IR 05000335/1988006
| ML17222A272 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 05/06/1988 |
| From: | Bibb H, Crlenjak R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17222A271 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-88-06, 50-335-88-6, 50-389-88-06, 50-389-88-6, NUDOCS 8806070037 | |
| Download: ML17222A272 (12) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-335/88-06 and 50-389/88-06 Licensee:
Florida Power'and LigHt Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name:
St. Lucie 1 and
Inspection Conducted:
March
April 9, 1988 Inspector:
H. E. B'
esident Inspec Approved by:R..
Cr enja ection Chic Division of Reactor Projects D te igne a
Signed SUMMARY
~
~
Scope:
This inspection involved on-site activities in the areas of Technical Specification compliance, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities, surveillance activities, the Unit 1 spent fuel pool rerack project, plant events review, and reactor trips.
Results:
Of the areas inspected, one violation was identified (paragraph 12).
SS06070037 880518 ADOCK OSOOO3m
REPORT DETAILS i.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- K. Harris, St. Lucie Site Vice President
- G. Boissy, Plant Manager
- R. Sipos, Services Manager
- J. Barrow, Operat'<ons Superintendent T. Dillard, Maintenance Superintendent J. Harper, gA Superintendent C. Burton, Operations Supervisor F. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor
- C. Leppla, ISC Supervisor
- C. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor E. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
- H. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor
- W. White, Security Supervisor B. Sculthorpe, Reliability and Support Supervisor
- J. Barrow, Fire Prevention Coordinator R.
Dawson, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Electrical
- C. Wilson, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Mechanical
- N. Roos, guality Control Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
Other NRC inspectors providing resident site coverage:
L. P.
King J. Caldwell W. Holland
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview 3.
The inspection sc'ope and findings were summarized on April 22, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph
above.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
One violation was identified:
The failure to meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.3 in that repositioning of the
"normal/isolate" switch, from normal to isolate, for Unit 2 containment isolation valve HCV-2516 resulted in blocking the containment isolation and safety injection actuation isolation signals.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed - Unit 2) Violation 50-389/87-20.-01
- Failure to follow procedures while lifting reactor vessel internals during refueling.
The licensee
responded to this violation in letter. L-87-514.dated December 16, 1987, committing to improve training in this area.
The training program was reviewed and found to be acceptable.
(Closed - Unit 2) Violation 50-389/87-20-02 - Failure to meet licensee commitments to Regulatory Guides 1.63 and 1.75.
The licensee responded to this violation in letter L-87-514 dated December 16, 1987, committing to revise the operating procedure.
Outstanding Items List Closeout Actions (Closed - Unit 2) Part 21 report P2184-02 - Deficient gimpel valve spring for steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
St. Lucie engineering staff performed a safety evaluation (JPE-PSL-87-3600 dated January 20, 1988)
which concluded that the subject valve spring was acceptable under normal and emergency operating conditions.
Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)
(71707)
The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible materials and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint setting, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of the emergency core cooling (ECCS)
systems.
Valve',
breaker/switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
During the inspection period the inspectors conducted a'omplete walkdown in the accessible areas of the high and low pressure safety injection, containment spray, and emergency diesel generator systems to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
Additionally, flowpath verifications were performed on the following systems:
chemical and volume control, main feedwater, and auxiliary feedwater.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2) (71707)
The inspectors, periodically during the inspection interval, reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheet, instrument traces, and records or equipment malfunctions.
This review included
control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
During routine operations, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated.
The inspectors conducted random off-hour inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the following safety-related tagouts (clearances):
Unit 1 Clearance No.
1-3-6 1-3-148 1-4-18 HVS-7 Fuel Handling Building Supply Fan -
PM [Preventive Maintenance]
"A" Component Cooling Water (CCW)
Pump Motor -
PM V-5201, 5204 - Pressurizer Surge Line Sample Valves-Isolate Unit 2 2-3-56 2B Charging Pump Recirculation Valve - Insure Isolation 2-4-8 2A Hydrogen Recombiner - Repair 2-4-16 2B Diesel Generator - Tighten Bolts No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2) (71707)
During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with limiting conditions for operations (LCOs)
and results of selected surveillance tests.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements was reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
Non-routine plant events were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that technical specifications were being met and that the public health safety were of utmost consideration.
One TS rel'ated violation was identified (paragraph 12).
8.
'aintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review; limiting conditions for operations were met, activities were accomplished using approved procedures, functional tests and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure the priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit 1 PWO 4812 PWO 4190 PWO 5353 Unit 2 Description 1A Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump -
PM 1B Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump -
PM 4160 VAC Switchgear 1A2-2. - Repair PWO 4512 PWO 4613 PWO 5132 2BB Battery Charger -
PM 2HVE-GA - Shield Building Exhaust Fan -
PM 480 VAC Pressurizer Heater Bus Breaker-Troubleshoot/Repair No violations or deviations were identified.
Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2) (71881)
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements.
Areas inspected included the organization of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper conditions, that access control and badging was proper, and procedures were followed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Surveillance Observations (61726)
During the inspection period, the inspectors verified plant operations in compliance with selected technical specifications (TS)
requirements.
Typical of these were'confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, containment pressure, control room.ventilation and AC and DC electrical sources.
The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operations were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspectors observed the following surveillance(s):
Unit 1 AP 1-0010123 Administrative Control of Valves, Locks and Switches OP 0030126 Estimated Critical Conditions Calculation Work Sheet OP 1-0420050 Unit 2 AP 2-0010125A Data sheet 9B AP 2-0010125A Data sheet
AP 2-0010125A Data sheet
Containment Spray - Periodic Test and Valve Operability Check Valves Tested During All Modes 2A Boric Acid Pump - Monthly Code Run 2A Component Cooling Water Pump - Monthly Code Run No violations or deviations were identified.
ll.
Fire Drills (64704)
On Wednesday, March 9, 1988, the resident inspector participated with two region-based inspectors (see inspection report no. 50-335, 389/88-05)
in the evaluation of the licensee's fire brigade response to a fire drill at the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump No. 2.A.
The resident inspector covered operations in the Unit 2 control room.
The fire drill commenced at 1006, was escalated to an unusual event at 1016 (due to ten-minute duration),
and was terminated at 1022.
Of note during the event were the following items:
a.
The brigade response was prompt.
b.
Shift Technical Advisor (STA) response was prompt.
c.
Proper procedures/revisions were used.
d.
Proper notifications were made in a timely fashion.
e.
The breaker for the 2B AFW pump was racked out as well as the 2A due to its proximity to the 2A.
f.
After the fire was extinguished on the 2A pump, an electrician was dispatched to megger from the 2B pump breaker down to the pump prior to placing it back in service to assure that it did not sustain water intrusio g.
At the termination of the event, the STA approached the resident inspector and briefed him on the activities.
h.
A brief critique was immediately held.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Plant Events Review (93702)
On March 13, 1988, at 1610 hours0.0186 days <br />0.447 hours <br />0.00266 weeks <br />6.12605e-4 months <br /> a containment entry was made on Unit 2 to look for a sudden increase of 0.5 GPM reactor coolant system leakage.
The leak was determined to be at the bellows of PDIS-2216, a differential pressure transmitter designed to isolate letdown in the event of a break in the non-seismic line downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger.
Operators isolated the leak with manual isolation valves located at the cell block.
However, with the D/P cell isolated, it began sending a close signal to V-2516, the inside containment letdown isolation valve.
The Shift Technical Advisor (STA),
Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS),
and Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor (ANPS)
reviewed the control wiring diagram (CWD) for PDIS-2216 and decided that the
"close"- signal from PDIS-2216 could be isolated by placing a remote normal/isolate switch to the "isolate" position.
This action was performed and noted in the shift log book.
Valve V-2516 also receives a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) and a containment isolation signal (CIS) to isolate letdown.
The STA, NPS, and ANPS, after reviewing the CWD, agreed that placing the.normal/isolate switch in "isolate" would not prevent an SIAS or CIS signal from isolating V-2516.
This conclusion was also noted in the shift log book.
The condition existed for 24 days until on April 6, an ANPS reviewing the CWD noted that placing the switch in "isolate" did indeed remove the SIAS and CIS signals from V-2516.
At 0805 on April 6, the switch was returned to
"normal" and 18C removed the terminal leads from PDIS-2216 and installed a
jumper.
The reason for not replacing the defective D/P cell expeditiously is that these is no spare on site and the vendor has quoted a four-month delivery time to fabricate a replacement.
The licensee performed an operability evaluation (completed on April 13, 1988) which concluded that the chemical and volume control system (CVCS)
may be considered
"operable" with PDIS-2216 valved out-of-service and its signal jumpered out.
The licensee additionally maintains that this temporary change is a maintenance activity and as such does not require a
CFR 50.59 review.
Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.6.3 requires that valve V-2516 shall be operable or one of the following actions taken:
a.
Restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status wi.thin four hours, or b.
Isolate the affected penetration within four hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
Co Isolate the affected penetration within four hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or d.
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next six hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
Contrary to this, V-2516 was left without SIAS or CIS isolation capability for
days.
This is a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.3 (50-389/88-06-01).
Spent Fuel Pool Rerack Procedure Review As part of the NRR staff's review to authorize the reracking of the Unit No.
1 spent fuel pool, the licensee was requested to describe the sequence in which the new racks would be installed in the pool.
By letter dated December 23, 1987, answer number 6, the licensee responded to the staff's request.
The authorization to rerack the pool was issued on March ll, 1988 (Amendment No. 91).
The Project Manager (PM) reviewed the plant's implementing procedures on March 30, 1988, to assure that the procedures reflected the commitments made by the licensee as to rack removal and installation (RRI).
The RRI procedure, as described by the licensee in the December 23, 1987, submittal, was further formalized in a set of Nuclear Utility Construction (NUC) procedures.
The PM reviewed procedure number FIP-001, Rev.
entitled
"Sequence of Rack Installation Procedure."
This was a master procedure which called upon additional procedures for more detailed steps.
Two notable, more detailed steps were FIP-005, Rev.
2 entitled
"Rack Removal Procedures" and FIP-004, Rev. 2, entitled
"Rack Installation Procedure."
Master Procedure FIP-001, Rev.
was reviewed in detail against the licensee's description of the RRI and both were in general agreement.
The PM was informed that the licensee and the licensee's contractors were not utilizing the NUC procedures, as far as actual rerack work was concerned.
The licensee believed that the NUC procedures were not'etailed enough considering the complexity of the rerack effort.
As such, the licensee further formalized the NUC procedures.
The licensee's procedures are called Work Process Sheets (WPS).
A copy was provided to the PM (CWO:1621, PCM:012-186, Supp.
0 and 1, Process Sheet 018-186-1232, Installation/Removal of Fuel Racks Old/New, Copy ¹35).
The WPSs were reviewed against the NUC procedures, and the licensee's description of the RRI (December 23, 1987)
and all were in general agreement.
A few minor procedural problems were noted by the PM as follows.
The NUC procedures did not appear to be a controlled document having the most up-to-date information.
The WPSs did appear to be a controlled document having the most up-to-date information.
For example; NUC Rack Removal Procedure (FIP-005, Rev.
2) specified to remove rack ¹1.
This was a
procedure to be used for removal of all racks; therefore, the procedure should have identified all old racks, not just rack ¹l.
The WPSs did identify all the old racks.
NUC Sequence of Rack Installation Procedure (FIP-001, Rev. 2)
had two rack support plates numbered
¹263, and had rack
support plate 8261 being set three different times, when it can only be set once.
The WPSs had this problem corrected.
These few procedural problems were discussed with the licensee's representative.
The licensee's representative specified that the WPS was the control document being used, and the problems identified by the PN in the NUC procedures were previously identified and corrected by the licensee when the WPSs were formalized.
This disposition by the licensee was found acceptable by the PN.
Lastly; the PN noted that the WPSs had three new racks being installed in a sequence different from the NUC procedures and the sequence specified in the licensee's December 23, 1987 submittal.
Specifically, the. licensee's submittal and NUC procedures had three new racks being installed as C2, then A2, and then Al.
The WPSs had these three new racks being installed as A2, then Al, and then C2.
This was also discussed with the licensee's representative.
The licensee's representative specified that if the sequence of C2, A2, and Al were used, this would cause the licensee to move a rack over spent fuel.
The licensee realized that this.was not permitted.
The sequence of A2, Al, and C2 would prevent this.
This disposition by the licensee was found acceptable by the PN.
In summary, the PM's review of the WPSs indicated that the licensee's implementing procedures reflected RRI commitments made by the licensee in the December 13, 1987 submittal, and no open items were identified.
The results of the PN's review with the determination of no open items was discussed with the licensee's plant licensing representative.
Reactor Trip On March 28, 1988, Unit 1 sustained a reactor trip.from 100 percent power at 1:33 a.m.
The trip was an uncomplicated reactor trip, with the following reactor protection trip units actuated:
Steam generator low level Thermal margin/low pressure Loss of load Local power density There was one engineered safety features actuation - auxiliary feedwater actuation, which functioned normally.
After the reactor trip, three of the main steam safeties lifted.
Two of them reseated in 30 to 45 seconds, and the third in approximately 60 seconds.
The 1A atmospheric dump valve operated as expected, but the 1B dump did not open.
Subsequent troubleshooting revealed a
broken wire in the 1B dump valve control circuit.
The wire was repaired and satisfactory operation was achieved.
The initiating event for the trip was a failure (failed closed) of the 1B steam generator feedwater regulating valve.
Efforts to prevent the trip by taking manual control, reducing turbine load, and opening the
percent feedwater bypass valve were not sufficient, and the reactor tripped on low steam generator leve Subsequent troubleshooting of the feed regulating valve and associated controls found a slightly sluggish steam/feed flow mismatch amplifier and a small amount of dirt in the feed regulating valve air controls, neither of which could clearly explain the failure.
Repairs were made and the unit returned to power on March 28 (same day) at 9:15 p.m. Investigation into the feed regulating valve control circuitry is continuing.
No violations or deviation were identified.