IR 05000335/1988033
| ML17308A461 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1989 |
| From: | Crlenjak R, Paulk G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17308A460 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-88-33, 50-389-88-33, NUDOCS 8903140063 | |
| Download: ML17308A461 (7) | |
Text
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+p*y4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Repor t Nos:
50-335/88-33 AND 50-389/88-33 Licensee:
Florida Power 5 Light Co 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name:
St. Lucie 1 and
Inspection Conducted:
December 11, 1988 - January 28, 1989 Inspector:
G. L.
P nior Resident Inspector Approved By:
R.
V.
lenj
, Sect'
Chief D vision of Reactor Projects ate igned a.e igned SUMMARY Scope:
This inspection involved on site activities in the areas of Technical Specification compliance, operator performance, overall plant opera-tions, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities, and surveillance activities.
Results:
Of the areas inspected no violations or deviations were noted.
One Licensee Identified Violation was identified.
Failure to meet the requirements of TS 3. 1. REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees Barrow, J., Fire Prevention Coordinator Barrow, J., Operations Superintendent
- Boissy, G., Plant Manager Buchanan, H., Health Physics Supervisor
- Burton, C., Operations Supervisor
- Dawson, R., Maintenance Superintendent Frechette, R., Chemistry Supervisor
- Harper, J.,
gA Supervisor Harris, K., St. Lucie Site Vice President
- Leppla, C.,
I
&
C Supervisor
- Roos, N., guality Control Supervisor Sculthor pe, B., Reliability and Support Supervisor
- Sipos, R., Service Manager
- West, D., Technical Staff Supervisor White, W., Security Supervisor Wilson, C., Asst. Plant Superintendent
- Mechanical
- Wunderlich, E., Reactor Engineering Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview Plant Tours (71707 and 71710)
The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly estab-lished, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and com-bustible materials and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours, the inspector s looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The frequency of plant tours and control room visits by site management was noted to be adequate.
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ECCS systems.
Valve, breaker/switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
During the inspection period the inspectors conducted a
complete walkdown in the accessible
areas of the plant to verify that system lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
3.
Plant Operations Review '(71707)
The inspectors, periodically during the inspection interval, reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operato'r alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
During routine operations, control room staffing, control room access and operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated.
The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
Control room annunicator status was verified.
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the following tagouts (clearances):
1-1-106 1-1-125 1-1-135 1-1-155 Boric Acid Strainer S-6903 1B2 Water Box and Circulating Water Pump 1B Battery Charger Fuel Cask Crane 4.
Technical Specification Compliance (71707)
During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with limiting conditions for operations (LCO's)
and results of selected surveillance tests.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch posi-tions, and review of completed logs and records.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occur-rences as they happened.
The inspectors verified plant procedures were adequate, complete, and the correct revision.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed for abnormalities.
A.
Unusual Event on January 27, 1989 At 8:10 am on January 27, 1989, Unit 1 personnel were in the process of changing out defective indicating lights on the lamp test circuitry for the rod control system.
During the lamp replacement process an apparent short-circuit occurred causing an overload of the 28V DC relay interface power supply which feeds par t of the system.
This power supply failure in turn caused the Control Element Drive System (CEDS) to become inoperable due to the inability to manually manipulate the control element assemblies (CEA's)
from the control panel via the in-out switch.
However, the CEA's were still capable of performing their intended function of shutting down the reactor when required (i.e. reactor trip).
With the moveable control assemblies inoperable, the unit entered a
hour technical specification action statement requiring a reactor shutdown.
St.
Lucie Unit 1 declared an Unusual Event at 9:15 a.m.
per
CFR 50.72.b. l.i.A, "initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plants'echnical specifications."
The reactor shutdown was promptly comnenced by the boration method.
Troubleshooting of the power supply revealed no other abnormalities.
The CEDS relay power supply was returned to functional status and the CEA's were exercised to verify operability.
The moveable control assemblies were declared back in service and the Unit exited the Unusual Event at ll:08 a.m.
The resident inspector monitored and observed all aspects of the evolution.
Command and control functions were noted to be excellent both in the control room and at the maintenance area.
The licensee took a r'esponsive and conservative approach by initiating an immedi-ate controlled reactor shutdown.
Proper NRC and State offices were promptly notified.
5.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities on selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review; limiting conditions for operations were met, activities were accomplished using approved procedures, functional tests and/or calibra-tions were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure the priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1C 1A2 Vacuum Tank Outlet Check Valve Unit 1 28V DC Relay Power Supply for the Rod Control System During the observation of the replacement of the lA2 vacuum tank outlet check valve (V12122)
the inspector observed that two of the eight installed flange bolts did not have proper thread engagement upon work completion.
The journeyman doing the work had used shorter bolts due to check valve installation interference.
The procedure used for this work (LOI-MM-29; Method of Disassembly and Reassembly of Bolted Gasketed Joints)
did not specify a check for thread engagement.
General Main-tenance Procedure No. M-0039, Threaded Fasteners of Closure Connections on Pressure Boundaries and Structural Steel, however, did specify correct thread engagement.
The general maintenance procedure is typically used
for this type of work.
The workers were not using M-0039 since LOI (Letter of Instruction)-MM-29 had been specified in the work instructions.
After discussions with mechanical maintenance supervision the two incor-rectly installed bolts were changed out and correctly installed.
The licensee deleted the LOI procedure and incorporated the work activities directed by the LOI into the more detailed General Maintenance procedure.
6.
'Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee (90712)
The following Licensee Event Reports (LER's) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that technical specifications were being met and that the public health and safety were of upmost consideration.
The following LER is considered closed:
(Closed)
50-335/89-01, Loss of Boration Flow Paths Due to Personnel Error On January 9,
1989, Unit One was operating at 100%
power when it was discovered that Technical Specification 3.1.2.2, boration flow path, had been violated.
The 1B boric acid pump had been administratively declared out of service at 0830 on 1/9/89 because the discharge gauge was out of calibration.
At 1443 on 1/9/89 the 1B diesel generator was declared out of service for maintenance.
The 1B diesel supplies the emergency power to the boric acid gravity feed valves and the refueling water tank (RWT)
supply valve to the charging pumps.
Technical Specification 3.0.5 requires the emergency power source to be available in order for the valves to be considered fully operable.
At 1655 on 1/9/89 the lA boric acid pump was removed from service for preventive maintenance.
This reduced the boration flow paths to less than allowed by TS 3. 1.2.2.
The 1B diesel generator was returned to service at 2334 on 1/9/89, terminating the event.
The event was discovered by day shift personnel reviewing the logs on 1/10/89.
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions and apparent root cause of the event and considered it satisfactory.
A violation will not be cited due to licensee identification and adequate corrective action.
7.
Non-routine plant events were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that technical specifications were.being met and that the public health and safety were of upmost consideration.
Physical Protection (71881)
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the
facility met current requirements.
Areas inspected included the organi-zation of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper conditions, that access control and badging was proper, and procedures were followed.
Surveillance Observations (61726)
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations in compliance with selected Technical Specification (TS)
requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, containment pressure, control room ventilation and AC and DC electrical sources.
The inspectors veri-fied that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operations were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accom-plished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspectors observed and/or reviewed the following surveillances:
OP 1-0110050 AP 1-0010125 OP 1-0110057 OP 1-1200051 Control Element Assembly Exercise Verification of Required Shift Surveillance DNB Margin Nuclear and Delta T Power Calibration Licensee Action on Outstanding Items List (92702)
(Open)
Unresolved Item 50-335, 389/88-25-01:
This item related to Technical Specification compliance for the Ultimate Heat Sink System remains open; however, the licensee supplied to the inspector the licensee interpretation of this requirement.
Since the inspector feels the licensee interpretation does not meet the Technical Specification require-ment, NRR will be requested to evaluate this concern and provide an interpretation of the intent of the Technical Specification 4.7.5.1.2 requirement.
Inspection Summary:
As a result of the NRC Inspection 50-335/88-25 and 50-389/88-25, an unresolved item was identified pertaining to Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)
Valve testing.
The inspector's interpretation is that during this test
"...all attendant controls that are normally and procedurally required during operation should be tested.
In other words, valve operation from both control rooms should be tested every 6 months.
Therefore, the inspector feels that the plant is not meeting Technical Specification (TS)
Surveillance Requirements for this syste Licensee Pos ition:
The TS requirement states that the valves will be proven operable by
"cycling each valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel".
However, the TS does not specify how the valves are to be cycled.
The TS does not state explicitly that the valves should be cycled from the control room, as is the case in TS 4.7.8,
"ECCS Area Ventilation System" Surveillance Requirements, which states "...by initiating from the control room and verifying...".
Furthermore, the TS definition for OPERABILITY states
"A component shall be OPERABLE when it is capable of performing its intended function, and when all necessary attendant instrumentation...".
There is no attendant instrumentation that is necessary for the UHS valves to perform their intended function.
An operator could manually open the valves within the most limiting ACTION statement time allowance of 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> (TS 3.7.5 ACTION a.)
and satisfy all UHS requirements and intended functions.
Testing from the control room is a conservative means of proving operability which is not specifically required by the TS.
In summary, the Plant considers it is in full compliance with all Surveillance Requirements with respect to the UHS barrier dam isolation valves.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 3, 1989 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee; however, the difference on interpretation of the Technical Specification on the UHS system was discussed as identified in paragraph 9.
One Licensee Identified violation was identified.
Failure to meet the requirements of TS 3.1.2.2 (par agraph 6).