed to improve and eliminate the discrepancies by establishing a standard procedure in tolerances for installation, inspection, evaluation and incorpora-tion.
90~i@'05
~ 0~000 OS '39010~
PDC Q
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"J.
H. Barrow, Operation Superintendent
"G. J. Boissy, Plant Manager
- D. A. Culpepper, Engineering
- R. Dawson, Assistant Plant Superintendent - Electrical
- T. D.
Diliard, Maintenance Superintendent
"T. D. Geissinger, Backfit
"K. P.
Hughes, Lead Engineer L. McLaughlin, Technical Staff Engineer B. Moss, Quality Control (QC) Inspector
"L. W. Neely, Technical Staff Licensing
"R. J.
Riha, Engineer
"R. Roos, QC Supervisor
"D. H. West, Technical Staff Supervisor
"C, Wilson, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Mechanical
"E. Wunder'lich, Reactor Engineer Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, mechanics, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Ebasco Services, Inc.
R. Russo, Principal Structure Engineer NRC Resident Inspectors
"G. Paulk, Senior Resident Inspector
"H. Bibb, Resident Inspector
"M. Scott, Designated Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(92702)
(Closed)
UNR 50"335/87-26-01 and 50-389/87-25"01, Pipe Support Discrepancies between Field Conditions and the Drawings'his matter concerned the deficiencies.
found in the pipe support such as an additional plate in the field, gap larger than the requirement, plate size difference, weld symbol missing, etc.
The inspector held discussions with the responsible licensee engineers and reviewed the information provided - Evaluation of Pipe Support and Expansion Anchor Nonconformance, Ebasco Report No. 132-63.500, Rev.
1, dated
September 27, 1988.
The response stated that the licensee did follow the procedure in dealing with the discrepancies identified via a
Change Request Notice or, after implementation, by a
gC inspector via a
Non-Conformance Report (NCR)
to revise the design drawings.
Engineers will review the disposition of each deviation.
The licensee stated that the discrepancies for an additional plate and base plate size difference for Support No. BF-2-9 were due to the incorrect drawing provided to the inspector during the previous inspection.
The latest drawing, Rev.
was found and showed the plate and the correct base plate size as installed in the field.
The inspector reviewed the resolution for each discrepancy and requested the revised calculations or drawings for confirmation.
They were found to be acceptable.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed)
UNR 50-335/87-26-02 and 50-389/87-25-02, Base Plate and Anchor Bolt Deficiencies.
This matter concerned numerous deficien-cies on the expansion anchor edge distances and the base plate warpages.
The inspector held discussions with the responsible engineers and reviewed the Ebasco Report stated above.
Neither Ebasco nor the licensee has the tolerance criteria for walkdown inspection, fabrication, installation or gC inspection in piping systems.
If anything is different from the design drawings, the Non-Conformance Report will be written and sent to the Engineering Group for evaluation and disposition.
It may or may not require the drawings or calculations to be updated to reflect the discrepancies.
This is up to the engineer's judgement.
Therefore, there could be inconsistencies among the engineers since everybody could have a
different judgement.
For the 'larger discrepancies on expansion anchor edge distances, the calculations were revised.
Ebasco did document one case of Base Plate Warpage and Expansion Anchor Angularity in NCR 4002-793M, which was analyzed and dispositioned by Engineering
'acceptable as is'.
Ebasco decided to reanalyze the two piping systems in the absence of Mark No.
CW-58-62 (Gang Support with CW-59-61)
and CW-53-72 (Gang Support with CW-54-71) which have the base plate warpage and expansion anchor angularity.
The above four supports will be removed and changed to new dead weight supports only.
The adjacent pipe supports have been reviewed and determined to have no adverse effect on any loading condition.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed)
UNR 50-389/87-25-03, Base Plate and Anchor Bolt Calculation Problems.
This matter concerned support calculations using different safety factors and allowables for anchor bolts, incorrect calculation methods, and inadequate safety factor of 1.33 and
by Bergen-Paterson.
The response in Attachment 2, Ebasco Report, stated above provides the resolutions item by item.
The resolutions included the statement of reason and to revise calculations to meet appropriate standards.
The inspector randomly reviewed the samples of calcula-tions and determined them to be acceptable.
The calculations reviewed were Support Nos.
CS-678-157, CW-64-51, SIH-65, BF-4001-190, and CC-2074-44.
This item is considered close d.
(Closed)
UNR 50-389/87-25-04, Support Not Found in Field.
The licensee did find this support.
And the support location was shown on the design drawings.
The licensee did not perform a detailed verification of the as-built configuration due to physical limitation of access.
The licensee judged the support to be adequate even if it had some minor deviations since the support calculation showed expansion anchor factor of safety beyond 45 (15 is required).
This item is considered closed.
3.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
One unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.
4.
(Closed)
Pipe Support Base Plate Design Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolt (IEB 79-02) - Units 1 and
a.
Walkdown Reinspection The inspector randomly selected 17 pipe supports which were accepted by the licensee QC inspection.
The walkdown reinspection was completed with assistance from the licensee engineers and gC inspectors, The supports were, partially reinspected against their detail drawings for configuration, identification, fastener/anchor installations, member size, component identification numbers.,
dimensions, rust, maintenance, and damage/protection.
Particularly, the inspector focused on anchor bolts and base plates for anchor bolt numbers, bolt size, bolt thread engagement, bolt edge distances, base plate thickness, base plate size, and nuts.
b.
Walkdown Results Numerous discrepancies were found during the walkdown reinspection.
The comments and discrepancies identified by the inspector are listed below.
The results were discussed with the engineers, The licensee performed the evaluation and determined that no operability concern was found for the identified discrepancies.
Pi e
Su orts Mark No.
Rev.
No.
Comment/Discre anc Unit
(1)
BF-3080-250 (Gang with BF-3080-255)
(2)
BF-3080-255 (Gang with BF-3080-250)
Pi e
Su orts Mark No.
(cont'd)
(3)
CW"16-3 (4)
CW-15"3 (5)
CW"15-4 (6)
CW-14-1 (7)
BF"1005-307 (8)
HA-2317-2 (9)
HA-2316"7 (10)
CS"678"2135 Rev.
No.
Comment/Oiscre anc Base plate, bolts, and nuts were rusty.
None Base plate, bolts, and nuts were rusty.
Base plate was rusty.
None None Rigid Strut No. HIR/711 was in field and drawing showed RSSA-8.
The drawing showed the wrong orientation for Item No. 4,
'bracing W4x13.
-Unit 2 (1)
CS-38-R11 Three and one anchor bolt edge distances were off 1" or more in field for Sections 0-0 and C-C of drawing, Section D-D of drawing should be rotated
clockwise to meet field condition.
Section C-C of drawing should be rotated 90'ounterclockwise to meet field condition.
(2)
CS-42-R1 (3)
CS"43-R3 None Two base plate details should be provided for Item Nos.
and
on drawing since the different bolt patterns were in fiel Pi e
Su orts Mark No.
(cont'd)
(4)
CS-( I)-44-R3 Rev.
No.
Comment/Discre anc One anchor bolt edge distance at Section B-B wa s off l-l/2" from drawing shown.
The cut-off orientation for bracing attachment to base plate at Section 0-0 of drawing should be in other direction.
Two base plate details should be provided for vertical and horizontal bracings since the different bolt patterns were in field.
(5)
00"17-R4 guantity of Material Item No.
9 should be
instead of 1.
(6).
DO"18-R5 (7)
MS-49-R1 Base plate dimension for Item No.
should be 1"x6"x3'-0" instead of 1"x6"x2'-9" shown on drawing.
None None Bergen-Paterson Large Bore Calculations During the previous inspection, the inspector reviewed the pipe support calculations and found that five out of eight support calculations performed by Bergen-Paterson for large bore at Unit 2 have used a safety factor of 1.33 and 2 to qualify anchor bolts with no consideration of the prying forces.
The licensee was requested to evaluate all safety-related large bore support calculations performed by Bergen-Paterson.
The IEB 79-02 requires the safety factor.for expansion anchor bolts to be equal to or over four for wedge or sleeve type expansion anchor bolts or five for shell type expansion anchor bolts with consideration of the prying forces, A list of 69 supports reviewed by Ebasco was provided to the inspector.
The document showing the list is Safety-Related Pipe Supports Using Expansion Anchors Designed by Bergen-Paterson, Unit 2, Attachment of CIV-88-255.
The response at Paragraph 3.3.b of Ebasco Report
No. 132-63-5000, Rev.
1, states that the review and revision were taken to resol ve the Bergen-Paterson Large Bore Cal cul ations.
Mith only two exceptions, these factors of safety have been shown to be greater than 4.0 for those supports whose calculations include prying forces and greater than 5.0 for those not considering prying forces, and are, therefore, acceptable.
A more thorough analysis is currently being conducted for Support Nos. SI-4205-6440B and CC-2061-191 to more accurately determine their factors of safety.
The licensee states that an operability concern should not exist, since a
preliminary review indicates factors of safety greater than 2.0 which is allowed for interim operation.
Pending the inspector review of calculations and the licensee solution on Support Nos. SI-4205-6440B and CC-2061-191, this item is identified as open item, Inspector Fol1owup Item (IFI) 50-389/88-28-04, Followup on Bergen-Paterson Large Bore Calculations.
Findings and Results The discrepancies found during the walkdown reinspection, shown in paragraph 4.b, require revisions to the drawings and calculations.
Pending the licensee review and revisions on the drawings and calculations, this item is identified as open item UNR 50-335, 389/88-28-01, Discrepancies for Base Plates, Anchor Bolts, and Pipe Supports between Field Conditions and As-Built Drawings.
During the previou's inspection, the inspector. found heavy rust on structural members, connections, and pipe supports in the intake structure area and identified IFI 50-335/87-26-04 and IFI 50-389/87-25-06.
A similar problem was found at the open pit area as the 'supports shown in paragraph 4.b which indicated rust on the components.
Especially all steels which contact concrete or are a couple inches above concrete are very heavily rusted in the lower elevation near drainage outlet pit.
The steels include base plates, embedded plates, anchor bolts, nuts, structural members, and two spring cans and springs.
Some steels appear to have reduced integrity and capacity which need engineering evaluation.
The licensee did indicate that the areas was painted and was not very efficient due to salt present in the air.
It appears to the inspector that water stays in the lower area for a long period since the higher elevation appear less rusty.
The licensee needs to develop an efficient maintenance procedure to eliminate the rust and perform an engineering evaluation.
This item is identified as IFI 50-335, 389/88-28-02, Plant Maintenance for Corrosion on Piping Systems and Structures.
During discussions with the licensee concerning the numerous discrepancies found between field conditions and as-built drawings, there was no standard procedure in tolerances for gC inspectors or engineers to follow for non-conformance eval'bation or incorporation of drawings and calcula-tions.
The inspector pointed out that one dimension difference might be insignificant in one case of load evaluation, but it might be significant in another case of load evaluation since the other engineer did not know the dimension difference between field conditions and as-built drawings or existed in a previous NCR.
The
responsible engineers from the licensee and Ebasco agreed that a
standard procedure of tolerance for installation, inspection evaluation, and incorporation is needed.
Peneling t e licensee completion of this standard procedure, this item is identified as IFI 50-335, 389/88-28-03, Establishment of Standard Procedure in Tolerances for Installation, Inspection, Evaluation and Incorpora-tion.
During the walkdown reinspection for Pipe Support No. BF-1005-307, Unit 1, the inspector found that anchor bolts were pulled out or loose at two columns of South Steel Missile Protection Shield at North Side of Unit I Auxiliary Water Pump due to pump vibration at foundation.
The responsible licensee engineer and Ebasco engineer did review and evaluate this condition and determined that it is acceptable for current conditions since a missile will hit this shield at one special angle which is considered to be an impossible situation.
Besides that angle, there are other heavy structures in the outside of shield to protect it.
Pending the licensee evaluation and resolution of anchor bolts at the shield, this item is identified as IFI 50-335/88-28-04, Anchor Bolt Problems at South Steel Missile Protection Shield.
Bulletin Closure The NRC Region II Inspection Report Numbers 50-335/79-22, 79-31, 80-20, 81-20, 81-26, 82-10, 83-38, and 87-26 for Unit I, and 50-389/79-16, 81-16, 82-11, 82-71, 83-66, and 87-25 for Unit 2 were performed for IEB 79-02 to verify and review the procedures, inspection programs, analytical methods, modifications, and documen-tations for the concrete expansion anchor bolts.
The majority of the required modifications and documentations for IEB 79-02 has been completed by the licensee.
The final summary report is to be submitted by the licensee and reviewed by the NRC.
Pending the review of the final summary report, this item is identified as IFI 50-335, 389/88-28-05, Final Summary Report Review for IEB 79-02.
The inspector also performed walkdowns and reviews in this inspection as stated above to verify the licensee performance and commitments on IEB 79-02.
Based on the previous inspection reports, this inspec-tion, and the licensee agreement to establish a standard procedure in tolerances to eliminate the discrepancies or different engineering judgements in installation, inspection, evaluation, and incorpora-tion, IEB 79-02 for Units 1 and 2 are considered closed except for the open item.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on November 4,
1988, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
(Open)
UNR 50-335, 389/88-28-01, Discrepancies for Base Plates, Anchor Bolts, and Pipe Supports between Field Conditions and As-Built Drawings (Open) IFI 50-335, 389/88-28-02, Plant Maintenance for Corrosion on Piping Systems and Structures (Open)
IFI 50-335, 389/88-28-03, Establishment of Standard Procedures in Tolerances for Installation, Inspection, Evaluation, and Incorporation (Open)
IFI 50-335/88-28-04, Anchor Bolt Problems at South Steel Missile Protection Shield (Open)
IFI 50-389/88-28-04, Followup on Bergen-Paterson Large Bore Calculations (Open) IFI 50-335, 389/88-28-05, Final Summary Report Review for IEB 79-02