IR 05000333/2002005
| ML022120518 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/2002 |
| From: | Meyer G Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I |
| To: | Ted Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| References | |
| IR-02-005 | |
| Download: ML022120518 (18) | |
Text
July 31, 2002
SUBJECT:
FITZPATRICK - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-333/02-05
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
On June 29, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 11, 2002, with Mr. Oscar Limpias and members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one issue of very low safety significance (Green). The issue was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements pertaining to disposal of radioactive waste materials. However, because of its very low safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issue as a non-cited violation in accordance with Section VI.A of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you deny the noncited violation, you should provide a written response with the basis for the denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I, the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Fitzpatrick facility.
The NRC has increased security requirements at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant in response to terrorist acts on September 11, 2001. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the NRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The NRC continues to monitor overall security controls and will issue temporary instructions in the near future to verify by inspection the licensees compliance with the Order and current security regulations.
Mr. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Glenn W. Meyer, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.
50-333 License No.:
DPR-59 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-333/02-05 Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl:
J. Yelverton, CEO, Entergy Operations B. OGrady, General Manager, Entergy Nuclear Operations J. Knubel, VP Operations Support H. Salmon, Director of Oversight A. Halliday, Licensing Manager M. Kansler, Chief Operating Officer, Entergy D. Pace, VP Engineering J. Fulton, Assistant General Counsel Supervisor, Town of Scriba J. Tierney, Oswego County Administrator C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Dept. of Law P. Eddy, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York W. Flynn, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority S. Lousteau, Treasury Department T. Judson, Central New York Citizens Awareness Network D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network S. McConnell, NYPIRG T. Dellwo, NYPIRG
M
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000333-02-05, on 05/12 - 06/29/02; Entergy Nuclear Northeast, James A. FitzPatrick
Nuclear Power Plant, Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation.
The report covers a six-week inspection by resident inspectors. The report also covers specialist inspections of physical protection, and radiation monitoring instrumentation and respiratory protection programs. One finding of very low safety significance was identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A.
Inspector Identified Findings (Self-Revealing)
- Green.
The inspector identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 61.56(b)(2) having very low safety significance. On June 3, 2002, a State of South Carolina inspector identified that a spent resin waste container from FitzPatrick, received for disposal at the Chem-Nuclear Low Level Waste Disposal Facility in Barnwell, South Carolina, exceeded the allowable limit for free-standing liquid.
Entergys failure to assure that the spent resin shipped for disposal met the de-watering criteria was determined to have very low safety significance using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process. The finding involved radioactive material control relative to non-conformance with pertinent waste characteristic specifications required for radioactive waste materials tendered for disposal at a licensed waste disposal facility. In this case, the non-conformance was not significant enough to result in denial of access to the disposal facility; and no other issues involving transportation requirements, such as package integrity, Certificate of Compliance, or radiation limits were involved. (Section 2PS2)
B.
Licensee Identified Findings None
REPORT DETAILS
SUMMARY OF PLANT STATUS The reactor operated at full power for the majority of the inspection period. One planned reduction of reactor power greater than twenty percent occurred during this period. On May 16, 2002, reactor power was reduced to 66% to repair main condenser tube leaks and to de-fish the main condenser waterboxes. Also, on June 24, 2002, the reactor was shutdown primarily for planned replacement of leaking safety relief valve pilot valves. The reactor was restarted on June 26, and full power was achieved on June 29,
REACTOR SAFETY
Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity [REACTOR - R]
==1R04 Equipment Alignments
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors performed the following partial equipment alignment walkdowns:
A residual heat removal loop while the B residual heat removal loop was out of service for maintenance
Reactor core isolation cooling and automatic depressurization systems during performance of ST-4N, HPCI Quick Start, Inservice, and Transient Monitoring Test (IST) and ISP-22-2, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Loop Low Flow Bypass Valve Instruments Channel Calibration During these walkdowns the inspectors verified that select valves and circuit breakers were in the appropriate position by comparing actual component position and the position described in the applicable operating procedures. The inspectors also performed visual inspections of the material condition of the major system components.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors toured several plant areas and observed conditions related to fire protection. The inspectors looked for transient combustible materials, observed the condition of suppression systems, penetration seals, and ventilation system fire dampers, and verified that fire doors were functional. Areas observed were:
Fire zone TB-1, turbine building south elevation 252 feet
Fire zone TB-1, turbine building north elevation 272 feet
Fire zone SH-1, screen well house and water treatment area elevations 235, 255, and 260 feet
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspector reviewed the implementation of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) as it pertained to the following:
Process radiation monitoring system
Instrument and breathing air system
Reactor protection system The inspectors reviewed the classification of functional failures associated with these systems. The inspectors also reviewed the deviation/event reports that were initiated for these components and verified that functional failures were properly evaluated.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspector reviewed Entergys assessment of plant risk due to the following planned and emergent maintenance activities:
Planned installation of modifications to core spray system motor-operated valve 14MOV-11B and the A station air compressor during the week ending June 15
Planned performance of ISP-22-2, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
System Loop Low Flow Bypass Valve Instrument Channel Calibration and post-modification testing of the A station air compressor on June 20 and 21
Planned maintenance outage during the week ending June 29 The inspectors reviewed the maintenance risk assessments and the evaluations of the potential core damage impact of the activities. Entergy concluded that these activities were not risk significant, based on the slight increase in conditional core damage probability for the period that the systems were out of service. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specifications and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for compensatory measures associated with these activities.
The inspection also included a review of contingency plans and verification that the effects on plant risk and protected equipment were discussed during briefings and shift turnovers. During the maintenance the inspectors toured the work areas to assure that the scope of the work was consistent with the maintenance plans and that no additional systems were adversely impacted.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the below listed operability determinations performed to address issues identified with safety significant systems. The inspectors reviewed associated sections of the UFSAR and technical specifications for the discrepant conditions.
Manual Deviation/Event Report (DER) #003, Failed temperature element for standby liquid control system suction piping heat trace
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspector reviewed safety evaluation JAF-SE-02-001 for revisions to the UFSAR regarding leakage detection system sensitivity. The review also included the UFSAR and LER 99-013, Steam Leakage Detection System Outside Design Basis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors observed and reviewed the post-maintenance testing associated with the following activities:
Motor replacement on core spray system motor-operated valve 14MOV-11B on June 11
Standby liquid control system maintenance on May 30
Functional testing of new station air compressor 39AC-2A on June 19 and 20
Safety relief valve pilot valve replacements on June 26 and 27
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspector observed and reviewed operations, maintenance, and test activities that occurred during a planned maintenance outage between June 24-29, 2002. The principle maintenance activities that were conducted during the outage included:
Replacement and testing of two safety relief valve pilot valves
Repair of various feedheater string steam leaks
Identification and correction of an increasing trend in unidentified drywell leakage rate
Repair of an inoperable intermediate range neutron flux monitor
Reactor feedwater pump seal replacement
Repair of a drywell floor drain sump pump discharge check valve.
During plant shutdown and startup the inspector observed or reviewed portions of the following activities:
Plant startup and shutdown per OP-65, Startup and Shutdown Procedure
Plant and reactor power changes per RAP-7.3.16, Plant Power Changes, and OP 26, Control Rod Drive Manual Control System
Approach to criticality consistent with RAP-7.3.13, Estimated Critical Positions and Reactor Startup/Neutron Monitoring
ST-5C, IRM-IPRM Instrument Range Overlap Check
ST-20X, Control Rod Drive Mechanism and Hydraulic Control Unit Troubleshooting Guide and Leak Test (four CRDs)
ST-39Q, Drywell Inspection
ST-39A, Type B Leak Test of Air Locks
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified
==1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors observed portions of testing and/or reviewed procedures and test results involving the following surveillance tests:
ST-3PA, Core Spray Loop A Quarterly Operability Test (IST)
ST-9BA, EDG A &C Full Load Test and ESW Pump Operability (IST)
ST-4N, HPCI Quick Start, Inservice, and Transient Monitoring Test (IST)
The inspector reviewed technical specifications and the JAF UFSAR, and verified that the testing met appropriate test objectives.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Emergency Preparedness 1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector observed portions of an emergency preparedness partial scale drill on May 21, 2002. The inspector also reviewed the post-drill critique (JEP-02-020) to determine if issues were identified and entered into the corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety (OS)
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)
a. Inspection Scope
During the period June 24-27, 2002, the inspector reviewed the effectiveness of administrative, operational, and engineering controls to limit personnel exposure for tasks conducted during a planned maintenance outage occurring during the inspection period. Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20 and Entergy procedures.
The inspector reviewed the exposure controls specified in ALARA Reviews (AR) for selected jobs. The actual cumulative exposure was compared with the estimated exposure and evaluated using the criteria contained in the relevant NRC Significance Determination Process. Jobs that were reviewed included Safety Relief Valve Repair (AR 02-034) and Drywell Entries for Inspections (AR 02-013).
Interviews were conducted with the radiation protection manager and the supervisor, ALARA planning and scheduling to assess departmental efforts in integrating radiological controls into the work planning process in preparation for the outage.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71121.03)
a. Inspection Scope
During the period June 24-27, 2002, the inspector reviewed the operability and accuracy of radiation monitoring instrumentation, and the adequacy of the respiratory protection program. Implementation of these programs was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable industry standards, and the licensees procedures.
The inspector observed technicians performing radioactive source and functional checks on a variety of instruments including a high range gamma survey meter (Telepole),portable survey instruments (RSO-50E, E-520), and personnel contamination monitors (IPM 7 & 8). The inspector reviewed the calibration records for selected electronic dosimeters (DMC 2000), small article monitors (SAM-9), contamination survey instruments (MS-2&3, Ludlum-177, SAC-4), and portable neutron survey instruments (PNR-4, E-600).
The inspector reviewed the maintenance records, safety interlock checks, and current calibration source activity/dose rate determinations for the two Model 89 Shepard calibrators used for instrument calibrations.
The inspector evaluated the adequacy of the respiratory protection program regarding the maintenance and issuance of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Training and qualification records for licensed operators and radiation protection technicians, required to wear SCBAs in the event of an emergency, were reviewed. Five
- (5) SCBAs staged for use in various locations with the restricted plant areas were physically/functionally checked, and maintenance records for selected SCBAs were reviewed.
The inspector evaluated the program for assuring quality in the radiation monitoring instrumentation and respiratory protection programs by reviewing a quality assurance (QA) surveillance report (SR 2269), four
- (4) departmental self-assessments; and twenty-one
- (21) condition reports related to radiation instrumentation, SCBAs, and the monitoring of plant radiation levels to determine if problems were identified in a timely manner and appropriate corrective actions were taken to resolve the related issues.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety (PS)
2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02)
a. Inspection Scope
During the period June 24-27, 2002, the inspector reviewed Condition Report No. CR-JAF-2002-02076, regarding Entergy shipping a waste package to the Barnwell Low-Level Waste Burial Ground that contained free standing liquid in excess of the allowable limit. This condition was reviewed against the waste characteristics criteria contained in 10 CFR 61.56.
b. Findings
Introduction:
The inspector identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 61.56(b)(2) having very low safety significance (Green). On June 3, 2002, a State of South Carolina inspector identified that a spent resin waste container, received for disposal at the Chem-Nuclear Low-Level Waste Burial Ground in Barnwell, South Carolina, exceeded the allowable limit for free-standing liquid as required by 10 CFR 56, Waste characteristics.
Description:
On June 3, 2002, a State of South Carolina inspector identified that a liner containing dewatered spent resin (Shipment No.02-458, Waste Liner No. L-496498-111),previously shipped by Entergy to the Barnwell Low-level Waste Disposal Facility, contained excessive free-standing liquid, in violation of the requirements contained in 10 CFR 61.56 (b)(2). This material was originally loaded into a High Integrity Container (liner) at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant in July 2000 and subsequently placed in storage. On May 28, 2002, this liner and another were shipped for near-surface land disposal at the Chem-Nuclear Systems, Incorporated, Barnwell, South Carolina Disposal Facility. Upon receipt at the Barnwell facility, this liner was selected by State of South Carolina inspectors for dryness verification testing. Subsequently, the container was determined to have in excess of 1% non-corrosive free-standing liquid, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 61.56(b)(2). Accordingly, the State of South Carolina issued a Notice to the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant and a monetary fine. However, the State did not take any action to deny FitzPatrick access to the disposal facility.
Analysis:
Entergys failure to assure that radioactive material shipped for disposal meet the de-watering criteria of 10 CFR 61.56(b)(2) is a performance deficiency since compliance with the requirement was reasonable and within Entergys ability to achieve. Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual safety consequence or potential for impacting the NRCs regulatory function; and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements or of Entergys procedures.
The finding is more than minor in that, if left uncorrected, the finding would become a more significant safety concern, since the State does not test and verify every waste container. Accordingly, repeated and undetected instances of improper low-level burial disposal of unstable radioactive waste materials may affect burial site stability and integrity, absent institutional controls and practices. Further, the issue was associated with the transportation packaging attribute of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone; and affected the objective of this cornerstone, since failure to comply with the free-standing liquid specification relative to the disposal of low level radioactive waste, may compromise public health and safety relative to the exposure to radioactive materials, released into the public domain, as a result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operation.
Specifically, as indicated in 10 CFR 61.56, Waste characteristics, the specifications are intended to ensure, in part, that the waste would not structurally degrade and affect the overall stability of the burial site through slumping, collapse, or other failure of the disposal unit that could lead to water infiltration (i.e., the radioactive contamination of ground water in the public domain). Failure to adhere to the free-standing liquid limitation acts to reduce the overall level of assurance of burial site stability and integrity.
Entergys failure to prepare radioactive waste in a form that contains as little free standing liquid as is reasonably achievable, but in no case exceed 1% of the volume of the waste (when the waste is in a disposal container), was evaluated using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process. The finding involved Radioactive Material Control relative to Transportation/10 CFR Part 61 requirements; and pertained to non-conformance with Low-Level Burial Ground waste characteristic specifications.
In this case, the matter did not result in denial of access to the disposal site, or involve under-classification of the waste material relative to 10 CFR 61.55, Waste classification. Accordingly, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green).
Enforcement:
10 CFR 61.56, Waste characteristics, Section (b)(2) requires that radioactive wastes (containing liquid) which are to be disposed of by land burial, be converted into a form that contains as little free standing and non-corrosive liquid as is reasonably achievable, but in no case shall the liquid exceed 1% of the volume of the waste when the waste is in a disposal container (liner) designed to ensure stability. Contrary to the above, on June 3, 2002, a State of South Carolina inspector identified that a liner containing spent resin (Shipment No.02-458, Liner No. L-496498-111) contained free standing liquid in excess of the 1% of the volume of the waste in the disposal container (liner). Because this violation is of very low safety significance and Entergy entered this finding into its corrective action program (CR-JAF-2002-02076), this violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG 1600. (NCV 50-333/02-05-01)
3. Safeguards
Physical Protection [PP]
3PP4 Security Plan Changes (711130.04)
a. Inspection Scope
An in-office review was conducted of changes to the Training and Qualification Plan and the Contingency Plan, identified as Revision 5 and Revision 7, respectively. The revisions were submitted to the NRC on May 10, 2001, in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The review confirmed that the changes were made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p), and did not decrease the effectiveness of the plan.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
[OA]
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 PIR Sample Inspection, DER 01-1157, Adverse Trend in PM Program Deficiencies
Scope The inspector reviewed the identification and resolution of problems associated with the PM program as documented in DER 01-1157. The inspector also reviewed the adequacy of the root cause analysis (RCA) to verify that the corrective actions were appropriate.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 PIR Sample Inspection, DER 01-4906, Half-Scram Occurred During Testing
Scope The inspector reviewed the Entergy evaluation and corrective actions related to this event. The inspector interviewed personnel and verified implementation of key corrective actions. The inspector reviewed similar events and reviewed station initiatives in the area of human performance improvement.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Other PIR Items
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed items selected across the initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity reactor safety cornerstones to determine if problems were being properly identified, prioritized, entered into the corrective action program, and corrected.
The inspectors evaluated deviation/event reports and condition reports to evaluate Entergys threshold for problem identification and efforts to establish the scope of problems by reviewing pertinent logs, work requests, engineering evaluations, surveillance test results, and self-assessments. The following items were reviewed:
02-01886, RHR heat exchanger inspection schedule
02-01729, Check valve 46SWS-60A/B test failures
02-01685, B train below refuel floor ventilation system functional failures
02-01657, Part 21 Notice concerning GE J-Core molded case circuit breakers
02-02042, Standby liquid control system procedure errors
02-00645, Drywell atmosphere monitoring deficiencies
02-02066, Emergency diesel generator room running drain trip found dry
02-02156, Security lighting switch out of position
02-02314, Main steam isolation valve limit switch failure
02-02436, Reactor feedwater pump oil leak
02-02335, Shutdown cooling system isolation
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA5 Other
.1 Review of INPO Report: The inspectors reviewed the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operators (INPO) report for the evaluation conducted in March 2002. The interim report was issued on April 25, 2002. The findings were consistent with NRC findings and no new issues were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On July 11, 2002, the resident inspectors presented their inspection results to Mr. Oscar Limpias and members of the Entergy staff. The inspectors asked whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
ATTACHMENT 1
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
a.
Key Points of Contact
T. Bergene
Supervisor, ALARA Planning and Scheduling
V. Bhardwaj
Manager, Engineering PCE
R. Brown
Radiation Protection Supervisor
G. Brownell
Regulatory Compliance
J. Flaherty
Quality Assurance Manager
A. Halliday
Manager, Licensing
T. Herman
Acting Manager, CA&A
D. Johnson
Manager, Scheduling and Outages
A. Khanifar
Manager of Engineering
O. Limpias
Director, Engineering
W. Maguire
General Maintenance Manager
B. OGrady
General Manager of Plant Operations
T. Phelps
Radiation Protection Supervisor
R. Plasse
Licensing
K. Pushee
Radiation Protection Manager
P. Russell
Operations Manager
T. Sullivan
Site Executive Officer
A. Zaremba
Director, Safety Assurance
b.
List of Acronyms
As low as reasonably achievable
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Control rod drive
Design Basis Threat
DER
Deviation/Event Report
Emergency service water
High pressure coolant injection
Inservice Test
Institute of Nuclear Power Operators
JAF
James A. Fitzpatrick
LER
Licensee event report
Non-cited violation
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Problem identification and resolution
Quality Assurance
Self contained breathing apparatus
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
c.
List of Items Opened or Closed
50-333/02-05-01
Failure to assured low-level waste sent to a burial facility
contained less than 1% free standing liquid by waste
volume (Section 2PS2)
d.
List of Baseline Inspection Performed
ALARA Planning and Controls
2OS2
Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
2OS3
Radioactive Material Processing/Transportation
2PS2
e.
List of Documents Reviewed
Documents Reviewed for PIR Sample Inspection
DER 01-1157, Adverse Trend in PM Program Deficiencies
ACT Nos. 01-57121, 01-57122, 01-60512, 01-60513, 01-60514, 01-60515, 01-60519,
01-60795, 01-60919, 01-60921 and 01-60922.
AP-03.03, revision 21, Deviation and Event Analysis
AP-05.05, Revision 8, Preventive Maintenance Program
AP-05.16, Revision 1, Predictive Maintenance Program
Interoffice Correspondence, PM Report for April 2002, May 10, 2002
Interoffice Correspondence, Six-Month Maintenance Effectiveness Follow-Up,
09/24/2001
Interoffice Correspondence, Six-Month Effectiveness Review, 02/13/2002
Other DERs Reviewed: 00-01200, 00-04790, 01-01142, 99-01843, 02-00065 and 02-
00081
PROCEDURES:
AP-07.00, Rev 6
Radiation Protection Program
AP-07.02, Rev 5
Radiological Equipment Use
AP-07.04, Rev 4
Respiratory Protection Program
RP-OPS-02.05, Rev 3
Response to Notifications and Alarms
RP-OPS-03.01, Rev 4
Radiological Survey Performance & Documentation
RP-OPS-08.01, Rev 10
Routine Surveys and Inspections
RP-RESP-02.03, Rev 4
Self Contained Breathing Apparatus, Scott Pressure Pak
4.5
RP-RESP-03.01, Rev 6
Drywell Constant Air Monitor
RP-RESP-04.01, Rev 1
Constant Air Monitor, AMS-3
RP-RESP-04.10, Rev 4
Constant Air Monitor, Eberline Model AMS-4
RP-RESP-04.14, Rev 0
Iodine Monitor, IM-1A
RP-INST-02.04, Rev 2
Count Rate Meter, Ludlum Model 177
RP-INST-02.07, Rev 1
Neutron Survey Instruments
RP-INST-02.08, Rev 0
Ion Chamber Dose Rate Meters
RP-INST-02.12, Rev 0
Electronic Dosimeter, Merlin-Gerin Products Instruments
RP-INST-02.14, Rev 0
Portable Radiation Monitor, Eberline E-600
RP-INST-03.01, Rev 1
Area Radiation Monitors
RP-INST-04.02, Rev 2
Whole Body Contamination Monitor, IPM
RP-INST-04.05, Rev 2
Small Articles Monitor, SAM Model 9
RP-INST-04.08, Rev 1
MGPI Telepole WR Extendable GM Survey Meter
RP-INST-05.03, Rev 0
Calibrator,
- J. L. Shepard, Model 89
RP-INST-103, Rev 4
Issue of Radiological Equipment
RPSO-04, Rev 1
Surveillance and Routine Test Scheduling
RTID-93-002
Calibration Frequency for Radiation Protection Survey
Instruments
RP-DOS-03.03, Rev 0
Whole Body Counter
IAP-1, Rev 25
Emergency Plan Implementation Checklist
TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENTS:
Waste Stream Analysis Report
RPT-PRM-02286
Maintenance Rule Basis Document for Process Radiation
Monitoring System
RPT-ARM-02287
Maintenance Rule Basis Document for Area Radiation Monitoring
System
SELF-ASSESSMENTS:
JRP-01-212, FSAR 9.8.3.6, Compliance For Emergency Breathing Equipment
JRP-01-200, Respiratory Protection Department: Emergency Breathing Air Program and
Equipment
JRP-02-091, Instrument Calibration Program
Self-Assessment Report: Evaluation and Benchmarking of SAM Use for Free Release
LESSON PLAN:
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
QUALITY ASSURANCE REPORTS:
SR 2269, Air Sampling Program
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM RECORDS:
Deviation/Event Reports (DER) & Condition Reports (CR)
CR-JAF-2002-02325, CR-JAF-2002-02076, DER-02-00835, DER-01-03579, DER-01-
04736, DER-01-04561, DER-01-04850, DER-01-04885, DER-02-00720, DER-02-
00846, DER-02-01372, DER-02-01602, DER-02-00121, DER-02-00134, DER-02-
00754, DER-02-01471, DER-02-01607, DER-02-01617, DER-0200-1816, DER-01-
03590, DER-01-04299